TWENTY YEARS OF POST-COMMunist TRANSFORMATIONS.
CHANGES IN VALUES AND ATTITUDES

Special Issue. Guest Editors: Wil Arts and Mălina Voicu

CONTENTS

WIL ARTS, MĂLINA VOICU, Guest Editors’ Foreword for the Special Issue on Twenty Years of Post-Communist Transformations. Changes in Values and Attitudes ................................................................. 3

WIL ARTS, Explaining European Value Patterns: Problems and Solutions ............... 7

MIRCEA COMŞA, HORAŢIU RUSU, Value Change in Eastern Europe: What is Happening there? ..................................................................................................................33

CHRISTOPHER S. SWADER, Linking Normlessness and Value Change in the Post-Communist World ..................................................................................................................63

MĂLINA VOICU, EDURNE BARTOLOME PERAL, Socialization or Context? Patterns of Support for Democracy in Spain and Romania ......................95
Methodological Forum
GERGŐ PULAY, The Civilized, the Vagabond, the Player and the Fool: Notes on Fieldwork in a Bucharest Neighborhood ......................................................... 117
CĂLIN COTOI, Jottings on the History of Romanian Sociology .............................. 135

Romanian Sociology Today
ADELA FOFIU, Apocalyptic Recounts on the Romanian Internet: The New Right Warnings on the End of Romania ......................................................... 153

Authors of this issue .............................................................................................................. 179
TWENTY YEARS OF POST-COMMUNIST TRANSFORMATIONS.
CHANGES IN VALUES AND ATTITUDES

Guest Editors’ Foreword

WIL ARTS1 AND MĂLINA VOICU2

Twenty years ago the Berlin Wall fell down and the Iron Curtain was raised. This marked the end of the Cold War and the decline and fall of the Soviet Empire. While the post-communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe experienced radical and profound transformations, Europe as a whole went through significant social, political and economic changes as well. In the social sphere, we witnessed the emergence of civil society, but also the revival of nationalism. In the political sphere, multi-party democracy and free elections were introduced and a great number of countries changed their international alliances and became member states of NATO and the European Union. In the economic sphere, command economies were replaced by the mechanisms of capitalist markets. During the past two decades these transformations have left their imprint on the ways people in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe perceive, cognize and evaluate social, political and economic phenomena, i.e. their attitudes and value orientations. This raises several important questions: In which direction and how did values shared by post-communist citizens evolve? Are these citizens today much closer to the values shared by the citizens from European countries who never lived under a communist regime or not? Is there a common pattern of value change in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe or is each country evolving in its own direction? Is there any clustering of post-communist countries depictable?

*Studia UBB Sociologia* prepared a special issue focused on changes in values and attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe during the post-communist transition. The authors have explored value changes over the past twenty years both from a longitudinal and a cross-sectional perspective. The issue includes four papers which try to identify these changes, employing various sources of empirical data, most importantly the *European Values Study*.

1 Department of Sociology, Tilburg University, e-mail address w.a.arts@uvt.nl
2 The Research Institute for Quality of Life, Romanian Academy of Sciences, Bucharest and GESIS, Leibniz Institute, Cologne, e-mail: malina.voicu@gesis.org
Wil Arts’s article *Explaining European Values Patterns: Problems and Solutions* opens the special issue, focusing on the theoretical aspects of comparative value research. The paper starts with a short overview of the history of the European Values Study (EVS). He depicts especially how theoretical explanations were improved in the course of time. EVS started in 1981 as an applied social science project aiming at providing valid and reliable information about the uniformity and diversity of value patterns various European countries. It lacked a sound theoretical background. By fielding three new survey waves (1990, 1999, and 2008) the project collected new data in ever more European countries. Starting from the failure of contemporary “grand” sociological theories, the article harks back to once discarded theories, such as modernization theory and institutionalism to explain not only the uniformity and diversity, but also the changes of value patterns in Europe. The author shows that and how both theories became much more sophisticated in the past decades. The result is a new theoretical framework for the values study project.

Comşa and Rusu’s article *Values Change in Eastern Europe: What happens there?* investigates the patterns of value-changes in Central and Eastern Europe during the post-communist transition. The paper employs a cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis of transformation in the values shared by the post-communist citizens living in Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, East Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Using data collected within the European Values Study and the World Values Survey and employing multi-group confirmatory factor analyses (MGCFA) and then comparing the means of the latent variables, the authors try to depict the existence of a common pattern of values change in the region. The results reveal only partial convergence within some clusters of countries.

Christopher Swader, in his article *Linking Normlessness and Value Change in the Post-Communist World*, starts from two different observations regarding post-communist societies, mentioned by previous researches: the devaluation of the interpersonal social sphere during the transition period and the increase in social normlessness emphasized by the increasing in social deviance in these countries. The author tries to connect the two phenomena, pointing out that the post-communist social disorder, such as deviance, can be explained by the weakening in social values, produced by market transformations, which undermined informal social control. Using data provided by the World Values Survey and the European Values Study, the author finds a connection between normlessness and social values, lower social values being a good predictor of justifiability of deviance.

Mălina Voicu and Edurne Bartolome’s paper *Socialization or Context? Patterns of support for democracy in Spain and Romania* focuses on the way in which both the pre-democratic situation before and the socio-economic context during the democratization process have influenced whether and, if so, how people
learned to support democracy. The authors compare the dynamics of support for democracy in Spain and Romania during the post-totalitarian period. Using data provided by Eurobarometer for Spain (1986-2010) and by the European Values Study, the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer and the Standard Eurobarometer for Romania (1990-2010), the authors decompose the overall change in differential changes due to cohort replacements and transformations produced by contextual effects. The results of the cross-classified fixed effects models (CCFEM) indicate strong effects of the socialization under the communist regime and significant contextual effects for both countries on support for democracy.

We hope that this collection of manifold explorations of value-changes in post-communist societies will provide valuable resources for further studies within this expanding field of sociology.
EXPLAINING EUROPEAN VALUE PATTERNS:
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

WIL ARTS

ABSTRACT. The European Values Study (EVS) started as an applied social science project that aimed at providing valid and reliable information about the value patterns of Europeans. Later on the focus of the European Value Systems Study Group (EVSSG) changed from solving social problems to solving social-scientific ones and from descriptions and interpretations to explanations. As a result of the applied social science origin of EVS it for a long suffered from a theoretical deficit. This article addresses the question of whether we can make up the theoretical deficit of EVS and, if so, how.

Keywords: European Values Study, modernization theory, institutionalism, multilevel theory

Introduction

At the end of the 1970s an international and multidisciplinary group of academics assembled to debate the cultural predicament of Europe. What they shared was a growing concern for the sustainability of an expanding European Community. They wondered whether there is something that one could call European identity and whether such a European identity is based on a coherent set of fundamental values. If so, could these values then lay the foundations for European unity? If not, could the cultural diversity of the nations that constitute Europe not sooner impede increasing European unity? The group called itself from then on the European Value Systems Study Group (EVSSG). They started an applied social science research project aimed at providing valid and reliable information as to how Europeans feel and think about European identity and the underlying value systems of their nations. By doing so the group wanted to enable policymakers to make wiser and more adequate decisions and formulate more accurate policies (cf. Stoetzel, 1983; Kerkhofs, 1997; Arts and Halman, 2003).

Looking at the start of EVS it is no surprise that the research questions raised when preparing the first comparative survey in 1981 were sooner the products of social concern than of social scientific curiosity. The advantage of

1 Department of Sociology, Tilburg University, e-mail: w.a.arts@uvt.nl.
this applied social science orientation was that the EVSSG casted its nets widely. They chose a broad field of research – religion and morality, marriage and family, society and politics, work and leisure – in order that they would be able to provide for policy makers an accurate description and insightful interpretation of a wide cultural panorama of Europe. A disadvantage of the applied background of EVS, however, was that the selection of items to be included in the questionnaire was not explicitly based on theory or made to test clearly formulated hypotheses.

EVS proved to be a success and, since nothing succeeds like success, after the 1981 wave there followed new waves in 1990, 1999 and 2008 in ever more European countries. Because social science is, according to Sorokin’s scathing remark, susceptible to fads and foibles, part of the explanatory disadvantage turned in the course of time into an advantage. EVS did not suffer from once fashionable theories getting in social science’s bad books. Another part of the disadvantage was undone by establishing first substantive, i.e. domain specific, research groups and later on even a theory group within EVS. The main tasks of these groups were to take stock of hypotheses and constructs that could guide explanations and interpretations of research findings as well as to suggest concrete items to be included in the questionnaires of the new waves. There was, however, a restriction put to these tasks. In order to keep open the feasibility to trace value change over the successive waves, at least two thirds of the questions had to remain the same. Therefore EVS is today still suffering from at least some theoretical deficit.

In the early stages of EVS this was not so much of a problem since – as mentioned before – the project was driven by social concerns and applied social science goals. In the mean time, however, the goals of EVS have shifted from solving social problems to solving social scientific ones and from describing and interpreting research findings to explaining them. Therefore it is high time to reconsider the theoretical foundations of EVS and to address the question of whether we can make up the theoretical deficit of EVS and, if so, how. Theoretical sociology is the obvious place to search for an answer to the first (‘whether’) part of this question. In the next section I will address more specifically the question of whether contemporary ‘grand’ macrosociological theory can play a fruitful part in explaining European value patterns.

State-of-the-art of ‘grand’ macrosociological theory

A great number of today’s well-known macrosociological theorists have argued that the societal condition of European countries has fundamentally changed since the last decades of the 20th century and that even more radical change is afoot. Too often, their theoretical efforts to explain the new societal state of affairs have amounted, however, to little more than negative labelling. Few have managed to move beyond pasting a ’post’ on the past. In contemporary
Europe, they claim, we all live in post-modern, post-industrial, post-materialist, post-fordist, post-secular, and some of us even in post-communist societies. Most macrosociological theorists seem to know what the case was in the past century (modernism, industrialism, materialism, fordism, secularism, and communism). They are, however, uncertain what is or will be the case in the new century. Is this a strange phenomenon? Perhaps not if there is any truth in Hegel’s flight of fancy that only when the dusk starts to fall the owl of Minerva does spread its wings and fly. With this statement Hegel meant to say that philosophy only comes to understand a historical condition just as it passes away. Does this also apply to macrosociological endeavours to understand the current predicament of European societies? The answer, unless we are indeed Hegelians, is: not necessarily. There are after all theorists who do put positive labels on contemporary European societies. Some macrosociologists are of the opinion that we still live in modern instead of post-modern times. They, however, also argue that ‘late’ modernity has taken on another form. Anthony Giddens, for example, speaks of a second stage of modernity that he calls ‘reflexive’, whereas Zygmunt Bauman speaks of ‘liquid’ modernity. Others do not put a slightly different but, on the contrary, a completely new label on today’s societal condition. Daniel Bell speaks of ‘information societies’, Peter Drucker of ‘knowledge societies’, Joachim Singelmann of ‘service societies’, Ulrich Beck of ‘risk societies’, and Manuel Castells of ‘network societies’. As such, there is not much wrong with these new labels but there is evidently something rotten in the state of ‘grand’ macrosociological theory. Most ‘post-something’ advocates and most ‘positive’ labellers are rather disinclined to offer concise explanations that can be empirically tested. Although they furnish suggestive vignettes, they shun away from any systematic attention to the precise causalities that operate. Furthermore, the empirical part of their scholarly efforts is often restricted to anecdotal evidence. When they nevertheless refer to numerical data, these data sooner serve as illustrations of their arguments than as testing grounds for their theories. Value researchers reading contemporary ‘grand’ macrosociological treatises are therefore inclined to quote in approval Hamlet’s lament: “Words, words, words”.

**What to do?**

If contemporary ‘grand’ macrosociology does not offer really viable options to explain the vicissitudes of value patterns in Europe, does this mean that we are left empty-handed? That we have to answer the earlier posed ‘whether’-question in the negative? No, there are alternatives on hand in comparative value research. What are the pathways followed? Some EVS researchers decided to return to earlier discarded modernization theory. Others embraced an institutionalist approach. Still others were in favour of constructing multi level theories. In the next three sections I will describe how these researchers have tried to explain whatever is happening with European value patterns.
Revival of modernization theory

Although EVS started as a project driven by social concerns and not by theory, ensuing publications nevertheless often contained explanations and interpretations of which many were based on insights from modernization theory (e.g., Halman et al., 1987; Halman, 1991; Ester et al., 1994). What was the pivotal insight value researchers derived from modernization theory? The orienting statement was that technical innovations and economic growth are the driving forces behind value change. This led to two central hypotheses. The first hypothesis is reading as follows: as modern, i.e. industrialized, societies advance technologically and economically, an individualization process will occur and the values of their populations will increasingly shift from a collectivistic to an individualistic ethos. The second hypothesis runs something like this: as modern societies advance a rationalization process will occur and the value patterns of their populations will increasingly shift from an absolute ‘ethics of principles’ to a pragmatic ‘ethics of responsibilities’, i.e. from a substantive to an instrumentalistic ethos. In addition to these central hypotheses a whole range of domain-specific hypotheses were formulated.

Why should the modernization process in general and industrialization in particular lead to an ethos of individualism and instrumentalism? The answer is that it is the force of industrial circumstances, the inherent logic of industrialism that persuades people to adhere to individualistic and instrumentalistic beliefs and values. Beliefs and values, functionally linked and organized in industrial settings, later on make their appearance in systems lacking an industrial infrastructure. The underlying theory is simple (Inkeles, 1960; Inkeles and Smith, 1974). It is assumed that people have experiences, develop attitudes, and form values in response to the forces or pressures which their environment creates. The theory holds that, within broad limits, the same situational pressures, the same framework for living, will be experienced in more or less the same ways and will generate more or less similar responses by people from different countries. The core proposition goes as follows: In so far as industrialization, urbanization, and the development of large-scale bureaucratic structures and their usual accompaniments create a more or less standard environment with more or less standard, institutional pressures for particular groups, to that degree they should produce more or less standard patterns of beliefs and values.

How to test the hypotheses derived from modernization theory? The prevalent test, when only the 1981 dataset was available, was a cross-sectional one. The countries involved were listed in order of their degree of modernization and subsequently it was analyzed whether their value patterns differed as predicted by the hypotheses derived from modernization theory. When the 1990 dataset became available the possibility arose to subject the hypotheses not only to a cross-sectional but also to a longitudinal test. EVS researchers looked
whether and, if so, how far countries had become more modern between the two waves of EVS and checked whether the predicted concomitant value change had actually occurred. To the disappointment of the researchers, in the early stage of EVS much of the predicted value change failed to materialize. Bailey (1992), therefore, argued that the best thing to do was write modernization theory off. De Moor (1994) agreed by stating that modernization theory is far too general to explain the dynamics of value change.

Not everybody, however, heeded their call. Some value researchers tried to modify modernization theory by finding an answer to the question of why the cross-national variation of value patterns was larger than predicted by modernization theory. They argued that the explanation of European value patterns should start with the observation that the explanatory problem to be solved is both uniformity and variance; uniformity, because it cannot be denied that modernizing nations tend to show similarity in value patterns, variance, because significant differences tend to continue despite such similarities. Variance could be explained by referring to the fact that the courses of modernization processes vary from country to country and that present value patterns are not only the product of modernization processes but also of country-specific value patterns of the past. Historical value patterns are therefore interwoven with modern ones. So not only technology and economy matter, but also history does.

How to test the idea that the cultural heritage of societies persist after controlling for the effects of technical and economic development? The solution consisted of including country dummies in the regression analyses. From a statistical perspective, the use of country dummies was certainly well justified as it improved the statistical fit of regression models. From a theoretical perspective, however, country dummies tell us nothing about the reasons why some countries are statistically different from others even when they share the same degree of modernization. One obvious strategy is to replace the proper names of countries by relevant variables. Another strategy is to subsume the many countries into fewer, relatively homogeneous and theoretically identifiable groups or types and focus the comparisons and interpretations on them.

The work of Ronald Inglehart and his co-authors is the classic example of this approach (e.g., Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Weltzel, 2005). They used Huntington's concept of 'cultural zones' and grouped the countries into eight such zones. Next they constructed a two-dimensional plot of survival-vs-self-expression and traditional-vs-secular-rational values. So far, so good. But then they committed serious methodological errors. First, they modified Huntington's typology by using at least four different criteria (religion, language, political history, and geographical location) to classify the countries involved. Several of their 'cultural zones' seem to be only residual categories that were probably invented because some countries did not fit into
an unambiguous classification, say, by religion or language. Second, they drew intricate and winding lines and curves in order to form compound areas in the figure showing the locations of the countries in the two-dimensional plot. This procedure is unnecessarily 'soft'. Other value researchers working with similar scatter diagrams used more sophisticated quantitative (e.g. cluster or principal component analysis) or qualitative techniques (e.g. QCA or fuzzy sets) to test whether the countries can be combined in adjacent groups as predicted. This has led, however, to less clear outcomes.

Value researchers also tried to modify modernization theory by finding an answer to the question of why much of the predicted value change failed to materialize. Only a few authors referred in this respect to the notion of partial modernization, i.e. the idea that not all societal domains modernize to the same degree and at the same speed. This notion of partial modernization is in line with Ogburn's (1952, 1957) cultural lag 'theory'. The term cultural lag refers to the notion that material culture (technology, economy) has a tendency to evolve and change rapidly and voluminously while non-material culture (values, norms, roles) tends to resist change and remain fixed for a longer period of time. Without mentioning Ogburn and his theory of cultural lag, Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1990) suggested a solution to the problem of why there is a time lag between technical innovations and economic growth on the one hand and value change on the other. He argued that value change most of the time takes place through intergenerational population replacement, i.e. younger birth cohorts replace older ones in the population. This is, by its very nature, a slow process. He assumed that people's basic values are largely fixed when they reach adulthood, and change relatively little thereafter. He also assumed in the so-called socialization hypothesis, that people's basic values reflect, to a large extent, the conditions that prevailed during their pre-adult years. From these two assumptions follows that intergenerational change will occur if younger generations grow up under different conditions from those that shaped earlier generations. Another assumption he made was that not only long-term developments such as technological innovation and economic growth, but also short-term changes, such as different phases of the business cycle, and short-term events, such as wars and revolutions, have an impact on people's values. This assumption is connected with the so-called scarcity hypothesis that goes as follows: people tend to place the highest values to the most pressing needs of the moment. How to test these hypotheses? By looking for life-cycle, period, and cohort effects. Some value researchers argue that people's value change is a product of their life-course: the older they grow, the more conservative they become. This means that we should look for life-cycle effects. Inglehart, by contrast, argues that life-cycle effects are negligible. According to his socialization hypothesis cohort effects will strike the eye and following his scarcity hypothesis period effects will noticeable.
Inglehart also argued that the emergence of postindustrial society seems likely to stimulate a further evolution of prevailing values, but not in precisely the same direction as in the early phases of industrialization. Later on Inglehart (1997) elaborated this idea by making an explicit distinction between modernization and postmodernization. Whereas in the modernizing stage materialistic values (survival, achievement motivation) are dominant, in the postmodern stage postmaterialistic values (well-being, self-expression) prevail.

Towards institutionalism?

In the past decade Inglehart (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart, 2008) derived theoretical ideas from institutionalism to enrich and modify (post)modernization theory. To explain why cultural traditions are persistent, he referred to the theoretical notion of path dependence. He argued that religious traditions are originally founded and sustained by religious institutions. The same applies to political, social and economic traditions and their related institutions. Later on they are, however, especially transmitted by educational institutions and mass-media. This means that there is a kind of fly-wheel effect at work. Even when the original domain-specific institutions themselves have already changed, traditions still have an impact because other institutions have taken over the driving force. Therefore, there is no one-to-one relationship between technological and economic development on the one hand and the prevalence of secular-rational values on the other. Furthermore, Inglehart argued that in postmodern times especially the distinctive social security systems of societies are intermediate variables that confound the relationship between technological and economic development on the one hand and the prevalence of postmaterialistic values on the other. One’s sense of security is, after all, not only shaped by the technological and economic level of a society but also by a society’s welfare institutions.

Earlier Gundelach (1994) had argued that institutionalism provides sooner competing hypotheses than auxiliary ones. He forwarded the hypothesis that if countries have different institutional characteristics, these characteristics will have a different impact on the values of their population. If they have the same institutional characteristics, however, these characteristics will have a similar impact. To test these hypotheses he identified several important institutional arrangements (family types, welfare state regimes, and levels of cultural fragmentation) which are similar in some European countries and different in other ones. He concluded that familialistic value patterns are best explained by which religious denominations dominate a country, welfare-state values by welfare-state regimes, and nationalistic values by the level of heterogeneity of a nation. Between countries variation proved to be much better explained by institutional factors than by modernization indicators. This seems to point to an institutional embedding of domain-specific value orientations, but not necessarily of more general value.
patterns. Haller (2002), for his part, stood up to Inglehart’s ‘generalist’ claims by focussing on one of his domain-independent value patterns, viz. the ‘traditional vs. secular-rational’ dimension. He observed that this dimension is empirically only weakly and inconsistently related to the level of economic development. What if we look primarily at the institutional context as explanatory variable? Does a hypothesized institutional impact on this dimension better stand the empirical test? He constructed three ideal types of institutional relationships between state, society, and religion. Applying these types to explain country scores on the ‘traditional vs secular-rational’ dimension, he found that there remained no exceptional cases for which he had to find, as Inglehart did, ad hoc explanations.

Towards a multi-level theoretical framework?

Ronald Inglehart (and many other value researchers) examined for a long time only the relationship between macro-level characteristics of societies. In doing so he statistically explained a much higher percentage of variance in value patterns (40%-80%) than is usually the case in sociological research. It can, however, be misleading to investigate value patterns and their change only at the macro level. Reporting the findings of the first wave of EVS, Harding et al. (1986) warned that national boundaries are in many ways the most arbitrary of divisions, bearing only a crude relationship to more fundamental socio-cultural differences. Regional variations and differences of outlook between social groups within individual countries may often be as great (if not greater) than differences between these countries. Neglecting these differences can be dangerous. What are the possible dangers of restricting the analyses to the macro level?

The first danger concerns the dependent variables. If the value patterns that are ‘typical’ for a country are measured by the mean values of the individual scores within-country differences in value patterns are overlooked. Countries that get the same ‘value’ label because they have similar mean value scores, can, however, differ considerably with regard to other characteristics of the frequency distributions (e.g. standard deviation, skewness) of the dependent variables (value patterns). Value researchers should not only look at nations as if they are homogeneous entities, but should also ask: how much within-country homogeneity/heterogeneity can be observed. Therefore they should include for example intra-national regions and social groups in their analyses. Regional or group differences could explain deviations from the mean.

The second danger concerns the independent variables. If value researchers interpret differences between nations only in terms of levels of modernization or institutional characteristics, there could be a fallacy of the wrong level at work. What is deemed to be a context effect could actually be a composition effect (a particular country has, for example, a higher percentage of elderly or Catholics or unemployed in its population than other countries, and the elderly, Catholics,
unemployed have other value patterns than the young ones, Protestants, employed). Value researchers should therefore always control for the composition of the population by including individual level variables.

The third danger pertains to the explanation of the correlations between macro characteristics. Value researchers should look at the social mechanisms that explain why a macro relationship at the national level is as it is. For such a 'deeper' explanation theoreticians usually invoke some form of 'causal agent' that is assumed to have generated the relationship between the national characteristics being observed. In the social sciences the elementary causal agents are nearly always individual or corporate actors and intelligible value research explanations should therefore most of the time include explicit references to the causes or consequences of their actions. Haller (2002), for example, has argued that if we keep the design simple and restrict the number of levels to only two (macro and micro level) we can distinguish four effects. First, we can observe macro-to-micro effects: e.g. a 'public personality' (sovereign) or 'macro-actor' (government) takes an important decision which directly affects institutions (laws, regulations) and indirectly influences value patterns. Secondly, macro-to-micro effects will occur: e.g. actions of macro-actors (political parties, trade unions) influence the attitudes of many individuals. Thirdly, micro-to-micro effects will be visible: e.g. individuals develop and adopt new values which influence their routines and practices and vice versa. Finally, micro-to-macro effects will be visible: e.g. a great number of individuals adapt their thinking and behaviour so that in the end institutions become transformed. A more sophisticated multi-level framework must according to Haller, in addition to a micro level, ideally distinguish three different kinds of macro-levels: 1) the supernational level, comprising groups of societies or nations, 2) the national level, comprising nation states usually considered as 'societies', 3) the subnational level, comprising territorial regions, social groups, birth cohorts etc. The aforementioned problems and solutions lead to the following advice for value researchers: include, if possible, always more than one level in your analysis.

Several value researchers have anticipated or acted upon Haller's advice. Arts and Gelissen (2001), for example, used multi-level analysis to investigate whether and, if so, to what extent, institutional arrangements (welfare state regimes) and individual characteristics (social-demographics, ideological stance) explain people's notions of solidarity and their choices of justice principles. Furthermore, they argued that the impact of institutions on people's values is an indirect one, because the impact is filtered and modified by cognitive factors (learning, habit formation, situational framing). They found significant evidence that this indirect effect occurs and that regime type matters. They also found important differences between social groups in line with individual level hypotheses and previous findings. Gelissen (2003) applied, more or less, the same theoretical model to explain cross-national differences in public consent to divorce by arguing
that welfare regimes are, to some extent, also ‘divorce regimes’. Multi-level analysis corroborated the welfare state type hypothesis, however, with one reservation. Differences in the permissiveness of divorce between the populations of the distinct welfare regimes do not so much occur because these regimes differ in the degree to which households’ welfare and caring responsibilities are relaxed via state, community or market provision, but sooner because these regimes also differ systematically in the prevalence of divorce and other institutional characteristics (e.g. divorce laws and customs). Therefore in this case the welfare regimes can better be denoted as ‘divorce regimes’.

Other value researchers using multi-level techniques followed in Inglehart’s footsteps by combining a modernization approach with a culturalist perspective. Kalmijn (2003), for example, inquired how and why European societies differ in their attitudes about sex roles. The pivotal insight of ‘orthodox’ modernization theory is that economic and technological innovations are the driving force behind behavioural changes and these changes in turn lead to new or modified attitudes that are more in line with new conditions. Kalmijn’s hypothesis is that changing sex-role attitudes are a reflection of changes in women’s employment. The individual level mechanisms that transform contextual developments into aggregate outcomes can be succinctly described in terms of attitude adjustment. People adjust their attitudes, not only in response to what they themselves experience, but also in what they observe that other people are doing in their surroundings. A culturalist version of modernization theory argues that the increase in egalitarian sex roles is part of a broader value change, which consists of secularization, individualization, and the erosion of ascriptive and particularistic evaluation principles. Secularization is probably one of the most important elements in this theory. The hypothesis claims that secularization leads to liberalizing gender norms. The mechanism is here again one of attitude adjustment: people base their attitudes on the cultural climate in society. Both theories were supported by the empirical evidence. It proved, however, difficult to explain, using social demographics, much of the individual variance.

Theory in action

A follow-up question that can be raised, is whether the dominant theoretical perspectives (modernization theory, institutionalism, and multi-level theory) that we have found in comparative value research mesh with the dominant theoretical perspectives in today’s other comparative research lines. In other words: if we look at theoretical-empirical papers in recent volumes (2000-2009) of peer reviewed, high-impact sociological journals can we then find instances of the above mentioned theoretical perspectives in action? If so, are there interesting hypotheses to be found in these papers that can function as heuristic instruments for comparative value researchers?
The procedure followed was, firstly, screening the abstracts of all cross-national studies in three American (American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, Social Forces) and four European (European Sociological Review, European Societies, Acta Sociologica, British Journal of Sociology) journals with the help of ‘theoretical perspective’-specific catchwords. One result, which could already be expected reading recent EVS publications, was that the three categories (perspectives) are not mutually exclusive. In various articles combinations of the three perspectives were used. Another result, which is almost self-evident, was that the three-way classification was not exhaustive. There are cross-national papers that use other theoretical perspectives (e.g. world system theory). These belong, however, to a rather small minority. The main result was, however, that this operation produced for each theoretical perspective a great number of papers. This means that the first question can be answered in the affirmative. We can in fact find many instances of the above mentioned theoretical perspectives in action.

The next step was to select for each perspective the ten most promising instances. The theoretical approaches that were used in these papers were reconstructed and the tested hypotheses were reproduced. Some of the results of this operation are rendered in the next three sub-sections. From them we should be able to answer the second question, i.e. the question of whether they advance interesting hypotheses that can be fruitfully used by comparative value researchers.

Modernization theory revisited

Some of the most successful applications of modernization theory in comparative research can be found in social stratification and mobility studies, more specifically is the study of intergenerational mobility. The locus classicus of this research line is Blau and Duncan’s (1967) status attainment model. Sieben and De Graaf (2001) build on this model. They argue that both economic and cultural modernization have a weakening impact of the family of origin on educational attainment and occupational status. Economic modernization has led to a shift from ‘achievement’ to ‘ascription’, and cultural modernization from particularistic to universalistic values. They also argue that political ideology plays its part and therefore formulate a socialist ideology thesis that maintains that in communist and social-democratic societies social reforms (open educational systems, redistributive taxation), in other words, institutional innovations, will diminish the effect of the family of origin on educational attainment and occupational status. At the same time, the effect of educational attainment on occupational status will be larger in communist and social-democratic societies. The predicted effects of the economic and cultural modernization hypotheses and the socialist ideology hypothesis are corroborated by cross-national survey data. The family of origin has, however, not lost its importance for sons’ educational attainment and occupational status yet.
A paper by Kalmijn and Kraaykamp (2007) belongs to the same research line. They argue that many studies have shown that educational attainment and occupational class have significant effects on people's attitudes, but little is known about how the magnitude of these effects depends on the societal context. They assess that there are three theoretical perspectives on the relationship between stratification and attitudes that lead to partly competing hypotheses. The individualistic perspective argues that due to modernization, and especially individualization, attitudinal differences between individuals no longer follow traditional hierarchical lines, but are instead shaped by individual autonomous choices. Therefore, the effects of class and education on attitudes are believed to be weaker in highly modernized countries than in less modernized ones. By contrast, the meritocracy perspective argues that stratification is still important in spite of modernization. Only because of modernization, and especially the shift from 'ascriptive' to 'achievement', the emphasis has shifted from an economic to a cultural basis of stratification, i.e. from class to education. It is therefore hypothesized that the effect of education on attitudes is stronger and the effect of class weaker in more modernized countries than in less modernized ones. A third perspective argues that class-linked inequalities are very persistent, and the effects of class on values and attitudes are stable across time and countries. From this perspective it is hypothesized that the effect of class does not depend on the degree of modernization of a country. They found that there is no evidence that the effects of class on attitudes are lower when countries are more modern, but they did find larger effects of education in more modern countries.

Another comparative research line in which modernization theory has a prominent place is the sociology of religion. Need and Evans (2001), for example, write that it is generally thought that processes of modernization have resulted in a process of secularization with respect to conventional religious participation and observance in industrialized societies. It is, however, not clear whether the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe have followed this pattern. Opponents of modernization theory argue that the experience of many decades of atheistic communism in Eastern Europe has led to a higher degree of secularism than could be expected on the basis of modernization theory. After the fall of communism, the institutional presence of religion was strengthened and this led to a recent resurgence of religiosity among the young. Need and Evans advance two competing hypotheses. The first one is derived from modernization theory and claims that there is in Eastern Europe a monotonic relationship between age on the one hand and religiosity and religious participation on the other, and that high levels of education and urban occupations are positively linked to lower levels of religious affiliation and participation. The alternative state-atheism hypothesis states that there is a U-shaped curvilinear relationship between age and religious affiliation and participation, and that membership of the Communist Party during state atheism led to lower levels of religious
EXPLAINING EUROPEAN VALUE PATTERNS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

affiliation and participation. They found that age and educational differences in participation rates follow patterns expected on the basis of modernization theory with no evidence of resurgence among younger groups. They also found corroborating evidence for an additional hypothesis that states that religious affiliation and participation is higher in Catholic countries and in Catholics in general, because the Catholic Church doesn't compromise under non-Catholic regimes, unlike other religions. Catholic participation rates proved to be significantly higher than Orthodox ones.

Halman and Draulans (2006), too, refer to the often cited declining levels of church attendance in Europe. In their opinion it remains, however, unclear, whether Europe should also be qualified as secularized in terms of religious beliefs. Therefore, they investigate the degree to which European people are secular not only on religious practices, but also on beliefs. They argue that trajectories of religious change occur all over Europe, but not at similar speeds. Using competing insights from modernization theory and rational choice theory they formulate hypotheses regarding the differences in the degree to which individuals and societies are secularized. At the societal level modernization theory stands the empirical test successfully. The higher the economic development of a European country, the less religious are its inhabitants. The higher the degree of globalization of a European country, the lower is the level of religiosity of its inhabitants. They did not find, however, empirical confirmation for the hypothesis of rational choice theorists that the more religiously pluralist a society, the more religious its people. The opposite seems to be true. People in more globalized societies are more aware of alternative worldviews and value systems and therefore traditional religiosity declines. The findings also reveal that religious denominations, as well as cultural and socio-economic heritages are important factors in explaining the patchwork pattern in levels of religiosity and religious participation.

Also in other research lines modernization theory can be observed in action. Jones and Smith (2001), for example, refer to the fact that modernization theorists have forecast the demise of nationalism. The forces of nationalism show, however, no signs of waning. To investigate this discrepancy they distinguish between two dimensions of national identity that can be gleaned from modernization theory. On the one hand an ascription/objectivist dimension can be distinguished that resembles the concept of ethnic identity. On the other hand there can be distinguished an achievement/voluntarist dimension closer to the notion of civic identity. Next they hypothesize that independently of individual differences in socio-demographics, the higher a country's degree of post-industrialism, the higher the relative commitment of its population to the more open and inclusive achievement/voluntaristic (civic) dimension. They also formulate the hypothesis that the higher a nation-state's degree of globalization, the lower will be its members' commitment to either form of national identity. Both hypotheses are corroborated by their research findings.
Another example is Kunovich and Slomczynski (2007) who argue that both modernization and post-industrial theories imply that persons living in countries with a high degree of societal meritocracy hold stronger meritocratic beliefs than persons living in countries with a low degree of social meritocracy. They found that the relationship between the degree of societal meritocracy and the degree of support for meritocracy is positive and statistically significant as predicted even if national wealth and educational stock (as well as individual-level variables) are controlled.

**Institutionalism revisited**

The rising interest in institutionalist explanations of social phenomena went hand in hand with developments within a theoretical perspective called ‘new institutionalism’ (Brinton and Nee, 1998). There are, however, many theories to be called new institutional. New institutionalist ideas in the inventory of major sociological journals used for this paper especially appear in articles where welfare state arrangements and social policy schemes are the explanatory variables. Bäckman (2009), for example, starts from the observation that welfare states have different approaches concerning how to decrease poverty. Diminishing poverty is not only a matter of welfare spending, but to a large extent also determined by the design of social policy schemes. These country-specific policy schemes or welfare state arrangements have a profound impact on financial poverty in western countries. He hypothesizes that differences (eligibility, replacement rate, and period of payment) in welfare state institutions – such as unemployment insurance, sickness insurance and parental leave schemes – explain cross-cultural differences in poverty rates. Because there is a built-in inertia in these arrangements and schemes, he hypothesizes that socio-demographic factors – such as women’s labour market participation, proportion of families with children, proportion of single-earner households, and the unemployment rate – primarily explain variations across time. As predicted the institutional social insurance factors primarily explain the spatial variation, i.e. variation between countries. In part also the temporal variation is explained by changes in welfare state generosity. However, the effects on temporal variation vary across time and it seems as if on average poverty rates during the 1980s were held back by increasing female labour force participation and decreasing family sizes, whereas during the 1990s poverty rates were upheld by welfare state retrenchments, primarily within the domain of unemployment insurance.

In the same research line on poverty a more or less similar approach can be found in Lohmann (2009). He regards the incidence of in-work poverty in 20 European countries and asks how it can be explained by differences in labour market institutions (degree of bargaining centralization, minimum wages) and welfare state arrangements (degree of decommodification and defamilization). Lohmann hypothesizes that bargaining centralization decreases in work poverty
and minimum wages will have a rather small effect because it only concerns a small part of low income-workers. He also hypothesizes that the more generous the benefits of the welfare state to workers and non-workers, the greater the chances that the working poor are lifted out of poverty. Defamilization is likely to have a negative effect on in-work poverty, because intergenerational dependence and dual-earner support both have a positive influence on in-work poverty reduction. He also hypothesizes that more generous child benefits have a positive influence on the extent of in-work poverty reduction. In general, the results confirm the overall hypothesis that both welfare state measures and labour market institutions have an influence on in-work poverty. By analysing influences on pre-transfer poverty and poverty reduction separately, Lohmann shows that such factors have varied effects on in-work poverty. While bargaining centralization proves to be relevant for the distribution of pre-transfer incomes only, the set-up of the social security system, in particular impacts the extent of poverty reduction.

Also Brady (2003) belongs to this research line. He studies the impact of left political institutions on a nation’s amount of poverty. He addresses the question of whether left political institutions affect poverty separately from the welfare state, or whether they are channelled through the welfare state, or whether they are combined with the welfare state. These three possible causal relationships are tested with an unbalanced panel analysis of 16 rich Western democracies from 1967 to 1997. The results demonstrate that the strength of left political institutions has a significant, powerful negative impact on poverty. More specifically, left political institutions partially combine with and partially channel through the welfare state.

Institutionalism is also prominent in the gender research line. Chang (2004), for example, provides new information on cross-national levels and patterns of occupational sex segregation in sixteen developing countries. She develops an institutionalist theoretical framework that focuses on gender related state policies (maternity leave, antidiscrimination, and protective legislation) that influence women’s integration across the occupational structure. Maternity leave is hypothesized to integrate women across the occupational structure, leading to a decline in sex segregation. Anti-discrimination legislation is also hypothesized to decrease overall sex segregation, but might have the opposite effect in certain sales and service occupations. Protective legislation is thought to increase sex segregation, except for the women with higher education in jobs with higher occupational status. Controlling for existing explanations (economic structure and human capital), Chang empirically assesses the effect of these gender related state policies on sex segregation. As predicted state policies were the strongest determinant of cross-national differences in levels of segregation, but two types of legislation had opposite effects: maternity leave is negatively related to levels of segregation while antidiscrimination legislation is associated with higher levels of segregation. Analyses of occupation-specific patterns of
segregation reiterated the importance of state policies, demonstrating how different types of policies have segregative and integrative effects throughout the occupational structure. Results also provided strong evidence of a culling effect, in which women’s representation in higher-status occupations declines as the percentage of women in the labour force increases.

To the same gender research line belongs Uunk et al. (2005). They observe that the proportion of women who withdraw from paid employment when they have children differs considerably among the countries of the European Union. It is often found that institutional arrangements, like public childcare, are the causes of these national differences. Supportive evidence for the institutionalist explanation is, however, threatened by two alternative macro-level explanations: the influence of the economic necessity to work and the influence of gender role values in society. Their main research question is whether and to what extent these alternative explanations alter the effect of public child care arrangements on mothers’ labour supply. As far as the institutionalist explanation is concerned, Uunk et al. hypothesize that because institutional arrangements lower the financial constraints, the greater the availability of public childcare in a society, the greater women’s labour supply in that country. They also formulate the hypothesis that economic affluence of a society is a suppressor variable. In other words, because economic affluence decreases the women’s need to work and increases the public support (child care facilities), the effect of this public support on women’s labour supply will become stronger. The cultural explanation, consisting of two components (women’s own gender role attitudes and the gender role attitudes of their environment), will have a different effect on the relation between public support and women’s labour supply. The authors hypothesize that egalitarian gender values in a society have a positive effect on both public support and women’s labour supply. As a result, the relation between public support and women’s labour supply will be reduced to zero. They find evidence in favour of the institutional and economic explanations. In countries with more generous provision of public childcare and in countries with a lower level of economic welfare, the impact of childbirth on female labour supply is less negative than in other countries. Economic welfare appears to suppress rather than rival the institutional effect. More egalitarian gender role values in a country increase mothers’ labour supply, yet these values do not alter the institutional effect. More egalitarian gender role values in a country increase mothers’ labour supply, yet these values do not alter the institutional effect.

There are still other research lines that show institutionalism in action. Pfeffer (2008), for example, works within the social stratification and mobility research line. He asks whether social inequality in education differs across time and countries. If the answer is yes, which institutional characteristics can then explain differences in educational inequality? He argues that the institutional
characteristics of a country, especially the educational institutional characteristics, influence educational inequality in more than one way. First, they have a direct effect on children's educational success (e.g. by encouragement of excellent students or by motivating less-performing students). Second, they have an indirect effect by ways of strengthening or weakening the intergenerational relation of educational level. The focus of Pfeffer in educational institutionalism is on social stratification. He defines stratification as the degree to which educational opportunities are differentiated within and across educational levels. Pfeffer hypothesizes that in nations with highly stratified systems, the guidance and management skills of parents are more consequential. In other words, the association between parents’ and children’s educational status is higher in highly stratified systems. The results show that the degree of educational inequality is associated with the institutional structure of national education systems. Rigid systems with dead-end educational pathways appear to be a hindrance to the equalization of educational opportunities, especially if the sorting of students occurs early in the educational career.

Another research line in which we can find institutionalism in action is social capital research. Van der Meer et al. (2009), for example, study the impact of a range of institutions on citizens’ contact with family and close friends. They aim to explain country level differences in social participation from an actor centered institutionalist perspective. They present two lines of reasoning. According to the first, family and friendship bonds function as a safeguard against economic hardship. Hence, people with economic and social security will not need informal relations. They formulate accordingly a crowding out hypothesis that states that the lower the level of social security in a society is, the higher the level of social participation. The second line of reasoning proposes that corruption or a lack of civil rights drive citizens to seek refuge in their secure intimate contacts. The safe refuge hypothesis states that intimate relations are a safe alternative for people who succeed in the public sphere, partly because of different state institutions. The authors empirically find that states matter. State institutions are an important determinant of social participation. Their findings mainly confirm the second line of reasoning, whereas the crowding out thesis is only supported for contact with the extended family. Moreover, they find that the contextual effects are not similar across social groups: the poor are more strongly affected by the institutional design than the rich.

Although these studies show that, how and why institutions matter, most of them treat values as exogenous. There are, however, branches within new institutionalism, especially embeddedness theory and cognitive new institutionalism that treat them as endogenous (March and Olsen, 1989; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). According to these branches, institutions transmit their embedded norms to the public and thereby frame people’s beliefs and values. These frames
may determine not only people's perceptions of self-interest but also mitigate their inclinations toward opportunism because transmitted norms become sometimes internalized. Institutions may therefore not only determine what people find to be a rational course of action, i.e. what is in their self-interest, but also what behavioural alternatives are acceptable to them or should be rejected from a moral point of view. Norms that are embedded in institutions and transmitted to people are, however, not slavishly followed by them, but filtered by their own interpretations and they may respond differently to the same norms depending on who they are and what they do, i.e. their social characteristics. This means that a research design is needed in which not only the impact of institutions and that of individual characteristic is analysed but also interactions between these two factors. Institutions can, after all, modify the individual level determinants of attitudes and actions.

**Multilevel theory revisited**

The development of new statistical methods of analysis (and their related software) has given a new impetus to comparative research in the past decades. Especially multilevel analysis has enabled social researchers to integrate micro-, meso- and macro-level variables in a structural-individualistic theoretical framework and to recognize the possible role of different levels of determinants on value and behavioural patterns (Gauthier, 2002). Methodological innovation went hand in hand with theoretical renewal. Already in the 1960s and 1970s well-known macrosociologists (e.g. Boudon, Coleman, Lenski) heeded Homans' (1964) call to bring men back in by introducing general propositions about individual characteristics when explaining societal phenomena. Given these developments, it is understandable that many of the above mentioned recent theoretical-empirical papers, which I have placed in a modernization or institutionalism framework, use multi-level analysis.

An example of a study that takes another (i.e. non-modernization and non-institutionalist direction) is Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003). They investigate public attitudes toward welfare state policies, more specifically public support for the sick, the elderly, and the unemployed. They argue that these attitudes are a result of both situational, i.e. unemployment, and ideological factors, i.e. egalitarian ideology, at both the national and the individual level. On national level, Blekesaune and Quadagno explicitly reject the institutional theory, because it has in their opinion empirical and conceptual flaws. They hypothesize that a nation with high unemployment rates will have a more positive attitude toward public support, because of the chance of becoming unemployed and because of pity. Furthermore, they hypothesize that the stronger the egalitarian ideology, the more positive the public attitude toward welfare support will be. On individual level, the apply both a self-interest and an ideology approach. The self-interest
approach states that people who receive public support or are likely to become a recipient of support, hold more positive attitudes toward public support, especially support aimed at their own target group. The ideology approach states that positive attitudes toward public support are caused by a more general value system about the individual, the state and other institutions. These values ideologically justify supporting or opposing welfare state policies. Opposing the welfare state is known as economic individualism, which assumes people are responsible for their own welfare. Data from ISSP are analyzed to test these hypotheses using a multi-level regression technique. Findings indicate that the national level is important in shaping public attitudes toward welfare state policies in industrialized nations. At the individual level both situational and ideological factors play a role.

Many social ecology papers theorize about the respective role of macro- and micro-level factors, but omit the intermediate (meso) one. What is, therefore, often lacking is an elaboration of the mechanisms by which institutionalized social networks such as organizations, markets and communities influence values and behaviour. This raises the question of whether we can find articles that take a few further steps in the right direction. The answer is yes.

Van Tubergen et al. (2004), for example, examine differences in labour market participation and unemployment between immigrant groups in different countries. They develop a design in which multiple origins and multiple destinations are compared, suggesting that the economic status of immigrants may be affected by the country from which they come (origin effect), the country to which they migrate (destination effect), and the specific relations between origins and destinations (community effect). They argue that it is not only fruitful to distinguish between these effects but also study them simultaneously. The authors use two theoretical approaches to distinguish between contextual and compositional effects. From discrimination theories, that maintain that macro effects can be ascribed to ingroup preferences and out-group prejudices, they deduce contextual hypotheses. They hypothesize that immigrants are better integrated in the labour market in countries with a long history of leftist democratic parties, because they are more tolerant and in favour of income redistribution, than rightist parties. Furthermore, they hypothesize that differences between natives and immigrants affect the labour market success of these immigrants. A different religion, and low educational level of the immigrant group, will lead to less success on the labour market. Also, based on the ethnic threat hypothesis, they expect that immigrant group size has a negative effect on labour market success. From human capital theories, that predict that macro effects can be attributed to the selection of human capital, they derive compositional hypotheses. According to human capital theory, immigrants’ success is determined by the skills they bring along or acquire in their new home country. Educational level, language skills, labour market experience, ability, motivation and talent are all predictors of economic success.
Van Tubergen et al. hypothesize that immigrants perform better in the labour market when the receiving country uses a point-system of immigration, when the origin country is less suppressive, when the origin country's income inequality is less dispersed relative to the destination country, when the origin country is more economically advanced, when the geographic distance between origin and destination country is bigger, and when the immigrant has been exposed to the language of the destination country prior to immigrating. Ethnic capital theory suggests the opposite effect of the ethnic threat hypothesis. It expects that immigrant group size has a positive effect on labour market success, because immigrants might help each other. Using multilevel techniques, the analysis shows that compositional differences associated with political suppression in the countries of origin, relative income inequality, and geographic distance affect the labour force status of immigrants. Contextual effects play a role as well in terms of religious origin, the presence of left wing parties in the government and the size of the immigrant community.

Another example of making progress within a social ecology theoretical framework is Ruiter and De Graaf (2006). They address two questions: 1) to what extent does the national religious context affect volunteering, 2) does a religious environment affect the relation between religiosity and volunteering. To answer these questions, their study specifies individual level, contextual level, and cross-level interaction hypotheses. They first hypothesize that church members are more likely to volunteer than non-members. This hypothesis is based both on altruism theory and network theory. Religious people have more altruistic values and have more close-knit networks (therefore they will be asked to volunteer more and find it harder to refuse). Because contact is an important factor in this network explanation, it is hypothesized that the difference between church members and non-members will decline strongly after taking church attendance into account. Furthermore, based on institutionalist theory, they state that Protestantism is less hierarchical and more subdivided, creating more involvement. Therefore Protestants can be expected to volunteer more than Catholics. Based on the spill-over hypothesis, the authors think that people who do religious voluntary work are also more likely to do secular voluntary work. However, this effect will be reduced by conservative Protestants who discourage secular voluntarism in favour of non-secular voluntarism. On the national level, it is hypothesized that, again through the network explanation, the chance of volunteering increases with the devoutness of the society. Finally, the authors hypothesize that, because of smaller differences, the effect of church attendance on volunteering will be smaller in devout societies than in less devout ones. The authors test the hypotheses by simultaneously studying the impact of religiosity of individuals, the national religious context, and their interplay on volunteering while controlling for possible confounding factors both at individual and contextual levels. They find, using multilevel analysis, that frequent churchgoers are more active in volunteer work.
and a devout national context has an additional positive effect. However, the difference between secular and religious people is substantially smaller in devout countries than in secular ones. Church attendance is hardly relevant for volunteering in devout countries. Furthermore, religious volunteering has a strong spill over effect, implying that religious citizens also volunteer more for secular organizations. This spill over effect is stronger for Catholics than for Protestants, non-Christians and non-religious people.

The reasoning in Ruiter and Van Tubergen (2009) follows naturally from the line of argument in Ruiter and De Graaf (2006). The authors address the question of why some nations are more religious than others. They propose a multilevel framework in which country differences in religious attendance are explained by contextual, individual and cross-level interaction effects. They discuss several theories that suggest answers to this question. Religious regulation theory states that there is more religious consumption in a free, unregulated market than in a market regulated by the state. Therefore, the authors hypothesize that the higher the religious regulation in a country, the lower church attendance will be. The modernization of ideologies thesis assumes that educational level has a negative influence on religious belief and that modernization has a positive influence on educational level. This leads the authors to the following hypothesis: the more highly educated people are, the less they will attend religious services. And also: the higher the educational level of society, the less people will attend religious services. The modernization of economies thesis states that people who are more financially, politically or materially insecure, will seek support in religious communities. Therefore, Ruiter and Van Tubergen hypothesize that people with a less secure position, will attend religious meeting more often. They also think that in countries with more socioeconomic inequalities, people will more frequently attend religious services. And, people who grow up in times of war will attend religious meetings more often later in life. The last theory dealt with by the authors is the modernization of social relationships thesis. It states that religious attitudes are mostly passed on through socialization and networks. They hypothesize that people who live in urban regions (where ties are looser), will attend religious meetings less frequently. Furthermore, they think that people, who live in more urban nations, attend religious services less often. Based on socialization theory, they hypothesize that the stronger the religiosity of the parents, the more likely the offspring are to attend religious meetings later in life. Also, the stronger the religiosity of a nation during one’s childhood, the more likely that person will be to attend religious meetings later in life. Finally, it is hypothesized that the stronger the religiosity of a nation during one’s childhood, the smaller the effect of religiosity of the parents will be on church attendance. The hypotheses are simultaneously tested with data from the EVS/WVS data file. Multilevel logistic regression analyses show that religious regulation in a country diminishes religious attendance and that there are only
small negative effects of people’s own education and average educational level of the country. Religious attendance is strongly affected by personal and societal insecurities and by parental and national religious socialization and level of urbanization. The above mentioned theories explain 75% of the cross-national variation in religious attendance.

**Conclusion and discussion**

Those who look to ‘grand’ contemporary macrosociological theory to find causally informative and testable ideas to eliminate the theoretical deficit of EVS will in all probability look in vain. Contemporary ‘grand’ macrosociological treatises often either amount to little more than negative labelling of today’s European predicament or, if they put positive new labels on them, are not informative and precise enough to put them to the empirical test. Yesterday’s ‘grand’ modernization theory had at least the advantage that explicit hypotheses could be derived from it, but preliminary EVS tests did not convincingly corroborate these hypotheses. Ruud de Moor (1994), one of the founding fathers of EVS, therefore concluded – as mentioned before – that modernization theory is far too general to explain both the dynamics of change in the various value domains and the changes in each domain in different countries. ‘Empirically founded partial theories are needed’, so went his urgent appeal.

Several value researchers acted upon his advice and developed and tested institutionalist domain-specific theories. These partial theories seemed to be more successful in explaining cross-national differences in value patterns or at least stood the empirical tests better than modernization theory did. Other value researchers, however, held on to modernization theory to explain both general and domain specific changes and differences in value patterns. Especially Ron Inglehart has made modernization theory much more sophisticated by, firstly, disaggregating cultural change into cohort, period and lifecycle effects and, secondly, including institutionalist auxiliary hypotheses in his explanations.

Looking at the state-of-the-art of cross-national comparative social research, one conclusion is that many articles in peer-reviewed, high-impact journals are driven by sophisticated versions of either institutionalism or modernization theory. The answer to the question of whether these versions can be helpful for comparative value researchers must, for the time being, be postponed. The proof of the pudding is after all in the eating. Therefore, it should be a real challenge for value researchers to translate these versions into hypotheses that can be fruitfully applied to explain country-, region-, group-, cohort- or period-specific value patterns. What strikes one most, however, is that multi-level analyses have become preponderant in cross-national comparative research. This sometimes goes together with developing multi-level theories. Social science’s accounts of why people cherish certain value orientations are usually given in terms of macro-level forces that are not necessarily the same
as the micro-level motivations of the people involved. While at the macro-level we can speak in general terms about large processes like modernization and big structures such as institutions, the micro-level is where the real causation happens. To complicate things, what is happening at the micro-level is nearly always embedded in meso-level institutionalized social networks such as markets, organizations, and communities. And to make things even more complicated, interactions between the different levels are also relevant. This means that developing explanations that include this kind of considerations is the biggest challenge for value researchers.

REFERENCES


EXPLAINING EUROPEAN VALUE PATTERNS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS


VALUE CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE: WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE?

MIRCEA COMŞA¹ AND HORAŢIU RUSU²

ABSTRACT. There are not many comparative studies dedicated to value change in Eastern European countries. In our paper, we employ both longitudinal and cross-national analyses to describe and explore whether and, if so, how Eastern European countries have changed their values on the conservatism-openness to change axis. We are using the available EVS/WVS 1990-2009 data sets from Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, East Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The main method employed is multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA); we are testing for measurement invariance (configural, metric and scalar) and then compare the means of the latent variables (values). We explore whether we can find overall value convergence or clustering of countries with more or less similar cultural heritages and economic developments or increasing entropy. Our findings suggest that there is neither an overall development towards convergence nor an overall development towards entropy that can be observed in Eastern Europe. What can be observed, however, are processes of partial convergence (i.e. convergence with respect to some of the values) in varying clusters of countries³.

Keywords: value change, cross-national analysis, longitudinal analysis, Eastern European countries, European Values Survey

Introduction

Modernization theory was, for a long time, the predominant theory in social science to explain technological, economic and socio-cultural change. This theory was mainly preoccupied by the transformation of pre-industrial societies into industrial ones and its consequences (see Appelbaum, 1970:36-54; Smelser, 1966; Smith, 1973:60-75; Sztompka, 1993:129-32). The main assumptions of modernization theory are an irreversible, unilinear, unidirectional/convergent and

¹ Babeş-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, e-mail: mcomsa@socasis.ubbcluj.ro
² Lucian Blaga University, Sibiu, e-mail: horatiu.rusu@ulbsibiu.ro
³ This article was supported in part by CNCSIS-UEFISCUS grants PNII-IDEI 2174/2008 “2009 Romanian Presidential Study”, grant director Mircea Comşa, and ID56/2007. The authors have equal contributions to the text, and they are indebted and grateful to Wil Arts and two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable suggestions and comments.
gradual change of preindustrial societies from the traditional to the modern (i.e. industrial) stage; from traditional, religious values to rational, secular ones (see Weber 1993 [1904], Tönnies 1957 [1887], Marx, 1954 [1859], etc).

The fact that in the past decades large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal surveys have become available, has led to an increase of critical reviews of modernization theory. Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997), using empirically based evidence, argued that a culture shift from traditional-religious to rational-secular values does take place, but at a slower pace than modernization theory expected. The reason is that cultural change takes place through population replacement, i.e. old generations cherishing traditional values die out and new generations holding rational values make their appearance. He also argued that the materialistic survival values of modernity are gradually replaced by the postmaterialistic self-expression values of postmodernity. DiMaggio (1994), however, argued that cultural values are relatively independent from whatever is happening in the economic system. He consequently predicted the persistence of traditional values. These kinds of considerations and predictions led to a great number of longitudinal and cross-national studies searching for unity and diversity, continuity and change in value patterns (Arts, Hagenaars & Halman, 2003; Arts & Halman, 2004; Ester, Braun & Vinken, 2006; etc).

Two of the above mentioned large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal surveys are the European Values Study and the World Value Survey. Containing in 1981 only Western European countries, from the 1990 wave even more Eastern European countries became involved. There are, however, still far less comparative studies dedicated to the East than to the West of Europe. With our paper we want to fill in a part of this gap. In our paper, we use both longitudinal and cross-national analyses to describe and explore value change in Eastern Europe. We address two research questions. First, what are the trends in value orientations in the Eastern European countries since the fall of the communist regimes? Second, what are the similarities and differences between Eastern European countries?

Conservatism and openness to change values

There are several theoretical and empirical models that substantiate present research concerning social values. Two of them, Inglehart's sociological model and Schwartz's psychological model, are often invoked (see Arts et al., 2003; Vinken et al., 2004; Ester et al., 2006; Ramos, 2006).

As argued before, Inglehart founded his model on a modified version of modernization theory. He also based it, however, on Maslow's (1943) psychological thesis of the motivational pyramid. Building on these two foundations he, firstly formulated a socialization hypothesis. He assumed that people's basic values are largely fixed when they reach adulthood, and change relatively little thereafter. He also assumed that people's basic values reflect, to a large extent, the economic and
technological conditions that prevailed during their pre-adult years. From these two assumptions follows that intergenerational change will occur if younger generations grow up under different conditions from those that shaped earlier generations. Another assumption he made was that not only long-term developments such as technological innovation and economic growth, but also short-term changes, such as different phases of the business cycle, and short-term events, such as wars and revolutions, have an impact on people's values. This assumption is connected with the so-called scarcity hypothesis that goes as follows: people tend to place the highest values to the most pressing needs of the moment. His analyses indicate the existence of a connection between people's interest in satisfying some basic needs (social security, economic prosperity, and so on) identified as being materialist and the low economic development of a society, and the interest in satisfying some superior, intellectual, esthetical needs (self-achievement, preoccupation for the environment, and so on) identified as being postmaterialist and a strong economic development (Inglehart, 1997).

Schwartz founded his model of values on Rokeach (1973). According to this model ten basic values can be distinguished: self direction, stimulation, hedonism, self-achievement, power, security, conformism, tradition, benevolence, and universalism. These basic values, according to Schwartz, can be identified in all societies. The structural organization (the arrangement, the pattern) of these values is determined by their compatibility or incompatibility. Schwartz argues that they are structured in two dimensions: openness to change versus conservatism, on one hand and self-enhancement versus self-transcendence on the other hand (Schwartz, 1992, 2006).

In addition to these two models, a taxonomy resulting from the analyses of Hagenaars et al. (2003: 23-48) informed our study. They identified, on the basis of EVS data, two dimensions of the axiological universe: a dimension that would represent a social-liberal orientation (whose key features, related to postmodernism, are individual liberty and autonomy) and a dimension that would represent a normative orientation (whose features are: the support for the traditional family, religiosity, the strong appreciation for the social norms and so on, things that are related to materialism).

We used the three models as heuristic devices. What we have learned from them is that in order to get an overall view of what has happened in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism we should not look at specific institutional domains and their concomitant domain-specific values (i.e. religious values, family values, work values, political values, etc.), but employ a "dimensionalist perspective". We selected variables that are theoretically distributed on an axis. The poles of this axis could be broadly defined, following Schwartz, as "conservatism – openness to change". "Conservatism" is closely related to Inglehart's traditional-religious and materialist dimensions and Hagenaars' normative dimension; "openness to change", in turn, is closely connected with Inglehart's rational-secular
and post-materialist/self-expression dimensions and Hagenaars’ social liberalism. More precisely, we considered the support for religiosity, traditional family type, instrumental qualities of work (work ethos) and authority, as value orientations of a conservative/normative type. Sexual permissiveness, tolerance, orientations against a non-democratic political system (democratic orientations) were regarded as openness to change values.

Although our primary focus is descriptive, as our research questions show, there is also an exploratory goal guided by conflicting expectations. The first expectation is mainly informed by Inglehart and Baker (2000) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005). Their studies present evidence supporting the modernization claims that economic development is associated with pervasive and to some extent predictable cultural change but, as Inglehart and Baker (2000:49) suggest, this does not necessarily imply convergence: “Economic development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than converging, they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritages”. Moreover, the economic collapse that brought with it a growth in the social risks can reverse the effects of modernization: “most of the societies that show a retrograde movement are ex-Communist societies, reacting to the collapse of their economic, social and political systems” (Inglehart and Baker, 2000:41) but “the reestablishment of the economic growth will move these countries towards modern and postmodern values” (Inglehart and Baker, 2000:42). “Both, economic development, and history (belongingness to a cultural zone or the cultural heritage), conclude the authors, “matter”. We are not so sure, however, that this is a correct observation. The former communist societies and their vicissitudes after the fall of communism are more heterogeneous than they appear at first glance. On closer inspection they show substantial cultural (religion, historical contexts etc) and economic diversity (level of economic development, economic evolution during post communism, occupational structure etc). Contrary to Inglehart and his co-authors, we expect to find that a clear pattern towards cross-national value convergence in Eastern Europe is not present. But we are not sure what to expect instead. Clustering of countries with more or less similar cultural heritages and economic developments? Increasing entropy instead of increasing order? That is what we want to explore.

Methodology

Comparing values cross-nationally and across time is not an easy task. Despite the fact that the availability of cross-national longitudinal surveys has increased in the last decades, there are still large disparities in coverage between countries. Data are absent for most of the former European communist countries for the period before 1990, and, moreover, for some of them, they are still missing or, at best, partially missing (lacking only from some of the waves). In this respect, EVS and WVS do not make an exception. Due to this lack of data, we have restrained our values comparison to 19 former communist countries: for each of these are
available at least three EVS or WVS waves from a total of five (2: 1990-1993, 3: 1994-1998, 4:1999-2004, 5: 2005-2007 and 6: 2008-2009). These waves cover the 1990-2009 period. Another problem we have faced was due to the missing of some of the potential items of interest for several of the countries. One could solve this problem in two ways: (1) exclude the countries with missing items for a wave (reducing the number of countries) or (2) measure the value of interest using only the available items (reducing the number of indicators). Because most of the values are measured by few items, further reducing the number of items per value is not really an alternative; this is due to the fact that for model specification we need at least three indicators. Moreover, measuring a latent variable by few indicators poses the problem of content validity.

In this paper our interest is on values comparisons cross-nationally and across time. Before values comparisons, two questions should be asked: "Are the values comparable across the full set of former communist countries?" and "Are the values comparable over time in each country separately?". To answer these questions, one needs to test for measurement equivalence or invariance of factors (latent variables) over countries and time (Reise, Widaman and Pugh, 1993; Riordan and Vanderberg, 1994; Van de Vlij, and Leung, 1997; Widaman and Reise, 1997; Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998; Byrne and Watkins, 2003; Boorsboom, 2006; Vandenberg and Lance, 2000; Davidov, 2008; Schmitt and Kuljanin, 2008). The measurement invariance refers to "whether or not, under different conditions of observing and studying a phenomenon, measurement operations yield measures of the same attribute" (Horn and McArdle, 1992: 117). One can say that a measure is invariant when "members of different populations who have the same standing on the construct being measured receive the same observed score on the test" (Schmitt and Kuljanin, 2008).

Among the available techniques, multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) appears to be the most important tool in the study of measurement invariance across multiple populations (Jöreskog, 1971; Byrne, Shavelson and Muthén, 1989; Meredith, 1993; Millsap and Everson, 1993; Reise, Widaman and Pugh, 1993; Widaman and Reise, 1997; Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998; Vandenberg and Lance, 2000; Vandenberg, 2002; Byrne, 2004). Consequently, for our analysis we have preferred MGCFA.

---


5 A necessary condition, but not sufficient, for a simple (one unmeasured variable) model identification is to have at least as many correlations as unknown parameters, consequently at least three measured variables (Saris and Galhofer, 2007: 202). If only two indicators per unmeasured variable are available, combining two or more simple models and adding some constraints could be an alternative in order to achieve identification.

6 Because our indicators are ordinal (three, four, five or ten point-scales) and some of them violate the assumption of normality this choice could be inappropriate (Lubke and Muthén 2004). On the other hand, in simulation studies, De Beuckelaer (2005) argued that using Likert scales and skewed data does not significantly affect the probability of incorrect conclusions in MGCFA.
According to the measurement invariance literature, the comparison of latent means across cultures / over time and their meaningfully interpretation requires three levels of invariance to be fulfilled (Horn and McArdle 1992; Meredith, 1993; Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998; Byrne, 2004; Brown, 2006; Saris and Gallhofer, 2007: 334; Schmitt and Kuljanin, 2008; Davidov, 2008). The first condition, configural invariance, requires the model to hold for all the groups involved or, in other terms, that the items should exhibit the same configuration of salient and nonsalient factor loadings across different groups. The second condition, metric invariance, requires, besides configural invariance, the slopes (factor loadings) to be the same (invariant) in all the groups studied. The third condition, scalar invariance, requires, besides metric invariance, the intercepts to be the same across all groups (invariant). If scalar invariance is supported, one can confidently carry out mean comparisons. If the test of equal slopes or intercepts shows that the parameters are not invariant for some items, one can choose to test for partial factorial invariance (Byrne, Shavelson and Muthén, 1989).

Based on the general framework proposed by different authors (Vandenberg and Lance, 2000; Byrne, 2004; Brown, 2006; Schmitt and Kuljanin, 2008) and a particular research example (Davidov, 2008) we have followed a set of steps to test measurement invariance and means comparison. As a general approach, despite the fact that the number of indicators for each model is relatively small, we have preferred a “step-up” strategy (Brown, 2006: 269) instead of a “step-down” strategy (Horn and McArdle, 1992).

In the first step we have computed for each combination of country and wave the variance-covariance matrices containing all the selected indicators. All the samples were weighted with the provided weights and the number of cases was fixed to 1500 for each sample. We preferred this method instead of using raw data because AMOS (Arbuckle, 2007) ignores the weights, and also, because we can use modification indices (they report about model misspecifications). Since all the indicators have no more than 10% missing values (around 5% for most of them) we preferred to work with data matrices (listwise deletion) for all the analyses.7

For each value we have estimated a baseline model using the ML estimator (see annex).8 All the models are identical across countries and they fit adequately the data for each country. At this stage the data were analyzed separately (Byrne, 2001; Davidov, 2008). For each combination of country, wave and model, the analysis revealed that all items have a high factor loading on their construct (value).

---

7 One can also deal with the missing values problem by using the raw data and the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) procedure.
8 For model identification we have set to one, in each group, one of the loadings (Yoon and Millsap, 2007). By doing this, we also set the measurement unit for the latent variable (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). The problem is that the use of a fixed loading for identification purposes can interfere with the process of finding the correct model of partial invariance (Cheung & Rensvold, 1999). To solve this problem we chose to re-run the MGCFA with different marker indicators (Vandenberg, 2002; Brown, 2006: 302) and select the best model according to fit indexes.
In the next stage we have considered all countries simultaneously and
tested all the models for configural invariance. The fit indices calculated (CMIN/DF, 
CFI, RMSEA, Pclose) reveal a very good fit to the data (CFI ≥ .982, RMSEA ≤ .010, 
Pclose = 1.000)\(^9\) (Hu and Bentler, 1999; Marsh, Hau and Wen, 2004) (see the 
annex). This means that the configural invariance is supported in all models 
for each combination of country and wave. This finding allows us to proceed to 
the next step (configural invariance is a pre-condition for metric invariance).

In the next two steps, we have tested each model for invariance (metric, 
then scalar) by imposing constraints on particular parameters (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 
1996; Bentler, 2004). Testing for metric invariance means that the factor loadings 
between the indicators and their corresponding factors (values) were constrained 
to be the same in each country and wave ($\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = \ldots = \lambda_g$, where $\lambda$ stands for the 
factor loading for an indicator and $g$ represents the group). All the fit indices 
suggest that the tested models should not be rejected (CFI ≥ .950, RMSEA ≤ .014, 
Pclose = 1.000).

Scalar invariance means that, besides metric invariance, the intercepts 
of the items are equal across groups ($\tau_1 = \tau_2 = \ldots = \tau_g$, where $\tau$ stands for 
intercept of one indicator and $g$ represents the group). Only scalar invariance 
allows the comparison of factors means. The CFI fit indices for all full scalar models 
indicate that one should reject them (CFI ≤ .891) despite the fact that RMSEA and 
Pclose indicate a good fit. In order to improve the fit we have relaxed the equality 
constraint for one intercept for each model.\(^10\) All the fit indices suggest now that we 
should not reject the new models (CFI ≥ .905, RMSEA ≤ .016, Pclose = 1.000). Thus, we can conclude that the value scales meet the partial scalar invariance 
test across these countries for all models.\(^11\) Consequently, we may compare 
values’ means across the countries and waves (Byrne, 2008; Davidov, 2008).

After establishing partial scalar invariance across countries and time, we 
have tested for latent factor means differences via MGCFA with mean structures. In 
order to be able to compare means across groups, mean levels have to be constrained 
to zero in one group to get the model identified (Sörbom, 1974; Jöreskog and 
Sörbom, 1996; Little et al., 2006; Arbuckle, 2007; Davidov, 2008). Such a comparison 
does not allow estimating the absolute mean in each group, but rather the mean 
difference in the latent variables between the groups (Sörbom, 1974; Arbuckle, 

\(^9\) Because of relative large samples size (around 1500 for each country), we chose not to apply the 
chi-square difference test (Cheung and Rensvold, 2002; Davidov, 2008). Following the recommendation 
of the same authors we preferred to use the CFI (Gamma hat and McDonald’s Noncentrality 
Index are not available in AMOS) and RMSEA.

\(^10\) For one model (“support for traditional family”) we removed from the final model a country-wave 
combination (Albania, wave 3).

\(^11\) For model comparison, instead of $\chi^2$ difference test (Δ$\chi^2$ test) we have preferred the goodness-of-fit 
indexes (Δgoodness-of-fit indexes) for assessing multi-sample model invariance (Cheung and Rensvold, 
2002; Chen, 2007). In our analyses, all ΔRMSEA are smaller than .01, but some of the ΔCFIs are bigger 
than .02 (“sexual permissivity” .27, “religiosity” .26, “tolerance” .35 and “work ethic” .50). This means 
that the intercepts could be different across some of the countries and waves.
2007; Davidov, 2008). In our case, for all models, the reference group was Romania, first wave available (in most cases EVS 1993). We chose Romania as reference group also considering its intermediary position within the Eastern European countries on the survival/self expression axis in Inglehart and Baker (2000:29) paper. Using our results one can look for values trends within countries and at the same time make values comparisons between them.

**Indicators**

Our paper is focused on the investigation of those values that allow longitudinal and cross national comparisons between and among the countries of Eastern Europe. Thus, the first step in our analysis was to find those values (that is results of the common value orientations or factors, in terms of the statistical analysis). Below we present those values and the way each of them was conceived.

Different studies show that religiosity is not only understood, but also measured in different ways (see Halman and Petterson, 2006:41-60; Voicu, 2006, 2007; Rughiniş, 2006; Rusu and Comşa, 2008). The most frequently explored dimensions of religiosity are faith and religious practice. In our analysis we propose a factor that is composed by three indicators that measures: the importance of religion, God’s importance, and, religious behavior – see the Annex, Table 2.

Family, among other institutions, adapts to the changes a society goes through. The alternative family models are more and more spread and the functions of the family are redefining. We considered support for the traditional family type as an indicator of conservatism. Here it is measured through a factor composed by three indicators: support for a home with both a mother and a father for the children, support for marriage and disapproval of women being single parents – see the Annex, Table 2.

The factor named instrumental qualities of work (work ethos) also reflects conservative values. It was constructed considering the model used by Hagenaars, Halman & Moors (2003:51) – see the Annex, Table 2. Another possible way of measuring conservative work orientations, based on different indicators than here, is proposed by Ester, Brown & Vinken (2006:89-97) who computed an index named extrinsic work values.

The factor we named authority, appears frequently in the literature under the name of authority versus autonomy and has various modalities of construction. The different versions have as background the Weberian theory of the rationalization of societies. On this basis, Inglehart (1997:390) proposes – for the abbreviated variant of achievement index – that the value should be given by the subtraction between the sum of two indicators that denote the spirit of “Protestantism” (perseverance/determination and thrift) and the sum

---

12 The practical way in which these indicators are constructed is described in the Annex, Table 2.
13 EVS/WVS waves 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
of two indicators that denote the preference for the traditional facet (religiosity and obedience). Schwartz (1992) creates two indexes, one of conformism and the other one of independence, which, in the model he advances, appear at the counter-poles of an axis. Conformism is an additive index created on the basis of an item that measures the importance conferred to the freedom of choice and of another item that measures the importance conferred to creativity. Here we elaborated two individual, measurements (factors) for authority – see the Annex, Table 2. The first one measures support for authority reflected in the confidence in authoritarian institutions (church, army). The other, is constructed considering the indexes proposed by Schwartz (1992) and Inglehart (1997), but, for a more elaborate variant, we also considered the model used by Hagenaars et al. (2003: 53). The latter is, on one hand, composed by items that refer to the support for authority, namely hard work, thrift, religious faith, obedience and, on the other hand, by items that refer to the support for autonomy, namely, independence, feeling of responsibility, perseverance/determination and imagination – see the Annex, Table 2.

**Sexual permissiveness**, the first value orientation related to the openness to change dimension, is measured on the basis of the acceptance of some behaviors that transcend the borders of “normality”: homosexual behavior, prostitution, abortion, divorce – see the Annex, Table 2. The factor we proposed is present in other analyses either as a simple index, or, encompassing two dimensions of permissiveness: a personal and a sexual one (for details, see for example Hagenaars, Halman & Moors, 2003). Scott and Braun (2006:69) use the same items when measuring sexual values related to deviant behavior.

**Tolerance** is generally understood as the acceptance of some behaviors or attitudes we do not agree with or that we do not like. Medrano & Rother (2006:152) argue that tolerance should “refer to the readiness to accept disliked behavior and thought at all times and in all places”. They speak about three dimensions of tolerance towards specific groups: deviant persons, political extremists and foreigners. In a similar manner Hagenaars, Halman & Moors (2003:50) measure, with additive indicators, three kinds of intolerance: towards ethnic groups, disturbing groups and extremists. In our study tolerance encompasses two dimensions, determined with two separate but correlated factors: tolerance towards persons belonging to some groups traditionally considered deviants (alcoholic people, homosexuals, drug dependents, people who have AIDS) and tolerance towards strangers (people of a different race, immigrants/ foreign workers).

The factor named **orientations against a non-democratic political system** makes sense to be used as an indicator of the openness to change dimension, considering that all the countries included in our analyses are former communist countries with totalitarian/authoritarian political regimes. It is composed by two indicators: one measures the attitudes against a military regime, the other against having a strong leader. Hagenaars, Halman & Moors (2003) use the same indicators – among others – when measure pro democratic attitudes.
Due to data availability, as we already mentioned above, not all reference values are calculated for the same year. While 1993 is the reference year for religiosity, support for traditional family type, sexual permissiveness and tolerance, for authority and attitudes against a non democratic political system the reference year is 1995, and for work ethos the reference year is 1999.

Results

In this section we will analyze the way each value – as part of the conservative-openness to change axis – evolved. Most of the figures, in the following section, are based on the conversion of the original scales (see Annex, Table 1) on a scale varying in most cases from -1 to 1.

a) Conservative values

Religiosity

Data show at least four possible situations concerning the religiosity of the former communist countries (see Figure 1): 1) countries (most of them) where religiosity is increasing after a longer or shorter period (Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldavia, Montenegro, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine), 2) countries with mixed tendencies, showing rising and declining rates of religiosity (Lithuania, Poland and Romania), 3) countries where religiosity decreases sharply after 1990.

Figure 1. Tendencies in religiosity across time and countries in Eastern Europe

Note: The mean differences are significant for p=0.05
and then stays constant, and 4) a cluster of countries where religiosity is constant significantly lower than reference and the other categories (Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary and Slovenia). Almost half of the countries seem to indicate, on the entire time span, a general tendency of rising religiosity.

We can identify a category of countries that tends to be constantly significantly more religious than the others. This category has an eclectic composition and includes: Romania (overwhelming majority is Orthodox), Poland (overwhelming majority is Catholic) and Bosnia Herzegovina (mixed with Muslims as the biggest religious group, followed by Orthodox and Catholics).

If we are to take each wave separately and then compare it with the others, we can sooner speak of changeable categories of countries across years than of trends towards either convergence or divergence.

Support for the traditional family model

Support for the traditional family type, in general, decreases from 1993 to 2009. Although there are countries presenting over the years mixed orientations, i.e. rising and declining rates of support for the traditional family (East Germany, Moldavia and Slovenia), most of the countries follow the same pattern, with different speeds. There is convergence to significantly lower levels of support of the traditional family than the reference value in 1993 (Figure 2). Again, if we analyze each wave

![Figure 2. Tendencies in support for the traditional family model across time and countries in Eastern Europe](image)

**Note:** The mean differences are significant for p=0.05

43
separately and then compare it with the others, we can rather speak of changeable categories of countries across years in terms of the level of support for the traditional family model. For instance, in 1993 East Germany, the Russian Federation and Slovenia were the least supportive countries, in 1999 Moldavia took over the lead, in 2005 Bulgaria replaced it, and in 2009 East Germany was again the least supportive one followed closely by a cluster of countries composed by Bulgaria, Moldavia and Slovenia.

**Authority**

The first measurement of authority support (confidence in authoritarian institutions) indicates, in general, convergence towards significantly lower levels of support than the reference value in 1995. Nevertheless, here too, we have different categories in what concerns the changes. Except Romania, whose support for authority does not show significant changes, there are countries where the support is declining across time (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Hungary, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine) and countries where the support is rising (Estonia, East Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia). The rest of the countries present mixed tendencies of rising and declining support.

![Figure 3. Tendencies in support for authority (confidence in authoritarian institutions) across time and countries in Eastern Europe](image)

**Note:** The mean differences are significant for p=0.05
Again, if we analyze each wave separately and then compare it with the others, we can rather speak of changeable categories of countries across years. In 1995, the most supportive countries for authority were Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Romania while in 2009 Romania stood alone. The least supportive countries included in 1995 the Czech Republic, Estonia, East Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, in 1999 included the Czech Republic, Estonia, East Germany, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia, in 2005 East Germany, Moldavia and Slovenia, while in 2009 included Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Montenegro and Serbia.

The second measurement of authority (authority as a value to be transmitted to children) indicates a similar situation (Figure 4). Nevertheless the clustering of countries is slightly different. Here too we can say that, in general, the majority of countries converged to significantly lower levels of support than the reference value in 1995. On the entire time span in Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia the support for authority (as a value to be transmitted to children) is rising, declines in Albania and the Russian Federation, has mixed tendencies in the Czech Republic, Montenegro and Poland and does not change significantly for the rest of the countries. If we analyze each wave separately and then compare it with the others, we can, again, speak of changeable categories of countries across years. For instance in 1995, the country most in support of authority was Albania, while in 2005 and 2009 it was Romania. The group of the least supportive countries included in 1995 East Germany, Hungary and Slovenia while in 1999, 2005 and 2009 East Germany and Slovenia.

Figure 4. Tendencies in support for authority (children values) across time and countries in Eastern Europe

Note: The mean differences are significant for p=0.05
The different tendencies shown in some of the CEE countries, with regard to the two measurements of authority, could be explained by the fact that theoretically we measure two different dimensions: one concerns rather a public attitude, vertical trust, while the other, a private attitude and horizontal trust.

We can not speak of a clear pattern towards general convergence regarding both measurements of authority. Nevertheless, just as was the case with the traditional family model, most of the countries follow more or less the same pattern, with different speeds, towards significantly lower levels of support than the reference value. It is important to notice again, that the structure of these categories is variable (see Figure 3 and Figure 4), differing not only from themselves across time, but also from the categories that we detected when analyzing religiosity and traditional family model.

**Work ethos**

The last value theoretically assigned to the conservative dimension reflects the support for the instrumental qualities of work (work ethos). Here too, although there are different clusters of countries following more or less different paths, we can say that most countries converge to significantly lower levels of support for the instrumental qualities of work than the reference value. Nevertheless, the countries are falling in four categories according to the dynamic of value change: in East Germany, Moldavia and Ukraine the support for the instrumental qualities of work is rising, declines in Bosnia Herzegovina, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Montenegro, Poland and Slovenia, has mixed tendencies in Bulgaria and Serbia and does not change significantly for the rest of the countries.

If we analyze each wave separately and then compare it with the others, we can rather speak of changeable categories of countries across years, than of convergence. For example, in 1999 and 2005 Romania and Slovenia were the most conservative countries, while in 2009 Bulgaria replaced them. At the opposite pole stands in 1999 East Germany, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine, in 2005 Serbia, and in 2009 Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro, Lithuania and Poland.

An overall interpretation of the values theoretically belonging to this dimension, could suggest, on the entire time span, a tendency of most countries to support to a significantly lower degree conservative values (except religiosity) than in 1993. Analyzing each value, country-wave by country-wave, we could observe sinuous movements with ups and downs towards higher or lower levels of conservatism, varying from one value to another and almost country by country. However, we can identify several clusters of countries following the same paths of change, but the structure of these clusters is rather different from one value to another.
VALUE CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE: WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE?

Figure 5. Tendencies in support for the instrumental qualities of work across time and countries in Eastern Europe

Note: The mean differences are significant for p=0.05

b) Openness to change values

Sexual permissiveness

Concerning sexual permissiveness, the support for sexual permissiveness declines in almost all countries (the exception is Lithuania where the support rises) on the entire time span (Figure 6). This result could indicate a general tendency of convergence but could also indicate parallel evolutions with different speeds. There is a category of countries (Czech Republic and East Germany; this group could also include Slovenia if we ignore the 2005 results) where the support for sexual permissiveness is constant significantly higher than the support in all the other countries, and a category where the support is constant significantly lower than the reference value (Bosnia Herzegovina, Moldova, Poland and Ukraine).

Nevertheless, if we consider the data from each wave, the support for sexual permissiveness follows sinusoidal trends in almost all the countries, except Bosnia Herzegovina, Moldova and Ukraine where only a decreasing tendency is present and Lithuania where an increasing tendency is present. If we analyze each wave separately and then compare it with the others, we can rather speak of changeable categories of countries across years. For example in 1993 the Czech Republic and Slovenia were the most supportive while Moldavia and Poland were the least supportive; in 2005 Bulgaria and East Germany were the most supportive while Moldavia, Poland and Romania were the least supportive.
Figure 6. Tendencies in support for sexual permissiveness across time and countries in Eastern Europe

Note: The mean differences are significant for p=0.05

Tolerance

The first measurement of tolerance (tolerance towards strangers) indicates on average higher levels of tolerance in 2009 than in 1993 (Figure 7). The only countries where there are no significant changes of tolerance are Moldavia, Bosnia, East Germany; the tolerance is constant but on parallel levels. In this case also there are categories of countries like the Czech Republic, East Germany and Slovakia where the level of tolerance is constantly higher than in all the other countries (except the 1993 wave) and countries like Moldavia where the level of tolerance is constantly lower. Mixed trends are present in Bulgaria, Romania, the Russian Federation and Slovenia.

If we analyze each wave separately and then compare it with the others, we can, again, rather speak of changeable categories of countries across years. For example the most tolerant countries in 1993 were East Germany and Slovenia while the least tolerant was Lithuania. In 1995 the first category included Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, East Germany and Slovakia while the latter included Albania, Lithuania, Moldavia, Montenegro, the Russian Federation and Serbia. In 1999 the most tolerant countries were the Czech Republic, East Germany, Latvia, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia while the least tolerant were Lithuania, Moldavia and Montenegro. In 2009 the first category includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, East Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia while the least only Moldavia.
VALUE CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE: WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE?

Figure 7. Tendencies in tolerance against deviants across time and countries in Eastern Europe

Note: The mean differences are significant for p=0.05

The second measurement of tolerance (towards strangers) does not indicate the same general situation as the tolerance towards deviants (Figure 8). There is a category of countries where, on the entire time span, there is a decrease in tolerance (e.g. Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and the Russian Federation) a category of countries (e.g. Bosnia Herzegovina, East Germany, Latvia, Montenegro, Romania and Slovakia) where there is an increase in tolerance and countries where the levels of tolerance form 2009 is not significantly different from the level in 1993 (e.g. Czech Republic, or Ukraine if we consider the 1995 wave). It should be mentioned again that even though there are categories of countries having similar tendencies, they are on parallel levels and the changes are taking place with different speeds. When considering each measurement point (wave) for each country, mixed trends can be identified for most of the countries (e.g. Belarus, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Slovenia etc).

If we analyze each wave separately and then compare it with the others, we can again rather speak of changeable categories of countries across years. For example in 1993 the most tolerant countries were Poland and the Russian Federation, in 1995 Albania, Belarus and East Germany, in 1999 Latvia, the Russian Federation and Serbia, and in 2009 Montenegro. The least tolerant is in 1993, Slovenia, in 1999 Bulgaria, and in 2009 Albania, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, the Russian Federation and Slovenia.
Figure 8. Tendencies in tolerance towards foreigners across time and countries in Eastern Europe

**Note:** The mean differences are significant for p=0.05

*Orientations against a non-democratic political system*

In what concerns the attitudes towards a non-democratic political system, data show mixed tendencies. There is a category of countries where, on the entire time span, the support for a non-democratic political system is decreasing (e.g. Albania and Ukraine), an overwhelming category of countries where it is increasing (e.g. Bosnia Herzegovina, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Moldavia, Montenegro, Serbia) and, countries where the levels of support in 2009 is not significantly different from the level in 1993 (e.g. Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia and Slovakia). Nevertheless when we take into consideration each wave most of the countries show mixed tendencies in increasing or decreasing support.

If we analyze each wave separately and then compare it with the others, we can again rather speak of changeable categories of countries across time. For example in 1993 the most supportive for a non-democratic political system was Albania and the least the Czech Republic, East Germany and Hungary, while in 2009 the most supportive for a non-democratic political system are Bosnia Herzegovina, Moldavia, Montenegro and Serbia and the least East Germany.

A general interpretation concerning the values theoretically assigned to the openness to change dimension suggests that the evolutions of value orientations are more mixed than in the case of the values belonging to the
conservative dimension; the same sinuous process of variation is observed. Again, we can not speak about clear patterns of convergence or divergence or about a general tendency of supporting less or more than at the beginning of the 1990s the openness to change values. Only when speaking of sexual permissiveness or tolerance towards deviants a general direction suggesting convergence could be assumed.

![Tendencies of resistance against non democratic political systems across time and countries in Eastern Europe](image)

**Figure 9. Tendencies of resistance against non democratic political systems across time and countries in Eastern Europe**

*Note:* The mean differences are significant for p=0.05

Even though in what concerns each value analyzed, we can identify different categories of countries, no matter of the year of observation, the structure of these categories is rather different from one value to another. Moreover, the structure of these categories modifies in case of each value from one wave to another by addition or elimination.

**Conclusions**

The main descriptive questions we raised in this study were: "What are the trends in value orientations in the Eastern European countries since the fall of the communist regimes?" and "What are the similarities and differences between the Eastern European countries?"
Answering these questions with the methods we employed revealed an interesting situation. Data show that it is difficult to speak about a general trend in value orientations at CEE level towards either conservatism or openness to change.

As a general picture, we learned that different countries tend to cluster in different manners depending on the value studied and the year of observation. There are partial dynamics towards convergence in some of the countries, but not a general dynamics in all countries. These partial dynamics towards convergence differ in case of each value analyzed, the composition of the clusters of countries converging varying continuously. Nevertheless, we can not say that we have a clear pattern towards entropy, in the sense of a total lack or order. We can conclude that the results show no general trend of convergence but rather instances of country-categorical convergences towards some values. The next step should be to test whether these partial convergences can be explained by various social, cultural, political and economic circumstances and developments.

REFERENCES


Vandenberg, R.J. (2002). Toward a further understanding of and improvement in measurement invariance methods and procedures. Organizational Research Methods, 5: 139-158.


Data Files Suppliers: Análisis Sociológicos Economicos y Politicos (ASEP) and JD Systems (JDS), Madrid, Spain/Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands/Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung (ZA), Cologne, Germany:) Aggregate File Distributors: Análisis Sociológicos Economicos y Politicos (ASEP) and JD Systems (JDS), Madrid, Spain/Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands/Zentralarchiv fur Empirisch
Annexes

Table A1.

The EVS values selected for analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>No. of point scale (reference variable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for traditional family</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work ethic</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority - confidence in order institutions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority - children values</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual permissiveness</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance towards deviant behavior</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance towards foreigners</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against a non-democratic political system</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A2.

List of indicators selected for each value

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>V9  Religion important in life (1-not at all important to 4-very important)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V186  How often do you attend religious services (1-never to 7-more than once a week)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V192  How important is God in your life (1-not at all important to 10-very important)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the traditional family type</td>
<td>V57  Child needs a home with father and mother (1-disagree; 2-agree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V58  Marriage is an out-dated institution (1-agree; 2-disagree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V59  Woman as a single parent (1-approve; 2-disapprove/depends)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work ethic</td>
<td>V50  To develop talents you need to have a job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V51  Humiliating to receive money without having to work for it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V52  People who don’t work turn lazy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V53  Work is a duty towards society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V54  Work should come first even if it means less spare time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scale: 1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority: confidence in order institutions</td>
<td>V131 Confidence: Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V132 Confidence: Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scale: 1- not at all to 4- a great deal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Values

| Authority: children values | Children - values not to learn - non-authority (additive: 0-none; 4-all; reversed): independence (V12), feeling of responsibility (V14), imagination (V15), determination / perseverance (V18). Children - values to learn - authority (additive: 0-none; 4-all): hard work (V13), thrift saving money and things (V17), religious faith (V19), obedience (V21). |
| Tolerance towards ... | On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours? (1-mentioned; 2-not mentioned) Deviant behavior: drug addicts (V34), people who have AIDS (V36), homosexuals (V38), heavy drinkers (V40). Foreigners: people of a different race (V35), immigrants/foreign workers (V37). |
| Against a non-democratic political system | V148 Political system: Having a strong leader V150 Political system: Having the army rule Scale: 1-very good to 4-very bad. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sexual permissivity - configural</td>
<td>5.774 .997 .007 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual permissivity - metric</td>
<td>20.337 .952 .014 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual permissivity - metric partial (2)</td>
<td>20.073 .964 .014 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual permissivity - scalar partial (1 2)</td>
<td>26.984 .935 .016 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity - configural</td>
<td>3.576 1.000 .005 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity - metric</td>
<td>14.715 .976 .011 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity - scalar</td>
<td>45.945 .865 .021 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity - scalar partial (1)</td>
<td>23.072 .950 .015 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance14 - configural</td>
<td>6.210 .983 .007 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance - metric</td>
<td>8.437 .958 .008 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance - scalar</td>
<td>14.211 .891 .011 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance - scalar partial (1 2 5)</td>
<td>13.162 .923 .010 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for traditional family - configural</td>
<td>3.333 .987 .000 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for traditional family - metric</td>
<td>3.277 .971 .005 1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for traditional family - scalar (all)</td>
<td>30.439 .255 .017 1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 Tolerance related to deviants and tolerance related to foreigners.

Table A3.

Configural, metric and scalar invariance - Summary of fit statistics - 19 countries and five waves
## Value Change in Eastern Europe: What Is Happening There?

### Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for traditional family - scalar partial (1 3) (all countries and waves)</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21.943</td>
<td>.735</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for traditional family - scalar partial (1 3) (Albania3 excluded)</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.195</td>
<td>.972</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for authority&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt; - configural</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.457</td>
<td>.986</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for authority - metric</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.938</td>
<td>.950</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for authority - scalar</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32.103</td>
<td>.332</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for authority - scalar partial (1 3)</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.938</td>
<td>.950</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for authority&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt; - configural</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.333</td>
<td>.987</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for authority - metric</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.743</td>
<td>.972</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for authority - scalar</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34.658</td>
<td>.781</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for authority - scalar partial (1 3)</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.743</td>
<td>.972</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work ethic - configural</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.922</td>
<td>.982</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work ethic - metric</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.580</td>
<td>.955</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work ethic - scalar</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30.302</td>
<td>.683</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work ethic - scalar partial (1 2 5)</th>
<th>CMIN / DF</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>PCLOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.786</td>
<td>.905</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Figure A1. Model: sexual permissiveness**

---

<sup>15</sup> Authority: “confidence in order institutions” and “against a non-democratic political system”.

<sup>16</sup> Authority: “children values” and “against a non-democratic political system”.
Figure A2. Model: religiosity

Figure A3. Model: tolerance

Figure A4. Model: support for traditional family
WORK ETHIC

To develop talents need to have a job

Humiliating to receive money without having to work for it

People who don’t work turn lazy

Work is a duty towards society

Work should come first even if it means less spare time

Figure A5. Model: work ethic

AUTHORITY: CONFIDENCE

Confidence: Churches

Confidence: Armed Forces

Political system: A strong leader

Political system: The army rule

AGAINST A NON-DEMOCRATIC POL. SYSTEM

Figure A6. Model: authority (1)

AUTHORITY: CHILDREN

Children values 1

Children values 2

Political system: A strong leader

Political system: The army rule

AGAINST A NON-DEMOCRATIC POL. SYSTEM

Figure A7. Model: authority (2)
LINKING NORMLESSNESS AND VALUE CHANGE
IN THE POST-COMMUNIST WORLD

CHRISTOPHER S. SWADER

ABSTRACT. The apparent realities of the communist dystopia lead to specific expectations from the transition to capitalism: the replacement of communism should cause not only a boon in human happiness, but also a resurgence of social life. Two types of observations in the past 20 years challenge these expectations. First, people from former-communist countries are often nostalgic and pessimistic when discussing changes in social relationships, friendships, family, and social engagement. Many lament the perceived decay of relationships due to a claimed growth in egoism, materialism, working hours, and moving abroad. Such stories suggest that people may have come to devalue the interpersonal social sphere during the transition years. In addition to these changes in values, there is evidence for enhanced normlessness. An example is the steep increase in murder, suicide, alcoholism, and juvenile delinquency in many post-socialist societies. However, these two observations, changing values and social disorder, have not been fully integrated, whether theoretically or empirically. As a first step toward alleviating this, the present article connects both of these changes to the reintroduction of a capitalist economic structure. Post-communist social disorder, such as deviance, can be explained if the free-market transformation weakened social values and thereby undermined the informal social control which depends on these values. This article will, in two steps, empirically investigate this proposition. First, it will ask whether the transformation to capitalist culture has resulted in individualized values that challenge informal social control. Second, this new latency of sociality will be linked to normlessness.

Keywords: normlessness, values, sociality, post-communism, post-socialism

Introduction

Aside from its debated political consequences, what are the social ramifications of the transformation of the centrally planned economies toward the free-market model? Post-communist transformations occurred amid great expectations both from within these countries and from abroad. Expectations arose largely because communist rule often affected the intimate social sphere through material poverty, the ideological devaluation of family and the individual in favour of work and the state, and state repression that forcefully invaded personal lives and degraded the worth of the individual (Shlapentokh 1991).
In other words, “communist rule had huge costs – not only materially, but also in terms of human happiness” (Inglehart 2000:218). These apparent realities of the communist dystopia lead to an expectation from the transition to capitalism: the replacement of communism should cause not only a boon in human happiness, but also a resurgence of social life.

Two types of observations in the past 20 years have challenged this expectation. First, people from former-communist countries are often nostalgic and pessimistic when discussing changes in social relationships, friendships, family, and social engagement. Many lament the perceived decay of relationships due to a claimed growth in egoism, materialism, working hours, and moving abroad. Such stories suggest that people may have come to devalue the interpersonal social sphere during the transition years. Scientific research also refers to this value change. For instance, Xiaoying Wang (2002) reports the rise of a “post-communist personality” characterized by hedonism, egoism, and materialism. In addition, Ronald Inglehart notes that most former-communist countries have moved “backwards” toward “materialist” (survival-oriented) and “traditional” (religious, nationalist, and authoritative) values (Inglehart and Baker 2000).

In addition to these changes in values, there is evidence for enhanced normlessness. An example is the steep increase in murder, suicide, alcoholism, and juvenile delinquency in many post-socialist societies. In St. Petersburg, Russia, murder rates more than tripled between 1990 and 1994 (Committee of Economic Development of the Government of St. Petersburg 1995). Additional evidence is indicated for higher crime rates in Poland, Hungary, and each of the former Soviet republics (Lotspeich 1995).

However, these two observations, changing values and social disorder, have not been fully integrated, whether theoretically or empirically. As a first step toward alleviating this, the present article connects both of these changes to the reintroduction of a capitalist economic structure. Post-communist social disorder, such as deviance, can be explained if the free-market transformation weakened social values and thereby undermined the informal social control which depends on these values.

This article will, in two steps, empirically investigate this proposition. First, it will ask whether the transformation to capitalist culture has resulted in individualized values that challenge informal social control. Second, this new latency of sociality will be linked to normlessness.

Theoretical Setup

Alternative Approaches

Few scholars connect macro-level normlessness and micro-level value change in transition countries. One of them, Xiaoying Wang (2002), provocatively connects both China’s and Russia’s “disjunction of values” to social disintegration. However, she sees the cause of this problem as rooted in the contradiction arising
from the implementation of capitalism alongside socialist rhetoric, resulting in a failure to create Weber's ideal of an ascetic and disciplined bourgeois subject. As a result, "a brand new type of person is born: a communist turned nihilist, a nihilist turned hedonist, who responds to the new opportunities presented by the market as if directly to a set of stimuli, with little mediation either of a moral code or a conception of self" (2002:7). However, Wang's explanation differs from that presented in this article, because for her these new problematic values result from not enough capitalism. She implies that China's capitalist development is stymied by an intrusive and confused socialist state, which fully adopts neither economic system. In this diagnosis, she is not alone. Even economist Richard Lotspeich (1995:566), who reports that crime rates have risen dramatically in transition economies, expects "that liberalization of economic activity will ultimately reduce criminality." This conclusion comes despite his own observation that the United States, representing the capitalist epitome, has crime rates higher than those in many traditional societies. Curious in accounts such as these is that there is no hesitation to invoke positive repercussions of capitalist development – whether it be Inglehart's (e.g. Inglehart 2000; Inglehart and Baker 2000) democratic or self-expressive values, Wang's asceticism and self-discipline, or Lotspeich's faith in the liberal economic model's connection to lower crime rates – while dismissing any negative values, such as egoism, materialism, and corruption, as offshoots of the communist legacy. In contrast, this article argues that these 'negative' values may also be byproducts of the free-market economic system.

Apart from the normative bias of the above optimistic accounts of value change, they also run counter to a body of work indicating that economic development may indeed be tied to a decline in social cohesion. For example, criminology literature on China\(^2\) links decaying informal social control with new values brought by the rapid change to capitalism (See, for example, Anderson and Gil 1998). However, even within such research, the precise mechanisms of this causal claim are usually left unclear.

The most convincing explanation offered to date which links value change, normlessness, and the free-market – while considering that the free market structure might also be responsible for some of these changes – is found within an article by David Halpern (2001). Halpern answers the question, "can values explain crime?" by reporting an empirical link at the national level between materially self-interested values and higher crime rates. However, again the 'how?' of this linkage remains under-theorized.

\(^2\) China is certainly "capitalist" in economic terms, especially in view of its vibrant consumer sector. However, because of a focus on Central and Eastern Europe, China is not empirically analyzed in this article.
This article offers such an explanation. The market economy disperses Halpern’s “materially self-interested values” among the participants who adapt to it, and this value transmission corresponds to a devaluation of social relationships. This devaluation would also weaken the informal social control that governs individual behavior and thereby undermine the normative framework of societies experiencing it.

**The Present Theoretical Framing**

Market economic development may influence value shifts in part through individuals’ reflective adaptations to the structure of the new economic environment. The term ‘structure’ here refers to the effects of shifting from a planned to a market economy on the consumer/worker who is aware of and adapts to this new economy. For example, a shift to the free-market system implies a stronger link between supply and demand, freer prices, greater availability of goods, scarcer work opportunities with higher potential pay and more numerous and irregular working hours, and more freedom of economic activity than within the previous planned-economic system. This new economy as a whole, despite its ability to generate wealth for particular groups, produces pressures that may weaken the social values of the individuals making choices within and adapting to it.

Before tackling this argument in more depth, the values concept will first be introduced, since it mediates between economic structural change and informal social control. Afterwards, the question of how the shift to capitalism resulted in values with diminished emphasis on sociality will be answered by referring to potential mechanisms of this change to be empirically investigated in this article. Third, it will be described how informal social control may be impacted by this shift, with a resulting expansion of normlessness.

**Values**

Value change mediates between economic structural transformation and declining normative power over the individual. The advanced free-market economy may transform traditional social values, causing these to increasingly reflect a market structure characterized by growing rationalization, individualization (see Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002), and material aspirations.

Schwartz and Bilsky (1987:551) define values as “(a) concepts or beliefs, (b) about desirable end states or behaviors, (c) that transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance.” This article focuses upon social values in particular, which are those that emphasize and prioritize social relationships and face-to-face communication. These values are ‘social’ not in a generalized sense, but rather because they embody the most core mode of sociality, face-to-face interaction.
This intimate interaction forms the power underlying informal social control. In contrast, non-social, or individualized, values prioritize the self, materialism, or other non-social spheres or activities.

Although many scholars (Arts and Halman 2004; Basanez et al. 2004; Halman 1995; Hofstede 1994; Rokeach 1967; S.H. Schwartz 1994; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1997) have dealt with the research of values (for an excellent review, read Hitlin and Piliavin 2004), a focus on social values in transition societies has been absent. For example, while the Inglehart discourse outlines broad value shifts resulting from economic modernization, such as individualization and the growth of secular-rationalism (Inglehart and Baker 2000), this shift is only described as positive, without negative side effects. This optimistic review is possible because it is concerned with the political repercussions of value shifts, specifically the link between economic development, post-materialist values, and democracy. Inglehart sees materialist values as a gateway to the post-materialist values that are critical for the development of democracy. In this approach, he does not engage in a full exploration of social-psychological materialism and the consequences, such as shifting social values, it might imply. In addition, the values research of Rokeach (1967; see Piirto 2002), Shalom Schwartz (1992, 1994), Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997), and Hofstede (1994) has an individualist-collectivist dimension of some sort (Dahl, 2004) but has also not been especially engaged in pursuing changes in ‘social’ (relationship-oriented) values in detail, or within in transition societies. A partial exception may be Schwartz and Bardi’s (1997) article, “Values and Adaptation to Communist Rule,” in which no significant value change was found between 1989-91 and 1996-97 among teachers and students in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. However, Schwartz and Bardi mainly investigated political values concerned with questions of social order, such as “the basic issues or problems that societies must confront in order to regulate human activity: conservativism, intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, hierarchy, egalitarianism, harmony and mastery” (1997:220). These abstract political ideals are relatively distant from those of interest in this study, those at the level of the face-to-face relationship.

Of greater relevance here, Burroughs and Rindfleisch (2002) and Shalom Schwartz (1992) argue that materialist and collectivist values are inherently opposed to one another. Furthermore, Ahuvia (2002) argues that economic development leads to individualistic cultures where personal happiness is valued more than social obligations. Similarly, and drawing more on qualitative observations, Sennett (1998) describes the effects of capitalism on individual lives and the contradiction between the requirements of work and family life. Alleged shifts toward individualistic and materialist values are alluded to today, among others, in Eastern Germany (Uhlendorff 2003; Keddi et al. 2003; Swader 2008, 2009), Russia (Shlapentokh 1991; Malysheva 1992; Swader 2007, 2008, 2009), and China (Lu and Miethe 2001:109; Rojek 2001; Wang 2002; Swader 2008) as a result of their recent market transformations.
How Might Capitalism Individualize Values?

There are many potential mechanisms through which values could become individualized through the shift to capitalism. To begin with, I will describe those that will be empirically investigated within this article.

First, capitalist values become infused in new generations through individuals’ agentic adaptations to capitalist work. Inkeles and Smith (1974) introduced a similar idea when they wrote about “the factory as a school.” Indeed, modern workplaces demand and reward knowledge of value sets which are functional to them. Yet this does not only occur in a top-down manner. Individuals recognize the tools of success within their economic environment and adapt themselves in ways to maximize their own chances of achievement. In this way, individuals’ values become linked to those of the particular economic structure within which they are found. For this mechanism of value change, the structural properties of an economy at large are more important than the immediate conditions of economic scarcity it produces for particular individuals. A hypothesis can be derived from this argument. **Hypothesis 1:** Those in jobs favored by the new individualized economy should, having been ‘schooled’ by those occupations, possess a lower degree of social values than those in other occupations.

Second, material security may shape values in particular directions. For instance, feelings of insecurity (Kasser and Kanner 2003) and risk may promote materialistic values at the expense of more social ones. Along these lines, the family stress perspective argues that economic stress causes family stress. Apart from Elder’s well-known *Children of the Great Depression* (1974), a recent formulation of this concept is found in an article written on the post-Soviet Czech transformation (Pechacova et al. 2000). This work demonstrated how increased marital instability occurred because of a family’s perceived economic pressure. In a related approach, Ronald Inglehart (2000) argues that material insecurity during the youth years can shape materialist value orientations during adulthood. If these scholars are right, those with the highest incomes should have the strongest social values due to fewer material stressors and less scarcity (**Hypothesis 2a**). However, an alternative should be considered as well, whereby high income – picture for a moment the oft-caricatured Russian ‘new rich’ – may serve as an indicator for those who have successfully adapted to the highly individualized new economy. Thereby, those with the highest incomes should have the lowest levels of social values (**Hypothesis 2b**).

Third, increased economic competition in an environment of greater potential economic gains leads to heightened material aspirations, and these may lead to a higher valuation of work and a corresponding devaluation of non-work activities, such as socialization within the family. Also, these aspirations would increase the values of entrepreneurialism, materialism, and competitive consumerism at the expense of less-materialistic and more cooperative modes of living. Many studies link value shifts to economic aspirations. For example, Barry Schwartz (1994:13) illustrates some of the ways how market capitalism breaks
down family structures. In addition, Kasser et al. (2003: 19-21) have demonstrated correlations between materialistic value orientations and poor relationship quality. The love relationships and friendships of those with high materialist value orientations are shorter and more conflicted than those with low materialist values. They report that the spillover of materialist values into relationships causes people to be more likely to use their friends, to be more "Machiavellian," and to be more likely to compete with others. In addition, the Durkheimian danger of anomie may result from hedonism and aspirations that may spin out of control (Kuperberg 1999:179). According to these perspectives, those with the highest material aspirations should exhibit less social values (Hypothesis 3).

Fourth, the spill-over of aspirations from the material to non-material sphere implies an expanded valuation of work overall, including its non-material components tied to identity and self-worth. Previous standardized nine-to-five work expands in complexity, hours, and importance into a ‘career,’ and individuals are infused with great ambition. As individuals direct their self-projects, their efforts to build ‘successful’ lives become more and more radical, since the possible limits for personal success are as boundless as those for material success. Thereby, persons in an individualized world might come to possess enhanced ambition overall, as they define themselves increasingly through their career success. In such a situation, others are primarily valued instrumentally (rather than intrinsically, valued as ‘ends in themselves’), only insomuch as they confirm and assist the self. Based on these notions, Hypothesis 4 may be constructed, by which those who are more ambitious should have lower social values.

Fifth, as a representation of the domination of economic capital, individuals may have great incentives to exploit their personal relationships for the sake of economic gain. The possible extent of this exploitation would have been less in previous times because of smaller potential rewards and aspirations (because of the comparably limited accumulation potentials of individuals within socialist economies). Roots of this argument lie within basic Marxian thought (1978). Hypothesis 5 thereby arises: those who exact more exploitation upon others or perceive more exploitation by others are less likely to have high social values, since those values would be negatively impacted by this exploitation.

Sixth, intergenerational changeover catalyzes value change in the direction of more modern values because new generations face the new economic culture without baggage from the past, and thus more radically adapt to it (i.e. Karl Mannheim’s “fresh contact,” 1952). Furthermore, older generations serve as inadequate role models, being unable to inform younger generations on how to succeed within an economic environment in which they have no personal experience. Therefore, younger cohort members tend to rely upon their peers as role models. Each of the above intergenerational factors should catalyze the individualization effect. Hypothesis 6: those in younger birth cohorts should possess less social values than those in older birth cohorts.
The six hypotheses above will be investigated as to how they correlate with social values. There are, of course, additional arguments of relevance, although they are beyond the grasp of the present analysis. For instance, advertising and other cultural messages conspicuously try to influence persons to adopt more materialistic lifestyles (Kasser and Kanner 2003:3), which could lead to the neglect of competing social spheres. This process leads to an “internalization” of culture from media and advertising (Kasser et al. 2003:16), which relates to Horkheimer and Adorno’s (2002) discussion of the “culture industry” within The Dialectic of Enlightenment, wherein culture reinforces individuals’ objectified locations within the economic system. In addition, cognitive dissonance resolution (see Festinger 1957) catalyzes the individualization effect of the economic system (Swader 2008). In essence, individuals face conflicts between work/money-related values on the one hand and family/moral values on the other, and these conflicts tend to be resolved in the direction of least resistance in a market economy: the weakening of the family-moral dimension. Finally, the “colonization of the lifeworld” (Habermas 1989) may explain how social values become commodified through the rationalization of the capitalist economic system. This “colonization” refers to the power of abstract rational systems to insert their logics into non-rational spheres. For example, the economic system may insert its quantification and profit-logic within the sphere of relationships, causing individuals to use one another for financial gain. The above mechanisms – media influence, cognitive dissonance resolution, and rationalization – cannot be adequately investigated using the present data at this time, for lack of adequate indicators.

How Could Individualized Values be Relevant to Normlessness?

Criminology uses the concept of ‘social control’ (see Landis 1939; Hirschi 2002) to explain high crime rates and other forms of social disorder in post-communist countries. Grounded in Durkheimian notions of social integration, the theory posits that individual behaviour is best regulated by ‘informal’ social control, which is an individual’s internal control based on the socialization, reinforcement, and punishment from his/her valued social relationships, such as family members and friends. In contrast, ‘formal’ social control is external control based on law and force, such as the police.

Valued social relationships are prerequisites of, and in a sense the medium of, informal social control. Therefore, a weakened valuation of these relationships is a logical suspect in the decline of such control. People who care less about socializing are therefore less controlled by social norms. This devaluation of the social sphere may translate into the undermining of norms in two ways, both through a reduction in the transmission and in the enforcement of social norms. First, fewer social norms are socialized into the individual. Sociality is therefore less likely to end up on the list of transmitted norms. Also, weakened sociality valuations imply that even existing norms are less effectively replicated.
or transmitted to new generations. Second, aside from transmission, the social norms that do exist are poorly reinforced because this function requires a high valuation of social relationships to succeed. Therefore, social disorder may result from devaluation of the social sphere through weakening informal social control, thereby causing deviant behavior through normlessness.

This social control argumentation may also be viewed through a more classical prism. For instance, if capitalist economic development is indeed one part of a broader movement from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* (Tönnies 2001) and one accepts the validity of this historical transformation in social structures, the question arises of the effects of this shift on social solidarity. On this point, Durkheim (1933) notices the dissolution of a mechanical solidarity based on likeness and the intimate interdependence within traditional social groups. He notes its replacement by organic solidarity, rooted in the differentiated division of labor. However, if solidarity is defined from a perspective that emphasizes normative control, as linkages and interdependence between human beings at the face-to-face level, Durkheim’s organic model, characterized by the division of labor and *abstracted* interdependence, is irrelevant since it does not replace the loss in face-to-face sociality. Durkheim’s organic solidarity is more characteristic of ‘formal’ social control.

Of course, not all forms of normlessness are negative. We can identify both ‘bad’ and ‘good’ norms according to common understandings, and both may decay. This article does not discuss normlessness in order to condemn a loss of particular values. Rather it points out that, in societies ruled by a richer complexity of normative controls, individualization implies the replacement of that normative structure with a thinner alternative. This tends toward, but can never fully achieve, a ‘norm of normlessness.’ In such an environment, anomie conditions may arise which provoke forms of social anarchy that most of us would label as negative: such as murder and suicide. Therefore, this discussion of ‘normlessness’ is motivated by a focus on the function of the normative structure as a whole (‘normfulness’), rather than by the functions of specific norms (such as those ruling the family, work, materialism). Family and friendship norms, because of their importance for informal social control, are keys within this wider normative structure.

The historical disappearance of Durkheim’s classical normative structure, mechanical solidarity, correlates with historical developments in social control. Industrialization-era social disruptions brought to light the inadequacy of traditional methods of maintaining order. The devaluation of social relationships as a result of urbanization, technologies, capitalist development, and rationalization resulted in a higher degree of normlessness and deviance. The deterioration of traditional family life and mechanical solidarity during industrialization undermined traditional informal control, resulted in social disorder, and was responded to by the state through the entrenchment of formalized control through police
and laws. Thereby, social control theory may explain the historical connection between social disorder and the onset of economic change in the form of rapid industrialization. It may also help to explain the social disorder found today in post-communist societies.

Because of the above historical shifts in social control amid modernization, it is expected that, within this study, those most affected by capitalist development – explicitly the younger birth cohorts (Hypothesis 7), those in new occupations (Hypothesis 8), and those of high income (Hypothesis 9) – should express greater degrees of normlessness. In addition, normlessness overall should negatively correlate with social values (Hypothesis 10).

**Methods**

**Cases**

This study uses a ‘most dissimilar’ case design, also known as Mill’s method of agreement. A similar outcome is sought in otherwise divergent post-communist societies: the growing salience of individualist values. Individualist values may be enhanced in each society because of the operation of common transformation mechanisms – linked to the structural economic change from planned to market economic systems. Therefore, the focus will not be on country differences but rather on the similarities between them.

This research uses a maximum number of Central and Eastern European post-communist cases, albeit being restricted by missing data. The group of nine countries (abbreviated as ‘PC9’) investigated includes Bulgaria, Eastern Germany, Georgia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and Slovenia. All other post-communist countries were removed because of missing data in key indicators.

The analysis uses the World Values Survey integrated 5-wave cross-sectional dataset (WVS 2009). However, the first wave (collected in 1981-1984) was removed immediately, because there were extremely limited data collected among the PC9. Waves two and four were also removed because of missing data required for key variables. Therefore, this study utilizes waves three and five (collected respectively in 1994-1999, and 2005-2007), a total of 24,792 respondents among the PC9.

**Operationalization**

**Social values**

Key theoretical concepts are operationalized through related World Values Survey indicators. To start, two indicators are chosen to represent the main dependent variable, social values. To recall from the above sections, the social values of interest here are those that relate to informal social control, the extent to which our respondents are regulated by their informal social
relationships. With this in mind, the first indicator chosen is the respondent’s answer to the statement, “One of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud.” Respondents could “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree.” The second indicator is the respondent’s answer on the same scale to “One of my main goals in life has been to live up to what my friends expect.” These two indicators, make parents proud (labeled “d054” in the dataset) and friends’ expectations (d055) are excellent parallels to the informal social values construct, since they literally ask whether the respondent lives his/her life according to others’ expectations. This is a core feature of norm transmission and maintenance. In addition, these two, unlike many considered “social values” indicators within the WVS, exhibit good variation because they force individuals to weigh the value of parents/friends against the well-being of the self. Also, these two indicators correlate at a remarkable .428 (pooled waves 3 and 5). A number of ostensibly good indicators from the WVS were not used because of assorted problems. For example, the author believes the items child independence and child unselfishness to be strongly related to the social values concept, but while correlated, their similarity is nowhere near that of parents proud and friends’ expectations. Furthermore, the former variables also load in a different component during factor analysis, so it was decided to keep the more convincing two variable construct. Other items inquiring about respondents’ ideal values for children were rejected as representing ‘abstract’ social values; child tolerance and child responsibility refer to tolerance or responsibility towards a generalized other rather than a particularized other. The same problem of abstracted dependence can be said of child obedience, since it does not specify obedience toward a particular source. These abstractions contrast with this paper’s interest in close – relational – informal social control. In addition, the WVS’ general family important (a001) and friends important (a002) indicators were rejected because they exhibit extremely low variation. Nearly everyone considers his/her family and friends important; 98% found family “rather” or “very important,” and 86% could say the same for friends. Another two items had to be eliminated because they were only collected in the 3rd wave. This was unfortunate, since these also come close to the social control concept. These variables ask whether respondents believe that parents should potentially sacrifice their own well-being for that of their children (a026) and the extent to which persons should unconditionally respect their parents (a025), regardless of their attributes and behaviors.

The two social values indicators chosen, parents proud and friends’ expectations, are combined into an additive “social values index” ranging between two and eight, with a score of eight representing a respondent strongly agreeing with the above statements and two representing a strong disagreement. Table 1 displays the means, standard deviations, and valid N of this index across the PC9 in 2005. Georgia, by far, possesses the highest mean social values level, while Eastern Germany and Romania have the lowest.
Table 1.

Descriptive Results for Additive Social Values Index by Country, 2005 Wave of WVS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>5.150</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>1.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>6.707</td>
<td>1323</td>
<td>1.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>5.143</td>
<td>1015</td>
<td>1.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>5.749</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>1.311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>4.820</td>
<td>1471</td>
<td>1.482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>5.324</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>1.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>5.236</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>1.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>5.100</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>1.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>4.852</td>
<td>1016</td>
<td>1.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.359</strong></td>
<td><strong>10183</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.405</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Independent and control variables

Linear regression analysis will investigate how social values vary alongside six key independent variables identified in the above theory section: adaptation to capitalist work, material insecurity, material aspirations, ambition, exploitation, and intergenerational changeover.

Adaptation to capitalist work is operationalized through a dichotomous variable based on the respondent’s occupation (x036). Occupations favored within the developing service-sector (as opposed to the former industrial) economy are classified as “new occupations.” These include owners, non-manual managers, office workers, and professionals. All other workers are classified as “other.”

Material security is tapped through a 10-point income scale (x047), and a dichotomous “high-income” variable is also constructed from this to distinguish those in the upper 4 ranks (approximately the top 20% of respondents) of the 10-point scale from others.

Material aspirations are represented through two variables. First, the extent to which being rich and having expensive things is valued (a190) is used as a basic indicator. Furthermore, how thrift and saving things (a038) is valued in children is used as well, since it represents an alternative side of materialism, one in opposition to consumerist values.

Ambition is tapped through an indicator representing the importance of overall success (“it is important to be very successful; to have people recognize one’s achievements”) (a194).
Exploitation is measured through a question asking whether the respondent believes that wealth accumulation is by nature zero-sum and competitive, as opposed to the belief that wealth may grow so that there is enough for everyone (e041).

Intergenerational effects are tapped through the construction of birth cohort groups. To begin, five cohort groups were constructed: pre-communist, transition to communism, communist, transition to post-communism, post-communist. In each society, persons who were 10 years old or younger at the time of transition to communism or post-communism were assigned to the new cohort. Those who were at least 18 years old at the time of transition were put into the previous birth cohort. Persons who were between 11 and 17 years old were put into ‘transition’ birth cohorts. These cohorts were, of course, differently constructed for the nine countries involved. In each case, dates of formal establishment and breakdown of communist rule were used. Unfortunately cohorts one and two (pre-communist and transition to communism), were much too small in Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine to include them separately (because of the advanced age of those respondents). These cohorts were instead collapsed into one “pre-communist” birth cohort. Nonetheless this oldest cohort is very small in some countries, so its particular results should be interpreted with caution. Yet, we are left with four cohorts for analysis: pre-communist, communist, transition, and post-communist, as defined in Table 2.

Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Shift to communism</th>
<th>Shift away from communism</th>
<th>Precommunist Birth Cohort</th>
<th>Communist Birth Cohort</th>
<th>Transition Birth Cohort</th>
<th>Post-communist Birth Cohort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: Author’s analysis.
It is also necessary to control for several factors because of their presumed links with social values. First of all, those who are religious are likely to be less influenced by capitalist value change because of their support of an ultimate value (god) in opposition to the ultimate capitalist value (profit). The indicator for the importance of god (f063) is scaled from one to ten, with ten indicating "very important," as opposed to "not important at all." Furthermore, gender must be controlled for, since research indicates that women tend to be more compassionate, less competitive, and less materialistic than men (Beutel and Marini 1995). Finally, the regression also controls for marital status, based on the assumption that this may positively correlate with sociality.

Normlessness

A number of variables were used to represent normlessness. Unfortunately, many of these are not collected in every country or every wave. As a result, the connection between social values and normlessness is best represented through the results of two sets of correlations, followed by an OLS regression analysis. The first set of analyses is run using 2005 data and correlates seven normlessness indicators and the social values index. First, a variable representing hedonism was used, with the expectation that it would negatively correlate with social values. This item asked respondents if they see themselves as persons for whom it is important to have a good time and spoil themselves (a192). Finally, five items are used that ask whether particular ‘deviant’ acts are justifiable: the justifiability of fraudulently obtaining government benefits, avoiding a public transport fare, cheating on taxes, someone accepting a bribe, and of prostitution, (f114, f115, f116, f117, f119). These represent a range of deviant behaviors, including actions generally perceived as detrimental to the public as a whole and those perceived as morally questionable. These particular items are chosen because they are believed to represent behaviors that many persons might consider against the norm, and they were each collected in the 3rd and the 5th waves across the PC9. Based on this and the results of a factor analysis (Table 3), these five are added together into a deviance justifiability index, with a possible range between 5 and 50. A ranking of 25 would represent that the behaviors are halfway between "always" and "never" justifiable. Yet the overall mean value of this index was much lower than this, at 12.02. Thus, the index represents a technical definition of deviance. It is not a normative evaluation by the author on any of the items. Table 4 displays the means of this deviance index across the PC9. Georgia has a much lower mean than other countries, and Ukraine has the highest.

A similar set of correlations is run on the PC9 using data from the 3rd wave, its collection centered in 1995. However, the hedonism variable was removed, since it was not included in this wave. In addition, a variable on moral absolutism was used. It represents whether good and evil are considered absolute
versus the belief that good and evil rather depend upon specific circumstances (f022). In addition, to the other deviance indicators was added the justifiability of buying stolen goods (f139), which was not collected in 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Component 1*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justifiable: claming government benefits</td>
<td>.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport</td>
<td>.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justifiable: cheating on taxes</td>
<td>.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe</td>
<td>.719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justifiable: prostitution</td>
<td>.430</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.**

**Component Matrix: Principle Components Extraction on 5 items of Deviance Index**


*Note: Only 1 Component Extracted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>11.6213</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>7.71842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>7.7878</td>
<td>1409</td>
<td>5.19735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>14.7023</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>8.22487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>11.2867</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>6.38798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>10.0613</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>7.29667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>13.7237</td>
<td>1719</td>
<td>8.90663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>14.9294</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>8.22862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>15.5035</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>9.33200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>10.9628</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>6.29679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12.0220</td>
<td>10192</td>
<td>7.98624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An OLS regression analysis is then performed on pooled PC9 1995/2005 data with deviance justifiability as the dependent variable and the social values index, birth cohorts, new occupations, high income, and country and wave dummy variables as covariates.

**Results**

**Social Values**

The social values index is analyzed as per how it differentiates across waves, birth cohorts, high versus low-income groups, and new occupations versus other occupations. These analyses involve observations across the 3rd and 5th waves of the PC9.
A trend analysis shows that aggregate social values significantly decrease between the 3rd and the 5th waves, from a mean of 5.68 to 5.36 (p=.001). Figure 1 demonstrates this through a boxplot. Of the nine countries under analysis, six of them significantly decline in social values during this 10-year period, with drops in Bulgaria and Romania especially large. Of the three exceptions to this trend, Russia and Poland demonstrated no significant change, while Georgian social values increased moderately but significantly.

When looking at social values across cohorts, we find that the post-communist birth cohort has significantly higher social values than the communist cohort. However, the gap between cohorts is smaller (5.67 vs. 5.49) than the overall gap between 1995 and 2005. Also, Figure 2 suggests that the over-time decline may unfold at a slower pace for the communist cohort.
There is a significant differentiation between high-income (mean=5.28) and non-high-income respondents (mean=5.61) across social values. Figure 3 illustrates that, while social values decrease across both income groups, high-income respondents have lower social values.

The same can be said about the difference in the social values of owners, professionals, managers, and office workers (mean=5.40) compared to other occupational groups (mean=5.59). Those in new occupations have lower social values (Figure 4).
Figure 3. Social Values Index Mean, differentiated by high income (upper 20%) and non-high-income respondents, PC9 countries, across 3rd and 5th waves

Figure 4. Social Values Index Mean, differentiated by favored 'new-occupation' holders versus others, PC9 countries, across 3rd and 5th waves
In the next step, OLS regression analysis is conducted in order to predict social values while controlling for the concepts of relevance. The 3rd wave did not collect each of the key variables, so this operation is only performed on the PC9 collected in the 5th wave (2005). The hierarchical nature of the data (samples were conducted independently in each society) was dealt with through country-level dummy variables, which is a statistically adequate method for dealing with the subgroup differences (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 220). Furthermore, results of the interactions between country-level dummies and all other independent variables are not interpreted here, because they only modestly (by about 2%) increased the explained variance while complicating the interpretation and distracting from the main task of explaining common explanatory factors. The OLS Regression model used here is appropriate because this most-dissimilar case design aims to explain causal homogeneity of transition factors across very dissimilar cases rather than to explain causal heterogeneity between countries. This model allows, after controlling for subgroup differences, relevant intergroup factors to emerge.

The analysis demonstrates (adjusted r-squared = .221) that (see Table 5), by far, the greatest predictor for an individual’s level of social values is his/her society, represented by 8 dummy variables. Georgia was selected as the baseline, since its mean level of social values is the highest (recall Table 1). The greatest negative country level influences in this model compared to Georgia are seen in Romania and Moldova. In comparison, being from Poland, Russia, or Slovenia exhibits a more moderate negative impact on social values. Despite the explanatory power nested in these nine country subgroups, there are also significant and meaningful influences across countries. These are the primary topic of this article: a set of common explanatory factors that may influence post-communist societies as a whole.

| Coefficient Matrix for OLS Regression run on Social Values Index PC9 in 2005 wave |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------|
|                                              | Unstandardized Coefficients | Standardized Coefficients | t | Sig. |
|                                              | B               | Std. Error | Beta |       |       |       |       |       |
| (Constant)                                   | 5.512           | .089      |       | 62.272 | .000  |
| Precommunist birth cohort (vs. Communist cohort) | .100            | .061      | .017  | 1.623  | .105  |
| Transition birth cohort                      | -.053           | .041      | -.013 | -1.284 | .199  |
| Postcommunist birth cohort                   | .176            | .041      | .047  | 4.278  | .000  |
| Female                                       | -.051           | .028      | -.018 | -1.817 | .069  |
| Married or Living together as married        | -.031           | .031      | -.010 | -.984  | .325  |
| New occupation vs. others                    | -.089           | .032      | -.029 | -2.766 | .006  |
| Scale of incomes                             | -.014           | .007      | -.023 | -2.077 | .038  |

81
| Important to be rich and have expensive things | -0.025 | 0.011 | -0.024 | -2.291 | .022 |
| Thrift: saving money and things important for ch | 0.144 | 0.028 | 0.051 | 5.218 | .000 |
| Wealth accumulation can be non-competitive | 0.023 | 0.005 | 0.044 | 4.439 | .000 |
| How important is God in your life | 0.051 | 0.006 | 0.114 | 9.185 | .000 |
| Success is important | 0.178 | 0.011 | 0.173 | 16.479 | .000 |
| Bulgaria (vs. Georgia) | -1.306 | 0.062 | -0.269 | -21.044 | .000 |
| Moldova | -1.520 | 0.056 | -0.344 | -27.037 | .000 |
| Romania | -1.803 | 0.056 | -0.447 | -32.236 | .000 |
| Poland | -0.976 | 0.059 | -0.200 | -16.526 | .000 |
| Russia | -1.078 | 0.059 | -0.267 | -18.314 | .000 |
| Slovenia | -1.291 | 0.062 | -0.276 | -20.678 | .000 |
| Ukraine | -1.471 | 0.061 | -0.292 | -24.084 | .000 |
| East Germany | -1.585 | 0.067 | -0.347 | -23.494 | .000 |

R-squared, adjusted: .221. Author’s calculations.

When controlling for other relevant factors, pre-communist and transition-era cohorts are the same as communist birth cohorts in their social values. However, being a member of the post-communist cohort increases an individual’s social values by .18 on the 8-point index compared to being born in the communist birth cohort. The results also show that there is no significant effect on social values for those who are married or for being female. Being in a "new-occupation" decreases a person’s social values by .09 points on the index. Material security indeed correlates with social values. Each income step higher (out of 10) correlates with a .014 point drop on the social values scale. Furthermore, high material aspirations, in terms of the importance of being rich and having expensive things, tend to lower social values, while a focus on thrift and not spending money leads to higher social values. Similarly, the more that respondents see wealth accumulation as being non-zero-sum and non-competitive, the higher are their social values. Spirituality, a belief in the importance of god, is shown to be a powerful indicator for high social values. In the meanwhile, opposite to expectations, a step (of 6 total) higher in the importance of success indicator (representing ambition) correlates with .18 higher in social values, the strongest of the non-country influences.
**Normlessness**

Five deviance indicators are analyzed over time, by cohort, by occupation type, and by income: higher justifiability of fraudulently claiming government benefits, of avoiding public transport fees, of cheating on taxes, of someone accepting a bribe, and of prostitution. As noted above, these have been collapsed into an additive *deviance justifiability* index between 5 and 50. This index decreases significantly, albeit slightly, between waves. However, the picture changes when we look at occupation, income, or birth cohort. We find that those in new occupations, with more income, and in younger cohorts are more likely (each of these is statistically significant) to have a higher deviance rating than others. In particular, Figure 5 illustrates that deviance declines at a slower rate for those in new occupations. In addition, among the richest 20 percent (Figure 6), deviance has leveled off, compared to a decline among those with lower incomes. Among those in the post-communist birth cohort, deviance justifiability levels actually increase between 1995 and 2005, in contrast to other birth cohorts (Figure 7). Therefore, the overall decline in deviance appears to concentrate among those with lower incomes, in older occupations, and in older birth cohorts.

![Figure 5. Deviance Justifiability over time by Occupation](image-url)
Figure 6. Deviance Justifiability over time by Income

Figure 7. Deviance Justifiability over time by Birth Cohort
Normlessness and Social Values

An analysis of normlessness and deviance indicators finds them to be correlated with the social values index, as social control theory would predict. In the 5th wave, 2005, for example, low social values in the PC9 correlate significantly (Pearson correlation: -.113) with higher deviance justifiability. In the meanwhile, hedonism, while strongly correlated with high deviance justifiability, did not correlate with the social values index.

A similar picture is shown in the 3rd wave, for 1995. Here, the data again correlate (Pearson correlation -.152) low social values with a higher degree of deviance justifiability, in addition to the justifiability of buying stolen goods (.046 correlation). In addition, low social values correlate with moral relativity (.085), whereby good and evil are not seen to be absolute, but are rather dependent upon circumstances.

Within the OLS regression (r-squared = .102), the above-reported relationships between social values and deviance justifiability hold constant (Table 6). Again, the respondent’s home society explains much of the variance, with most societies corresponding to higher rates of deviance justifiability in comparison to Georgia, the baseline. An exception is Romania, whose indicator was insignificant in predicting deviance justifiability in comparison to Georgia, after controlling for other factors. Another control, being female, corresponds to a nearly 1 point (.8) drop in the deviance index. In addition, after accounting for other factors, there is still an unexplained drop between waves in deviance, as being in Wave 5 correlates with a 1.8 lower rating in the deviance index.

Table 6.

Coefficient Matrix for OLS Regression run on Deviance Index PC9 in 1995 and 2005 WVS waves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>13.701</td>
<td>.334</td>
<td>40.974</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (vs. Georgia)</td>
<td>.769</td>
<td>.249</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>3.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>3.857</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>16.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.229</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>.525</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>2.216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2.312</td>
<td>.216</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>10.724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>4.925</td>
<td>.308</td>
<td>.137</td>
<td>16.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>4.519</td>
<td>.228</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>19.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Germany</td>
<td>2.406</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>8.957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-800</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>-6.701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Wave (vs. 1995)</td>
<td>-1.781</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>-.112</td>
<td>-13.771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New occupation vs. others</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regarding our independent variables, being in a "new occupation" bears no relationship to deviance justifiability. However, being in the high-income quintile is highly correlated with the deviance index. In addition, membership in either transition or post-communist birth cohorts is a strong predictor for high deviance justifiability, even surpassing some country indicators in its effect. In comparison, the traditional pre-communists had lower deviance justifiability than those in communist birth cohorts. Finally, our main independent variable, the social values index, is negative related to deviance justifiability. Each of 8 steps up in social values correlates with a .47 drop in deviance justifiability.

Discussion

Summary

The social values index, representing 9 post-communist countries, declines significantly between 1995 and 2005. Post-communists overall have higher social values than communists. However, their social values appear to decline at a faster rate than for those in the communist birth cohort. In addition, social values differentiate significantly by occupation and by income, with those in 'new occupations' and of highest income possessing significantly lower social values.

The results of the OLS regression with the social values index as the dependent variable in 2005 are now compared to the original hypotheses. When controlling for other variables, Hypothesis 1 (H1) is confirmed, as those in new occupations (owners, non-manual managers, professionals, and office workers) possess lower social values. Regarding the influence of high-income, H2a is negated, and H2b is confirmed. In other words, material security does not enhance social values; rather, wealth appears to signify diminished social values as a result of having successfully adapted to the new economic culture.
In addition, regression results confirm H3; high valuations of being rich and low thriftiness predict lower social values. H4 was negated. In fact, the opposite was proven correct, whereby ambition positively affected social values. However, further findings suggest that this was a non-competitive, non-exploitative ambition, since the H5 was confirmed, demonstrating that a belief in the inherently competitive nature of wealth accumulation corresponds to a lower score in social values. After controlling for other variables, the hypothesis of intergenerational changeover (H6) proves incorrect, since there is a significant difference between younger and older birth cohorts, in that post-communists were more social than those in communist birth cohorts in 2005 when controlling for other factors. Furthermore, the gender and marriage control variables showed no significant effects. As expected, religiosity was strongly correlated with a high rating in social values, and country level dummy variables strongly predicted social values.

When examining normlessness, the deviance justifiability index showed a slight, but significant, decrease between 1995 and 2005. However, this decrease was clarified when considering birth cohort, since deviance justifiability among post-communists increased between the 3rd and the 5th waves, while it decreased for other cohorts. Furthermore, deviance justifiability was also significantly higher among those with higher income and in new occupations.

As predicted, normlessness correlates with social values. Low social values are a good predictor for high deviance justifiability, confirming H10. Furthermore, OLS regression results from pooled 1995/2005 PC9 countries confirm Hypotheses 7 and 9. Higher deviance can be predicted through membership in a younger birth cohort (H7) or the high-income subgroup (H9). Hypothesis 8 is proven incorrect, since those in new occupations did not have higher deviance justifiability levels after controlling for other factors.

Reflections

One issue to be discussed is the impact of spirituality, or belief in God, within this study. The analysis showed the importance of god in general to be a major predictor for social values. In this case, might the faster decline in social values and rising deviance among the post-communist cohort be due to a lower level of spirituality? The answer appears to be no, since additional analysis shows that the ‘importance of god’ rises equally in all cohorts between the two waves.

We should also consider the impacts of our materialism variables, both in terms of material security (income) and aspirations (materialism and thrift). In each of these spheres, the cohort differences are telling. Not surprisingly, a larger proportion of post-communist respondents earn a higher income in 2005 than in 1995 compared to the other birth cohorts. Furthermore, a high materialism level (“importance of being rich”) and a low level of thrift valuation are strongly varying by birth cohort, with the post-communist cohort the most materialist.
and the least thrift-oriented. Each of these factors, high material security and aspirations, and low levels of thrift, is correlated with low social values and higher deviance justifiability. It is reasonable to conclude that this newest cohort’s individualization pace and normlessness is connected to its economic adaptive aspirations and success.

The confirmation of H2a over H2b is important, since these hypotheses have opposite implications. H2a implied that the new rich are pro-social because their material security has allowed them to adopt post-materialist values; this argument puts economic conditions (scarcity or abundance) at the forefront as a value change explanatory mechanism. In contrast, H2b looks at economic structure instead of economic conditions and therefore sees the new rich as representing the epitome of, not transcending, the values of the contemporary materialist economic culture: individualism and self-centeredness. The confirmation of H2b in this study is one of a structural value change mechanism over one related to immediate economic conditions, but questions remain. For example, is there a lag-effect whereby the presumed impact of material wealth upon post-materialist values for the new rich during the 1990’s will only show up later, or is their comparative desocialization more enduring?

The ambition and exploitation measures also deserve extra mention. Ambition alone does not appear to negatively affect social values. A possibility is that this effect occurs only when the character of the ambition is competitive and materialistic. In other words, those persons who are highly success oriented and believe that wealth can be accumulated without exploiting or competing with others do not suffer from the social values consequences of those who believe the opposite. Furthermore, against expectations, the chosen indicator for ambition posted a positive effect on social values. The indicator used asked respondents about the importance for them of achieving success, specifically recognition from others. This latter specification, one that linked success to others’ evaluations as opposed to internal self-generated success definitions, is one that may be responsible for the surprising result. Defining success in a manner explicitly linked to social recognition may not be a full exploration of the concept of ambition. It is possible that individualization could be exacted in a way whereby individual success is linked to social recognition, and thereby embodies high sociality. However, an adequate indicator for overall ambition de-linked from social recognition would serve as a good counterbalance for testing the impact of these two modes (internal vs. external) of success on one another in relation to social values.

Normlessness and ‘deviance justifiability’ are significantly linked to low social values, in accordance with informal social control theory. The author would have preferred to use indicators measuring deviance in relation to known or immediate others, more similar to the ‘lying justifiability’ indicator
LINKING NORMLESSNESS AND VALUE CHANGE IN THE POST-COMMUNIST WORLD

collected by the WVS in 1990 (but not thereafter). This is because informal social control effects would be theoretically stronger on deviant behaviours more closely linked to the intimate relationships that reinforce normative boundaries. Therefore, one would expect abstract state-targeted, or 'stranger-deviance,' such as that measured here (not paying taxes, falsely claiming government benefits), to be less linked to intimate social values than would be intimate deviance (e.g. physical abuse, lying, cheating, or stealing from known individuals).

On the other hand, 'homo-sovieticus' argumentations would especially presuppose that corruption and deviance against the faceless state were bred by the communist system, and such corruption today would simply be vestigial (e.g. Klugman 1986; Sztompka 1993; Tarasulo 1994; Wang 2002). Because of both of these arguments, the fact that precisely these abstract forms of deviance correlate to low social values and to the most highly adapted persons (from younger cohorts, new occupations, and the rich) is surprising. Such evidence may be a reminder against homo-sovieticus discourses assuming deviance to be solely a product of socialist remnants and the resulting mal-adaptation to capitalism. Rather it may be partially a byproduct of successful adaptation to capitalism.

Despite that the post-communists appear to be on a faster downward slope in regard to social values losses than those in other cohorts, there is still no explanation as to why post-communists would have a higher social values baseline, after controlling for material conditions and aspirations. Perhaps it is an age effect, whereby younger persons in general are more closely linked to their families and friendships than older persons, and thereby value them more. This study was not able to test this hypothesis.

**Shortcomings**

Any quantitative investigation of values, at best making use of loosely measured cognitive structures, is unable to elucidate the detailed change mechanisms, which may be provided by certain qualitative research. In turn, qualitative studies lack the generalizability made possible by representative datasets, such as the WVS. Indeed this article does not describe the precise pathways by which values become more or less social. Also, it is certainly the case that additional relevant factors should be continually sought for explaining the link between capitalist cultural transformation and effects upon intimate social values. Further research might also explore causal heterogeneity in regard to specific interactions between the country indicators and other covariates, either through a multi-level analysis or an OLS Regression with elaborated interactions involved; however, that was not the focus of this article.

In addition, no comprehensive normlessness model has been offered here. Rather, the study focused on linking normlessness to social values, as per the implicit assumptions of informal social control theory. The next step would be
to map out other key factors influencing normlessness, such as demoralization and ideological collapse, in post-communist space and to control for these alongside social values within one model.

It is argued here that the economic change characteristic of post-communist transformation results in a form of individualization. Of course, capitalist economic culture is deeply entrenched and adapting in the developed world and is still growing within the developing world. It would be useful to compare this study’s findings with economic-driven individualization in developed countries (for instance, in the OECD), compare social-democratic with liberal regimes, and compare developing with post-communist countries. An expectation might be that individualization is more ingrained within those regions most economically developed. Alternatively, a post-materialist condition may have indeed set in by which social values become more enhanced with economic growth.

Conclusion

Previous studies have hardly investigated social value change as a mediator between free-market transition and deteriorating normative power over the individual. Post-communist countries are the ideal places to engage in such research because the reintroduction of the free-market offers a unique opportunity to observe the effects of capitalist development upon individuals’ social values.

In order to avoid some misconceptions of what is presented here, two reminders should be offered. First, normlessness is influenced by more factors than capitalism alone. Capitalist culture may be one of many macro-level forces contributing to normlessness through their effects on individual-level social values. Secondly, it is not suggested that social values have deteriorated across post-communist societies in an identical manner because of structural economic change. Specific national and local value shifts are also certainly shaped by ideology, history, and culture, as made clear by the explanatory power of the country variables within this study.

Social integration and intimate social values are not inherently ‘good,’ more important than other goals, such as democratization or liberal values, or without drawbacks. Rather, social values are presented as valuable in this argument only from a perspective that prioritizes informal social control and normative regulation because of particular anomic consequences when they are lacking. Of course, there are also negative side effects to such intimate values, such as propensity to support political authority or to fall prey to deviance supported within a cohesive subgroup, such as a street gang or the mafia. Indeed, social values as defined here appear to be correlated with support of authoritarian leadership. Yet in contrast, they also highly correlate with items such as “I decide my goals in life by myself,” and “I seek to be myself rather than to follow others.” This suggests a more nuanced reading of these social
values than a term such as 'moral heteronomy' would suggest. These individuals may be highly self-directed, and even ambitious, but in a less competitive, more socially contextualized way. This, and the fact that social values are linked to a high propensity to want to help others, suggests that they should not be dismissed as the values of the authoritarian flock. Rather these values, and this shift, should be seen as more complex than a binary reading of either 'socially intimate and politically dependent' or 'socially distant and politically independent' would suggest.

In any case, a focus on fundamental sociality, the valuation of the interpersonal face-to-face tie, may serve to broaden value discussions that have tended to view economic development as a panacea. In the meantime, there are also temptations to believe the opposite, that normative and social-integrative decline is an inalterable consequence of economic growth. Between these two poles, a route forward may be to consider individualization as a process of fundamental multi-valence, as one that generates complex effects of positive, negative, and as of yet indiscernible qualities.

REFERENCES


SOCIALIZATION OR CONTEXT?
PATTERNS OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN AND ROMANIA

MĂLINA VOICU¹ AND EDURNE BARTOLOME PERAL²

ABSTRACT. Europe experienced few waves of democratization after World War II, transition to democracy occurring in different social, economic and political contexts. The present paper focuses on the way in which pre-democratic situation and the socio-economic context during democratization influence learning of support for democracy and compares the dynamic of support for democracy in Spain and Romania, during the post-totalitarian period. The two countries belong to different waves of democratization and having a different totalitarian past (fascist for Spain and communist for Romania). Using data provided by Eurobarometer for Spain (1986 -2010) and by Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer and Standard Eurobarometer for Romania (1990-2010) we decompose the social change in changes due to cohort replacements and transformation produced by the contextual effects. The results of the cross-classified fixed effects models (CCFEM) indicate strong effects of the socialization under the communist regime and significant contextual effects for both countries on support for democracy³.

Keywords: support for democracy, post-totalitarian transition, age-period-cohort models

Introduction

During the past decades a transition process from totalitarian regimes to democratic ones occurred in both Southern and Central and Eastern Europe. Some Southern countries have experienced a transition from fascism to democracy, while in Central and Eastern Europe communist political systems were replaced by democratic ones. One would expect that the ideological differences between the old regimes have an impact on the new ones. One

---

¹ GESIS, Liebniz Institute, Cologne and The Research Institute for Quality of Life, Romanian Academy of Sciences, Bucharest, e-mail: voicu.malina@gesis.org
² Deusto University, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Humanas, Bilbao, e-mail: edurne.bartolome@deusto.es
³ This work was carried out at the European Data Laboratory for Comparative Social Research (EUROLAB) at GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. Access to the EUROLAB was supported by the European Community under the “Structuring the European Research Area” specific programme Research Infrastructures Action in the 6th Framework Programme.
would also expect, however, that even if the totalitarian regimes in South and East were different in nature, the transition from totalitarianism to democracy deeply affected the political culture in these societies in more or less the same way. The new democratic institutions are, after all, in need of being legitimized and the political values of the population have to change. Spain and Romania are instances of the two old regimes and they share the same kind of democratic transition. What we want to do in this paper is to compare what happened to the political values of the Spanish and Romanian populations sharing the same kind of transition process and having different totalitarian experience.

After the civil war of the 1930s, Spain between the ’40s and 1975 was subjected to Franco’s fascist regime which forbid basic civil liberties, did not allow the official existence of opposition parties and isolated the country from the rest of Europe, and installed an autarchic economic system. From a political point of view, the country was divided between leftists and francoists, polarization being the keyword in describing the Spanish political culture after the civil war. However, starting with the ’60s economic strategy changed and an autarchic system was replaced by an open market economy, while borders were opened both to foreigners visiting Spain and to the Spaniards working abroad. The result was a period of significant economic growth, modernization and de-polarization, which helped in changing political values and attitudes. Transition to democracy began when Franco died and it was a smooth process, political changes being negotiated and agreed by all political actors. After the transition period, Spain was integrated into European Union and experienced significant economic growth, while democracy was consolidated.

As all the countries from Central and Eastern Europe, Romania got a communist regime after World War II. And this lasted till its not so velvet revolution of 1989. The totalitarian regime was imposed by the Soviet Union, while the majority of the population did not support it. As elsewhere in the region, the communist political authorities repressed the political opposition, restricted civil and political liberties and started political indoctrination of the population in order to increase the legitimacy of the new regime (McGregor, 1991). During the last 25 years of the communist regime, Romania was governed by president Ceauşescu, whom imposed a ‘sultanistic dictatorship’ (Linz, Stepan, 1996). The extreme personalization of power during Ceauşescu’s time drastically reduced institutional autonomy and pluralism, while political repression was more severe than in most other communist countries. As a result, at the end of the communist regime, there was neither a reformist opposition inside the communist party, nor a democratic political movement as alternative to the communist party. When Ceauşescu’s regime collapsed in 1989, it did not happen in a peaceful way as was the case in the other communist satellites, but was accompanied with violence.
The transition in Romania meant not only political transition as in case of Spain, but involved also an economic transition from a state owned command economy to a privatized market one. The economic transition involved high social costs. Poverty, unemployment and inflation increased dramatically during the first decade of post-communism (Zamfir, 2000). During the second decade, the economic situation recovered, the country joined NATO and the European Union.

What we find interesting in a comparison of Spain and Romania is that both societies went through decades of totalitarianism before democracy prevailed. This means that some birth cohorts have had experiences prior to totalitarian times, other cohorts have been socialized during the totalitarian regime and still other cohorts have only direct knowledge of democracy. Therefore a comparison between the two countries allows tracking how attitudes towards democracy have been crystallized under different pre-totalitarian, totalitarian and post-totalitarian conditions. Moreover, both countries benefited by higher and persistent level of support for democracy in the beginning of transition (see Weil, 1989 for Spain and Evans & Whitefield, 1995 for Romania). In that sense, we expect some similarities and some differences in the way pro-democratic values and attitudes have been generated among Spanish and Romanian citizens.

Research questions

The purpose of this article is to analyze whether, and if so, how and how far support for democracy has been settled in Romania and Spain, and how these attitudes developed over time. In order to gain understanding of how time plays its role in the acquisition and settlement of supportive attitudes towards democracy, we are going to explore this aspect from a three axis perspective. Firstly, we will take a look at cohort effect. More precisely, we will analyze whether, and if so, how the common experiences of these cohorts had an impact on supportive attitudes. Secondly, we look at period effects. We will analyze whether, and if so, how specific events at specific moments in time may have also played a relevant part in this process. And thirdly, we look at age effects, as a way to measure if there is an effect of the life course on support for democratic procedures.

We especially aim to identify if and how socialization during a totalitarian political regime shapes support for democracy on the long run. Controlling for contextual effects and for individual aging, we investigate the effect of early socialization on support for democracy in two different post-totalitarian societies: a post-communist and a post-fascist one. We are not so much interested in comparing levels of support for democracy, but sooner in the pathways and mechanism of building support for democracy in Spain and Romania.
Using pooled survey data from various sources (Standard EuroBarometer, Central and Eastern European Barometer, Candidate Countries EuroBarometer and European Values Survey), we decompose the social change in support for democracy over the post-totalitarian period, in Spain and Romania, with Cross-Classified Fixed Effects Models, in changes due to socialization, to historical context and to aging.

The paper contains five parts. The first one is dedicated to a literature review on political support and mechanism of changing in political values and attitudes. The second one comprises the description of data, of variables employed and the methods used in the analysis. The third part describes the results, while the fourth discusses them. The final section is devoted to conclusions and recommendation for further research.

**Theoretical Framework**

*Theories regarding the acquisition or change of political support for democracy*

There are several approaches which try to explain how supportive attitudes towards democracy arise in society. One approach considers the cultural factors as the driving forces behind changes in political attitudes. According to this perspective, individuals acquire through the socialization process their identification with the political system (Mishler and Rose 2007). Each generation becomes political conscious in different historical moments, under different economic conditions and is socialized in a specific and distinctive way.

Another approach takes an institutional perspective. According to this theory, individuals assess, evaluate and reconsider their support subject to the current circumstances. Weil (1989: 683) argues that political support should be understood as a balance between citizen demands and the State capacity, and this support depends on two main aspects. It relies on the one hand on the performance, and the perception of individuals of the capacity of the State to respond to the citizens’ demands. On the other hand, it depends on the structure of opposition, the functioning of the party system, the coalition forms, cabinet stability, etc. The evaluation process occurs under different conditions of stability, with distinctive consequences. In stable societies, as Mishler and Rose (2007:823) point out, the sense of continuity leads only to small changes in those attitudes. Societies which suffer significant transformations, however, may witness large alterations in the political attitudes of their citizens. The cultural and institutional approaches are sooner complementary than mutually exclusive.

Evans and Whitefield (1995: 485-6) provide a third explanation for the preconditions which help the settlement of democratic support in new established democracies. The authors pay special attention to the combination of different factors such as modernization, the negotiation of the transition process, and
the way in which the market economy works. Modernization, understood as increase of living standards, growth of private ownership, emergence of a middle class, and an improvement of education enables support for democratic procedures. Moreover, the impact of modernization on support for democracy is facilitated by the conditions related to the state structures and institutions, and also by the way in which democratic regime transition occurs.

**Cohort replacement versus intra-cohort change**

According to theories of social change, changes in social values and attitudes may occur as a result of two mechanisms: through cohort replacement and through intra-cohort change. The first mechanism relies on the assumption that values and beliefs are formed during childhood and youth and remain stable during adult life. As cohorts age, they are integrated into occupation, family and other social networks, which presumably leads to a greater stake in maintaining the status quo (Danigelis, Hardy & Cutler, 2007: 814). Social change then results from cohort replacement; younger cohorts socialized in a different social and political context replace the older ones.

As Mannheim (1952) and Ryder (1965) have pointed out, early formative experiences leave an imprint on the values and attitudes of generations or cohorts. Each cohort will significantly differ from the others depending on the type of social, economic and political conditions experienced during the formative period. The differences among generations with respect to attitudes and value orientations reflect a historically specific set of conditions, resulting in a permanent ideational or cultural imprinting that generates a momentum of its own (Alwin, 1990: 348). Inglehart (1990, 1997) underlines the effect of social wealth and economic prosperity during the youth period on the post-materialist value orientation of the younger cohorts, socialized in advanced industrial countries after the Second World War. Moreover, major social, cultural and political events such as wars, national crises, economic recession and even election campaigns leave an imprint on the values shared by the younger cohorts (Sears & Valentino, 1997; Ester, Mohler & Vinken, 2006), as a generational effect emerges ‘on issues that become highly salient in one specific historical era’ (Sears & Valentino, 1997: 47).

The mechanism of intra-cohort change assumes that social change is the result of changes in individual values due either to social, economic and political events experienced during adulthood, or to lifecourse events. Sears and Valentino (1997) point out that large-scale events, such as the Great Depression, World War II and the Velvet Revolutions, make new issues salient in life and may cause changes in early orientations. Dalton (1994) considers learning from other nations as a process influencing political socialization in adulthood. The author shows that the adult population of East Germany has learnt democratic support from the example provided by Western Germany.
Starting from the assumption that the theoretical approaches of support for democratic procedures mentioned above are complementary rather than antagonistic, Rose, Mishler and Haepfer (1998) and Mishler and Rose (2002) elaborated the *lifetime learning model*. According to this model, support for a political regime is acquired during early socialization, but can be adapted during adulthood. If the political regime is effective, the output strengthens the experiences accumulated during the primary socialization and support for the regime increases. If the output is not satisfactory in the long run, support is eroded and decreases.

There is no consensus with respect to the effect of aging on political attitudes. Previous studies have tested three competing hypotheses aiming to explain the impact of age on political attitudes and values (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991; Marwell, Aiken and Demerath, 1987; Danigelis, Hardy and Cutler, 2007). The “impressionable years” hypothesis suggests that younger adults have less stable attitudes tending to change them according to the circumstances. The “aging-stability” hypothesis states that attitudes become increasingly stable after a specific point in life. The symbolic vs. non-symbolic attitudes hypotheses points out that symbolic attitudes are highly stable over time, because they are acquired during pre-adult socialization and have strong affective origins. The non-symbolic attitudes have a more cognitive origin and tend to be less stable in time. (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991; Danigelis, Hardy and Cutler, 2007). These studies show that generally speaking it is difficult to conclude that aging predicts changes in political attitudes, even though for specific attitudes and under specific conditions, the life course does have an effect.

Consequently, one can assume that cohort replacement takes into account the early socialization experiences and is likely to be a main factor in support for democracy in stable political regimes, as new cohorts learn early in life that the political regime is the only legitimate one. Contextual influences are more likely to occur in countries which have experienced a change in political regime. The historical context affects mainly adult cohorts, which have already internalized support for one political regime, but they adapt their values to the transforming environment. Aging is rather a stability factor, no major changes being reported due to passing from one stage of the life cycle to another, no matter which society is under investigation.

**Hypotheses**

The two countries considered in the current analysis share a common totalitarian past. Part of their adult populations have been socialized under a non-democratic political regime. They have internalized and unconsciously adapted their individual value systems to the ideological and political values embedded in the former system (Berend, 2007). Democracy was a new phenomenon for them, and the new regime was challenged to reshape citizens’ beliefs into a culture compatible with the democratic system (Dalton, 1994). The rapid
introduction of democratic institutions in societies dominated by non-democratic norms created cognitive dissonance (Mishler & Rose, 2002), and the older cohorts were 'forced' to adopt norms and behavior appropriate to the democratic system. In such cases, intra-cohort change was the main mechanism of social change, with adult cohorts changing their norms and values. Therefore, we expect to find significant differences between cohorts socialized during the totalitarian regime in both countries and younger cohorts socialized mainly during the new political regime. Moreover, as we have pointed out before, rapid social change significantly influenced the values and attitudes of both Spaniards and Romanian, during the transition period.

However, the two cases differ in many aspects. Not only the political history and nature of the totalitarian political regime was different, but also the way in which the transition started and developed. Moreover, the economic and political conditions after the regime change were dissimilar. Romania has a pre-communist democratic legacy thanks to the period between World War I and World War II, which has helped it implementing the new democratic institutions (Pop-Eleches, 2007). Thus, some older cohorts were socialized during a democratic period and have some experience with a non-totalitarian regime. On the other side, there are young cohorts born after 1985 and socialized mainly during the post-communist democratization, which are more likely to be supportive towards democracy as compared to cohorts socialized during communist time, as we have argued before. We expect to find significant inter-cohort differences for Romania, those cohorts which came into age during communist time being less supportive towards democracy as compared to pre-communist and post-communist ones.

On the other hand, in Romania, as in other post-communist countries, the new democracy came under great pressure when economic reforms resulted in inflation, unemployment and poverty (Linde & Ekman, 2003). During the first decade of post-communist transition Romania experienced a significant economic crisis, which has eroded the initial reservoir of support for democracy, existing from the honeymoon period (Sandu, 1996). Thus, we expect to find negative intra-cohort changes due to the economical output, at least for the first period of transition.

In the case of post-fascists regimes in Southern Europe, the situation is rather different from that in post-communist societies. Data from Spain shows that the higher level of support in the beginning of the transition (the honeymoon effect) persist even during the economic crises which have affected Spain during the consolidation of democracy (Montero, Gunther and Torcal, 1998). The reasons for these high and consistent positive attitudes towards democracy are related to the intense modernization and social transformation of the Spanish society during the democratic transition and consolidation. The decline of social polarization during the transition served as a necessary condition for the consolidation (McDonough, Barnes, Lopez Pina, 1994). Political learning, before-after evaluation, modernization, development of a market economy, accompanied by the erosion of aspects which sustained the old regime, such as agrarianism,
illiteracy and higher religiosity, played a central role in the generalization of support for democracy. According to McDonough, Barnes and Lopez Pina (1994: 352), growth and equity were the key elements to settle the Spanish democratization.

The contextual changes strengthen the support for the new democratic regime simultaneously among all cohorts. We expect that changing attitudes towards democracy will be due to intracohort change. We also expect to find significant positive contextual effects during the entire period under analysis for Spanish society. However, the Spanish population has experienced a truly democratic regime only after 1975 and many of the adult cohorts were socialized in a totalitarian society. Therefore, we expect to find stronger support for democracy among younger cohorts, born and socialized during post-totalitarian transition.

As we have argued before, we do not expect to find significant effects produced by aging, because political attitudes and values remain stable during the adulthood and old age. However, we will control for age in our analyses because we aim to disentangle the effects produced by the three processes: population turnover, intra-cohort change and aging.

Based on the theoretical framework presented above, we have formulated the following hypotheses:

- **(H1)** There are significant intra-cohort changes in both Spain in Romania, but operating in different directions. Contextual effects boost support for democracy in Spain and erode it in Romania.
- **(H2)** There are significant inter-cohorts differences in both societies.
  - **(H2.1)** Spanish cohorts socialized during the democratization period are more supportive to democracy, as compared to the pre-democratic ones.
  - **(H2.2)** In Romania, there is a higher support for democracy among cohorts socialized during pre and post communist time as compared to those born and socialized during the communist period.

**Data and measurement**

The dependent variable taps support for democracy measured by the answers to the question: How satisfied you are about the way in which democracy works in [country]? Very satisfied/satisfied/not very satisfied/not at all satisfied. We have recoded the answers into a dummy variable, so that the dependent variable takes value 1 if the respondent declared to be satisfied or very satisfied with the way in which democracy works in his/her country and 0 if the answers were not very satisfied or not at all satisfied. We have chosen this indicator to tap support for democracy because it is the only one available for both longitudinal and cross-sectional comparisons.

We have used age as independent variable, tapping the respondent's age at the survey moment. No other significant control variables are available, due to different coding used in different surveys included in the analysis. Some descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables are provided in Table 1 for the Spanish sample and in Table 2 for the Romanian one.

### Summary Statistics for Support for Democracy and age, cohort and period variables in Romania (1991-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy (dummy)</td>
<td>1=declared support 0=withheld support</td>
<td>14545</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Respondent's age at survey year</td>
<td>15707</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort</td>
<td>Five-year birth cohorts</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Survey year</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Pooled datasets from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, Standard Eurobarometer and European Values Survey for Romania. Authors' analysis.

### Summary Statistics for Support for Democracy and age, cohort and period variables in Spain (1986-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy (dummy)</td>
<td>1=declared support 0=withheld support</td>
<td>18246</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Respondent’s age at survey year</td>
<td>19287</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort</td>
<td>Five-year birth cohorts</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Survey year</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Pooled datasets of Standard Eurobarometers of Spain. Authors’ analysis.
Method

The separation of Age, Period and Cohort effects is one of the biggest challenges in the study of social change, due to identification problems (Period=Age + Cohort) (Firebaugh, 1997). Yang & Land (2008) propose Hierarchical Age Period Cohort (HAPC) models to overcome the identification problems. The authors apply multilevel cross-classified models, on repeated survey data, aiming to investigate the clustering effect of the contextual research units, namely the birth cohorts and the survey year, on the variation of the dependent variable. This technique allows for separate estimation of the age effect for each cohort by period cell (Schwadel, 2010).

According to Yang and Land (2006, 2008), using multilevel modeling, one can estimate separately the effect of age and the effect of birth cohorts and period, because age is an individual characteristic and it belong to the level -1 of the multilevel model, while birth cohorts and survey years (which tap the historical context) are contextual variables, belonging to the level -2 of the model. Moreover, cohorts and periods are rows and columns in a matrix of cohorts by period, which represent level -2 of the multilevel model. These models are based on cross-classified hierarchical models and assume that individuals are simultaneously nested within cohorts and historical context, the willingness to support democracy being determined by both birth cohort and the specific historical context at the same time, while keeping the effect of age under control.

Within the framework of the HAPC models we have chosen Cross-Classified Fixed Effects Models (CCFEM), because in these models, the fixed cohorts and period effects 'are partial regression coefficients that represent the net effect of each cohort and period, controlling for all other cohorts and periods' (Yang and Land, 2008: 316) and we need to estimate the specific differences between cohorts due to our hypotheses. Because our outcome variable is a dummy one, we have employed hierarchical logistic regression. The fixed regression coefficients and the odds ratios of the multilevel models allow estimation of their effects on the target variable for each cohort, while the fixed coefficients and odds ratios for each survey year permit the estimation of their impact on the changes in support for democracy. Both survey years and birth cohorts are second level variables. The fixed coefficient and the odds ratio for age allow the estimation of their net effect on the dependent variable, at the individual level.

In the current analysis we have used 5-year birth cohorts for both countries. For Spain the first birth cohort includes people born before 1905 (N=72), while for Romania before 1915 (N=78). For both countries the last birth cohort consist of people born after 1990 (N=139 for Spain, N=78 for Romania). The CCFEM estimates the effects of 18 cohorts and 17 periods in Spain and 16 cohorts and 13 periods in Romania, using the first year and cohort as reference category in both countries. Basically we have controlled for age at
level 1 and for the combined effect of cohort, coded as dummy variables for the 5-year cohorts, and of period, coded as dummy variables for each survey year. Our full model is shown in the equation (1) for Spain and in the equation (2) for Romania:

\[
SUPDEM_{ijk} = \theta_0 + \pi_1 \text{AGE} + \sum_{j=2}^{18} \pi_{1j} \text{Cohort}_j + \sum_{k=2}^{14} \pi_{1k} \text{Period}_k + e_{ijk}. \tag{1}
\]

\[
SUPDEM_{ijk} = \theta_0 + \pi_1 \text{AGE} + \sum_{j=2}^{18} \pi_{1j} \text{Cohort}_j + \sum_{k=2}^{14} \pi_{1k} \text{Period}_k + e_{ijk}. \tag{2}
\]

We analyze the data in two steps. In the first one, we have run partial models for both Spain and Romania, controlling only for age in order to estimate the variance components for cohorts and period. Since CCFEM does not allow the estimation of these variance components when controlling for each birth cohort and each period, we run some partial models before running the fixed models. In the next step, we have run the CCFEM for Spain and Romania as described above.

**Analyses and results**

The results of partial models are shown in Table 3, for both Spain and Romania. They indicate very small effects of age on support for democracy, as we expected. In Spain the fixed coefficient for age is significant, due to the large number of cases (N=18246), but the effect on the outcome variable is marginal. The variance components for cohort and period are both significant in Spain and Romania, but the contextual effects are much higher as compared to the cohort’ ones. In both countries context exerts a more important effect on support for democracy than socialization does. However, the cohort effects are higher in Romania than to Spain.

**Table 3.**

Partial models: Cross - classified effects for age, period and cohort in Spain (1986 - 2010) and Romania (1991 - 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Romania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.366 ***</td>
<td>-0.683 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.007 ***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance components</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort</td>
<td>0.011 ***</td>
<td>0.026 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>0.143 ***</td>
<td>0.280 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Pooled datasets from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, Standard Eurobarometer and European Values Survey for Romania. Pooled datasets of Standard Eurobarometers for Spain. Authors’ analysis.
The results for CCFEM for Spain, shown in Table 4, indicate that there is no effect of aging on support for democracy, as expected. The fixed effects for the birth cohorts point out a lack of impact of early socialization on support for democracy. We have used the first cohort as a reference category and the data in Table 4 show no significant differences among various birth cohorts. Contrary to our hypotheses, socialization under the totalitarian regime has no impact on support for democracy in Spain. The likelihood for supporting democracy is the same, no matter when the person was born and socialized. However, a careful investigation of the CCFEM results indicates some differences between cohorts, even if not statistically significant. Thus, odds ratio show an increase in support for democracy among younger cohorts. Basically, support for democracy seems to be more popular among people born after 1945 and is increasing in each new birth cohort. People belonging to the younger cohorts have a higher probability to support the democratic regime.

The data indicates stronger contextual effects, support for democracy significantly increasing in 1990, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2005 and significantly decreasing in 1988, 1993 and 1995. The changes seem to be induced by the different phases of the business cycle, boom boosts the support, while bust erodes it. The results support the idea that political support highly depends on economic success or failure. Good economic performance consolidates support for democracy.

Table 4.

### Cross-classified fixed effects for age, period and cohort in Spain (1986 - 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual effects</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>1.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>1.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1905</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>1.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1910</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>0.941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1915</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>1.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1920</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>1.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1925</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>0.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1930</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>0.932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1935</td>
<td>-0.203</td>
<td>0.816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1940</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1945</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>1.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1950</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>1.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1955</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>1.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1960</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>1.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1965</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>1.437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1970</td>
<td>0.506</td>
<td>1.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1975</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>1.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1980</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>1.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual effects</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Odds ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1985</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>1.730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1990</td>
<td>1.120</td>
<td>3.064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Odds ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y1988</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>0.883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y1989</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>1.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y1990</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>1.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y1991</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>1.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y1992</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>1.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y1993</td>
<td>-0.503</td>
<td>0.605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y1995</td>
<td>-0.497</td>
<td>0.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y1997</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>0.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y1998</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y2000</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>2.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y2001</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>1.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y2002</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>1.964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y2003</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>1.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y2004</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>1.614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y2005</td>
<td>0.583</td>
<td>1.791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y2010</td>
<td>-0.233</td>
<td>0.792</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Pooled datasets from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, Standard Eurobarometer and European Values Survey for Romania. Pooled datasets of Standard Eurobarometers for Spain. Authors’ analysis.

**Table 5.**

| Cross - classified fixed effects for age, period and cohort in Romania (1991 - 2010) |
|---------------------------------|-------------|------------|
| Individual effects             | Coefficient | Odds ratio |
| Intercept                      | 0.162       | 1.175      |
| Age                             | -0.002      | 0.998      |
| Cohort                          |             |            |

| C1915              | 0.062       | 1.064      |
| C1920              | 0.034       | 1.034      |
| C1925              | -0.223      | 0.800      |
| C1930              | -0.223      | 0.800      |
| C1935              | -0.398      | + 0.672    |
| C1940              | -0.281      | 0.755      |
| C1945              | -0.401      | + 0.670    |
| C1950              | -0.447      | + 0.640    |
| C1955              | -0.536      | ** 0.585   |
| C1960              | -0.465      | + 0.628    |
| C1965              | -0.584      | ** 0.557   |
| C1970              | -0.517      | ** 0.596   |
| C1975              | -0.267      | 0.766      |
| C1980              | -0.333      | 0.717      |
The results for CCFEM for Romania are shown in Table 5. Age has no effect in the Romanian case, too. The fix effects for the birth cohorts indicate different socialization effects of the communist regime on support for democracy. Our reference category for cohorts is the first one which includes people socialized in the more democratic context of the pre-war Romanian society. As compared to this cohort, the six cohorts born and socialized mainly during the communist regime are significantly less supportive to democracy. Thus, people who have spent at least 18 years under the totalitarian communist regime and were socialized by the communist institutions significantly differ from the cohorts born and socialized in prewar or post-communist society. There are no significant differences between the reference cohort and the other cohorts born in pre and post-communist period. However, even if they do not significantly differ from the reference category, the youngest cohort, born after 1990 seems to be the most supportive one.

The fixed effects for the survey year indicate a strongly significant impact of the context on the dynamics of support for democracy. The reference category used in the analysis is the first year for which we have available date, namely 1991. As in other post-totalitarian societies, Romanian society experienced a honey-moon period in the beginning of transition (Sandu, 1996). Compared to the following years the level of support for the new democratic political regime was higher in 1991. In the other years the contextual effect was in many cases a negative one. The economic crises experienced by Romanian society during

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pooled datasets from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, Standard Eurobarometer and European Values Survey for Romania. Pooled datasets of Standard Eurobarometers for Spain. Authors’ analysis.
the first decade of the transition, as well as the new global economic crisis seem to seriously erode the support for the democratic regime.

The support for democracy was significantly higher, as compared to the honeymoon period, for only two years of the post-communist transition, namely 1996 and 1997. This was the period when the democratic opposition won the elections and replaced the former communists in government. The democratic change of political power showed that democracy worked and this boosted the support for the new regime. On the other hand, there are no significant differences between the reference category and year 2008, which was immediately after the Romanian accession into European Union. It was probably another honeymoon period which enhanced support for the current political regime.

For both societies under investigation, the current analysis indicates no significant effect of aging on the variation of support for democracy and very strong and significant effects of the political and economic context. The good economic performance of the Spanish post-totalitarian government increased support for the democratic regime and helped consolidation of the democratic regime. In Romania, the good economic performance of the democratic system boosted the legitimacy of the new regime, while the bad economic performance constantly eroded the support for the democratic regime.

The two societies differ from the point of view of the socialization effects of the previous political regimes on variation in support for democracy. While in Spain all the cohorts are equally supportive to democracy, in Romania the cohorts socialized in the communist society are significantly less supportive as compared to the ones socialized during the more democratic pre-communist and post-communist contexts. As compared to the fascist regime in Spain, the communist one socialized the Romanians in a more totalitarian political culture leaving a more durable imprint on the individual value orientations.

Conclusion and discussion

Discussion

The results partially support our expectations. We have found significant contextual effects on both societies under investigation. In Spain intra-cohort change enhanced support for democracy in most of the years of the post-totalitarian transition, due to the good economic performances of the democratic regime. In Romania, the political and economic context eroded the initial support for the new regime, because of the lack of positive economic outcomes. These results are in line with our expectation. However, the data does not support our hypothesis referring to the inter-cohort changes for Spain. Basically, Spanish people are equally supportive towards democracy, no matter when they have been born and socialized. In the following paragraphs we will
try to formulate an explanation for these results. For Romania, however, we found significant effects, in the expected direction.

Reisinger et al. (1994) talk about three different sources of political values: political culture, indoctrination and modernization. Political culture has its roots in the history of each society and, in this respect, the consolidation of democratic values depends on the historical events experienced by each society. Indoctrination refers to the regime’s efforts to inculcate certain political values to the population and this is one of the main characteristics of the communist regimes from Central and Eastern Europe (Reisinger et al. 1994; McGregor, 1991). Modernization and its associates, industrialization, urbanization and education, shape political values, making people more willing to live in a democratic society. We assume that each of the three components has contributed to shaping the support for democracy in Spain and Romania, producing dissimilar effects on different birth cohorts.

The two countries under investigation have different historical experiences which conducted to different political cultures. Not only the type of the totalitarian political regime was different, but also the ways in which the totalitarian regimes were installed and disestablished are different. In Spain, Franco’s regime was supported by a significant part of the population in the beginning, which opposed another significant part of the population. Polarization was the key concept of the Spanish political life during the totalitarian period, while depolarization conducted to democratization (McDounough, Barnes, Lopez Pina, 1994). According to the mentioned authors, depolarization occurred because of processes like modernization, economic growth, secularization and changes in social doctrine of the Catholic Church.

Depolarization was a gradual process, due to new macro-economic policies and the fact that some of the political leaders of the new regime tracing ‘their roots to the technocratic developmentalism and limited pluralism of Francoism’ (pp. 357). On the other hand, the political doctrine of the Catholic Church changed during the 60s and 70s (Huntington, 1991. This new orientation delegitimized the ultra-rightist or clerical fascism (Lipset, 1994) and opened the road for democratization of the Christian conservative parties. Basically, the new political regime had a ‘backward’ legitimation (Di Palma, 1980), which helped to transfer part of the support for the old regime to the new one. Thus, the new regime received part of its legitimation from the former one and the support for last regime converted in support for the new one. In this way, generations socialized during the totalitarian regime adapted their values and converted their support for one political regime into support for the newly established one, which explains why all the cohorts are homogenous regarding support for democracy.

Romania has had a different totalitarian and post-totalitarian experience. The communist regime was imposed by an external conqueror, the Soviet Union, while the support for communist ideology was very low among the population
in the very beginning of the communist period. The new political leaders imposed by the Soviet Union started a very strong indoctrination of the entire population, as elsewhere in the region (McGregor, 1991). The communist regimes were very aggressive in obliterating all others cultural orientations and replacing them with the 'official political culture' (pp. 183). Various agents of socialization were involved in this process, like schools, mass-media or peer-groups. In Romania the communist doctrine was taught in school from the first grades, while political enrolment started at the age of 6 and was compulsory for all the children attending schools. The communist regime has had a very important socialization impact on the political values shared by the generation which grew up during the totalitarian time, which explains the significant and persistent inter-cohort differences in support for the democratic regime.

Modernization is another issue which induces differences between the two cases. Spain is and used to be a wealthier society than Romania was and is. At the start of the transition, the Human Development Index was 0.766 for Spain and 0.723 for Romania⁴, which indicates a gap in social development of the two countries. According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005), human development brings a change in value orientation and a higher support for democracy and democratization. Thus, the Spanish cohorts socialized during the Franco’s regime have a higher likelihood to share democratic values as compared to the Romanian cohorts socialized during the communist regime. The difference arises not only from the type of regime itself, but also from the level of development existing in each society at the moment when democratization started.

Thus, there are not significant and persistent inter-cohort differences in Spain, because the depolarization of Spanish society, converted part of the political support for the old regime into support for the new political regime. In the Romanian case, strong political indoctrination practiced by the communist regime made a serious imprint on the political values of the generation socialized during the totalitarian time. Moreover, the gap in modernization and in human development between the two countries make Spanish more inclined to support democracy in the beginning of transition. While the political culture theory and modernization theory explain why there are no cohort effects in Spain, indoctrination and the lower level of human development explain why there are persistent cohort effects in Romania.

**Conclusions**

The paper focuses on patterns of support for democracy in Spain and Romania and tries to explain how changes in support for democracy have occurred during the post-totalitarian period. The analysis disentangles the effects of intra-cohort and inter-cohort changes in support for the democratic

---

⁴ Data retrieved from UNDP website (www.undp.org) at 20.12.2010
regime, in order to detect which was the main mechanism which conduces to building a persistent support for the new political order. The study employs longitudinal data on support for democracy coming from various waves of Standard Euro Barometer, Central and Eastern European Barometers, Candidate Countries Barometers and European Values Survey and uses Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort Models for testing the research hypotheses.

The results partially support our hypotheses, indicating significant contextual effects for both societies, rather positive ones for Spain and mainly negative ones for Romania. The data shows that good economic outcomes helped building significant support for democracy in Spain, while economic crises eroded legitimacy of the new regime in Romania. There are some negative contextual effects in Spain and positive ones in Romania, but generally speaking the post-totalitarian context boosted support for democracy in Spain and corroded it in Romania.

The data confirms the cohort hypothesis only for Romania, showing that pre and post-totalitarian cohorts are more willing to support democracy as compared to the ones socialized during the communist regime. For Spain, the cohort hypothesis is rejected. Our tentative explanation for this result resides on the idea of converting support for the previous regime into support for democracy during the depolarization process which occurred during the post-totalitarian transition in Spain. In Romania, the lower level of human development and the strong indoctrination practiced by the communist regime, kept the inter-cohort difference still alive.

The results of the current research show how democracy consolidated in Spain and how the new political regime built a reservoir of diffuse support. However, the continuous and significant erosion of support for democracy caused by the contextual effects does not explain how democracy still benefits from a reservoir of support in Romania. The data shows that this erosion is complementary to significant inter-cohort differences. Old and young cohorts have internalized the democratic values more than the adult ones and the democracy benefits by a reservoir of diffuse support provided by these generations.

Further longitudinal researches should investigate this evolution and should also try to detect which contextual factors exert negative and positive effects on support for democracy in both countries. Classical theories of political support refer to economic performance or corruption. Longitudinal analyses can detect the contribution of each component to building or eroding support for the political regime. On the other hand, our results show positive intra-cohort changes among the young generations in Spain, but the differences are not significant. Further longitudinal research should approach this research topic as well and should identify the exact moment when socialization in a complete democracy makes a difference between generations and cohorts.
REFERENCES


Methodological Forum

Editorial Note:

Following the series of methodological discussions, this issue presents Gergő Pulay’s account on ethnographic fieldwork as a learning process mediated by close interactions and language, based on his own experiences of research on urban marginality in Bucharest, and Călin Cotoi’s inquiry into the history of Romanian sociology, in the quest for a meaningful linkage with social theory.
ABSTRACT. This text is based on the experience of a long term fieldwork in an impoverished urban setting of Bucharest. The aim of the article is twofold. First, it highlights some of the conditions that reproduced the poverty of poverty research in social sciences – especially in disciplines that rely on ethnographic methods. Informed by these concerns, the second part of the article provides a reflexive account on fieldwork as a process, showing how different situations and stages of involvement in a community open up situated sources of experience that constitute the researcher’s knowledge. As a non-native speaker of Romanian, I put special emphasis on the question of language as a medium of understanding the categories and distinctions by which people organize their social worlds. Language and interaction provide the elementary units which make fieldwork similar to any other learning process.

Keywords: fieldwork as process, ethnography, urban marginality, public space, language and interaction, researcher and informants

Introduction

Methodological texts written by ethnographers are not always considered to be trustworthy readings. In order to fit the requirements of a scientific method, these accounts tend to claim that personal choices were indeed necessities, and that the author’s own strategy should be taken as a recipe of efficient research conduct in general. Usually such texts come out after the publication of articles and books with higher academic evaluation. This is one of the reasons why it is easy to take them as simple rationalizations, aiming to universalize situated acts and events which already happened, so it would be impossible to change them anyways.

Accidents, unexpected encounters, difficult and changing personal alliances or deviations from previous concepts and theories are inevitable parts of fieldwork as a process. Ethnographers who claim that the distinct character of their work is due to the navigation in these shifting circumstances are often criticized for imposing a biased, subjective and personal agenda on their readers.
According to this criticism, for them it is just a set of sentimental stories and moral tales that stand for professional achievements. Sometimes it seems as if the readers would have to be more interested in the personality of the author than the actual case under scrutiny. The lengthy descriptions or quotations from interviews are presented as scientific evidence but their analysis might be deficient – especially when the author fails to convince us that a preferred interpretation must be the valid one over others. In this case, what is introduced as ethnographic is just another aspect of self-appraisal since it has little to convey besides the repeated statement of being there. One way of avoiding these pitfalls is to take on a reflexive exercise and to consider what Sudhir Venkatesh calls the social production of the ethnographer: it means to investigate the conditions that made the completion of a certain study possible, including the question of how researchers are viewed by informants (Venkatesh, 2002).

### The poverty of poverty research

Debates amongst the researchers of poverty and social marginality provide many examples for the strategic usage of the criticisms summarized above, particularly in US scholarship. Regardless of the historical or political situation, these topics are always hot issues. This fact guarantees that the related scholarly debates become heated, passionate and controversial. A partner in a dispute might attribute problematic points to another one who claims that these points have never been made. Or perhaps they both use the word “ideology” or “ideological” as a pejorative label in order to discredit the other’s account because it “distorts reality”. At the same time it is because of the very hotness of these issues that academic accounts on ghettos and dangerous places, hustlers and down-and-outs, can aspire to success in the non-academic segments of the book market. The mission of “fighting against stereotypes” or “giving voice to the excluded” can be used as an excuse for resorting to journalistic solutions in the field of social sciences.

These topics are conceived as problems not only in the academic sense of the word – referring to a set of research questions – but also in vernacular terms, as in the notion of “problem-families” and in the context of policy making under labels like “social integration”. Accordingly, scholars are urged to turn their results into plans for intervention. As it often recurs, the requests to make statements and give recommendations come way before the research process would have arrived at a phase we might define as a middle-range theory. In the need to fulfill all requirements, scholars make an urgent switch from the

---

2 Good examples can be found for this in the debate provoked by Loïc Wacquant’s severe and extensive criticism of American urban ethnography (Wacquant, 2002). For a summary of the debate, see: Chaddha-Wilson, 2009.
scale of their empirical findings to high levels of abstraction labeled by general concepts like "poverty", "exclusion", "the Roma" or "the Afro-Americans". At this step speculation can become inevitable, which then leaves room for controversies and translates into the criticism of being "ideological".

These political and moral conditions have a decisive role in the processes that have kept the studies of poverty and social marginality at a relatively poor level of theorization. As in many other research fields, some of these processes seem to be based on the repetition of dilemmas that originate from the founders of the field. In the anthropological study of poverty this role belongs to Oscar Lewis, inventor of the – indeed, controversial – concept of the culture of poverty. Lewis's theoretical input regarding the interplay of structure and agency was rather vague, some of his statements contradict each other and his listings of behavioral patterns were only substitutes for a definition of culture. His major concept was based on an intuition he had way before he would have been able to work through the research material he collected with his collaborators amongst poor families in Mexico or Puerto Rico. In this sense his work remained unfinished – in spite of all the volumes he wrote in the genre of ethnographic report. His books became widely successful and his style influenced even those who criticized him or intended to overcome the pitfalls associated with his work and career. In the midst of the heated poverty-debates of the 1960s, this genre of writing allowed readers to attribute almost any kind of political intention to his statements on a left-right scale. Lewis believed that basic structural changes in society and the redistribution of wealth are the major prerequisites for eliminating the culture of poverty. However, his accounts on families and individual persons became the target of harsh criticisms for providing academic support for the American folk-theory, which considers poverty as an individual failure before anything else.

"Blaming the victim" became a main catch-phrase in the context of these heated debates. As William Julius Wilson argues, putting the emphasis on the role of structure (in the sense of low incomes, joblessness and bad housing) or culture (that translates into attitudes, tendencies, and the resulting behavior of people) in the reproduction of poverty came to be perceived as mutually exclusive choices of analysis, derived by ideological or political convictions (Wilson, 2009). Claiming to speak for the poor or else taking part in their empowerment, researchers often reproduced these divisions which came to be perceived as more and more insurmountable. As part of the same vicious circle, some representations were criticized for "blaming the victim" while others were seen as "sanitizing the poor" and their social suffering.

---

3 Amongst the books of Lewis there is a rarely quoted volume of essays which provides a rich overview of his work and the topics he was interested in (Lewis, 1970).
4 For an intellectual biography of Oscar Lewis, see: Rigdon, 1988.
It is not difficult to acknowledge the highly unfruitful nature of these debates. In such a context high revelation could be made by scholars who understood that violence “from below” is above all a reaction to structural violence, or that inhabitants of stigmatized areas tend to internalize the stigma and then target it towards others – all of which leads to the total fragmentation of these communities (Wacquant, 2008). Similar revelations could be made by the description of underground economies that develop in territories abandoned by the state, where local institutions – like churches or civic associations – have entered into shady businesses even if their ultimate goal is to eliminate them (Venkatesh, 2006). In the light of these debates it was also a powerful statement which pointed out the connection between the distrust towards corrupt local authorities and the emergence of the “code of the street” which enables people to settle disputes amongst themselves (Anderson, 2000). It was also revelatory to figure out that drug-trafficking can be the most consequently color-blind employment sector for ghetto-inhabitants – even in the midst of projects aiming at equal opportunities (Bourgois, 2003). In order to position themselves, scholars from the field claim that they are daring to address these issues – even if they are aware of structural conditions and the risks of reinforcing negative stereotypes. As Philippe Bourgois notes in the introduction of his famous ethnography of Puerto Rican crack-dealers in East Harlem: “Out of a righteous, or a 'politically sensitive,' fear of giving the poor a bad image, I refuse to ignore or minimize the social misery I witnessed, because that would make me complicitous with oppression” (Bourgois, 2003: 12).

In fact, such controversies should be seen as being embedded into predominantly American academic and policy discourses as well as the changing political-economic conditions of the US. One might argue that the purpose of imposing these discourses in a European – and specifically eastern European – context is to suggest that governmental or non-governmental interventions in the field of poverty and social exclusion must be the same as on the other side of the Atlantic. Such examples had been conducive to the setting up of academic and policy-oriented discourses that dealt with the problems of poverty and ethnicity – or to put it differently “the Roma” – in post-socialist eastern Europe. In these conditions the Roma could easily become the victims of unbalanced comparisons. These comparisons are based on analogies set up between cases or groupings – minorities or diasporas – which are different in the sense that one of them entered the fields of recognition struggles and academic knowledge production earlier, so the other is defined as a latecomer in this context. Based on this relationship, unbalanced comparisons treat one of the cases as being a

---

5 Loïc Wacquant argues for the comparative formation of ideal types for the American ghetto and the French banlieu exactly in order to counter this trend of conflation (Wacquant, 2008).
6 The notion of the underclass was the focal point in a major debate of the period, see Stewart (2002).
normative model for the other. To give one example, during the last two decades it has become a general practice to use the notion of _ghetto_ with reference to divergent forms of spatial and social exclusion in eastern Europe. Such an umbrella term might be useful for raising funds and awareness but its analytic function is more questionable as it conflates ethnically mixed and homogenous contexts, as well as rural and urban settings, where poverty can be found. Strategies of interpretation based on such concepts tend to reproduce exclusion on an analytic level as they represent the social worlds of the marginalized as being separate and fully secluded from the more respectable domains of society.

### An obsession with the low

As everyday forms of contemporary Romanian anti-Gypsism suggest, the low qualities associated with the Roma are often localized in marginal settings but the forces attributed to marginality are also seen as threatening with invasion, hence being capable of absorbing people and places without respect to ethnic categories. In everyday talk it is common to hear about cases in which Romanians feel insulted after being confused with the Roma by foreigners or being called into question because of them. In most cases, the stories of such incidents and the vernacular forms of anti-Gypsism accompany each other; at least the switch from one to the other seems to be quite obvious for the speakers. The references to such insults can provide justification for drawing a strict boundary between _our_ culture and the incompatible _Gypsies_.

My original research proposal included a multi-sited fieldwork in the various locations where these symbolic conflicts are taking place. In my imagination all of these sites were connected by the production and consumption of _manele_, a Romanian ethno-pop genre, which is considered to promote the “values” of the Gypsies, even though it is also embraced by large sections of the non-Roma Romanian majority. As a form of expressive culture and an object provoking heavy criticism, this musical genre seemed to crystallize most of the conflicts I hoped to understand. I thought I could do research in which music provides a certain junction that allows me to connect the issues of the self and the other, social aspirations and actual inequalities, self-colonization or the

---

7 For the Serbian case, see: Port (1998).
8 I have to note here that the usual form of self-designation amongst the Roma people in the neighbourhood of my study is _Gypsy_ (tigan), which they change or specify only if they refer to their sub-ethnic lineages, such as _spoitori_ (tinsmiths) or _lăutari_ (musicians). These labels refer to traditional occupations, so they do not necessarily reflect the actual work people do in the present. When someone uses the word Roma in the neighbourhood, it means usually that the respective person has connections with some Roma NGOs, or has some aspirations towards these organizations. These are the reasons why – besides the category of Roma – I use the term Gypsy both when I refer to the categories used by outsiders and the terms people use themselves for identification.
visions of order and disorder with a specific role attributed to the Gypsies. My assumption was that such an analysis can provide an alternative to much of the music studies I knew that tended to treat music as an object in itself made up by instruments, sounds and lyrics instead of pointing out its social embeddedness, which explains why music is so important for the people both as something to like or hate. My experience was that the (otherwise rather small) literature on manele and the analogous popular genres in south-eastern Europe did not manage to go too far in these directions.9

The first period was rather difficult after I arrived in Bucharest in late 2008, even if I was lucky enough to have friends in town from the very beginning so I was not exposed to loneliness too much. I gradually realized that the idea of multiple sites translated into a total mess once I tried to put it into practice. The crystallizations and symbolic struggles were truly omnipresent: they were everywhere and nowhere at the same time. The call for “behaving in a civilized way” or “not being antisocial” could be heard from the public address systems in Bucharest’s markets, buses, or in political speeches. My interest in the visions of order and disorder, the obsession with the low and the struggle for its elimination – even the aim of meeting fans and opponents of manele – could have brought me to almost any location. It seemed to be as reasonable to study around the national parliament as in the poorest corners of town. I regularly attended concerts and other musical events, but I conceived them to be as pretentious as most of the fancy clubs downtown, so I usually left with dissatisfaction. Wherever I was, everyone seemed to be highly “civilized” (civilizat), and the enemies of civilization were always identified in someone else.

Using the concept of marginality – as it is understood in most urban ethnographies – can be problematic in the case of a post-socialist city such as Bucharest. Here the traits of marginality can also appear in zones which are identified as “central” while “marginal” areas can be seen as mirrors of the “center”, as they are pointing at its hidden or undesired characteristics. I developed a certain obsession with the rhetoric of marginality after going through so many conversations in which people with very different social backgrounds were all explaining to me how marginalized they feel in their country or society. I even tried to convince a filmmaker in Bucharest to make a documentary in which we would interview representatives of different social classes from the top to the bottom – starting with some of Romania’s leading intellectuals and politicians – just to ask them the same question, namely whether or not they feel marginal in their social environments. It looked like an interesting sample for comparison. This initiative was rather meaningful with regards to my desperate state of mind those days.

9 For example: Buchanan (2007).
In the context of my primary academic socialization, studying the manifestations of ethnicity and nationhood was a strong paradigm. The role of Gypsiness was apparently crucial in the discourses and struggles I was mainly interested in. However, the way I perceived ethnic boundaries in practice was hardly fitting the frameworks I thought to rely on. Ethnicity studies have a certain tendency to focus on situations when the relevance of ethnic categories is due to their exclusiveness and to the acts of closure in which they are deployed. Alternatives to this approach have been elaborated under familiar labels such as hybridity or creolization. Nowadays it is rather an ambiguous enterprise to go on this path, designated mainly in the 1990s when the usage of these concepts became fully imbued with normative and celebratory references to the brave new world of our common boundless future.

In Bucharest, the pervasive nature of the low was reflected in the concept of țiganie, since an actual neighborhood or settlement is only one of its possible references. Calling something a țiganie did not even imply the actual presence of people with Roma origins. In this sense the very idea of țigan refers rather to a kind of social no-man’s land than to what social sciences tended to depict as an ‘ethnic group’. I gradually understood that my primary ethnographic exercise should be to understand this complex in which ethnicity as a matter is obviously part of a larger set of distinctions, as it can be often interchanged with other categories. It was already observed that Romania’s ethnic and regional diversity tends to be interpreted in everyday life as mediating more genuine distinctions – based on the virtues and deficits of civilization (Brubaker et. al., 2006). However, this interplay of social and ethnic distinctions gained little scholarly attention, mainly with regards to the troubled and complex relationship with the Gypsies. An overwhelming part of the classical ethnographic studies on Roma – especially in Eastern Europe – were either conducted in rural settings or else depicted their field-site and its social relations as determined by the quasi-rural division of the Roma and the peasant. Partially due to these conditions ethnographers focused on the regular maintenance of boundaries instead of the dialectics of transgression. While international migration created potential confusions between Roma and Romanians from the outside, intermixture was seen as threatening from within or from below. In this case the causes of unrest could be located in the territorially stigmatized neighborhoods known as “Gypsy areas”.

I thought that the only way out of the vicious circles of my inquiry was to give up the idea of studying multiple locations. I felt a compelling need to resort to a kind of anthropological study in which my perspective is primarily based on the position I acquire inside a certain space and community that I aim to understand. Choosing the neighborhood as a field site allowed me to preserve most of my initial ideas and interests while locating them in a limited
space where I could expect to develop durable relationships of intimacy. These conditions made it possible to grasp the struggles I was interested in their most immediate terms.

**Entering the ‘no-go area’**

It was hard to find another area in Bucharest that was subjected to such a drastic territorial stigmatization as Ferentari. Like the Gypsies in general or the Westerners’ opinions of Romania, the neighborhood also seemed to be something that many people know “very well” in Bucharest. As with these issues, in most cases this claim of expertise did not require any correlation with actual contact or experience. When I interviewed one of the retired leading architects of Bucharest’s Communist systematization, and told him briefly about my fieldwork, he said: "What do you want to study there? It’s a neighborhood without history.” Sometimes I entered into difficult negotiations with taxi-drivers in the center as I told them about my destination only on the way. In these cases the issue of the Gypsies tended to come up in our conversations: "where the Talibans live" – as some taxi-drivers said. Besides the explicitly criminalized images, the neighborhood could also be depicted as a zone of badly dressed people, dirty streets and dirty speech. Such visions of the low were often accompanied by the worries for those otherwise honest Romanians, who couldn’t help but fall down on the social ladder and now live in such an area of the city. At the same time there was another, more positive discourse which depicted the same place as a “last quarter” of Bucharest, in the sense that some of those relationships are still extant there which are usually implied in the notion of community.

During my first visits the neighborhood appeared to me as a perfect location for the kind of participant observation I intended to make. I was impressed by the vivid street life. I thought that the massive presence of inhabitants outside will provide me opportunities to develop contacts and relationships. People were using public space for various purposes such as car-repair, the cleaning of rugs or just hanging out and seemingly doing nothing in peer-groups, drinking, young men watching porn-clips on their mobile phones, playing the small drums known as tarabana, listening to music, or families holding street weddings. Contrary to the images of eastern European urban margins with endless lines of concrete blocks, a large part of the neighborhood resembled a village, both in terms of the built environment and people’s everyday practices. Besides these parts, two major housing types were reminiscent of the Communist era when the neighborhood was intended to become a worker’s quarter - in other words an urban melting pot of predominantly lower-class people.¹⁰ One

---

¹⁰ When I asked older inhabitants about what kind of people lived in the neighborhood those times, usually they referred to the “needy” (nevoiaşi).
of the ways to identify these two housing types was still to refer to the initial recipients of the flats. The first were the better-off blocks with two room apartments, hot water and heating which were once dedicated for members of the army. The second were the impoverished blocks with studio apartments which have no heating and hot water inside. These were once built for those workers who came to Bucharest without having a family (nefamiliști). The streets with this second type of buildings were sometimes also labeled as “ghetto,” mainly amongst the younger inhabitants. However, the most common way of identifying these buildings was to refer to the “junkies” (drogați) who were known to be concentrated in these blocks. The first studio apartment I rented in the neighborhood was in a building of this type. Shortly after I paid the first rent, someone broken into the studio while I was away. I was lucky not to have any of my belongings there at that point. Still, mainly because of my continuing plans for a long-term fieldwork – including the autumn and the winter – I decided to move to another place within the neighborhood. I found a friend willing to rent a place with me. We started strolling around the neighborhood and asking people whether if they knew of rooms or a flat that would be available for us. This is how we found the apartment that became our home for almost a year and a half.

The vagabond and the civilized

In the light of the widespread obsession with civilization (civilizație) in Romanian intellectual history, politics and the media, it is not a surprise that the same concept was a central one also for the inhabitants of this poor Bucharest neighborhood. It had been deployed regularly in the negotiation of space, and the private and public domains of everyday life. Inhabitants expressed their own understandings of what is and what is not to be “civilized” in these contexts. Subsequently, labels like “civilized” – or its opposites like “vagabond” or “homeless” (boschetar) – designated the practical choices I could make in terms of relationships and solidarities, and they defined the spaces of my daily activities.

After moving in to the neighborhood, many of my neighbors suggested I accept their common wisdom and not make friendships, don’t socialize with anyone in the street. As they were telling me, people might abuse my trust just to exploit me. When I asked why anyone would do so, the usual answer was that ”because they are vagabonds”. This approach to street-life was summed up by the common phrase “hi, hi” (salut, salut), which meant that the ideal way to avoid risk in public space is to exchange only greetings with neighbors – we cannot choose them anyways. This way the minimal respect is paid to other people but one should not go with them further than that. I felt that I had better chances to remain a “good boy” (băiat bun) in front of these people if I kept the strict rules of communication that they were telling me about. However, these suggestions were totally against my intentions as a fieldworker. One of
my neighbors, Uncle Ion\textsuperscript{11}, was an old man who lost one of his legs due to an accident that happened some decades ago when he was working as a stevedore. He liked to spend his time with sitting in front of our block on a bench, chatting with people and browsing in the street. He saw what I’m doing in the neighborhood day by day. This is how he shared his concerns with me once: “It’s better if you stay here and not stroll around; it’s not like in your town. These are junkies and nuts (nebuni). They ask for a cigarette and if you say you don’t have any, they will make a squabble and you are alone. That’s why I’m telling you; I know what I’ve seen. You are a stranger; you have no father, no mother here, you have no relatives. You have nothing. You shouldn’t trust anyone these days, especially here in this zone with all these madmen and junkies. They don’t know why you came here. You are a clever boy, intelligent; you are not a fool (fraier), you don’t want to be beaten up, right? Don’t go where they are playing music because there are always drunkards. Here is the money, bring me a beer. I buy one for you as well if you want” (fragment from the interview with Uncle Ion).

Exaggerations of personal righteousness are one of the recurrent forms of a general quest for respect and dignity in territorially stigmatized areas. Some neighbours told me recurrently, “you just walk a hundred meters here and you are in another world”. This statement was rather a typical example of the spatial distinctions with which the inhabitants divided their everyday surroundings – sometimes even two different sides of the same street – in a meticulous manner, hence creating complicated moral cartographies of the places and people around. The meaning of the practical and symbolic work that my neighbors invested into their “civilized” environment became particularly clear to me on a summer day. That afternoon a drug addict died right in front of our block after a heroin overdose. My neighbors were keen on distinguishing our block and its most immediate environment from the general decay of the neighborhood and particularly from the area a few corners away that was commonly identified as nest of “the junkies” (drogaţii). As a matter of fact, the plot right in front of our block, behind a neighborhood heating house was a usual location for the homeless to make campfire and also the junkies to consume drugs. The death I witnessed was already the third case over that year which happened on the very same plot. After they were interrogated by the policemen and the ambulance took the dead body away, my neighbors moved back to the small garden around our block, went on cultivating the flowers and chatting about how Ceauşescu’s times were better. After all of this, they began to reproduce the sense of their immediate space as being civilized.

There were different understandings of civilization amongst those youngsters who were regularly hanging out. Giovanni – as his friends called him – was a young man in his twenties who made his money by repairing cars and motorbikes. His father was from a family of Gypsy musicians (\textit{lăutari}). During

\textsuperscript{11} I changed the original names of all the characters in this text.
Communism he played the double bass at weddings and other celebrations to earn additional income to his wage labor as a factory worker. It was at that time when the father met his future Romanian wife, Giovanni’s mother. Giovanni had a brother, who was known as Lorenzo amongst friends. He was a worker in a printing house, later he was fired due to the crisis and became jobless for a longer time. The brothers both considered themselves to be Gypsies, though sometimes they added that actually they are “halfies” (jumi-juma). Nevertheless, certain experiences and aspirations were much more important for them then these ethnic labels. As with many others, they considered the neighborhood as probably the worst possible place to live in Bucharest. They often recalled the nice and spacious house where they lived before they had to move here more than a decade ago, when their previous building was privatized. The memories of this earlier home still provided a source of distinction for them opposed to their actual living environment. By contrast to most of the young men from our street they did not socialize with neighbors too often but cultivating friendships with peers living in other parts of town. They were listening to rap and hip-hop instead of Romanian manele, the most common musical genre in the neighborhood. When they had money and spare time, they went to one of the largest public parks in Bucharest (far from the neighborhood) to smoke marijuana with their friends. No other thing could make the boys so excited as these trips. The journey from home to other friends’ places and then to the park had its own ritual. They dressed up in their coolest clothes, they were listening to music aloud from their mobile phones on the bus, while singing and clowning around. Last but not least, they were trying to enter into dialogue with the appealing young women who got in their way. Their usual strategy was to choose a girl, stand or sit as close to her as possible, and then start staring at her – without saying a word – until she responds, or just becomes embarrassed. It was exactly this that happened one summer day on the metro, when a security guard intervened and called for “civilized behavior” (comportament civilizat). The boys felt offended. The guard’s scolding provoked a debate on the nature of civilization. Lorenzo turned to the security guard: “we are very civilized, ok? My name is Lorenzo.” Following the general custom of youngsters in the neighborhood, he used English words to support his point with some additional emphasis: “I am a civilization man,yes?” Later we got off the metro but the discussion went on about the incident. Lorenzo addressed me by one of the names I had in the neighborhood and said: “You will see Grigore, you will go home to Hungary, but you’ll remain as insane (nebun) with this civilization thing as these people here in Romania. What does civilization mean to them? At least if we would have injured or beaten up that girl … but we didn’t. We were just staying on the seat and we tried to speak with a girl, a kind of ‘how are you doing’, wasn’t it civilized?” As a conclusion, Giovanni said: “I think this guard was drunk. I will beat him up if I see him around tomorrow”.
The scolding made by the security guard touched upon the boys' sense of respect in a moment when they were just about to reach a state that they associated with the diverse and multiple ways to be cunning, a "player" (*şmecher*). This included certain forms of hyperactivity, the body being in a stylish but constant motion, as well as certain forms of self-expression – speaking, singing or dancing – that are powerful enough to provoke and then preserve other people's attention, as a highly valued symbolic good. In ordinary situations of hanging out or wasting time in the streets, moments of boredom could easily turn into symbolic competitions for the attention of the others. Such situations provided the interactive frames for learning some of the skills associated with "cunningness" (*şmecherie*). These practices rely on a vision of the social world in which one has to navigate in highly unpredictable circumstances as it is impossible to be fully aware of the intentions and future action of others, and the codes of conduct are constantly redefined. Accordingly, the way to get a good position is to provoke attention and then preserve it as long as possible, mainly if the relationships of respect are not fully settled.

**Language and interaction**

My approach to street-life was determined to depart from the issues of language as I am not a native speaker of Romanian and I was still in the process of learning it when I moved to the neighborhood. My position as a stranger allowed me to rely on certain empathies from most people. When discussing my situation, they often recalled their own experiences as temporal migrants abroad, and their memories of being lonely or vulnerable. Moreover, this position proved to be useful because it allowed me to ask the exact meanings of categories that people used in their divisions of the social world. Such requests for explaining the situated meanings of words and phrases might not have been legitimate if I was recognized in the role of a native speaker. Most of my acquaintances appreciated that I speak only when I have something important to say or that I am available for discussing the big issues of life – opposed to what they considered to be the "rubbish" (*prostie*) of ordinary street-talk. In fact, these “rubbish” conversations were amongst the main mediums through which I could understand social distinctions.

My command of Romanian was criticized sometimes for following the standard version without too many slang formulas. According to this criticism, speaking the standard form of language means to show obvious signs of one's weakness, even homosexuality. The problem with the standard language was not only due to the lack of slang formulas. Above all, it was an evidence of being educated in the regular sense, in other words not having the “school of life” or the “school of the street”. In spite of its advantages, education in the regular sense makes people speak only one kind of language and deprives them of the
skill to speak in various ways – according to different situations, interests and interlocutors. Linguistic devices play a great part in the performances of toughness, but relying only on rude or aggressive verbal formulas is insufficient, as it is more important to be recognized as a master of code-switching.

Despite of the ethnically mixed population of the neighborhood, *Roma dominance* is also recognized by many of the non-Roma inhabitants in the field of expressive culture.12 Many of them use elements of Romani language in ordinary conversations – besides the general words and phrases known to be from Romani in vernacular Romanian. These expressive forms are seen as requisites of pragmatic efficiency, as they constitute a language of certain public affairs. At the same time the distribution of language skills in Romani does not follow a strict divide between those who are Gypsies and those who are not. Amongst the Gypsies in the neighborhood I often came across the phenomena that parents did not teach the Romani language to their children even if they were fluent speakers. It is appealing to interpret this strategy as a sign of aspirations for social mobility – especially in the context of a former “worker’s quarter”. However, this choice could also rely on more practical concerns, such as using Romani only between the parents or elder relatives when they discuss issues that the children were not supposed to know about. Some of these people acquired their Romani language skills “in the street” – exactly the same way as some of their Romanian peers. An old Gypsy man from my street liked to gather the local kids; he told them to sit down around him and then he would start teaching words and phrases in Romani – “a very useful language”, as he put it.

**Street-life and exchange**

After a while I reached a point when I could go out to the street almost any time of the day. I immediately found acquaintances I could join for a chat, for a drink or for a trip with someone’s car either for the simple joy of riding – especially if the car was a new acquisition – or with the purpose of making a deal and carrying some “merchandise” (*marfă*) from one place to another. When some of the guys saw how many times I exchanged greetings or small comments as I was walking along the street, they said that I was becoming a “boy of the quarter” (*băiat de cartier*). I thought that this is what success means during fieldwork. However, soon I started to feel that the façade of this overall success was still very much about the beginnings of getting involved. It is not possible to be in good terms or intimate relationships with everyone even on a

---

12 Les Back notes in his study of two multiethnic South-London neighborhoods that in mixed black and white peer groups expressive culture and linguistic appropriation provide one of the mediums through which elements of an ethnic culture transform into class culture as part of the local practices of indusion (Back, 1996).
single street. On a few occasions after coming home in the company of a certain
group, some of the other guys – whom I knew well from around the corner –
would behave as if they didn’t even recognize me. Most of these friendly circles
were rather exclusive, and guys from a certain corner usually claimed that they
“don’t know” the others who were doing more or less the same as them, the only
difference being their activities occurred some tens or hundreds of meters away.
If people from one of these groups or places saw me with others, later I had to
listen to long speeches about what “dummies” (figuranti) the others are and
how I’m doomed to failure if I keep on socializing with them.

These statements were reflecting some of the rules that organized the
activities of hanging out or making friendships in the street. These practices
could provide access to resources such as information about opportunities to
make money, exchanging services in the form of barter, getting food, drinks or
other products from a shop-keeper for cleaning or providing some other kind
of help around the place. Trust and debt had a particularly important role in
most of these practices. Although it was hardly possible to establish a whole
livelihood on these resources available in the street, these opportunities were
still important especially for those who were moving back and forth between
the states of having temporary jobs and being fully out of work. Having
trustful relations and being visible on a daily basis around a corner or another
similar public location meant having a share in the symbolic ownership of that
place. Most of these public activities were done only by men. As a single male
researcher, I had access to women only in the roles of wives, mothers and
sisters of the men I knew. In order to balance this situation, I started to make
interviews with women in their households together with a female colleague.

To get involved into any of these circles was possible by entering into some
forms of exchange with its members, in other words to “make a combination”
(combinatie). For example, as part of such combinations I could give my room
to a good friend so that he could meet his girlfriend there. Another friend of
mine was trading with clothes in the winter, but in the summer he usually
got to Spain with his accordion and made money there by playing in terraces.
His problem was with concurrency since there were many other Gypsy
musicians on the streets of Spanish cities, playing more or less the same thing.
He understood though during his previous trips that the Spaniards like tango
and waltz a lot, so he decided that during the winter he’ll learn as many tunes
as possible from these genres and by the summer he will develop a fully new
repertoire. My role was to search the internet and download music for him.
These forms of exchange did not have to involve money.

Indeed the images of the neighborhood as a dangerous place can be
opposed with examples of how secure it could be for someone who is living
there, has stable relationships and some experience about the local ways of
getting by. One evening I met Liviu in the street while I was on the way to a bar in order to meet my flat-mate and some musicians who were playing there almost every evening. As Christmas was approaching, Liviu carried a big bag which was full of the presents he bought in a market for his children that same day. I suggested he join me. Even though he liked the idea, he found it embarrassing to enter the bar with this huge bag in his hands. During the day Liviu worked as a vendor in an outdoor market but in the evenings he liked to sing. That's why he had a certain collegial approach to the musicians who were playing that evening. After a few seconds of thinking he threw the bag on a pile of garbage, knowing that it will all look the same, so his bag won't be taken away. As it turned out on our way back, he was right.

One evening I met a young man whom, at that point, I knew only distantly through some of his relatives. I said “Hi, what are you up to?” His answer was the following: “Hi, I'm a pickpocket.” I didn't know what to reply to this, so I just asked, “Really?”, and then he said, “yes, why? In your country there are no pickpockets?” After this introduction we started discussing his experiences from the prisons of Greece and Spain – organized by the central theme of why Spanish prisons are better than their Greek counterparts. Following this, he continued with the question as to whether I had been offended, robbed or had any other problems since living in the neighborhood. I was never robbed or offended so I said no. He continued by making a contrast between, on the one hand, the external images of the neighborhood as a “dangerous” place, and on the other, the actually “peaceful” and “normal” life that can be seen only from within. My impression was more or less the same. Friends from the city and some of the teachers from the local primary school kept on asking me whether I was scared. It felt as if we were speaking about two different places.

The men who were regularly out in the streets had a different relationship to the junkies compared to my respectable neighbors. Although they spoke about them in a similar deploring way, they still entered into exchange with those they knew by person. Junkies were often selling various objects in the street – be it mobile phones or weapons. Once a junkie was showing a gun to us and a negotiation started about the price. As the discussion was going on, he held the gun to my head – only “as a joke”. A friend of mine pushed the gun away from my head saying that we are brothers (fraţii) and therefore I shouldn't be harmed. The others knew that I was still uneasy about always treating such “jokes” in the right way.

Obviously, joking is one of the best ways of gaining linguistic and cultural competence in any environment. Pretty much the same ways as it is with smaller beatings or pretended scuffles that can be part of friendly interactions, it is often not obvious if a certain comment or gesture is made in order to pick on somebody or whether it is just the parody of that intention. The reference
to joking can also be a pretext to avoid conflicts between people or different groups. One evening we were staying around the corner when Claudiu arrived, a young man from a family of Gypsy traders. He was furious because of an identity check by policemen who were searching for drugs and dealers in the neighborhood. Such identity checks were disappointing and sometimes humiliating experiences for my acquaintances who had nothing to do with drug trafficking. In the middle of his account about this bad experience, he turned to me and said “I had enough of this game, I know that you are also an undercover policeman, just show me your certificate!” Apparently there was no irony in his voice, and his experience that day also made me think that he is serious about this idea.

I always paid a lot of attention to giving precise and comprehensible explanations to the people in the area about who am I, about what it is to do fieldwork, what is to be a doctoral student, to have a scholarship or to write a thesis. I was particularly sensitive to being labeled as an undercover policeman ever since some people from the margins of my local network started to spread exactly this gossip about me. Back then it required several days to bring my discussions back to the otherwise usual topics, to clarify the obvious difference between my conduct and that of an undercover policeman – as people usually put it: “he has his own profession” (el are meseria lui). The power of such a label is that there cannot be total evidence in one’s defense if it is imposed and taken seriously. It is even more so the case in an area where it is part of the common sense that several policemen are working undercover, my friends even knew some of them by their face.

Such ideas were running through my mind when Claudiu brought up the label of undercover policeman with reference to me. I took out my wallet, showed him my student ID and said, “Here you are, this is my permission”. I couldn’t mask that I am annoyed, as I was translating the words on my student ID into Romanian. The guys were in silence for a few seconds while they passed the ID from one hand to the other. “It was only a joke”, they commented. Apparently I forgot that the main feature of such situations is that – as long as possible – they should not be taken seriously. In this case, I truly felt like a “fool” (fraier). As Claudiu concluded, “It would have been better if you are one”. After all, the frames of our interaction and the presence of the peers – who considered the whole situation to be a joke – allowed us to end up with a different, ironic understanding of the situation opposed to the one at the beginning. Getting involved and gaining trust in the street was about succeeding in such performances.

Concluding remarks

Studies of poverty and social exclusion are often criticized because of their poor level of theorization. This is largely due to the politicized nature of the debates into which they are embedded. The research topics of scholars
from these fields tend to be *hot issues* regardless of historical moments, political and economical circumstances. Due to these conditions researchers often face much higher expectations regarding their results than the ones they can actually live up to. Being asked to provide general conclusions regarding disadvantaged peoples, scholars often enter into speculations. Later on, while debating each other’s work, they reflect upon these conditions by using the label of *ideology* in order to question or even discredit the opponents.

Categories like *community, respectability* or *antisocial* provide resources also for the residents themselves in poor areas. As the scholars, they use such terms strategically while making distinctions between “inside” or “outside” in terms of space and belonging. In conditions of urban marginality inhabitants struggle to pull themselves out of their unfavorable circumstances. One of the few available resources for this is to show the proof of value, worth or the quality of immediate spaces – such as the household – they inhabit and strive to control. These strategies are crucial in situations where structural problems accumulated by the wider society are turning into personal problems and practical challenges faced on a daily basis. Long term fieldwork in a territorially stigmatized area of Bucharest allowed me to grasp these struggles in their immediate forms. In this context, the categories such as “civilized” and “vagabond” or “cunning” and “fool” are central to the ways in which inhabitants organize their perceptions of the social world. Entering this space in the role of an ethnographer implies that one’s own activities are also categorized by such concepts on behalf of the informants. During my fieldwork I could be a “good boy” for some of my neighbors, but this role would have implied giving up almost the entire research plan I had in mind. My fieldwork became a project of learning “in the street” whether in terms of language skills, the everyday practices of getting by or the possibilities and limits of developing trustful relationships. This process is not equal to the romanticized ethnographic tale of becoming an insider; it is rather about gaining legitimacy as a student in the local “school of life”.

**REFERENCES**


JOTTINGS ON THE HISTORY OF ROMANIAN SOCIOLOGY

CĂLIN COTOI

ABSTRACT. Social sciences are, usually, in the uncomfortable position of having to earn their scientific credentials in order to be able to intervene in politics. In the interwar period, Romanian sociology put itself, with remarkable few afterthoughts, in the service of the nation-state. During the communist regime in Romania, authoritarian politics of science were imposed in the area of social expertise. Sociologists responded by silently subverting the hierarchies of scientificity and scholarship legitimacy. Paradoxically, this subversion is one of the roots of the inability of present day sociology to connect, in a meaningful way, with social theory.

Keywords: Marxism-Leninism, hegemony, social sciences, ideology, science, multilevel models

Introduction

In the history of Romanian social sciences, there usually are chronological landmarks that cut more or less neat historical periods: interwar, socialism and post-1989 (Larionescu 2007). The continuities and ruptures are, nevertheless, not so easy to situate in well-circumscribed historiographic boxes. The present paper proposes an approach that uses the customary three periods while trying to discover continuities and traditions that cross over the conventional boundaries. The grid I use in this reading of the history of Romanian sociology is one imposed by the relationships between social sciences and politics and the (potential) critical stance sociology was able to use at various historical moments. That is why I believe that what happened with and inside social sciences during the so called “socialist times” is of utmost importance for understanding the history and the present day Romanian sociology.

In order to have a better understanding of the avatars of social sciences in Romania, a simple historical enumeration of academic institutions, departments, reviews or books can be misleading, therefore, a wider, regional and theoretical contextualization is necessary. A very short detour through a possible Gramscian understanding is an important step in this direction.

1 University of Bucharest, e-mail: calin.cotoi@sas.unibuc.ro.
2 This paper was written with the support of the CNCSIS research grant nr 2077, IDEI programme, and the postdoctoral programme POSDRU ID 62259.
Hegemony and tradition

Antonio Gramsci’s use of the word “hegemony” (Gramsci, 1971) is notoriously ambiguous (Williams, 1960). It is usually understood as culture plus power and seen as a “critical” addition to the so-called anthropological meaning of culture – which generally signifies not much more than a coherent symbolic system, or, as Clifford Geertz more elegantly put it, after Max Weber: the spinning of “webs of signification” (Geertz, 1973). Hegemony is seen as opposed by counter-hegemony currents in the same way the local is seen as confronted and engendered by the global. This meaning of the term is apparently suitable to describe the role played by Marxism-Leninism in socialist countries, especially in its relationships to other self-proclaimed scientific discourses. Nevertheless, at a closer look, hegemony – understood this way - seems to convey nothing more than a vague idea of domination and to set us on the sterile trail of discovering authentic counter-hegemony movements and inventing fatuous dissidences and/or resistances.

On the other hand, John and Jean Comaroff’s attempt to put hegemony to use in an anthropological setting – by stabilizing its meaning through comparisons with ideology and culture – offers too narrow a definition of “hegemony”, as the opposite of ideology:

Whereas the first [hegemony – C.C.] consists of constructs and conventions that have come to be shared and naturalized throughout a political community, the second [ideology – C.C.] is the expression and ultimately the possession of a particular social group, although it may be widely peddled beyond. The first is nonnegotiable and therefore beyond direct argument; the second is more susceptible to being perceived as a matter of inimical opinion and interest and therefore is open to contestation. Hegemony homogenizes, ideology articulates (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991: 208).

The division suggested here is inadequate to describe the relationship between historical materialism and the social sciences in socialist Romania, where historical materialism was subverted by other hegemonic discourses that had “scientificity” or “nation” as their central value. The subversion was indirect and partial, as Marxism-Leninism was never contested, but constructed as the “empty slot” of scientific discourses. I intend to use, in this paper, a larger definition of “hegemony,” as the dominant discourse that is never confronted head-on – with the exception of real dissidence – but may be silently subverted and displaced by other hegemonic discourses, giving birth to a fractured landscape of hegemony (Scott, 1985).

The ways in which social sciences came to be structured in the interwar period - as scientific discourses on the nation - provided a template, in a totally different political and social environment, for the legitimization and re-institutionalization of social sciences in Socialist (and National-Communist)
Romania. I believe it would be misleading to imagine the situation of social sciences in socialist Romania as swinging back and forth from the meta-narrative of Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism to down-to-earth empiricism. The influence of structural-functionalism (especially R. K. Merton) but also French structuralism was quite important in providing a so-called “opening” to sources of Western “scientificity” that were to be, implicitly, surreptitiously or even in a “dissident” manner, opposed to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. An analysis of the position acquired by social sciences – which were banned as 'bourgeois' in 1948, reinstated in 1965 and then banned again in 1977 – has to take into account how they were situated vis-à-vis the actual hegemonic discourses of the period (seen as dynamic and shifting) and how they were involved in power plays amongst various factions inside the Party.

In mapping external discursive influences, a simple "borrowing" model – which is potentially essentialist – is, obviously, not sufficient. More revealing of the real position of social sciences inside hegemonic ideology would be an attempt to show the strategic way "marginal" thinkers applied the ideological and scientific discourses of the more or less "canonical" West (functionalism and structural-functionalism) or East (Marxism-Leninism) to solve local and national problems and appease local concerns.

The particularity of thinking at the margins is, probably, that it tries to maintain a resemblance to the “core” theories, that legitimize the marginal, Central and East-European scholars, as scholars, while attempting to use the same theories for purposes for which they were not originally intended. The case of the socialist period is complicated by the fact that the interwar source of canonicity: the West (mostly German and French sources) was criticized and subverted by a politically powerful and state-enforced discourse: Stalinism.

The Marxist-Leninist hegemony was resisted, yet, at the same time, accommodated and shown a more or less genuine respect during the Stalinist period. This remained the case, even when a shift had occurred in the official hegemonic discourse (Verdery, 1991), during the process of nationalization of the communist ideology (Gheorghiu, 1991: 443-56). The shift was never complete and cultural wars (Antohi, 2007) were started inside the hegemonic political-cultural position. It would take a more thorough and in-depth investigation than the present one to analyze the relationships between political cleavages and cultural polemics in socialist Romania. For the social sciences, which were only marginally dragged into the main cultural war between the so-called “protochronists” and “synchronists” (Verdery, 1991), the recourse to "tradition" became a feasible and important strategy.

Tradition – understood as imagined (Anderson, 1991), or even invented (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1977) – is important for analyzing how Romanian sociology, in the 1960s and 1970s, tried to re-construct disciplinary and historical genealogies in the same way that, in a larger cultural setting, interwar culture was selectively reincorporated in the cultural and scientific national canon (Verdery,
The gambit of "scientificity" was at this time played on a heterogenous field defined by historical materialism, Western structural-functionalism, empirical research and fieldwork and, interwar models of "national science".

Social sciences and national sciences

One model for understanding the tensions underlying social sciences in Central and Eastern Europe is provided by the classical dichotomy that counterposes two ways of doing social sciences and ethnology: Volkskunde and Völkerkunde; science of the people and science of the peoples. Apart from the fact that this classification seems parochial, it is, I think, not sensitive enough to political factors and it itself needs to be examined and deconstructed in a wider theoretical and historical setting (Bausinger, 1969).

George W. Stocking Jr. introduced an important distinction between two different ways of "doing anthropology": "nation-building anthropology" and "empire-building anthropology" (Stocking, 1996). Put simply, these two anthropological discourses are anthropology (social and/or cultural) on the "empire-building" side, and ethnography or folklore on the "nation-building" one. I think that Stocking's differentiation, while a bit too schematic, has the great advantage of speaking for itself and introduces the element of politics in any understanding of academic and disciplinary development, an element that is essential for grasping the history and present configuration of social sciences in Eastern Europe. The weak aspect of this binary model lies in its neglect of the existence of the German or Hapsburg empires in Central and Eastern Europe and in the construction of a too clear cut distinction between ethnology and sociology. Uli Linke's attempt to critically synthesize these two classifications/models opens a potentially fruitful perspective on Eastern European social sciences. In his view, both kinds of social science/anthropology have their roots in the symbolic concern with otherness when it assumes, systematically, political dimensions (Linke, 1997).

Social knowledge was transformed into an agent of power appropriated as an instrument of domination in the 'civilizing' and 'domesticating' efforts of the state. In England, the orientation of social inquiry was outwardly directed, influenced by the colonial encounter with distant peoples in the overseas empire. In other parts of Europe, such as Scotland or Germany, the quest for social knowledge was inwardly directed, motivated by problems of national identity and political disunity (Linke, 1997: 99).

Thus, by participating in different political tasks, anthropology (Völkerkunde) and folklore (Volkskunde) became separate academic fields. The study of folklore (Volkskunde) can be linked to two distinct political trends: romantic nationalism and administrative particularism (Bausinger 1969, Linke 1997). If the romantics used folklore as an ideological discourse in their quest for national unification, administrators saw a political application of folklore in the management of
populations. The emergence of the population as a target of folklore research finds its early beginnings in the pragmatic concern of the German states (and, to some extent, of East European countries), not, as is generally assumed, in the ideological concerns of the German romantics. In fact, neither Johann Gottfried Herder nor Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm ever used the term *Volkskunde* (Bausinger, 1969).

In Uli Linke's view, *Volkskunde* even remained "the verbal emblem of the administrative tradition until the second half of the XIXth century, when the name acquired romantic connotations by association with the English term "folklore", newly coined at that time" (Linke, 1997: 108).

The rise in the importance, professionalism and institutionalization of the social sciences in Romania began in the interwar period. Almost all of the ethnography and sociology of that era was constructed in a *Volkskunde*, nation-building setting (Mihailescu, 1995). Another important feature was the relative marginalization – paralleled by a partial cannibalization - of ethnography/ethnology as a nation building science, by the emergent sociological-mono-graphical school of Dimitrie Gusti.

Gusti (1880-1955) is considered to be the founder and head of the so-called "Bucharest Sociology School". He was an important scientific figure, albeit mostly from an institutional point of view, in Romanian interwar social sciences. He constituted sociology as a hegemonic, nation-building science in the context of post-1918 Romania. The 1920s brought tremendous territorial and institutional change to the Kingdom of Romania. Provinces, formerly part of the Hapsburg Empire (Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina), or of the Russian Empire (Bessarabia) were incorporated into Romania at the end of 1918. The task of integrating a demographically, socially, institutionally, economically and culturally very diverse population was huge. Romania underwent fundamental changes as it struggled to integrate, in a very short span of time, the newly annexed provinces into the fully-fledged mechanism of a nation state.

In 1914, the Old Kingdom of Romania had an area of 137 903 square kilometers and a population of 7 771 341. The territory of Greater Romania had expanded to 295 049 square kilometers by 1919 and the population of the new state now numbered 14 669 841. By 1930, the population had risen to 18 057 028. The country was rural and had a small industrial sector. The proportion of ethnic minorities hugely increased from approximately 8% (mostly Jews) in the Old Kingdom to almost 30% in the new Romania (Anuarul Statistic al Romaniei 1929-1930). This huge increase in the heterogeneity of the Romanian state brought a strong ethnic dimension to the rural/urban divide, creating the perceived problem of an ethnic Romanian peasantry confronted with a mostly "foreign" urban population. In Irina Livezeanu’s view, a “bitter struggle between peasant and urbanite, between village and town, between Romanian and foreigner ensued. Many Romanians viewed this as a battle over the very survival of their rightfully enlarged state” (Livezeanu, 1995: 11).
Apart from their direct territorial and institutional effects, the 1920s led to a new pattern of relations between national-culture experts on the one side, and state bureaucrats and political elites on the other. A new generation of intellectuals, educated in the new Romanian academic system, who derived their legitimacy from an expertise in the national culture, but also from their mastery of occidental scientific canons, collided with the older, established generation of national-culture experts and, even more importantly, with the new political and state elites, less dependent now on legitimacy from this new intelligentsia, and less able to absorb the huge mass of cultivated youngsters produced by the national educational system. The inner heterogeneity of the new society was not only due to rise in ethnic minorities from 8 to 28%, but also to great disparities - in lifestyles, political culture, economic infrastructure etc. – between ethnic Romanians from different regions.

The captivity of interwar sociology. The national blind spot

I take Anton Golopenția to be representative for the Bucharest Sociological School, as he was very active in defending the School’s theoretical and methodological position against internal and external attacks (Amzăr 1935; Bougle, 1938) and he is considered, even nowadays, as one of the most technocratic, not-politically-involved members of the School.

The social sciences, born during the liberal XIXth century, had to undergo, in A. Golopenția’s view, great changes to adapt to the heavily administered XXth century. The essential goal of the renewed social sciences consisted in informing the governments on the processes taking place in their own states and in the foreign states with which they had contacts. The social and political sciences, which were drifting freely, autonomously, in the liberal times, were seen as coming back in the service of the state and the government. The liberal, theoretical, formalistic, pluralistic and autonomous stage in the development of social sciences, acting like in a Hegelian ruse of reason, had elaborated finer and more sophisticated instruments that could be used in the service of the state with a much higher efficiency than in previous times (Golopenția, 2002: 7).

For Golopenția, this new stage in history is a necessary one, springing from the attitude out of which the modern occidental civilization developed. The state of the social and political sciences required a new and more comprehensive integration. The liberal sciences, especially the “theoretical” ones, such as political economy and law, but also sociology as it transformed itself into a formal and liberal science, had distanced themselves from the rationalist-activist position. They have transformed into a kind of “crypto-platonic rumination on the signification of their own existence” (Golopenția, 2002: 54).

From the perspective of the Romanian sociologist, science transformed itself, in the “new epoch”, in an instrument ready to be used in the incessant battle between the states, battle in which nothing was decided in advance. Geography,
international relations, ethnic minorities etc. were all seen as forms of reality to be understood and integrated in a constant flux of information and action (transformation or preservation) for the good of the state. The destiny, the choice of a particular elite or even ethnie were not so important for Golopenția as was the survival of the state.

Science was, for the Romanian sociologist, a part of the actual confronting of real people with the world in which they were living so it could not rise above the existing antagonisms amongst individuals and people. Science was understood as a universal tool - through its methods and the kind of relationship towards reality - but a tool that had always been used from a specific political position, been useful for a certain people or nation, whose specialized device for orientation, systematization of experience and administration it became. Golopenția explicitly said: "Science is one of the instruments through which irrational entities affirm themselves" (Golopenția, 2002: 56).

The interwar sociologists3 ignored the changes that the emergence of a new programmed and heavily administered world – the very world they were trying so hard to bring to life - introduced in the very constitution and reproduction mechanisms of the nation. The nation was understood as having a strong natural-organic setting and as existing behind scientific discourses. Thus, the primordial national community was implicitly constructed as a substrate which sustained and nurtured the scientific discourses. This is as if a national, unspecified, scientific and objective instrument was needed, precisely for handling specific national issues; any lack of scientificity of the theory would have a negative impact on the national project.

The interwar emergence of sociology as the hegemonic discourse in the scientific construction of the nation (understood as almost totally synonymous with the nation-state) provided a strong "path-dependancy for social sciences in socialist times.

**Sociology and modernization in socialist and national-communist Romania**

The socialist period is still very much understudied from the point of view of a social and conceptual history of scientific disciplines. The social sciences, with their history of being banned, re-imagined, resurrected and re-contextualized in various phases of socialism and socialist ideologies, are a particularly fruitful subject for such examinations.

After World War II and the installation of a socialist, Soviet-like regime in Romania, sociology was labeled 'bourgeois' and subsequently banned. A kind of highly ideologized and Party-centered Soviet *vulgata* of Marxism took

---

3 I am speaking here about sociologists connected to the Bucharest School of Sociology which had a truly hegemonic position inside social science in the period between the two World Wars.
the place of sociological analysis. The adoption, in Soviet Union, of the official ideology of “socialist content in national form”, and the subsequent development of different types of national communism, in Eastern Europe, have been well-documented by a vast theoretical corpus centered on the political legitimacy drawn from nationalist ideologies in socialist countries. Yet, the ways in which the scientific discourses of sociology and ethnology on modernization, socialist culture and nation are connected with this nationalist/nationalized form of socialism have received far less attention.

The Romanian case is particularly interesting, as it presented a strong national-communist ideology (Verdery, 1991) as early as the 1970s, articulated through various scientific discourses regarding modernization. In 1965, sociology was rehabilitated in its role as a science in charge of technical social modernization, but also in order to support a political trend inside the Romanian Communist Party (Mihailescu, 2007). Some of the old professors and even some theories from the interwar sociology were partially rehabilitated. The number of students greatly increased; studies on urbanization and industrialization were financed by the State/Party. A blend of autochthonism and Western scholarly influences shaped a new kind of discourse on social modernization and the socialist nation.

Ethnography survived, but still in a marginal position. Ethnology/anthropology continued as physical anthropology under the supervision of the Faculty of Medicine, and under the institutional umbrella of a small institute conducting some fieldwork research, mostly in anthropometry and serology. At the end of the 1960s, during one of the so-called liberalization periods in the socialist countries, sociology was reinstated and re-institutionalized, both as a teaching and a research discipline, as a more or less ‘captive’ science inside the Marxist-Leninist ideological template. The ideological context was apparently very different from the interwar one. Sociology was to provide the scientific toolbox (Mihailescu, 2007) for what seemed to be a new cycle of modernization inside the new socialist nation-state. In Maria Larionescu’s view:

Political factors intruded on sociology’s revival, making it generally ‘captive’, but the post-war evolution of the discipline shows a few paradoxical aspects due to several factors: pre-war traditions, the existence of a group of sociologists despite the administrative ban and incarceration of reputed sociologists, the impact of Western theories, and, last but not least, the impact of empirical sociological research (Larionescu, 2002: 502).

After Stalin’s death, gradually, an “ideological meltdown” seemed to occur in the socialist countries. The principle of conflict between classes was complemented and sometimes even replaced by the “softer” concept of the “socialist social structure”. Later on studies about “quality of life” and “life styles” were sponsored by the socialist technocratic elites (Zamfir, 2009).
Michael Vorišek’s analysis of the relationship between historical materialism and sociology in USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia tries to show that “the Marxist-Leninist ideology mattered in sociology, and that for a certain crucial period it played an intimate part in sociology’s development” (Vorišek, 2007: 122), as the establishment of an autonomous science of sociology does not, necessarily, “challenge the status of historical materialism as the Marxist-Leninist view on society” (Vorišek, 2007, 122-3). The relationship between Stalinism and sociology was arguably less clear-cut than the labeling of all sociology as “bourgeois science” would suggest. In the post-war Western scientific canons, Marx was reinstated as a “founding father” of sociology, together with Weber, Durkheim and, sometimes, Vilfredo Pareto (Aron, 1967; Giddens, 1971). In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union sociology was, at first, attacked, and subsequently banned, primarily because of its “bourgeois” essence and not for being sociology per se. In the Romanian case, this happened also because the Bucharest Sociological School was seen as some kind of ideological competitor in governing and administrating the country.

The position from where a Romanian Marxist sociology could have appeared was precarious, as it had to contend with the hegemonic position occupied by historical materialism and, from the end of the 1960s, with the tension introduced into this hegemony by the emergence of a very assertive national-communist discourse claiming some roots in the rediscovery of interwar national(ist) traditions.

The multilevel model of sociology - that Vorišek analyzes in connection with the cohabitation of Sociology with Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union - is only partly applicable to the Romanian case. A genuine Romanian Marxist sociology never emerged, as social sciences embraced a self-assumed technical position, similar to the interwar one, and created an “empty slot” for Marxism. As presented by Dmitrij Modestovič Ugrinovic, in 1968, there were three levels of integration in this multilevel model: (1) historical materialism; (2) special sociological theories – concerned with subsystems of society; and (3) the concrete sociological research, that was to have an important empirical part (Ugrinovic, 1970). This model can be used to describe the way Romanian sociologists imagined their position in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Ideology mattered for them, but it did so in a special way. This official multilevel model of sociology was used and interpreted in an oblique way by the social scientists involved in it. They did not confront it head on, question or subvert it in a radical or outspoken way. Instead, an alternative multilevel model of “scientificity”, embedded in the ideologically sanctioned one, was, gradually, created. The sociologists tried to assign a high level of “scientificity” to the lower levels of the model, distributing, at the same time, a flat, superficial and “ideological” discourse at the top. Part of the history of Romanian sociology
during the socialist regime consisted in the history of the attempts to assign, by diverse actors – scientists, politicians and institutions – the opposed characteristics of “scientificity” and “ideology” to various layers of multilevel models. The active re-imagining of the interwar tradition brought another factor into this science-ideology debate: the national one.

Even if formal affiliation to Marxism-Leninism was a must, sociology re-imagined itself as a purely scientific, even technical, discourse. The problems of industrialization, urbanization, and rural development were, for a fleeting moment, high on the agenda of the newly re-institated science. The implicitly non-ideological stance was, nevertheless, misleading. The rehabilitation of the discipline in the mid-1960s also furthered a “nationalization of a cultural capital and re-establishment of an internal genealogy” (Gheorghiu, 1991) as a connection with the Gusti’s interwar school was, more or less implicitly, imagined and invented. The continuity was probably best demonstrated by the presence of Henri H. Stahl, a former student of Gusti, and a major figure of the interwar sociological school, who had a leading role in instructing the new specialists during socialist times. Other members of the Gusti school also became affiliated with the “re-born” discipline and fieldwork was reinstated as a main pillar of sociological research and teaching (Mihaiescu, 2007).

The position of associated or invited professor was used in a small scale rehabilitation of former sociologists and ethnologists. Traian Herseni was rehabilitated as early as 1962, by co-publishing a book (Ralea and Hariton, 1962) with a scholar close to the communist regime (Mihai Ralea). Herseni, who had a very ambiguous political background – he wrote articles for the interwar review “The Left”, and then he became a member of the Iron Guard extreme right movement - was rehabilitated in that period, becoming a confirmed Marxist-Leninist. In similar ways, Victor Caramelea, a former member of the Gusti School - refashioned as a social anthropologist - and Mihai Pop, ethnographer and former member of Praga’s linguist circle, were assigned positions in institutes and allowed a small degree of administrative power. There were some attempts to use sociology as a planning and policy-designing discipline. In 1973, before the Law on Global Agreement (Law nr. 57/1974) was approved by the Great National Assembly, under the guidance of Miron Constantinescu, it was “sociologically tested” (Mihaiescu, 2007) for one year.

The fate of sociology was, on one hand, connected to the political destiny of Constantinescu, a high-ranking official of the Romanian Communist Party and former member of Gusti’s interwar sociological school and, on the other
hand, to its legitimizing potential for the projects of the Romanian Communist Party. The political failure and subsequent death of Constantinescu during the economic crisis and the emergence of a new type of legitimizing strategy (the national-communist one), led to the banning of sociology at the end of the 1970s (Mihăilescu, 2007).

During this short-lived revival of sociology, a small group of researchers, under the guidance of Caramelea, formed, still within the discipline of physical anthropology, a social anthropology group, doing what today would be probably be called "anthropology at home". Due to lack of funds, they mainly studied the region where Caramelea was from, but used a British and North American theoretical framework. Caramelea was associate professor at the new department of sociology in the faculty of Philosophy, like other former students of Gusti. When sociology was again banned at the end of the 1970s, this entire institutional framework dissolved and crumbled. Some sociologists migrated to the "Stefan Gheorghiu" Academy (the Romanian Communist Party School) or to Institutes affiliated to the Romanian Academy (Larionescu, 2007).

Ioan Mihăilescu, Rector of the University of Bucharest after 1989 and scientific secretary of the European Centre for Social Sciences, based in Vienna from 1974 to 1979, who was a member of the first generation of sociologists schooled during socialist times, explained his option for sociology in 1965:

The re-establishment of sociological teaching seemed a kind of opening of the higher education system to the West. I was tempted by sociology also because, after it was banned as a bourgeois science, it was re-instated. I also knew that Romania had a great tradition in sociological research. My option for sociology came from this mixture of tradition, Occidentalism, novelty, renewal of socialism (Mihăilescu, 2007: 37).

In order to have a better understanding of the place held by social sciences in socialist Romania and of its ambiguous relationship to orthodox Marxism-Leninism, even as much as a schematic view from the post-1989 perspective is important. The most important trend in post-1989 social sciences was that of westernization. For sociology there were, however, more influences (reinterpreted, re-appraised and even mythologized) stemming from the two historical experiences of the interwar and the socialist period.

Perhaps one of the most visible - and apparently radical changes in Romanian sociology - was the almost "overnight" break with Marxism-Leninism. The violent disappearance of the Ceausescu regime brought, almost concomitantly, the fall of the official paradigm, by all accounts without significant resistance or attempts to defend the former official doctrine (Larionescu, 2007). In fact, the break was not that radical, as the newly emergent non-Marxist sociology attempted to continue its ‘technical’ and ‘objective’ stance from the 1970s with a certain distaste for anything more than ‘middle-range’ theories, combined with
a chaotic theoretical syncretism. Sociology hoped to attain, in the mid 1960s and the 1970s, the safe and apparently non-ideological position, of a theoretical and methodological toolbox ready to be used in the modernisation policies of the socialist state. It was as if Marxism mattered before, mostly as an empty slot, and that, after 1989, when Marxism-Leninism seemed doomed, that slot remained empty.

**Conclusions**

The relationship between social sciences and politics has always been ambiguous. Social sciences have tried to carve a space, to construct a distance from “ideologies”. When they failed to produce a critical discourse on politics or to engage directly the political power, that space or distance became a blind spot. The mechanism, social scientists deployed to conceal their intimate connections with power, was the construction of a dichotomy opposing „science” to „ideology”. In the case of socialist Romania, social sciences were confronted with the dominant discourse of Marxism-Leninism and imagined themselves as “objective”, “scientific” and “technical” by transforming Marxism into an “empty slot”. The irony is that by abandoning, or by being forced to abandon, any critical discourse on society and power, the social sciences were not able to preserve their position as legitimate centers of scientific authority and they were swiftly replaced by Ceausescu’s brand of national-communism – a kind of grotesque ethno-folkloristic-communism.

The case of sociology – the development of which was to be interrupted in late 1970s - and, to some extent, of ethnology, shows the emergence of various discourses on modernization, urbanization and social equality in socialist Romania, even if the master narrative remained that of Marxism-Leninism. By re-imagining links with the pre-socialist period, and using nationalist propaganda, the socialist state and Party were imagined as continuing – on a higher level – the modernization work of previous generations. The alternative scientific discourses were nevertheless weak, as they totally depended on the benevolence of the political elites of the Communist Party and the socialist technocratic elites, and were discarded later, as national-communism became more assured of its hegemonic position.

Interwar sociology, rather sophisticated and synchronous with the debates going on in Western Europe at that time, was almost totally un-reflexive, as it was constructed on the blind spot of the convergence between science – seen as the source of reforms, social programmes and development – and a nation understood in an organic and primordial way. The social was created as programmable, as totally transparent to the sociological scientific gaze, but, in the same time, as rooted in the continuous, primordial and opaque flow of national history and substance. This dialectic between transparency and
opaqueness explains why, later on, in socialist, but also in present day neoliberal times, sociology emerged as social engineering with little interest in social theory. The “empty slot” strategy, which social scientists used to subvert Marxism-Leninism in socialist times, was made possible by the pre-existent national “blind spot” of interwar sociology. In the wake of its disappearance, the interwar sociological "nation", left technocracy, social programming and social development with an enduring "empty slot". That empty slot was used to negotiate the position of sociology as technical expertise, after WWII.

Strangely enough, Romanian sociology had its most “critical” potential, towards state-backed politics of science, during communist times. Social scientists were, unfortunately, not able to use the critical space they had created through a subversive politics of multileveled scientificity, as the public spaces were shrinking and the regime looked for legitimacy elsewhere.

REFERENCES


Romanian Sociology Today

Editorial Note:
This is a special section dedicated to research articles from the field of Romanian sociology.
ABSTRACT. The New Right organization from Romania traces its origins back to the inter-war period, to the Archangel Michael's Legion. Its nationalist discourse is constructed on anti-modern, anti-European and extreme Christian dimensions, which are consistently summarized by their slogan, Identitate națională. Revoluție spirituală/National identity. Spiritual revolution. A short account on the evolution of the national idea in Romania would prove that during the last 200 years the notion of national identity has evolved rapidly as a response to the history dominated by the Ottomans, the Russians and The Austro-Hungarians. The need and greed for a national identity oftentimes tinged the nationalist discourse with extremism. After 1989, the 2000 elections proved that Romanians are prone to choosing the nationalist discourse. In the following paper, I will analyse how the New Right uses the internet to spread and promote their ideas, by looking at how they depict extreme threats to the Romanian identity. Apocalyptic stories will be my focus and, as the internet is a cultural product that addresses consumers and audiences, I will also assess the extent and form of reaction to the on-line apocalyptic stories. The New Right makes its voice heard on the internet, and given that voice means agency, thus change, I analyse the on-line apocalyptic stories as dialogic events, where writers and readers, tellers and listeners meet and reconstruct the world. The analysis of the extreme threats will show that the Romanian apocalypse has ethnic and demographic dimensions, sustained by propitious political settings. The issues of Hungarian-Romanian and Roma-Romanian relationships are central to the case taken into account. The study triggers attention toward the odds of the Romanian apocalypse to become a credible topic on the public agenda, and thus reiterate the extreme nationalist ideology in the setting of a young, unstable Romanian democracy.

Keywords: cyberhate, extreme threat, nationalism, New Right, MaxQDA analysis

* PhD candidate in Sociology at the Babes-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca, Romania, fellow in the doctoral program co-financed by the SOP HRD program, contract 6/1.5/S/3 – „Doctoral studies, a major factor in the development of socio-economic and humanistic studies”, and a visiting postgraduate researcher at the Research Institute for Cosmopolitan Cultures at the University of Manchester. E-mail: fofiu_a@yahoo.com
“RNS – Romanian National Security. We're sick witnessing how you, "trashes", try to mock our country by creating a very different image from the real one, calling us “romanian gypsies”, broadcasting shitty TV programs like TopGear. If you had the nerve to annoy a whole country, find out that we won't stop here! Romania. Guess what, gypsies aren't romanians, morons.”

On 15 April 2010, the Daily Telegraph website sections Short Breaks and Wine and Dine have been hacked by a nationalist organization from Romania, the Romanian National Security (Arthur, 2010). The nationalists behind this cyber-attack were annoyed and aggrieved that international and, specifically, British media has considered Romanians and Roma1 as the same ethnicity. The powerful negative emotions behind the message and the black background which highlights the Romanian flag, along with the Roma issue, illustrate the Romanian cyberhate dynamics. The most important criterion for hate speech on the Romanian internet is the national identity built on ethnic dimensions and racialised differentiation. This event, as it is not isolated, is of specific relevance at this point, in understanding social conflicts in the contemporary, information society.

1 In Romania, people refer to the ethnic Roma also as "Tigani" (Gypsies).
Conceptual background

Athina Karatzogianni’s research on how new media can be used for conflict has shown that the internet is an appropriate environment for sociopolitical and ethnoreligious conflicts (Karatzogianni, 2006, 2009). One of her arguments is that informational societies characterized by globalizing trends have also led to the globalization of conflict. Digital technologies overcome every dimension of historical or cultural model of contact between individuals and at the same time it functions on very familiar patterns of interaction. Since the information age delineates a series of cultural products in various technological forms, the internet is a cultural product and, through its dynamics, it is able to produce culture, but only as long as it is used by its creators. Internet and cyberspace are human-crafted, and as follows, the forms, the content, the purposes and the results get to be all too human themselves. If conflict is a cultural and social construct, if internet is a cultural and social asset, combining the two is the result of a merely mathematical equation. The unexplored aspect of this relation is whether the dynamics are different in every matter on-line. Researchers have already begun to cope with the unknown territory of digital interactions. Lisa Nakamura has researched how the graphics on the Internet reproduce the racial structure that defines the off-line society. She proved that the Internet is another environment where cultural definitions of race can develop and mirror the structural racial relations in the western society. “Digitizing race” (Nakamura, 2009) is a strong argument for the Internet as a digital cultural device that is built on already known and familiar structures and patterns of interaction and relations. “Race matters in cyberspace precisely because all of us who spend time online are already shaped by the ways in which race matters offline, and we can’t help but bring our own knowledge, experiences, and values with us when we log on” (Kolko et al., 2000, in Fernandez, 2002). The research on race in cyberspace was and still is groundbreaking, as the digital networks of the information age have been theorized as bias-free, as new territories where differences have no value. Karatzogianni’s assertion that “the users of the internet are colour-, class- and gender-blind, in contradiction to face-to-face communication” (Karatzogianni, 2006) is no longer valid when the internet can replicate differences and behavioural reactions to these differences. To continue, Karatzogianni adopts an optimistic view over the role of the internet when she states that “with nearly 10% of the world’s population now online and more gaining access each day, the internet stands to become the most powerful engine for democratization and free exchange of information and ideas ever invented” (Karatzogianni, 2006). Most probably, if the internet is used that way. In analyzing ethnoreligious cyberconflicts, Karatzogianni admits at a certain point, though, that “the
The techniques used in digital propaganda might be the same as throughout of the western cultural history, but it also might be more powerful and spreading much faster and easier. Racism on the Internet, or cyber racism, has its origins in the white identity narrative, and issues of ethnicity and national identity come into play, to build on the racial dimension of the European identity. Yinger develops his definition of ethnicity as "a segment of a larger society whose members are thought, by themselves and/or others, to have a common origin and to share important segments of a common culture and who, in addition, participate in shared activities in which the common origin and culture are significant ingredients" (Yinger, 1976, in Yinger, 1985) Further on, the assumed commonalities are race, religion, language and historically (or ancestral, as Yinger puts it) inhabited territories. Following this, race as a defining characteristic of ethnicity is a complex issue in contemporary Europe. Garner states that racialisation in the 21st century is no longer a binary cognitive process that differentiates black from white (Garner, 2003, in Garner, 2006). Between multiple and contingent identities, constantly subject to change and instability, and thus to alienating uncertainty, individuals look for "a brand name" (Herberg, 1955, in Yinger, 1985) to give meaning to their universes and situate them in relation to others. Identity crafting is a complex process that works at the same time with inclusion and exclusion of individuals. It is the constantly re-emerging relation us versus them. The important issue at this point is that ethnicity in East and Central Europe entails an innate identity. Even though an ethnicity can be culturally or socially constructed, its perception as innate gives way to racialised thinking of the others. Although a biological classification of the peoples of the East Europe would tag them all as Caucasian, social, cultural and psychological dynamics create racial rankings of individuals and groups that have lived on the same territory throughout the history. It is my argument here that whiteness is the racial norm that regulates ethnic relations in East Europe and my objective is to grasp the expression of this dynamic in the Romanian cyberhate.

**The national idea in Romania**

The emergence of nations and of the national idea is often associated with the great social change that the modern era facilitated. The last two centuries of Romanian history can broadly be understood as a period of emergent national identity and unification into a state (1800s to 1918-1920), a period of racial nationalism (1920s to 1940s), ethnicity and nationalism during the communist era (1940s to 1989) and nationalism in the post-communist era (1989 to the present day). I will rest on the later period, the contemporary national politics.
Although there is a serious scholarly discourse on the ethno-genesis of the Romanian language and people, a keen eye on the history of the Romanians would observe that these peoples had no chance to enjoy national and ethnic freedom (Havel, in Williams, 1999). From servitude to imperial powers, to obedience to European politics and to the dictatorship of the communist era, the history did not create the proper conditions for national freedom. As a result, nationalist discourse has been used as a political tool, to gain independence or to obtain, exercise and maintain power. Facing the disorientation after the fall of the communism, peoples in Eastern Europe had to address the new challenge of implementing a democratic model, very unfamiliar to them. Former communists adopted new political labels on the political spectrum, as social democrats have used notions of “ethnicity” and “national identity” as a means of attaining their own interests (Williams, 1999; Spencer and Wollman, 1999). Thus was the case in Romania. After the events of 1989, the National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvării Naționale), a political group that emerged as a counter-reaction to the communist regime, has internally dissolved as a result of conflict over political power. In 1992, the Democratic National Salvation Front (Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale) was formed by Ion Iliescu, a former communist who became Romania’s post-communist president until 1996, and was the basis of the much debated Party of Social Democracy in Romania (Partidul Democrației Sociale în România). From 1994 to 1996, the instrumental value of nationalist discourse was evident in the ruling coalition between the Party of Social Democracy in Romania, the right wing Romanian National Unity Party (Partidul Unității Naționale în România), the right wing Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare) and the left wing Socialist Party of Labor (Partidul Socialist al Muncii). From 1996 to 2000, the social democrats and their political combinations lost power in favour of the Romanian Democratic Convention (Convenția Democrată din România), which opposed the nomenklatura in the politics after 1989. From 2000, though, the social democrats were again ruling Romania, under the name and form of the Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social-Democrat), which was the former Party of Social Democracy, but with a new name – a relatively natural cyclic evolution in a post-communist country (Williams, 1999). Since 2004, the social democrats became the opposition, as a

---

2 The formation of the Romanian people from a combination of three factors, during the span of 2000 years: the Dacic culture, heavily influenced by the Roman occupation and migration fluxes, mainly Slavs, which resulted in the Romanian language (10% Dacic linguistic elements; 60% Latin linguistic elements; 20% Slavic linguistic elements; 10% influences from other languages, during the mediaeval and modern era). The Romanian people was, as follows, formed by the Middle Ages, and since then constantly subjected to cultural and linguistic influences, given the divided and complex occupational history of the Romanian principalities (Drăgoescu, 1997).
coalition between liberals (the National Liberal Party), democrats (the Democratic Party) and minority representatives (the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania) obtained political power and rule in Romania.

Throughout this political dynamic, the most interesting turnover is the elections of 2000 for parliament and presidency. Although the former communists of the Social Democratic Party won, and Iliescu became again the president of Romania, the strongest competitor in the elections was the extreme nationalist Corneliu Vadim Tudor and his party, Greater Romania Party, as he finished the second after Iliescu, with a tight score, in the first round. Romanians were then facing a choice between ex-communists and extreme nationalists (Pop-Elecheș, 2001), but external pressures on the Romanian politics and a fierce campaign attacking directly Corneliu Vadim Tudor turned Iliescu into the president of Romania. It would thus appear that the young democracy in Romania has won and overcome all the obstacles. But this perspective would be superficial, as the explanation of the rise of extremism in Romania is still needed. Extreme nationalism is still threatening Romanian democracy, as the New Right (Noua Dreaptă) organization has started, during 2010, to collect signatures and gain enough supporters in order to create a political party. Their campaign is still ongoing, on the internet and off-line. My focus in the present paper is on the New Right blog, where members and sympathizers publish their ideas.

The “Romanian model” and public attitudes toward minorities

Analysts consider Romania as one of the best adapted countries to democratic values and practices, as the Constitution insures the equality of citizens and governmental and non-governmental institutions work toward non-discrimination (Veşe, 2003). European institutions and media have, eventually, considered the “Romanian model” as a solution and strategic plan for cohabitation of ethnic minorities and majorities in a nation-state, according to democratic and multicultural values, after the Kosovo problem elicited fearful reactions that the Transylvanian province of Romania could slip on the same path in the Hungaro-Romanian relations. The positionality of Romania between the Balkans, the Slavic world and the European influence created a historically multicultural model of ethnicities and national identities, and, passing the test of post-communism, Romania was expected to be able to manage the minority-majority relations on its territory. Optimistic analysts of the political and ethnic dynamics in Romania claim that on the Romanian territory, the preservation and development of cultural identities of minorities are established (Veşe, 2003). Even so, minority-majority relations are very dynamic, and a close regard upon them is needed. Current flows of globalization, international media influence, trans-nationalism and migration impose new
challenges on an already feeble balance. Drawing on previous research on extremism on the internet, I consider that the on-line activity of the New Right may announce a resurrection of a nationalist discourse which is not new to Romanian politics, and it can still unbalance a young democracy, already affected by the reproduced ex-communist political structure. As the very recent history has proved, extreme nationalism has high chances of success with the Romanian electorate, and the New Right activity on-line aiming at creating a political party leads my way in analyzing their blog, the nationalist discourse they exercise and the narrative model they adopt in reclaiming extreme threats for the Romanian identity, nation-state and politics. The relevance of the New Right activity on-line and its effects on the audiences is even more highlighted by a recent study on attitudes toward minorities in Romania, especially toward the Roma (IRES 2010). This study reveals a pattern of majority view over a minority consistent with the political ideology and public intellectual discourse of nationalism. When asked how many rights are guaranteed by law to minorities in Romania, the most of the respondents (from a national representative sample of N=1231) declared there are too many rights for minorities (35%). As well, 34% have a bad opinion and 20% a very bad opinion about the Roma minority. As for the social distance, although the majority of the respondents would agree to have a Roma co-worker or a Roma neighbour, when asked about accepting a Roma as a member of the family, the majority (57%) disagreed. The majority of respondents also totally agreed that Romania is too tolerant with Roma people (62%) and 36% - again, the most – considered that Roma people are not discriminated against in Romania. Roma people are also perceived as a threat to Romanians, as 52% totally agreed that the Roma issues in France impede on the freedom of circulation of Romanians in Europe, while 38% - the most – considered that, after returning from France, the Roma people would be a threat to the physical security of individuals and their families. On a symbolic level, Romanians are negatively affected by the linguistic resemblance between “Roma” and “Romanian” (59%). Furthermore, it is believed that Roma people can’t be integrated into a European society because they refuse integration (53%) and investing structural funds for the integration of Roma people is useless (38%). When asked about specific actions necessary in solving the Roma issue in Romania, 93% disagreed with allocating aids and assistance, 81% disagreed with building housing, 91% disagreed with insuring access to utilities, while 58% agreed with facilitating the access to education for Roma children, and 60% disagreed with programs for professional qualification of Roma adults, 85% disagreed with insuring formal identity cards and formal ownership of lands and houses for Roma people, and finally 93% disagreed with programs for reducing the discrimination against Roma people. (IRES, 2010)
As descriptive as this paragraph is, it speaks by itself. The Roma issue in Romania has, throughout the history, been a problematic aspect of the multi-ethnic and multicultural Romanian space. The fact that these attitudes are still prone to extremist values is consistent with the constant re-emergence of nationalist discourse in Romania. The view that Romania has successfully modified its Constitution and its laws as to host minorities and insure peaceful co-inhabitancy is, as follows, a superficial analysis of Romanian politics that comply with external requests of the European Union, as a result of Romania’s accession to this structure. The nationalist spark lies beyond public non-governmental and political speech, and the public opinion might surprise, as extreme “(revisionist) attitudes are supported by the Romanian population to a surprisingly high extent” (Andreea, 2003). The issue becomes even more stringent when minority-majority differences take the form of a racialised perception of the other. Referring to Roma, this ethnicity is, in many ways, racialised (Ahmed et al., 2007), as Romanians mainly identify a Roma person by physiognomy (74%) or by the colour of the skin (62%) (IRES, 2010). External markers, as clothing (62%), behaviour (84%), language (77%) and vocabulary (85%), contribute to the cultural construction and perception of Roma as an ethnicity (IRES, 2010).

My focus in the following paper will be on the far right nationalistic discourse on the Romanian internet, regarding extreme threats posed to the national identity. Although severely affected by Balkanism, Romania has been working on implementing a democratic model, after the collapse of communism, and legal frames have declared discrimination and racism on the internet as crimes or contraventions, according to the social threat they impose. It is worth remembering that Romania’s positionality at the margins of the Slavic world and of the Balkans turns its territory into a transit space that is even more dynamic by its proximity to the Hungarian element of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. The resulting identity struggle has confronted and still confronts the constant change brought by transiting forces, and attention to the national idea is necessary. In this sense, accounts on what threatens the Romanian identity in the view of the New Right, expressed on their blog, will develop on the narratives of an ethnic apocalypse of Romanians and on the reactions that the audience expresses on threads of comments to the blog posts.

The present study. Methodological issues

Content analysis seemed to be the most appropriate and prominent method, since it is defined as a valid method for making inferences from text to other different conditions or properties of the source of the text (Krippendorff, in Chelcea, 2004), which means that by acquiring knowledge on the on-line content, further knowledge on the generators of the on-line content could be obtained. As all cyberhate content is supported by off-line structures, the content
analysis approach to the Romanian cyberhate contributes to understanding and even monitoring how extreme nationalist organizations in Romania make use of the new media. Exploring apocalyptic discourse and constructions of extreme threat to the national idea in Romanian cyberhate determined my choice of qualitative content analysis. The New Right blog is on-line and active since June 2008. Since then, over 2000 posts have been published. Its aim is to rehabilitate the image of the New Right organization and to acquire supporters and sympathizers. It hosts public debates between readers, as well as it facilitates a public infusion of more personal ideas of members of the New Right, who frequently write articles and post them on the blog. I manually selected articles from January 2010 to March 2011 – half of the blog’s life. A preliminary sample of 450 posts was selected and saved in an electronic archive, in the form of portable documents (*.pdf). When necessary, I also downloaded and saved images (*.pdf or *.gif). As I browsed the blog, I selected the posts by their title and the first paragraph. If the topic in the title or the first paragraph was not relevant to the issue of extreme threat, the post was eliminated from the preliminary sample. I used a purposive sampling technique - the most frequently used when doing qualitative research.

The practical analysis of data was facilitated by the MaxQDA programme, very useful as a management tool in storing and categorizing files, applying codes, filtering codes and data and generating graphic descriptions of the analysis. Coding was conducted on a dynamic, on-going basis, as I constantly compared the data before deciding which code to apply or if there was need for a new code. At the end of the coding process, a coding schema emerged, which revolved around the concepts of apocalypse, extreme threat and death of Romania. Reading and coding each article determined several case-drops based on their level of irrelevance to the research objectives, and the final sample was N=290.

The apocalypse of Romania in the New Right on-line speech

Romania’s pathway to the end is ethnically defined on the New Right blog. Processes of Hungarization and Gypsification impede heavily on the Romanian identity, and they are caused by political settings, economic problems and by a failed European Union project. In the following sections, I will analyse both processes, by looking closely at the graph below and at the actual content of the blog posts. The graph shows the co-occurrences of codes in the analyzed sample. MaxQDA does not provide relations between codes, but only offers a statistical co-occurrence, which is further to be analyzed by looking at the specific coded segments that, in the end, describe a code and constitute a discourse about that code. The squares represent the frequency of overlaps (close presence in a discourse) between two codes. When the squares are bigger and brighter, the two codes overlap very frequently, and the co-occurrence indicates a specific narrative.
In this sense, the Hungarization of Romania appears to be the highest threat to the Romanian identity. As the graph shows, it is a process heavily determined by political manoeuvres and it co-occurs quite frequently with the certitude of the efficiency apocalypse. The most important dimension of the political conspiracy is the fact that the Hungarian minority in Romania is represented by a political party which has, since 1989, been in the ruling combination of powers. As a result, the New Right denounces a political conspiracy between the Hungarian party and the Romanian parties that maintain the power through ethnic and national bargain. The New Right accuses the present leading party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Romania, to preserve its power through an alliance with the Democrat Union of the Hungarians in Romania, which, in return, manipulate the politics in Romania in order to obtain territorial autonomy in the counties with the highest density of Hungarians, and, eventually, for the entire Romanian province of Transylvania. A higher goal of re-attaching Transylvania to Hungary is indirectly pursued. Frequent accusations of the president or ministers are present throughout the blog, and, statistically, the Hungarization of Romania is the most frequent topic that the New Right addresses. The New Right accuses the constant pressure that Hungarians pose to the Romanian political system, in order to obtain their autonomy, and reports on an orchestrated action at the European level in this sense are present on the blog. Specifically, the vice-president of the European Parliament is the leader of the Democratic Union of Hungarians from Romania, which symbolizes, for the New Right, a success of the Hungarians in approaching their autonomy goals. To the exasperation of the New Right, Hungarians in Romania have recently been allowed to apply for citizenship to Hungary. Illustrative of the Romanian apocalypse brought by

---

3 Harghita and Covasna are in the middle of Romania and are inhabited by a 75% majority Hungarians.
The interesting aspect of these discourses is that the New Right envisions the certainty of the end of Romania. One of the strongest and the most frequent expressions of the certainty of the end is the occurrence of “ethnic cleansing” syntagm, that the New Right associates with the Székely Land\(^5\) issue. The symbolic manoeuvres in the HarCov\(^6\) region are heavily perceived by the New Right as an ethnic cleansing of the Romanian minority in that area. The associated emotions are extreme hatred against Hungarians and intense stupefaction. The narrative of ethnic cleansing is tinged with awe and almost an impossibility of reaction, which transforms the New Right and the reader in spectators of the apocalyptic story. Occasionally, ethnic cleansing is expressed as ethnic genocide,

---

\(^4\) http://www.condeiulardelean.ro/articol/dictatul-de-la-viena-se-reintoarce  
\(^5\) A region in the middle of Romania, mainly inhabited by the Hungarian speaking Székely ethnicity, which overlaps with the counties of Harghita, Covasna and Mureș. It has been mentioned in historical documents since the Middle Ages.  
\(^6\) An acronym for the Harghita and Covasna counties in the middle of Romania (see note 5) that designates a discursive region, rather than an official one.
which is surprisingly powerful in the narrative, especially when it is meant to summarize a report on symbolic threats. This transforms a symbolic damage into a physical inflicted pain, which loads the apocalyptic narrative with extreme negative emotions against the acts that the text accounts for.

Figure 3. Caption of the New Right blog, Dictatul de la Viena se reîntoarce, http://blog.nouadreapta.org/2010/03/dictatul-de-la-viena-se-reintoarce, taken on the 28th of March 2011)

In this line of thought, the accession of Hungarians to public administration jobs, especially when they are management jobs, is highly reprehensible. Constant denunciation of threats to the symbols of Romania is developed on the blog. Hungarians in the counties of Covasna and Harghita are accused to desecrate the Romanian flag, the Romanian coat-of-arms and historical Romanian intellectuals. The highest threat to the Romanian identity is perceived to be the linguistic autonomy of the above mentioned area, as the Hungarian language is declared the official language in the two counties. This is symbolically emphasized by projects that propose a constitution of the ethnic area, ironically proposed
by Hungarian extreme-nationalists. The article below illustrates how Hungarians in Romania have a specific strategy, so as to gain symbolic capital and power, and to use it in order to attain their own goals.


The article describes how the Hungarian language was declared the official language of the Székely Land and gained symbolic value similar to any official language of a state. In the view of the New Right, this statement is technically impossible, as the Székely Land doesn't exist formally. Since the officials in the area insist on adopting a language different form the Romanian one, the threat to the Romanian national identity is perceived as very high. The article is built around the public statements of the vice-president of the Székely National Council, Ferenc Csaba: “Our cause is sacred. I think of those people sent to local administration organisms. We have a responsibility, we assumed a task. Here, in the administration, we can create the basis for our autonomy. I wish that the decisions made in here are respected. We want to
create the future Székely Parliament”. The statement is, once more, accompanied by the map of Romania, coloured with the Romanian flag, on which the borders of the Székely Land are drawn with barbed wire. The region is differentiated with the use of the Hungarian flag colours. Interestingly, this article is sourced on a different website, Realitatea.net. On its original form, the article presented a different image which showed the flag of Hungary. The article in itself is informative and doesn’t comment on the news, but embedding both of these images in the text transforms the complex message. The nationalist reaction to the topic is stronger in the New Right blog version of the article, as the informative value of the text is translated into a visual, compelling threat of changing the form of Romania as we know it. As discussed before, in this sense the apocalyptic threat to the Romanian national idea is intense in the New Right narrative, on the topic of Hungarization.

These posts are some of other tens on the subject, which shape the apocalyptic narrative on the New Right blog into an account of anti-Romanian ethnic cleansing that happens in the middle of Romania, with the consent and support of the political ruling coalition. Symbolic threats to the national identity, from altered maps of Romania to accounts on how Romanian intellectuals and leaders are desecrated, combine with accounts on realistic threats of the Székely Land developing on its own, despite the economical difficulties of Romania. The complex story of the Romanian national identity being menaced by the Hungarian element takes apocalyptic dimensions, as Romanians are entitled to worry they might even disappear and melt into the Hungarian culture and identity. This is a historical topic in Romania that goes back to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The inter-war extreme nationalism origins of the New Right ideology, which builds on the revolutionary ideas of the nineteenth century, explain the actuality of the topic in the New Right envisions of the world.

The Gypsification of Romania

The second ethnic threat to the Romanian identity is Gypsification. While the Hungarization of Romania is a political and symbolic process that impedes on Romanian values and symbols, the Gypsification process is a question of numbers, sustained by political manoeuvres, which leads to discrimination against Romanians. A symbolic question of the resemblance of the names of the two ethnicities, Romanian and Romani or Roma, is very much denounced by the New Right.

---

7 “Cauza noastră e sfântă. Mă gândesc la acei oameni trimiși în administrațiile locale. Avem o responsabilitate, ne-am asumat o sarcină. Aici în administrație putem crea bazele automiei. Doresca hotărările adoptate aici să fie respectate. Vrem să construiem viitorul Parlament Secuiesc”.
Suspecting a conspiracy between Roma elites and the political powers, the New Right imagines that Romania will disappear off the map and a new country will replace it: Rromania. This is a word play, as Roma in the Romani language is supposedly written with a double R, Roma, and the resemblance to Romania gives way to a new name, Rromania, the country of the Roma ethnicity.

Figure 5. Caption of the New Right blog, Tiganizatia, sau pamantul fagaduintei..., http://blog.nouadreapta.org/2010/04/tiganizatia-sau-pamantul-fagaduintei/, taken on the 3rd of April 2011

The article above is published on the New Right blog by a member, Ştefan Timoceanu from Craiova. Its title means “Tiganizatia, or the promised land...”. The title intends to have a great impact on the reader, as it prepares us for a story about a Roma country, a promised land for the Roma people. The impact intensifies when the reader sees the picture: Casa Poporului, the People’s House, has Roma cultural elements. The building is a communist inheritance, it houses the both chambers of the parliament and is also known as the Palace of the Parliament. It is thought to be the largest and the most expensive administrative building, and it essentially symbolizes Romania. The added elements represent...
the architectural style that Roma use in building their homes, often called castles. They are particular in the Romanian landscape, as the roofs, for instance, are ornate with intricate embroideries in metal. In front of the Palace of the Parliament, there is also a Roma family in a horse cart. The text begins by questioning the possibility for such a country to exist and the chances of Romanians to inhabit it or to be expelled off its territory. An appeal to higher, celestial powers denotes that the Promised Land is a prerogative of God, and no man has the power to promise land and ownership to other people. Nevertheless, the author warns that the Americans assumed supreme power and promised a country and a land on Romania’s territory, but, surprisingly, it wasn’t meant for Romanians. This country was promised to the Roma tribe. The author uses the concept of “tribe” on purpose, as he sustains that, by leaving India, the Roma people could only preserve a tribal structure and dynamic. Considering the aforementioned scenario as possible, the author reveals that “all of a sudden, begins an avalanche of answers to all these questions about the violent and suspiciously fast Gypsyfication of our nation, through all means possible, especially through subliminal messages bombing from mass media, through manelization and demographic explosion.”

The article develops in the following section on negative stereotypes of Roma in Romania and accuses the unequal distribution of resources between Roma and Romanians, which is associated with the decreasing human quality of individuals and low levels of education. The two variables describe the whole population of Romania, which is the victim of the Roma culture. There are little chances for Romanians to overcome the situation, as Roma have started to organize themselves and currently have a king, an emperor and a president. Since this ethnicity has three rulers, its institutional power is unique. Political leaders in Romania declare that Roma and Americans ought to be respected and not be spoken badly against. The author ends his plea remind the reader that Petre Țuțea suffered in communist prisons for his country, Romania, and was very deceived when he realised that there weren’t one hundred young men ready to die for their country. In this line of thought, the author contends, if today there are one hundred young men ready to die for the country, the history, meaning the history of Gypsification, might offer them the opportunity to die.

---

9 The expansion of the culture of “manele” – a musical genre and subculture, very popular in the Balkan area, especially in Romania, with uncertain origins, but very similar to Turkish, Serbian and inter-war suburb music. It is often associated with Gypsies.

10 brusc porneste avalansa de raspunsuri la atatea intrebari legate de violenta si suspect de rapida tiganizare a natiunii noastre prin orice mijloace posibile, in special prin bombardarea cu mesaje subliminale prin intermediul mass media, manelizare si explozie demografica.”

11 October 6, 1902 - December 3, 1991, Romanian philosopher, journalist and economist.
This end is particularly interesting, as the apocalypse of Romania through Gypsification is under no means acceptable. The alternative of the New Right to the certainty of Gypsification is only death, since separation, in realistic terms, is fairly difficult. In this sense, the extremist bloggers make use of a linguistic differentiation when they re-publish articles about Gypsies. The rejection of an ethnic apocalypse brought by the Gypsies is constantly present throughout the blog, as each time the word Roma is used, the administrators of the blog have written next to it țigani (Gypsies) in brackets, using a strong red colour, as visual and linguistic correction meant to differentiate the two ethnicities, Romanians and Gypsies.

Figure 6. Caption of the New Right blog, Numărul țiganilor din Baia Mare, de patru ori mai mare decât cel oficial, http://blog.nouadreapta.org/2011/03/numarul-tiganilor-din-baia-mare-de-patru-ori-mai-mare-decat-cel-official/, taken on the 26th of March 2011
The article above is an illustration for how the New Right insists in highlighting the ethnic and linguistic difference between Romanians and Gypsies. The strategy uses visual queues that rely on the high contrast of the red, bold text to the white background and to the formal black writing around it. At a symbolic level, this strategy appears as a struggle against the foreseen Gypsification. The articles on this topic, throughout the blog, acknowledge a numerical growth of the Roma population, along a political setting that protects the Roma culture and sustains its distribution. The two dimensions that work toward the Gypsification of Romania appear as out of reach for the New Right, which is alarming for the near future of the Romanian identity. The demographic question of the Gypsy population in Romania is very much debated, as no official statistics can approximate their numbers. Although in public screenings, around 500,000 declared themselves Roma, it is thought that the actual population is around 2 million. The title of the article above is a statement in this sense: “The Gypsy population size in Baia Mare, four times higher then the official one”. The article is re-published from the eMaramures.ro website, and discusses statistical problems in the Maramures county. Apparently, Roma chose not to declare their ethnicity in order to avoid being discriminated against. This turns the Roma demographics out of control, in the New Right view, and their narrative ensures the reader that the demographic dynamics will definitely lead to the unbalance of ethnicities, transforming the Gypsies in the majority of Romania. Even though Roma complain of discrimination, Romanians are those heavily discriminated against by the political, social and economic systems that sustain the Roma. Romanians face the aging of the population, as birth rates are below 2 children per woman, while Roma women give birth to more than 3 children per woman. As a result, the foresight of the apocalypse by 2040-2050 is validated for Romania on the New Right blog. 

The disappearance of Romania by means of Gypsification is a complex narrative that combines on the New Right blog a scenario of demographic twists and orchestrated politics. The discourses seem infused with paranoid statements, as the bloggers, although they provide data in support of their claims, adopt a propagandistic speech while using negative stereotypes in visual and textual forms. The stereotypes are even more emphasized through visual and linguistic corrections of the texts, in order to differentiate Roma from Romanian.

In the following section, the question is whether the on-line apocalyptic speech of the New Right is effective. In the following section, I will look at the comments to the New Right posts, in order to assess how the on-line audience reacts to the stories of ethnic and cultural endings. How are these apocalyptic scenarios heard by their on-line audiences? Did these messages persuade? Is the apocalypse certain, or is it only a probable event?

---

12 Town in the Northern side of Romania, residence of the Maramures county, which is considered, in the far right ideology, as a historical Romanian region, where Dacian communities persisted over time.
On-line reactions to the apocalypse of Romania

A blog exists for its readers. The moment a blogger stops writing and maintaining their blog up to date, the blog loses its audience and gets lost in cyberspace. In the culture of communication, this is equal to a symbolic death. The stories and accounts on the New Right blog are destined to be received in the same way that they are meant to persuade. Communication technologies and ideological speech can be a powerful combination. In order to better understand the work of cyberhate, the analysis of its echoes is relevant at this point. The frame for this analysis is set by Ananda Mitra's ideas of voice applied to the internet (2002). Voice is a human capacity, since it has agency: humans use their voices not only to send messages and position themselves relative to others, but also to stimulate reactions and determine actions. Voice has to make itself heard in order to exist. Voice has to make itself understood, and is loaded with emotional content that speaks to the audience at different levels. Discourse through voice can shape realities and can restructure the lived universe. The audience is then integrated in the process of restructuring, not only they consume the messages they receive, but they also become part of it. When actors make their voices heard and connect to their audiences, dialogical events take place in the world.

In the previous sections, I have analysed the New Right discourse online and determined the content of their stories. In order to determine if this discourse has agency, I will analyse the comments posted by internet users to the blog articles that recounted the apocalyptic threats to the Romanian identity. If voice through discourse restructures the world and places the audience in the process of restructuration, the comments should be supportive to and in agreement with the stories that are told by the New Right. But, since the audience makes itself heard, the question of its own agency comes into play. The content of the audience response can shape our understanding of the effectiveness of the work of cyberhate. In this sense, I will rest on each apocalyptic narrative assessed earlier, and summarize the reactions of the readers to the scenarios.

The apocalyptic scenario of Hungarization of Romania was narrated by the New Right as happening through political manoeuvres of the Hungarian minority, that has access to influential positions and abuse them as they threaten symbols of the Romanian identity. In the pattern of analysis of the comments to the blog posts, the reactions to the issue of Hungarization are very dynamic and intricate. Instead of simply expressing approval or disapproval, commentators chose to channel their reactions in suggesting ways to resist the Hungarization process, while their discourse is loaded with affective dimensions. Some of the reactions are pessimistic, which explains why part of the audience considers that the Hungarization process can't be stopped or undone. A secondary reaction to the pessimistic statements is the accuse of a "keyboard nationalism", meaning that supporters of the national idea accuse those who are pessimistic of not doing anything, but making claims in front of the computer. The graph below shows how codes on the causes overlap with codes on the reactions to Hungarization. In
analysing the comments, I specifically looked at what the audience considers the sources of the process and, as follows, how they react to the phenomenon and its causes. Consistent with the previous analyses, if political determinism of Hungarization is considered the main cause, the reaction to it is resistance, suggested solutions to overcome the process of Hungarization.

Figure 7. Comments to the topic of Hungarization on the New Right blog

In order to illustrate the graph, I return to the blog post that describes how the Hungarian language was declared the official language of the Székely Land and gained symbolic value similar to any official language of a state. There are 16 comments to this article, and the first one declares a strong and determined “no” to the Hungarian language in Romania. The commentator also warns that Romanians need to wake up, or they will lose Transylvania to Hungary. Other comments are open to conflict, as the audience reacts with call to arms and to war, since Hungarians are looking for trouble. As well, the audience offers solutions for the need of Hungarians to speak their own language: “if they want an official language, they should go to their home in Hungary and there they will have it. In Romania we speak Romanian and that is the end of story.”

People in the Harghita-Covasna area are accused of discrimination against whites, as they refuse or even don’t know to speak Romanian, and they reject Romanian politics, by trying to overtake the power and influential positions in the Romanian society. The audience builds a whole scenario of ethnic conspiracy against Romanians, which only contributes to the emotional tensions contained in the comments: “I can’t believe how much nerve those Hungarian jerks have! All New Right members (and not only) must get in the streets! We must do something!!” Nevertheless, the pessimists admit that Hungarians are more

---

14 “Daca vor oficializare sa se duca la ei acasa in Ungaria si acolo o vor avea. In Romania se vorbeste romaneste si cu asta am terminat discutia.”
15 “nu imi vine sa cred cat tupeu nesimit au ungurii! toti membrii ai noii drepte (si nu numai) trebuie sa iasa in strada! trebuie sa facem ceva!!”
fortunate than Romanians, given that they are united and supportive to each other: “The question is: do we have economical power to do something? I don’t think so, and Hungarians know it. Politically, we have our hands tied because we are apart and only with the contribution of the Hungarian Democratic Union have we political stability. Practically, we are in chess.”\textsuperscript{16} Other readers express laments in their messages, as their dear country suffers that much because of Hungarians. The call to action is present throughout the reactions of the audience, and it is loaded with passion for Romania or with anger and stupefaction against the Hungarians.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{Caption of comments to the New Right blog, Aleşii locali din Secuime au votat pentru oficializarea limbii maghiare http://blog.nouadreapta.org/2010/03/alesii-locali-din-secuime-au-votat-pentru-oficializarea-limbii-maghiare/, taken on the 27\textsuperscript{th} of March 2011.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{16} “În trebuirea este: avem putere economica sa facem ceva? Nu cred si ungurii stiu asta. Politic suntem legati la maini pentru ca suntem dezbinati si doar cu aportul UDMR avem stabilitate politica. Practic suntem in sah.”
The New Right blog also depicts the Gypsification process of Romania as a question of demographic dynamics, sustained through political power, by using strong negative stereotypes and visual cues to remind the reader that Romanians are different from Gypsies.

The analysis in MaxQDA shows that the audience approves the discourse above, although opposing views are once more expressed. The most frequent reaction of the audience is the suggestion of ways to overcome or resist the process of Gypsification.

The caption above shows some of the comments to the article “A new country on the world map: Rromania?”. The article is consistent with the one analysed in the previous section, which addressed the question of Tiganizatia, the Roma country on Romania’s territory, and develops on the informal relations between Roma elites and current Romanian political leaders. All the comments are in agreement with the discourse of the article, and further develop the negative stereotypes of Roma. They are impossible to educate and no one can stimulate their interest in anything. Europe has a negative image of Romania because of Roma. This stirs many negative emotions, and Romanians that express their opinions on-line are angry or sorrowful at how Europeans confuse Roma people with Romanians. This is consistent with the New Right actions of linguistically differentiating Romanians from Roma. This issue is even more difficult to cope with given that politicians in Romania don’t take any action in order to restore the image of the country. The interesting twist in this thread of comments is that one of the commentators is Italian, and he declares his support to the Romanian New Right. Somehow, this is explainable since Italy faced an intensive immigration of Roma people that created several ethnic conflicts, very much discussed in the international mass media. The commentators to the article adjust to the presence of the foreigner and give up writing in Romanian, and express themselves in Italian and English. This is surprising, since the Italian reader stated that he was able to read Romanian, but he is not...
able to write in this language. In a particular interpretation, if the New Right blog posts call for the practice and the preservation of the Romanian language, the audience seems to give up this exact behaviour when there is only one foreigner. The comments thread is ended by a Romanian commentator who claims that the Gypsies in the region where he lives are awful and there is much injustice in Romania, since only Romanians are punished by the law when they break it, and Gypsies are forgiven or ignored by the authorities.

The work of Romanian cyberhate – issues related to the question of on-line messages and audiences

The fact that most of the articles present on the New Right blog are re-published from other websites has a double significance. On one hand, the New Right blog refers to external sources to gather data for their ideology, and if the original article doesn't totally comply with their goals, the New Right
authors intervene and alter the body of the text or the images attached to the textual message. On the other hand, since the original articles didn’t need very much alteration in order to suit a far right speech, it can be argued that the original websites were of a far right, or nationalist orientation. Browsing the referred websites, it can be noticed that they were nationalist blogs, press review websites or important names of the Romanian written mass media. This is consistent with Andreescu’s considerations on the Romanian public opinion, which, on several occasions, proved the proneness toward nationalistic discourse (2003). As follows, the audience is not just a piece in the restructuring of the world through the voice of the New Right. Since individuals and institutions use their voice as agency, the world is rebuilt in new narratives that might be parallel to the social reality. The New Right succeeded in recreating a world that is ending, as a result of several ethnic and demographic processes that unbalance the world as we know it. Their success is illustrated by the fact that the audience, the on-line reader, decided to respond to the stories and to signal that the message has been received. In this stance, the voice of the New Right becomes a dialogic event, which can symbolically alter the world. The question of voice and discourse, though, has the power to transform the listener/reader into a piece of the puzzle that the discourse manipulates (Mitra, 2002), which, in a critical view, voids the audience of power and will, and thus of agency. The analysis of the comments to the New Right blog, though, shows that the audience has its own agency, as their voice not only acknowledges the New Right speech and the apocalyptic stories, but also develops them, explains them, tries to resolve them and search for solutions. All these discourses are loaded with will and, thus, agency. The world is not re-shaped only by the New Right bloggers, but also by their audience. There is a partnership between the two elements of the communication process – the teller and the listener, or the writer and the reader. The recounts of the apocalypse originate on-line, as the New Right bloggers write their ideas and spread other consistent stories through the internet and their computers. On the other symbolic side of their screens, there is an audience interested in their discourse that is able to receive the stories and develop them to the point of counter-reaction. In this stance, the effectiveness of cyberhate speech and strategies is to be questioned. Further research might reveal surprising results regarding the proneness of Romanian audiences toward nationalist feelings, since the internet is difficult to regulate and to monitor, and the political settings on Romanian grounds might incite the public opinion to extremist ideologies, when decent solutions to common problems lack.

The evolution of the national idea on the Romanian territory, since the 1800s to the contemporary setting, shows that Romanians are familiar with symbolic discourses on the Latin or Dacian descendence of the peoples, with European Illuminist values, or with racial nationalist strategies to identify the
true Romanian type, along with fluctuant communist national ideas that resonated either to the international community of labourers, or to the specific interests and obsessions of a single political leader. The young democracy of Romania can still experience unbalance and failure, since the politics around the national idea are still inconsistent. As Glick (2002) noted, in times of scarcity and instability, when the source of a difficult living is hard to identify, individuals can easily channel their frustrations in scapegoating other groups. The difficult transition toward capitalism and democracy in Eastern Europe and specifically in Romania might prove to be too much of a challenge for the public opinion. Since studies on attitudes toward other groups illustrate extensive negative stereotypes and proneness to prejudice, the research on the Romanian cyberhate might prove relevant in foreseeing not necessarily political trends, but the odds for the public opinion to scapegoat ethnic minorities. My statement here is that the combination on the New Right blog of members’ speeches with mass media articles and adjacent nationalistic claims denotes the occurrence of nationalism, even in disguised forms, on the highly consumed Romanian internet (IRES, 2011), on the public, national mass media and, one step further, in the public opinion. Researchers, practitioners and politicians should wonder what might happen if the ethnic apocalypse of Romania becomes a publicly believed narrative.

REFERENCES


THE AUTHORS OF THIS ISSUE

Wil Arts studied sociology at Utrecht University and the Netherlands School of Economics in Rotterdam. He is a professor emeritus of General and Theoretical Sociology at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. He has also taught at Erasmus University Rotterdam and Utrecht University, both in the Netherlands, and at the Economic University of Bratislava (Slovakia). As a steering committee member he has been involved in a number of comparative cross-national research projects on distributive justice, solidarity, and values, such as the International Social Justice Project, the European Values Study and the Health and Social Care in Europe Project. He has extensively published on these and other topics (e.g., the welfare state, industrial relations, social inequality) in numerous articles and dozens of books.

Edurne Bartolomé Peral is sociologist and political scientist, holding a PhD in Political Sciences and Sociology (Deusto University). She is currently working as a researcher and lecturer at the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences at the University of Deusto in Bilbao. Since 2002, she has been working in the Spanish research team of the European Value Study, coordinating the fieldwork of the 2008 wave. Edurne has been visiting student at the Universities of Essex, Michigan and Cologne, and has been visiting researcher in the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Eurolab at the University of Cologne, Jacobs University Bremen, University of Michigan and University of California Irvine, where she finished her PhD dissertation on political support in Europe in comparative perspective. She authored several national and international publications in this field.

Mircea Comșa is an associate professor at the Sociology Department of the Babeș-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, where he earned a PhD in Sociology in 2002. He has 16 years of experience in sociological research, in national and international teams, in academic or private sector research. His areas of expertise are: survey research, electoral sociology, research methodology and design, social statistics, and sampling. He teaches undergraduate courses in Electoral Sociology, The Design of Sociological Research, Social Marketing and Market research, and graduate courses in Advanced Quantitative Methodology and Complex Preferences Analysis. He is involved in research teams such as the Public Opinion Barometer – BOP (SOROS Foundation, 1998-2008), Romanian Electoral Studies (SOROS Foundation, from 2009), European Values Survey – EVS (Romanian team, from 1999), Comparative Study of Electoral Systems – CSES (wave 3),
Călin Cotoi is Associate Professor at the University of Bucharest, Department of Sociology. He is an alumnus of Wissenschaft Kolleg zu Berlin, Collegium Budapest, Centre for Advanced Studies Sofia, New Europe College and University College London. His areas of expertise are: political anthropology, social history, history of social sciences, social theory, science and technology studies, and anthropology of development. He is presently working on the topic of ethnicity and new governmentality technologies, the history of Romanian social sciences, and fin-de-siècle socialism in Central and Eastern Europe. He published a book on political anthropology and one on interwar social sciences.

Adela Fofiu is a PhD candidate in Sociology at the Babeş-Bolyai University, fellow in the doctoral program co-financed by the SOP HRD program, contract 6/1.5/S/3 – „Doctoral studies, a major factor in the development of socio-economic and humanistic studies”, and visiting postgraduate researcher at the Research Institute for Cosmopolitan Cultures at the University of Manchester. Her research interests include national identity, nationalism, minority-majority interactions and the rise of far right speech in the current globalization flows and new media settings, with specific attention to cyberconflicts and cyberhate. During her PhD studies, she has presented papers in seven academic international conferences and has gained experience in sociological research in two national research grants at the Sociology Department of the Babeş-Bolyai University. She has authored a book chapter and several research reports. She is also a founding member of the Society of Sociologists from Romania. Her PhD project on the Romanian cyberhate is supervised by professor Petru Ilut, Dr. Adi Kuntsman and Dr. Bridget Byrne.

Gergő Pulay is PhD candidate at the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. Currently he is writing up his doctoral thesis based on a fieldwork in a poor neighborhood of Bucharest, Romania. The topics of his interests include ethnicity, urban marginality, community studies and popular culture. His research was funded by the Marie Curie SocAnth International PhD Programme for Promoting Anthropology in Central and Eastern Europe and also the Romanian Cultural Institute’s grant for foreign researchers. His previous research experience includes topics such as the labor migration of ethnic
Hungarians from Romania and Hungary; the role of musicians in the cultural dynamics of Roma representation and mobilization; neonationalism and right extremist subcultures; narrative life-story interviews. He was a visiting research student at the Department of Social Anthropology at UCL, London, UK; and the Department of Anthropology at Goldsmiths College, London, UK.

Horățiu Rusu is Associate Professor of Sociology and Head of the Department of Sociology and Social Work at the Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania. His research interests include identities construction, values and social change, the social effects of European integration in postcommunist countries. He authored a book on socio-cultural identity in Romania and co-edited books on issues connected with the social transformations of Eastern European societies.

Christopher S. Swader is an American assistant professor of sociology at the National Research University - Higher School of Economics in Moscow, with an academic background in Russian Studies, Sociology, Global Studies, and interdisciplinary Social Sciences. He earned his Ph.D. in 2008 at the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences. He currently teaches courses on individualization and modernization theories, critical theory (the Frankfurt School), life course sociology, and historical sociology. He currently writes a book entitled The Capitalist Personality, forthcoming in the summer of 2012. This monograph provides a comparative account of changing valuations of personal relationships in post-socialist countries in connection to their shifts toward a 'capitalist' economic culture. He also leads a research group on the "commodification of intimacy," which investigates the spread of materialist values and economic instrumental motives within the Russian dating scene. He has studied or conducted fieldwork or research stays in the United States, Germany, Russia, China, South Africa, and India.

Mălina Voicu (PhD.) is post-doctoral research fellow with GESIS - Leibniz Institute, Cologne, Germany and Senior Research fellow with the Research Institute for the Quality of Life, Romanian Academy. Her research interests are related to social values, with a special focus on religious and gender values. Her research activity deals especially with the inter-connection between religion and gender, as well as with the transformation of religious values in post-communist societies. She published articles on international journals, like European Sociological Review, Social Compass, and she has co-edited the volume Mapping Values Orientation in Central and Eastern Europe (Brill, 2010) with Loek Halman. She is member of the board of International Association for Study of Religion in Central and Eastern Europe and member of the European Values Study's Executive Committee and Theory Group and she is co-editor of the journal Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe.