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THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIC EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION

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I. Introduction

I will begin with three stories – all of them are “ancient history” and all concern this Faculty and University – as a way of paying tribute and giving acknowledgement to friends and colleagues.

I arrived in Cluj for the first time in January 1995. I had been sent by the Fulbright Association to lecture on research methods to the first graduating class in Political Science. At that time, Political Science was not part of an independent Faculty, nor yet even a department. It was a small branch of the Department of Contemporary History, within the Faculty of History and Philosophy. I arrived with suitcases and boxes of books, and was met at the airport by a young assistant who drove me to my flat (on a street that was not yet paved), showed me how to light the gas heater without blowing myself up, and then took me out for a pizza at New Croco Restaurant. This young assistant has since devoted his attention to other pursuits, far “inferior” to his role as scholar and teacher. But I think we will forgive Emil Boc, and we will be kind to him when we see him in the mayor’s office.

The second story concerns the development of this Faculty. I spent a number of years as a consultant to the Faculty in its early stages, traveling here a number of times per year. We put together a talented international team of advisers, notably Thomas Keil and Paul Sum. I remember one of the initial meetings in Cluj, where – after the polite introductions and warm greetings – I took off my suit-jacket, rolled up my sleeves, apologized for being an empirical social scientist, and gave a piece of paper to each of participants in the discussion, asking them to list the things that were doing well in the Faculty and some things that might require improvement. Number one on the list of improvements was the need to establish mailboxes for every instructor, so that messages could be delivered and student papers submitted. The Dean at the time responded immediately, requesting that the secretarial staff find something suitable. Within hours, a metal bookcase appeared with names taped on it. By the time I left to return to America, the “mailboxes” were filled with notes and papers. I believe it was

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The first such mailbox system for any Faculty at Babeş-Bolyai. Vasile Boari guided this Faculty through its earliest years and supervised the transition. For this, he deserves our praise and our thanks.

The final story concerns curriculum development. I was invited to serve as senior consultant to a major grant that bought books and computers for the Faculty, that brought Cluj professors to the U.S. for study, and that brought young U.S. professors to Cluj to work here and co-teach with local professors. But the main purpose of the grant was curriculum development. Our goal was to work together to produce an exciting, modern, and relevant political science curriculum, the first such curriculum in Romania. It was intended to stimulate the development of political science in the region and provide a model for political science departments in other universities. We worked cooperatively for many sessions and generated a curriculum that emphasized methods as well as theory that promoted quantitative as well as qualitative research that taught about the construction of political institutions and of democratic practices. Yet, quite obviously, political science had a different meaning under the Communist regime. The revival of an independent political science discipline was viewed as problematic by those who did not quite understand what we were doing, and there was confusion in some of the other Faculties. Upon finishing our draft curriculum, we immediately made an appointment with the Rectorat, explained the situation, and gave them the choice of supporting our proposed reforms or asking us to retreat from them. Support from the Rectorat was essential to the development of this Faculty at a critical time in its history. And thus again, I offer praise and thanks.

The Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration at Babeş-Bolyai is no longer in its infancy. When I first came here, there were eight books in the library, kept safely locked in a cabinet. There were five old computers, two of which worked, and the only functioning program was Solitaire. The secretariat was a desk in a building on Str. Napoca piled high with papers and with a telephone that no one answered. The Faculty now has its own building, significant academic infrastructure, international respect, and scholars who teach and publish at the highest levels. I am more and more impressed by its achievements every visit. There are so many people here to whom I owe a debt of gratitude. Cosmin Marian and Irina Kantor have been my co-authors on published papers; Cătălin Baba and I partied together at Mardi Gras; Gabriel Bădescu consistently teaches me enormous amounts about Romania and political science generally. And of course, I came back from Romania with quite a bit more than I brought with me – personified by my wife, Adriana Groza.

II. Democratic Standards and the Political Science of Categorization/Ranking

This lecture – entitled “the politics of democratic expansion and contraction” – consists of three segments: on democratic standards and aspirations; on democratic achievements (and non-achievements); and on democratic transformations. Each is an important theme. Furthermore, each relates to what we do as political scientists and how our political science understanding informs political practice.
Part of what we do as political scientists is characterize and code our observations. Take democratization, for example. It is our job to determine whether any given country is democratic or not. By what threshold characteristics do we say that a country safely can be coded as democratic rather than non-democratic? But even that is far too simplistic, as it turns democratization into a dichotomous variable – yes or no. Far more reasonably, we should construct a continuous variable – on a scale of measure, nations can be ranked as more or less democratic. Moreover, I want to argue, our scale for the measurement of democratization should be multi-dimensional. There are at least three different dimensions for evaluating the extent of democratic development. Full assessment of the ‘democratic-ness’ of any particular nation should entail a combined index linking all of these dimensions, leaving none out.

A) The first dimension is the most obvious and most commonly found in the literature and the popular press. It is democracy as an arrangement of procedures – relatively inclusive, fair, and free – by which politicians systematically compete with each other for the votes needed to win office [Schumpeter 1942]. But there are other dimensions as well – democracy as a distribution of effective power in society; and democracy as a set of moral ideals about rights, inclusion, and respect.

Democracy as an organized arrangement of procedures might be the most common interpretation, but it is certainly not without complexities. Imagine, for example, an election in which there are two or more parties competing for votes, but the parties are virtually identical in platform and positions, and have to be that way by law or to satisfy some ruling elite. There are situations like this in the world today, yet we would not want to call them democratic. Or imagine a competitive election with real alternatives, but participation is limited so that voters for certain options are either artificially over-represented or under-represented in the electorate. Or imagine a competitive election but information about the parties is restricted and biased, affecting what voters can know. Or imagine a situation in which elections occur but do not matter, either because the vote-counting is corrupt or because the most important decisions of the government are made by those not subject to democratic selection.

Robert Dahl of Yale University thus argues that a legitimate democracy must offer real choices, the opportunity for enlightened understanding, inclusive participation, equal participation, and effective participation [Dahl 1998]. We can code each nation for each of these criteria and establish comparative rankings. One of my favorite rankings of democratic procedures – by World Audit – currently lists the U.S. as the 13th most democratic of 150 nations. My personal estimate comes out just about the same. The most democratic in rank are: Finland, Denmark, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland. The U.S. is in the top group, but not at the very top of the list. At the bottom are: Myanmar, Libya, and Zimbabwe. (Romania, by the way, is 65 out of 150 in the latest World Audit ranking of democratic practices and procedures). Of course, 100% perfect inclusiveness is not practical and probably is not even wise. Yet there exists considerable variation among nations regarding their democratic procedures, even among the democratic nations of the world, which makes the topic worthy of serious study.
Democracy is a rule-governed activity. There is no simple and automatic translation from individual preferences into collective outcome. Rules determine who can vote, when you vote, where you vote, what offices are subject to election, who can qualify for the ballot, how the ballot is constructed, what outcome constitutes winning, and even who counts the votes and certifies the result. The existence of electoral rules clearly affects how democratic a nation is – how free and fair are its practices according to our best standards of judgment. However, it is important to note, the actors who write the rules of electoral democracy are also those subject to democratic evaluation. They tend to be party politicians whose own future is influenced by the rules that they establish. The implication of this simple fact, that politicians tend to write the rules that govern their fate, is something we will return to in a few minutes.

B) I wish to further consider the topic of democratic standards – how we evaluate nations according to their degree of democratic-ness. I will claim that procedural democracy is not sufficient. It is only one of the dimensions by which we judge democracies. I will briefly present two others.

The second dimension I use to characterize and evaluate democracies concerns the distribution of power. The 16th American President, Abraham Lincoln, spoke once about government “of the people, by the people, and for the people.” The assumption is that democracy is a system in which every legitimate participant has approximately equal power over the outcome.

Democracy in the first sense I discussed focused on political elites – the fairness of the processes by which they gain power. Democracy in this second sense focuses instead upon citizens. We want our leaders to be responsible regarding popular needs and responsive to popular wishes. Democracy is a system in which ultimate power and influence resides in the people as a whole; and in which each person constituting that whole counts for one, not more and not less.

Power is an elusive concept. It concerns who governs, not merely how we govern. One can imagine a popularly elected government that is not responsive or responsible to the people who elected it – because of egotism, or manipulation, or arrogance, or because it thinks more of what is happening in the halls of the capital than in the streets of the villages, towns, and cities.

Increasingly, across almost all nations, feelings of political efficacy are going down – that is, there is less general confidence that government is listening to people like me; that it responds to people like me; that my input matters; that people like me can affect the affairs of government. There is an increasing sense that someone else is in charge; that other voices are far more powerful; that democracy is a sideshow to which leaders attend only when absolutely necessary. Increasingly, across almost all nations, the means of popular manipulation employed ‘from above’ are becoming more effective and more pervasive.

The original notion of democracy – *demos kratos* – rule by the people – demanded more than a mere procedure for the periodic adding up of votes. It entailed confidence in the power of participatory engagement; it charged a nation’s leaders
with the obligation to attend to what citizens believe and to insure adequate opportunities for citizens to express those beliefs. It expressed worry about the potential for unequal access, status, or influence. It established a political sphere of equal rights and equal voice, essential to construction of a common conversation and deliberation.

Political scientists have a responsibility to study the distribution of power in society. It is an essential variable to our discipline. When we categorize nations as democratic or not – and rank them regarding how much they are democratic – we attend not just to the formal procedures of rule, but also to the dynamics of rule - who governs, in whose interest does the state operate, who has power and influence, and how broadly is that power distributed. Rigorous studies of power can provide data, far beyond the simplistic whining from scandal-makers. Again, as with procedural inclusiveness, the standard is certainly not 100% perfect popular responsiveness; that is an impractical and quite likely irrational ideal. But again, there is considerable variation across nations in their distribution of power, even among so-called democratic nations. And again, this is worth studying, documenting, discussing publicly.

C) There is a third dimension that I believe is essential to the political science study of democracy. For many scholars, democracy is not merely a process for mass participation in elections, nor is it merely a broadly distributed allocation of power and influence – it is also a moral system. It penetrates into our culture, into our ideals and aspirations, and changes who we are as citizens and as a community. It celebrates the notion of personal respect, of open discussion, of essential human rights, of public ethics, and civic responsibility. It entails a belief in social, political and to some degree economic equality, since no one should be so high as to be above the society and no one should be so low as to feel beneath inclusion. It produces a collective sense of belonging and mutual concern.

John Stuart Mill argued that democratic participation transforms us as ethical citizens. It teaches us to escape the narrowness and selfishness of our private existence. We learn respect for others and their rights; we learn to express our opinions and listen to the opinions of others; we gain sympathy toward the other members of our society, recognizing that our perspective is not the only plausible perspective; we learn to appreciate diversity across individuals, peoples, and situations. Democracy in a sense civilizes us – makes us a part of a civilization – and brings forth a higher self that sees more widely, appreciates more extensively, participates more collegially.

Jean Jacques Rousseau argued that democratic ethics also transforms our community. It helps to generate a common will, which is quite different than the sum of individual wills. Democratic ethics shows that our social product is not merely a function of summation, adding up the aggregated total of private opinions. Instead, it involves fashioning a new product, the consequence of deliberation, balancing, recognition, compromise, and mutual understanding.

As political scientists, we measure the penetration of democratic ideals into the popular consciousness. In the contemporary jargon, we study the extent of “social capital” and “generalized civic trust.” We ask individuals about their tolerance of
diversity, recognition of social complexity, and degree of respect for the rights of others. Certainly, as James Madison, an American Founding Father, recognized, “men are no angels.” But we can study, for each country, the extent to which democratic norms and ideals have taken root, and have helped to transform the culture.

To bring this section of the lecture to a conclusion, part of what political scientists do is to conceptualize, categorize, and rank. Democracy is among the most important phenomena that we study. Yet it is a complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon. We want to know the extent to which democratic procedures are free, fair, and inclusive. But we also want to know about democratic power, the extent to which power in society flows upward from an engaged, respected, and equal citizenry. And we want to know about democratic culture, the extent to which democracy infuses our norms, beliefs, and goals. All these, together, constitute a democratic society – or rather, all three are part of our measurement regarding the relative democratic-ness of any given country. We political scientists, across the globe, hold a mirror up to our respective societies, confronting them with their social practices, in many dimensions, on the assumption that understanding is on the road to improvement.

III. Democratic Achievements and the Political Science of Explanation

Political scientists categorize and rank, but they also seek to explain. Our aim is to understand the reasons for the achievements of societies, and the reasons for their failures. In particular, we want to know how and why nations democratize. We want to account for the forces that lead to the expansion of democratic rights and practices, and those that lead to their contraction. The story that I will tell in Part II of the lecture is not entirely positive. The lesson, to preview my conclusion, is that democracy is not necessarily a self-sustaining, self-expanding phenomenon. In fact, there have been historic periods of democratic contraction, and the incentives toward democratic contraction continuously threaten.

A) There have been three great waves of world democratization [Huntington 1991]: from the 1830s through the end of World War I; from the end of World War II through the middle 1950s; and from 1974 through the early 1990s. There were also two great periods of world-wide democratic contraction: the 1920s and 1930s; and the period from 1958 to 1973. Many countries can find their stories here.

Political scientists often debate the causal factors that lead to democratization or non-democratization. There are many empirical studies in the literature. I want to mention briefly a few causal factors that seem especially important to me. First, economic growth and prosperity matters considerably. Democracy seems to need a fertile soil in which to grow. Of the 24 richest countries in the world according to the World Bank, 21 are democratic (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are not). Of the 42 poorest countries, only two (India and Sri Lanka) are democratic.

Second, race/religion/ethnicity seems to matter, in a negative way. The more heterogeneous a nation, the lower the observed probability of democracy.
There appears to be a fear in many nations that minority interests will be in a better position to win benefits under regimes of mass participation, or might become a majority in some region or section of the country.

Third, war seems to matter. As a consequence of war, there has been pressure to expand voting rights to soldiers, for example, or to women at home who sacrificed for the war effort. By contrast, a strong military independent of civilian control works against democratization.

Popular pressure matters, of course, as does the threat of social disruption from those excluded from power. International pressure also can matter but tends to be inconsistent in direction. The country that promotes international democracy one day might turn against it tomorrow, depending on its self-interest and the pattern of alliances it constructs. This has been the history of my own country, the United States, as it variously has supported yet sometimes has undermined democracies when they are deemed to be unfriendly.

Finally, there is weak and controversial evidence that presidential governments tend to be overthrown by anti-democratic coup d’etats more often than parliamentary governments. The data are preliminary and not fully robust. The underlying logic is that the more political veto points, the more rigid the society and the less adaptable, therefore making it more vulnerable to protest and possible overthrow.

B) My own research during the past few years has adopted a somewhat different orientation. Rather than focus on background factors, I have instead examined the inherent incentives and disincentives facing political actors, impelling them either to pursue further democratization or to reject it. I have learned, unfortunately, that the motivation to expand and deepen democratic practices is quite often absent, for reasons that appear rational to both voters and elected politicians. If so, the progress of democratization is somewhat more fragile than we would hope or like to imagine. I have studied my own country, the United States, but the conclusions apply more generally.

There is a widespread impression that the U.S. is now and always has been a model democracy. The American Revolution of 1776 was fought on behalf of local democratic assemblies resisting the unifying control of the British king. The American “Declaration of Independence” proclaimed that all men are created equal and are endowed with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The American Constitution of 1787 established that all governments within the U.S. should be democratic in structure. The U.S. was the “first new nation,” established on the basis of anti-colonialism and domestic self-government.

Yet reality is more complicated [Keyssar 2000]. Women could not vote in the early American republic, nor was the U.S. among the first countries to extend voting rights to women. Australia (1892) and New Zealand (1893) were decades ahead. Similarly, U.S. citizens of African-American descent were usually refused voting rights in the early U.S., not just in the slave states of the South, but in most northern states as
well. New Jersey (1807); Connecticut (1818); Illinois (1818); Pennsylvania (1838); Iowa (1846); Michigan (1849); California (1849) – all adopted specific constitutional provisions depriving non-slave black U.S. citizens of the vote.

Economic class was also used to discriminate. In all but one of the original thirteen U.S. states, a person had to own substantial property holdings – usually in land – in order to qualify for voting. Approximately 40% of adult male citizens were deprived of the right to vote in early America because of the property qualification. This even prompted an armed rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842.

Religion similarly served to differentiate among citizens. At the time of the American Revolution, many states (New York, for example) explicitly prohibited Jews and Catholics from voting. South Carolina required that a voter “believes in God, and believes in a future state of rewards and punishments.” Even morality mattered. Connecticut initially required that a freeman explicitly petition the elite of his town in order to vote, and the vote could be suspended “if they walked scandalously or committed any scandalous office.” Decades later, the law still demanded “good moral character” for potential voters.

Of course, the U.S. today permits virtually universal adult suffrage, regardless of gender, race, class, or religion. Yet it does not have fully universal suffrage – even compared to other long-standing democratic nations – for many states disenfranchise felons, require long-in-advance voter registration, and lengthy residency in the community before permitting one to vote. In addition, it should also be remembered that the U.S., at times in its history, explicitly contracted the right to vote. The most obvious example concerns the period of apartheid after the Civil War. In Louisiana in 1888, 127,923 blacks were registered to vote. In 1904 (sixteen years later), only 1,342 blacks were registered, a reduction of 99%.

This leads to an interesting question, which in my empirical research I applied to the United States but with relevance elsewhere. The question is how and why ostensibly democratic regimes further democratize, and why sometimes they reverse the process. There are a number of causal factors at work – economic development, regional conflict, class differences, ethnic and religious fears, ideological principles, social mobilization. But there is something additional and essential that demands consideration. Democratization requires that politicians elected under the existing regime actually approve the reform of electoral rules. Regardless of underlying pressures, incumbent politicians must vote for the change. Thus we have to examine the incentive structure facing current regime actors, asking why they consciously might agree to expand participation, and why sometimes they might consciously seek to contract it. Put somewhat more formally, the task is to examine the logical micro-foundations for democratic choice among regime actors.

Here we see a problem. Logically, adding new voters increases the uncertainty and risk for incumbent officials, whose careers have thrived under the current electorate. Moreover, the interests of potentially enfranchised voters most often do not match the interests of already dominant social and political groups. Alterations in the regional, ethnic, class, racial, or gender distribution of power would, most
likely, carry changes for the policies pursued and the benefits conveyed. The conclusion is apparent. Democratic expansion can be costly to entrenched factions. Democratization thus should never be considered simple, ordinary, benign, or inexorable. Contrary to our hopes and dreams, democratization does not appear as an automatic, self-sustaining, and self-reaffirming process of development. Given the presence of self-interested actors and important probable political ramifications, democratic expansion always requires special explanation. In fact, democratic contraction, by formally excluding likely supporters of one’s opponents, might even be thought the more logical tendency.

My research has focused on the politics of political party competition in the United States, and the situation where the inclusion of previously excluded voters offers greater advantages to the party or faction in power than it risks from distressing entrenched supporters. However, this configuration does not occur often. Voting rights seem to progress primarily during one specific political configuration -- in which a) at least two major political parties have organized institutionally and are quite competitive; b) the former minority party wins a narrow victory and seeks the means to reinforce its tenuous hold on power; c) there is a subordinate group in the population excluded from participation, who would be attracted to the formerly-minority-party and thus could help it hold onto power if permitted to vote. (By contrast, when the subordinate group is already included politically and is allied to the opposing party, there is incentive for the formerly-minority-party to repress and pursue electoral contraction [King 2001-a; King 2001-b].)

I have attempted to model and test this hypothesis about party competition, and found a number of clear illustrations concerning the removal of the property ownership restriction upon voting in early America - for example, in Connecticut in 1818 after an alliance of religious Episcopalians and ideological Jeffersonians defeated the previously dominant Federalist Party; in New York in 1821 after the Van Buren faction representing small farmers finally defeated the DeWitt Clinton faction; in North Carolina in 1845 when the resurgent Democratic Party found the issue useful in capturing power from the formerly entrenched Whigs [King and Moeller 2006].

Political party competition also seems to explain the 17th Amendment, which established popular election of U.S. senators; it was implemented by the Democratic Party as soon as it regained office in 1913 and was intended to eliminate an electoral advantage that previously had favored the Republicans [King and Ellis 1996; Ellis and King 1999]. Similarly, it helps to explain the 15th Amendment, insuring votes for African-Americans, for those votes were needed by the then-dominant Republican Party in a series of close elections right after the Civil War [Gillette 1965]. These illustrations are not just historical; they continue to apply today. But that’s enough detail about United States politics.

The general point is that democratization is not always the product of high ideals, but instead often emerges from the mundane purposes of narrow political advantage. Thus it does not always and easily progress. Moreover, it is often at risk, for the incentive structure of mundane political advantage can lead incumbent
regime politicians to seek democratic contraction, disenfranchising those who otherwise would be opposed to their continued rule. This is an important – if somewhat disappointing – lesson to learn.

IV. Democratic Transformations and the Political Science of Prediction

We have discussed political science as categorization and related it to the multi-dimensional rankings we use to assess how democratic a country might be; we have discussed political science as explanation and related it to the background conditions and incentives structures that lead both citizens and political elites to pursue either democratic expansion or democratic contraction. In this third section of the lecture, I want to discuss political science as prediction – and relate it to the transformations occurring in democratization, worldwide.

I make predictions about the future with hesitance. If I were good at it, I would use my powers of foresight to play the lottery and win enough money to retire to Aruba. Yet it is important that political scientists examine data over time. Longitudinal, time-series analysis helps us to understand trends, movements, developments, co-integrated patterns, fluctuations, dynamics, shocks-and-recoveries, and structural breaks. It is a place where the mathematics of social science has made great strides in recent years (much of which is beyond my competence, although with delight I read the works of my younger colleagues, with new Ph.D.s and the latest skills).

I will argue, observing current trends, that the nature of democracy is changing. Just as we started to comprehend the characteristics of 20th Century democracy, the ground began shifting under our feet. The democracy I have been examining so far – what I have termed 20th Century democracy – is based on the notion of a self-contained nation-state. It entails, first, an inherent distance within each country between the democratic government and the democratically governed; and second, an inherent separation across these distinct, sovereign national democratic systems of governments and governed. Neither of these phenomena is enduring; both are undergoing transformation as we speak. It is a common paradox of social science – just as we begin to understand something in the world, which takes time and effort, the thing we study changes, mutates, and evolves in something considerably different. I will briefly discuss some current transformations, which will affect the kind of democracy rapidly emerging for future decades.

A) 20th Century democracy was a particular brand of democracy -- quite different, for example, from that of the ancient Greeks where the citizens would meet for deliberation on the hillside; leadership changed every meeting; and decisions were made by harmonia, by consensus. 20th Century democracy occurred within nation-states, encompassing large amounts of territory and millions of citizens who could not possibly meet together. Instead, they vote for representatives who are expected to made decisions on policy. Thus, unlike in ancient Greece,
there is a separation of democratic rulers and the democratically ruled – the instrument of periodic elections is what connects them.

Today, technology is making the 20th Century democratic conception increasingly obsolete. It is not just that we can send e-mail directly to legislators. There are thousands of blogs, websites, and chatrooms, plus text messengers and cell phones. Let me tell you a story, from my colleague Latha Varadarajan. In India a few months ago, the security police invaded a small, remote village because of an economic protest and were especially brutal. Within minutes, the world knew – because instant messages were sent and re-sent, with photos and first-hand accounts – and there were human rights complaints filed with Indian ministers before they even knew of the event. It is ever more difficult to keep information secret, or to keep it restricted to a few in number.

Beyond information issues, the spread of computer technology is changing the character of voting. It is now possible (and soon it will be familiar) to have individuals voting from their homes, electronically. The range of topics upon which they can comment, and the ease of consulting citizen opinion, will alter significantly the form of representative institutions.

Furthermore, citizens will communicate with each other, not merely with officials, exploding the prevailing notion of political community. Deliberation and discussion will no longer be confined narrowly to the village or neighborhood or workplace where individuals meet face-to-face. In the virtual community, people of similar interests can congregate in cyberspace and deliberate freely without the restriction of physical location.

Technology-based political innovation will come to the richer nations first, most certainly, but there is no holding it back. My prediction is that it will alter the nature of political participation; it will alter the character of political organizations; it will alter the skills and knowledge-base and means of access for citizens within democracy – easily within the lifetimes of the students sitting in this room. Technological capacity currently surpasses our political imagination, but it will not do so for long. Soon, social and political changes will follow at rapid pace.

B) The second prediction I make, based on presently-observable trends, concerns globalization. 20th Century democracy was grounded in the nation-state, a bounded territory of peoples and governments, with domestic politics inside and foreign relations outside. Within the nation-state are “our” citizens; in other nation-states are “their” citizens. We run “our” affairs, hopefully democratically, and they run “theirs”; and nations interact externally in the “inter-national” realm, a sort of state-of-nature where nations compete, cooperate, and sometimes conflict. Yet this notion of sovereign, self-governing, independent democratic (and non-democratic) states sits quite uncomfortably with newer realities. National political communities make decisions that have essential consequences far beyond their borders; and decisions by actors who escape the confines of all national borders often have essential consequences for those who live within our borders.
For example, economic processes are increasingly globalized. The automobile made in the U.S. is often a Toyota; China finds it less expensive to import soy beans than to transport them from the western part of the country. We have seen the globalization of economic trade, finance, and production, much of which is performed by transnational and multinational corporations. This increases the problems for nations that wish to regulate their own economies, because transnational companies do not located within any single nation whereas the people affected by those companies (as workers, consumers, citizens) are far more fixed in place. Given the mobility of transnational firms, national government are increasingly unable to hold them accountable, with labor or environmental or tax policies, since they can always move operations to some other location more advantageous. The governing capacity of democracy to assert fairness has diminished and the power of mobile economic actors has increased due of the global market.

Similarly, migration is changing the planet. Europe is now multi-racial. Within the EU, increasing numbers of people are working in nations where they are not citizens, and probably do not intend to become citizens. This has political effects. In New Zealand, Chile, and Uruguay, resident non-citizens can vote in all elections. In Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Belgium, Netherlands, Hungary, and Slovakia, resident non-citizens can vote in local elections. The concept of national belonging is rapidly being transformed.

In addition, there are increasing numbers of policy problems whose solution escapes national governance. This is most obvious for environmental issues. There are shared problems (global warming, ozone depletion) that can only be addressed through coordinated action. There are spillover issues (acid rain, downstream pollution) where the consequences of one nation’s polluting activities are felt more in other countries than in one’s own.

Finally, there are new trans-national organizations, treaties, norms, standards of ethics that are increasingly filling the space between nations, providing institutional structures where before there were only separate and sovereign nations. Romania is currently dealing with the consequences of joining the EU. But to my mind, the most significant of these developments are international courts and tribunals, especially the International Criminal Court, which can bring to justice those who commit crimes against humanity. It is a great disappointment that, of the more than 100 countries that have subscribed to the International Criminal Court, the U.S. is not one of them and has at times hindered the court’s efforts to bring political mass murderers to justice.

It is not that nations have “lost” their sovereignty [Held and McGrew 2007]. That would be an exaggeration. However, nations can no longer be characterized as separate and discrete units. The character of the global political community is changing; effective power is no longer fully within national governments; there are more shared problems; there are growing disjunctions between the formal authority of the nation-state and the demands of the international political-economy – and thus national sovereignty is becoming more complex, with overlapping and divided
political authority, cross-cutting loyalties, and ambiguity regarding where governing capacity actually sits. There are increasing boundary problems. So-called “communities of fate” do not sit simply within established “communities of authority.”

Globalization is not a choice. It is a fact of modern existence. The only question is how nations will adapt. Globalization can be a force for democratization, with increased information, awareness, development, and modernization. Globalization can be a force against democratization, as transnational firms reduce the ability of democratic societies to regulate their affairs. But most importantly, globalization will be a force for different democratization, for an evolving democracy, that stretches the boundaries of the nation-state, alters our notion of affected communities, and produces a world that is multiple, overlapping, complex, and sometimes planetary in perspective. The challenge is whether democracy – which we are just starting to comprehend as a phenomenon within nation-state boundaries - can adapt, transform, and thrive in an environment that escapes nation-state boundaries. It is a challenge that already is upon us and will become essential over the coming decades, as the generation of current students claim their democratic rights and exercise their democratic obligations.

V. Conclusion

This lecture has been in three parts, each of which has been linked to the project of empirical political science. Political science attempts to categorize, comprehend, and rank – and so we discussed democracy as an aspiration, involving a multi-dimensional scale for evaluation. Political Science attempts to explain -- and so we discussed democracy as an achievement, exploring the variables that encourage democratization and the incentive structures that promote democratic expansion or democratic contraction. Political Science attempts to predict – and so we discussed democratic transformations that, inevitably and inherently, are on the contemporary agenda because of globalizing and technological forces that are changing the nation-state. To some degree, this analysis has been optimistic; to some degree it has not. Democracy remains a contested concept because at its core it has the potential to empower, and power is always contested by those reluctant to share it.

Approximately 2500 years ago, Plato in the Republic argued that humans were not capable of effective, inclusive, participatory mass democracy. The dynamics of world political history, to a great degree, can be seen as a response to this challenge. For the first time, a majority of nations now practice some form of democratic self-government; a majority of individuals now live in nations that permit some form of democratic self-government. Yet Plato’s challenge remains – and our task is, yet again, to respond – by pressing consistently for responsive yet responsible democratic governments, that are increasing encompassing, increasingly equitable, increasingly empowering despite conditions that make this achievement difficult and ever more complex. I am proud to observe that the Political Science Faculty at Babeș-Bolyai has become part of this essential conversation, and I am proud to the degree that I have played a small role in encouraging its growth and development.
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CITATIONS


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ABSTRACT. After the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, churches have quickly returned as major societal actors in several post-communist countries. The Romanian Orthodox Church is one of them: in recent opinion polls, 87.6% of ethnic Romanians said they have much or very much confidence in the Orthodox Church – a higher share of the population than for any other national institution. Moreover, nearly half of the Romanians grant their church an active role in politics. Hence, there is a lot of room for the Orthodox Church to shape the democratization process in Romania. This article focuses on one aspect of the church's potential influence, namely on the mobilization of its members for civic activism. As to other organisations in Eastern Europe, the social differentiation and political pluralization that come along with the post-communist transition pose a challenge to the churches in the region. However, unlike the Orthodox Church, the Catholic and Protestant churches in Eastern Europe belong to an international body that looks back on a long history of acting in a democratic environment – thus drawing from a significantly different accumulated organisational learning. Through their churches, Christians in Eastern Europe are therefore exposed to different organisational norms and values. The Catholic and Protestant Church are found to put more emphasis on the societal involvement of their members, appear more ready to accept religious tolerance and have a less nationalist outlook than the Orthodox Churches. The quantitative analyses in this article show that the organisational culture of the Romanian Orthodox Church induces significantly less activism among its members than its Catholic and Protestant counterparts. Moreover, denominational affiliation is the most important explanatory factor for civic activism in Romania out of a wide range of variables.

Key words: democratization, church, institutional trust, civic activism,

1. Introduction

Nearly 20 years after the Iron Curtain fell, it seems safe to say that the outspokenly atheist communist regimes have not been able to weaken the churches' societal position in all the East European societies in a lasting manner. Since the democratic revolutions, in many countries in Eastern Europe the churches have been gaining ground again. Most notably in Poland, Romania and Russia, they have returned as major societal actors, shaping the new democracies' future. Nevertheless, the social differentiation and political pluralization coming
along with democratization pose a challenge to the churches in the region. Like other organisations in Eastern Europe, the churches have to adopt to the social structure that constitutes a democratic society and to find their place in a social space spanned anew between politics, economy and civil society.

The three most widespread Christian denominations in Eastern Europe appear to be prepared for this challenge to a different degree. As a whole, the Catholic and Protestant church look back on a long history of acting in a democratic environment. This accumulated learning has been mediated to the Eastern European branches in intensive relations. The Orthodox churches with their tradition of autocephaly and their main presence in societies that were almost exclusively undemocratic before 1989 - Greece being the most notable exception - face their adaptational challenge without being able to draw upon such a body of experience. In other words: the different adaptational and cohesional challenges the churches experienced in the past lead to substantial differences between the organisational cultures of the three denominations today.² This is not without consequences for the Christian churches' ability to contribute to the democratization processes in their respective countries. In this paper, I will focus on one aspect of their potential contribution, namely the mobilization of their members for active involvement in civil society organisations. My hypothesis is that because of differences between their organisational cultures, the Catholic and Protestant church are more successful in generating civic activism among their members in Eastern Europe, than the Orthodox church is.

I will explore this using the Christian churches in Romania as an example. Romania is one of the most religious countries in Europe and the Orthodox church is the dominant denomination.³ This makes the country a good case for an exploratory analysis of the impact of Orthodoxy on civic activism. However, potential majority/minority effects could distort the findings. Catholics and Protestants are a religious minority in Romania - cohesion among them could therefore be stronger. Firstly, this could lead to a smaller share of nominal members in the overall membership and secondly, to a higher degree of activation of their members for the matters of the congregation.⁴ These potential biases will be dealt with in the quantitative analyses.

In the following section, I will present the research design for this paper along with some notes on the theoretical background. A short account on the churches' history of organisational learning will follow, focusing on the differences in the organisational culture of the Catholic and Orthodox Church. I will assume that the differences between Orthodoxy and one of the two other Christian denominations are much more substantial, than the differences between Protestantism and Catholicism. The Protestant and Catholic Church shared most of the critical

³ Dungaciu, Dan (2004), p. 1. In 2005, 92,1% of ethnic Romanians declared themselves Christian Orthodox, 2,7% Roman Catholic, 1,2% Protestant and 1,6% Greek Catholic.
historical events in their political and social environment. Therefore, telling the story for Western Christianity as a whole and omitting the differences between the Western Christian denominations should still allow me to draw meaningful conclusions regarding the churches' influence on the civic activism of their members.

In the subsequent section, I will describe the sample that has been used for the quantitative analyses in this paper. The findings will be presented in section 5. They suggest that the organisational culture of the three churches decisively influences the civic activism of their members. Since the overwhelming majority of Romanians is Orthodox, Orthodoxy appears as a factor decisively shaping the prospects of civil society in Romania.

2. Theoretical Background

The research design of this paper is set in a nexus between the individual, civil society and the state. In consequence, it touches a vast array of theoretical debates, for none of which a consensus seems even close to be reached between the main scholars in the field. For lack of space, I will restrict myself to presenting the concepts that will be used for the research design itself. Firstly, I am going to explain how civil society and civic activism will be understood and measured in this study. Secondly, I will set forth the theoretical framework for conceptualizing the influence of the churches on the civic activism of their members. Its cornerstone is the concept of Organisational Culture. It will help me to reconstruct which activism-related group norms are conveyed by the churches to their members. Finally, I will present the theoretical background for other variables such as educational level or occupational status that will be controlled for in the subsequent quantitative analyses.

2.1. Civil Society and Civic Activism

In this paper, civil society will be defined as the social space between the private networks of the individual and the state, where people come together and form social groups to pursue their common interests. In this definition, common interests refers to interests common to the people that associate, not necessarily common to the whole of society. That is, activities linked to achieving the group's objectives do not have to be beneficial for the society as a whole in order to be called civic activism. The author shares the view that civil society and civic activism should rather be seen as "an ambivalent concept such as state or power." Only such an understanding of the concepts opens the way for unprejudiced research on civil society issues. Similar "value-free" definitions are used by several scholars in the field.

In line with this understanding of civil society, civic activism will be operationalized as Involvement in Organisations. It is a combined measure of peoples' membership in different civil society organisations with their volunteering for the respective organisations. It is coded in such a way that being a member and

7 Howard, Marc Morjé (2003); Karolewski, Ireneusz Pawel (2006); Reichhardt, Sven (2004).
volunteer in an organisation as well as being only a member or volunteer are all counted as instances for the involvement in an organisation. Hence, the variable is a dichotomous variable: a person will be either involved in an organisation or not. Involvement in Organisations is the dependent variable in this study.

2.2. Churches and Civic Activism

How do churches influence civic activism? Before I will explore this theoretically, I want to give a short account on how research on civic activism has treated religion so far. In a number of studies, individual religiosity - regardless of the religion in question - is taken as an independent variable to explain an individual's involvement in civil society organisations. In these cases, attendance of religious services proves to be a strong predictor of civic activism in religious organisations. For the involvement in civil society organisations other than religious ones the effects of religiosity are less strong or sometimes not significant. However, if denominational differences are taken into account, individual religiosity can better explain civic activism: more conservative denominations successfully mobilize their members for church volunteering, but less so for nonchurch civic engagement, whereas members of more liberal denominations tend to be more involved in both religious and secular organisations.

Some studies even come to the conclusion that some denominations do not mobilize their members for civic activism at all. In the case of the studies that found positive effects of religiosity in general on civic activism, negative effects of some denominations could have been consumed by strong positive effects of other denominations on civic activism. Therefore, their findings do not rule out the possibility that religiousness in the context of certain denominations has an overall demobilizing effect on believers. In line with that interpretation, several studies state that one has to differentiate between denominations to obtain meaningful explanations for the effect of religiosity on civic activism. Further more, most of the studies cited here are restricted to Western Christian denominations. In neither of these, Orthodoxy or non-Christian religions have been explicitly under scrutiny. Hence, general effects of religiosity on civic activism found in these studies are actually the effects of Western Christian denominations on civic activism. Differences between denominations found to be insignificant might prove to be very well significant, when the comparison also comprises non-Western religions.

But now, how do denominational affiliation and religious behaviour influence civic activism? What role does an individual's membership in a church - dependent on the denomination in question - play for its involvement in civil

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12 Lam, Pui-Yan (2002); Schwadel, Philip (2005); Uslaner, Eric M. (2002); Wilson, John (2000).
society organisations? Theories on civic activism set out the theoretical scope for this. Group norms and the integration into social networks are important explanatory variables for many approaches in the field. But how do group norms come into being? I believe that in this regard, churches have an important role to play: they convey a distinctive set of norms to their members and shape their outlook on the social and political environment.

The link between an individual's set of norms influencing her or his civic activism on one hand and her or his denominational affiliation on the other is provided by the social identity theory. It holds that people strive for a positive social identity, derived from belonging to positively evaluated groups. This is believed to be the reason, why social norms recognized by the group are followed by individual community members. Put more simply: "Christians do not interpret their religion in a vacuum; they take cues from fellow parishioners and clergy." The norms and values that are upheld in their religious community therefore strengthen or weaken their commitments directly. Whether these norms only value engagement for the community or also promote involvement in worldly matters depends on the community in question. Therefore, denominational affiliation can serve as an indicator for a certain view of society and civic activity a believer shares with the members of his or her congregation and denomination.

However, congregational affiliation might be a more exact indicator for an individual's view of society and civic activity. However, as even a proponent of a congregational approach notes: "Congregations within denominations tend to be somewhat similar." Therefore, if the differences between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Christians are under scrutiny, religious affiliation should be a fairly good indicator for differences between individuals' norms linked to civic activism. The more so as civic activists themselves often link their commitment to their religious faith.

Besides this, sharing the norms of a denomination does not necessarily require own religious practice. Religious instruction usually happens during the upbringing of a person and related norms are given on by parents to their children as part of a broader set of cultural understandings.

One of those norms is altruism. The common understanding of the teachings of Jesus Christ indicates that this norm is promoted by all variants of Christian faith to at least some degree. Altruism may serve as a motivation for activism that is beneficial to people beyond the limits of the community. This can be explained with the mutually enforcing co-action of social norms with the system of reciprocity as it is envisaged by the Social Capital approach. This way, seemingly altruistic behaviour, e.g. helping others outside the individual's community, may be

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17 ibidem.
explained by the individual's drive for honour or approval in his social network. Here, reciprocity is not ensured by the direct beneficiaries of the individual's behaviour, but by the community the individual belongs to. In exchange for its 'altruistic behaviour' the individual is accorded a higher status in the community. However, it has to be mentioned that altruism is not the only norm that makes the mechanism work. Intolerance or tolerance could have a similar function, if they are shared norms of the community. Intolerance could lead to harmful actions by an individual against others outside the community, tolerance to actions similar to seemingly altruistic behaviour. Again, reciprocity would be ensured by the members of the community the individual is part of.

Further more, the church's theology of state and culture, e.g. the value it puts on pluralism, the way it conceives its relationship with the state or its stance towards nationhood, are important for the church's impact on its members civic activism. If the church teaches that the state has the role to solve social problems, church members are believed to be less likely to get involved in civil society organisations - even more so, if civil society in general is rather in opposition to the state. With that configuration, being part of a church closely cooperating with the state is likely to translate into dissociation from civil society organisations. Along with that, the degree to which involvement in society is directly promoted by the Christian church in question varies. Whereas some religious communities rather promote the retreat from society, others teach their members to take an active role in the larger society. The organisational structure of the church can be view as an expression of both the church-state relationship and the value given to involvement.

2.3. An Approach to Analysing a Church's Stance on Civic Activism

Although norms appear to be constitutive of the role denominational affiliation plays for civic activism, it is a rather difficult endeavour to grasp the differences in the set of norms a particular Christian denomination promotes. The normative differences between the denominations are largely of emphasis. But again, these different emphases may account for much of the variation in mobilization for civic activism among the members of different denominations.

It is unlikely that official documents would display these nuances. To study the way religious services are held or the church showcases itself might

24 In fact, even the Great Schism of 1054 between the (today) Roman-Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Church had first and foremost political reasons. It mainly evolved from the universal claim to leadership of the Roman pope (Leb, Ioan Vasile, 2001a, p. 12). The theological dispute is based on the so-called 'filioque clause', an addition to the creed. However, the phrase was already added in 447 at the Synod of Toledo. The Great Schism occurred roughly 600 years later.
easily lead to distorted results due to the cultural bias of the researcher. The organisational structure, too, could be easily misconstrued. In addition to that religious concepts are deeply rooted in the personal conceptions of the world. These differences are unlikely to surface in the believers' portrayal of their faith. So how to grasp the set of norms a particular church conveys to its members?

The problems mentioned here are common to the research on organisational culture. The Organisational Culture approach tells us that the same observable behaviour or physical environment could mean contrary things in different organisations. Only if one gathers more information about the organisational culture one can be sure that his or her judgements are not misleading. Further more, if one asks members about the norms and values by which they guide their behaviour, one at best grasps the conscious part of the respective culture. This, in turn, is very likely to be distorted by social desirability.

To allow for a structured analysis that avoids these problems, in research on organisational culture three levels of analysis are usually distinguished: artifacts, espoused values and underlying assumptions. Artifacts are the most visible organisational structures and processes, i.e. how buildings of the organisation look or how members in the organisation behave. Espoused values are the justifications of the group's behaviour given by the members of the group as they are embodied in strategy papers, internal publications or the group's orally circulated philosophies. They are meant to guide the group and to show new members to what they should adopt to. Hence, these shared beliefs remain conscious. Basic assumptions, in turn, are the part of the organisational culture which are taken for granted by all members and which they themselves are not necessarily aware of any more. They are believed to provide the interpretational key for the other two levels of analysis.

Basically, organisational culture is thought of as an organisation's shared learning. A group is frequently challenged by the external environment in two ways: It has to adapt to changes in society and to assure cohesion among its members. A group has to find solutions to these adaptational and cohesional challenges in order to survive. The solutions become shared basic assumptions about how to behave in given situations, if they continue to be successful to solve the group's ultimate problems with adaptation and cohesion over a longer period of time. Once these solutions have become basic assumptions, they form the most stable part of an organisational culture and change only gradually, sometimes even long after they ceased to provide appropriate solutions to the external survival and

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26 ibid., p. 17.
29 ibid., p. 20.
internal integration issues. This is believed to happen, because of another important function that shared assumptions fulfill besides meeting external challenges: They provide meaning, stability and comfort for the group members. Shared assumptions reduce the anxiety that would occur due to the ever changing external environment in that they give ready answers for the understanding and prediction of events around one. Therefore, events that challenge basic assumptions will release defensiveness. A group will rather distort or deny what does not fit with its basic assumptions than readily change its general pattern of perception of the events around it.

The approach suggests that one can grasp an organisation's basic assumptions, if one identifies the major challenges in the history of the respective group. At the same time, the theory holds that basic assumptions might be persistent for a period of time even if the external environment of a group has radically changed and the assumptions do not lead to positive results any more.

However, the question remains, whether this approach may be applied to religious bodies as well. Organisational culture research describes the strength and degree of integration of a culture as "a function of the stability of the group, the length of time the group has existed, the intensity of the group's experiences of learning [...] and the strength and clarity of the assumptions held by the founders and leaders of the group." The main Christian denominations have existed for several hundred years. Moreover, the history of the denominations is full of critical incidents: All denominations went through changing political environments, schisms and times of persecution. The strength and clarity of the assumptions of the founders and leaders are also given. In addition to that denominations are very stable groups, since most of their members are part of them from birth to death. Therefore, I believe that the different denominations should all have a detectable and pronounced organisational culture. Their core are the basic assumptions - or in other words: norms - conveyed to and shared by their members.

2.4. Other Factors influencing Civic Activism

From the preceding subchapters it follows that group norms conveyed by the churches play a role in motivating church members for civic activism. However, not everybody that is motivated or has reason to engage in civil society organisations actually does so. The Resource Approach holds that lack of time, money and civic skills can be decisive obstacles to civic activism. In turn, if an individual possesses these resources, the probability that she or he gets involved in civil society organisations increases.

32 ibid., p. 4.
36 ibid., p. 7.
Civic skills are understood as the individual's capability to speak and write well, organize meetings and actively take part in them. People with a higher educational level and higher income have certain opportunities to develop these skills that people with a lower socio-economic status do not have. Their jobs provide them with a training ground for civic skills, because higher paid jobs usually include more self-management and organisational tasks than lower paid ones. The same applies to education: Forms of higher education involve more self-determination in setting up one's working schedule and more opportunities to train organisational skills, e.g. through the participation in student organisations. However, there are opportunities to learn these civic skills that are not linked to income or educational level: Active participation in a parish or in civil society organisations represent two options to develop civic skills available to a much broader range of social strata. The latter learning opportunity means that people that are already engaged in an organisation to a certain extent are likely to do so even more over time. In the quantitative analyses of this study, I will include the triad of indicators for an individual's resources, namely education, income and occupational status, to control for their effect on the civic activism of the church members.

Besides this, I will control for the effects of the demographical factors gender and age. In previous studies, both young and old people have proven to be less involved in civil society organisations than the middle-aged. As far as gender is regarded, in cross-national studies, no consistent effect on civic engagement has been found. In North America, women appear to be slightly more likely to volunteer than men. In Western Europe, there is no overall gender difference. In some countries males are more likely to get involved in civil society organisations, in others females. Differences sometimes occur in the type of civic activism, too.

Last but not least I will control for generalised trust. It is used as an indicator for a society's social capital by the Social Capital Theory. On the societal level, social capital is believed to have various beneficial outcomes: higher rates of political participation, better governance and accelerated economic growth to name only a few. Initially, civic activism was regarded as a source of social capital. The theory claimed that through their participation in civil society organisations, people develop norms of reciprocity and trust. However, several studies convincingly argue that the reversal is true: people that trust more join civil society organisations. Therefore, social capital would be a source of civic activism in a society that could distort my findings regarding the effect of the churches' organisational culture on civic activism.

39 ibidem.
3. The Churches' Organisational Culture

As I have argued in the second section of this paper, I believe that the inclination of a person to engage in civic activism is affected by its denominational affiliation. This is because I assume that churches convey a distinctive set of norms to their members. According to Organisational Culture research, this set of norms may be equated with the organisational culture of the churches. However, as it has been pointed out, the set of norms a church explicitly and implicitly promotes cannot be measured directly. Hence, for the quantitative analyses in the following section, the organisational culture of the three churches under scrutiny will be measured as a person's denominational affiliation, assuming that for every member of the same church, the organisational culture she or he shares is a constant.

In the following subchapters, the task is therefore not to discuss the measurement of the variable, but to explain, how the organisational cultures of the Orthodox Church differs from that of the Catholic and Protestant Church and what the expected consequences of these differences are for the motivation of the churches' members to engage in civic activism. Put differently, I will explain how the variable Organisational Culture of the Churches will influence the dependent variable Civic Activism when controlling for the factors presented in chapter 2.4.

As it has been argued in chapter 2.3., different organisational cultures are the product of a different organisational learning that occurred over time. This organisational learning is triggered by the political and societal environment which poses cohesional and adaptational challenges to the organisations. In the case of the Christian churches, the history of environmental challenges is long and complex. The nature of the task implicates that not only the Churches' history in East and West has to be taken into account, but also the history of principalities, nations, societal movements and ideas. Therefore, the account provided in the following subchapters makes no claim to be exhaustive. I will only be able to compare historical epochs and point out the major differences in the environmental challenges the churches had to face. However, the concise historical account should suffice for the reconstruction of the basic assumptions that are shared by the churches' members, since only the critical incidents in an organisation's history are believed to trigger organisational learning which in turn leads to the formation of basic assumptions.

I do not attempt to argue that the organisational culture and therewith a denomination's relation to society and state is based on insurmountable differences in theologies and that a given organisational culture would therefore be the only theologically possible outcome for the denomination in question. I am well aware of the argument that in the theology of any of the three denominations one could

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44 The inclination for civic activism has to be distinguished from the realized potential because of the impact of an individual's resources on its civic activism (see chapter 2.4. for more details).

45 This has been discussed in the second chapter: The denomination is the entity, in which religious beliefs are shaped and therewith related views on society and civic activity.

find the basis for an ecclesiology that embraces pluralism, civic activity and church-state separation - as well as intolerance, escapism and theocracy. My argument goes the other way round: I will cite theological arguments to show, how the churches have reacted on the challenges faced by them throughout history. This train of thought is not alien to theological disquisitions on the topic. What I want to elaborate is the de facto self-conception of the churches and their view on the relationship between Christianity and society that they - along with other values, as it will be shown - convey to their members.

The first task in the subsequent subchapter will be to establish a suitable starting point for the analysis of the critical incidents that have led to the development of different sets of group norms between the churches. In the words of organisational culture research: When does the organisational culture of the one catholic church start to differentiate in at first an Orthodox and Roman Catholic and later a Protestant variant? Afterwards, I will demonstrate how these different points of origin coined different historical trajectories for the organisational culture of the churches, with a special focus on the churches in Romania.

3.1. Three Denominations, Two Histories

The most obvious starting point for a separate history of adaptational and cohesive challenges for the Catholic and Orthodox Church would arguably be the Great Schism in 1054. At this point, the one Catholic church - here still literally the "universal church" - finally broke in two: the Eastern Orthodox with its religious centre in Constantinople and the Roman Catholic with the Pope as its leading figure in the West. However, the Great Schism itself is seen as the outcome of a longer process of alienation of the two religious communities in West and East. In 1054, inside the Christian church two subcultures had already been in the process of formation for a long time.

Therefore, the starting point for the analysis of the critical incidents for the development of the organisational culture of denominations today has to be set before that time. If one understands the ecclesiology of a denomination mainly as a function of its political and cultural environment - as organisational culture research would do and I do in this paper, it seems adequate to chose a point in time, where this environment significantly changed for the first time for the initially two and later three churches.

This was the case in 395, when with the death of Theodosius I the Roman Empire permanently split in two. He was the last Roman Emperor that succeeded to reunite the western and eastern portions of the empire. By the end of his reign,

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47 For an attempt to reconcile Orthodoxy and democracy on theological grounds see Papanikolaou, Aristotle (2003); for an account on how Catholicism came to embrace democratic values see Sigmund, Paul E. (1987).
he had changed the statute of religion in his empire. In 380, in an edict addressed to the population of Constantinople and entitled "Cunctos populos", Theodosius officially ended the religious liberty in the Roman Empire and declared the Nicene Christianity with its distinct understanding of the Holy Trinity the de facto state religion. Roughly one hundred years later, in 475, when Julius Nepos, the last legitimate Western Roman Emperor, had been deposed, in the Western part of Europe the church stood on its own, facing a struggle for power with the secular rulers of the time, whereas in the Eastern part of the former Roman Empire, Christianity was the state religion in an intact, now Byzantine Empire.50

In the East, this pattern of power remained basically unchanged for a thousand years, until the year 1453, when Constantinople was conquered by the Ottomans and the Byzantine Empire finally fell. After this, the Ottoman Empire became the central power in the territory of the Orthodox Church - an empire, of which the combination of secular and religious power was a distinct feature, too. In Russia, in this regard, the situation did not differ much: here, the Byzantine state ideology of Cesaropapism and therewith the combination of secular and religious power became the official doctrine for the church.51 In South-Eastern Europe, the Orthodox churches accepted the Balkan tribe logic to resist Islamization.52 This lead to "ethnocentric messianism", which was a quasi-continuation of the symphonia ideology under the given political circumstances.53 In closing, for Orthodox Christianity, the Byzantine empire is believed to not only be a passing moment in history but a formative period for its thoughts and practices.54 Byzantine Christian theocracy still functions as the primary frame of reference for contemporary Orthodox discussions on democracy.55

In the West instead, from the 5th until the 8th century, the central secular power having vanished, the church itself had to represent the authority of the Roman Empire, substituting it as the bearer of the Latin culture.56 Only in the time of absolute monarchy, the Roman Catholic church lost its autonomy to the secular rulers.57 Later, its political and social environment promoted liberalism and democracy and the church had to adopt its theology of state and culture to a pluralist ideology, like the Protestant Church.

The fact that in the West the churches developed the concept of separate and self-contained bodies and the Orthodox Church did not is a fundamentally different starting point for their organisational learning later on. Further more, their ministry being centered on different regions, they experienced different adaptational

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52 Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina (1998), p. 3.
53 ibid., p. 2.
55 ibid., p. 84.
57 ibid., p. 29.
and cohesional challenges. These are the two main reasons why from the viewpoint of Organisational Culture analysis, I believe that there are only two histories to be told for the three denominations under scrutiny: One for Christianity in the West and one for the Orthodox Church in the East.

3.2. Consequences for the Organisational Culture of the Churches

From its very beginning and until modern times, the Orthodox Church has been under the powerful rule of one central government. Thus, it developed the concept of symphonia. It called for the emperor and the bishop to closely cooperate. The amalgam of secular and religious powers envisaged by Symphonia had various implications. Most importantly, it resulted in a separation of spheres of activity between the church and the secular power. The Byzantine emperor Justinian I expressed this in making the distinction between the imperium and the sacerdotium. ‘The former refers to the emperor and is responsible for ‘human affairs’, whereas the later refers to the priesthood, symbolized in the person of the bishop, and ‘serves divine things’’. However, in this partnership, without doubt, the emperor always was the senior partner, being ultimately responsible for the ‘harmony between the sacerdotium and the imperium’. In exchange for its protection by the secular ruler, the church supported the imperial policies, thus leading to a "sacralization" of politics. Consequentially, the empire was seen as the divinely willed society of the one true god and the Orthodox Church dedicated itself to prayer and spiritual ends, refraining from worldly affairs.

At the same time, the Roman Catholic Church in the West entered a struggle for power with the "Barbarians" on its own, without the protection of a particular secular ruler, and was confronted with the task to Romanize the Germanic tribes. Therefore, from the start, the church developed a missionary and pedagogic approach to the society surrounding it and a monasticism that was community oriented, preserving and spreading Latin culture. Further more, the pretension of cultural superiority by the church and its demands for worldly powers brought it into conflict with the "Barbarians" and the later Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.

In the case of the Orthodox Church, symphonia had several consequences for its organisational structure. Since it never developed a self-conception as a separate body from the state, it neither developed an internal professional bureaucracy on its own. In consequence, the organisational ties between the different local Orthodox churches weakened over time. For many local churches, autocephaly became the

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58 Papanikalau, Aristotle (2003), p. 82.
59 ibid., p. 83.
60 ibid., p. 82.
63 ibidem.
64 ibid., p. 28.
organisational form of choice, thereby promoting an organic view of church, people and state.\textsuperscript{66} However, gaining independence from the Oecumenic Patriarchate very often led to an increasing dependency on the support of secular powers in the respective countries. In Romania, after gaining autocephaly in 1885, the regime set up a cost unit in the ministry of education and cults, which administered the church's assets and thereby made the church economically totally dependent on the state.\textsuperscript{67}

With the emergence of the modern national states, the local Orthodox churches became essentially national churches.\textsuperscript{68} In the words of Teoctist, the present day patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church: "As a national church, every Orthodox church has as a natural relationship to any state, because the life of the church unfolds within the respective state."\textsuperscript{69} Thus, in Orthodox countries, religion never was an alternative source of group identity to the idea of the nation state, both being interwoven from the start.\textsuperscript{70} This is also true in the Romanian case, even though the nationalist discourse was started by the Transylvanian Greek Catholic Church. Quickly, however, the Romanian Orthodox church borrowed and eventually monopolized this discourse, positioning itself as the paradigm for the very definition of "Romanianism."\textsuperscript{71} Reading the Romanian Orthodox Church's justification for its desire to be granted the status of a patriarchate in 1925 makes clear, how interwoven the self-conception of the church with that of the state is. As one of the reasons for its endeavour it states: "The maturity and strength of the unified Romanian national state demand the constitution of a patriarchate."\textsuperscript{72} In the first Romanian constitution of 1923, the church was granted the status of a national church.

Under communism, the autocephalous structure of the Orthodox Church further meant that institutional and moral support from abroad remained weak.\textsuperscript{73} Thus, the Romanian Orthodox Church was neither organisationally, nor culturally in a position to resist the regime's drive to use the church for its ends. It became "a good paradigm of the manipulation of the Church under Communism."\textsuperscript{74} It sanctioned the imprisonment of its politically active priests by issuing communiqués denying any form of religious persecution,\textsuperscript{75} entered the front of Socialist Unity and Democracy, rendered homage to Ceausescu on various occasions and even defrocked priests on indication by the party's leadership.\textsuperscript{76} In its drive to find a modus vivendi with the regime, it even tried to reconcile Orthodox theology with the nationalist-communist ideology.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{66} Henkel, Jürgen (2007), p. 113.
\textsuperscript{67} Leb, Ioan Vasile (1998b), p. 87.
\textsuperscript{68} Miller, Robert F. (2005), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{69} Henkel, Jürgen (2001), p. 172.
\textsuperscript{70} Dungaciu, Dan (2004), p. 11.
\textsuperscript{72} Leb, Ioan Vasile (1998b), p. 93.
\textsuperscript{73} Leb, Ioan Vasile (2001b), p. 160.
\textsuperscript{74} Miller, Robert F. (2005), p. 4.
\textsuperscript{77} ibidem.
On the other hand, the Roman Catholic Church, early in its history, developed a strong inner structure and leadership, resembling itself a monarchy. Having always been without the protection of a particular secular ruler, it kept this strong hierarchical structure throughout history and until today. With the emergence of nation states, the church had a strong international body that allowed the local churches to keep a more independent position in the relationship with local rulers. This is why in the West, nationhood and religion often were antagonistic guardians of group identity - or at least complimentary - and local churches proved largely immune to nationalist ideologies. Besides this, under communism, the international linkage helped the local Catholic and Protestant churches in the East to maintain a firm stance against the secular regimes. They were behind a "shield of 'nationalist (ethnic) persecution" - as a Romanian Orthodox theologian expresses it, arguably an outcome of strong international pressure. Besides this, the local Roman Catholic churches could count on the moral leadership of Pope John Paul II with his strong anti-communist policy.

In the case of the Orthodox Church, along with the continuity from Caesaropapism to religious nationalism, there is a continuity in its anti-pluralist stance. The equation of religious affiliation and national belonging means that who is not Orthodox does not fully belong to the national community. The cornerstone for the development of this logic was laid in the Byzantine Empire. Here, the principle of cultural unity within the empire was Orthodox Christianity. Other cultures did not enjoy the same privileges and were at times even persecuted. Therefore, the Byzantine theocracy was one that did not value multiculturalism. In communist times, the regime - being eager to strengthen national unity - could easily deploy the local Orthodox churches against ethnic and religious minorities. Most well known in this regard are the actions against the Uniate churches in the Ukraine and Romania, sanctioned by the churches' willing collaboration. Today, there is a growing fear to lose members to "unscrupulously proselytizing" American neoprotestant churches and the re-strengthening of the Greek Catholic churches in the region. The latter is still conceived as a direct challenge to the Orthodox Church's self-conception as the national church.

Besides nationalism, another distinct feature of Orthodox belief that can be traced back to the Caesaropapist ideology is escapism. The separation of spheres of activity between the secular and religious powers established with the concept

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79 Dungaciu, Dan (2004), p. 11.
83 ibidem.
85 ibidem.
of symphonia made the Orthodox Church refrain from independent involvement in society. Instead, hermits became the norm of spirituality. Theologically, this spiritual maxim is called hesychasm. Retreating to solitary places, monks try to come closer to the Holy Spirit through meditative techniques until they see "the light of God". How accentuated monasticism is in Orthodox theology, Teoctist expresses with the following: "Monasticism represents the deepest dimension of Orthodox spirituality and Orthodox life, the highest values, the closest relationship to God, the way of divinisation of man, the way of sacralization of man." The Orthodox Church understands Christianhood almost exclusively as the preparation for the afterlife, without active social implication as an integral part of it. This decisively influences the way in which challenges posed by the environment are interpreted by the church. For Orthodox theology, patience is the only possible, holy answer of the church to the divine ordeal of a tyrannic reign. "This patience is part of the creed, a working of the Holy Spirit and should not be mistaken as weakness or cowardliness."

This surely is not an interpretation of the creed which promotes civic activism. Thus, the very notion of active citizenry as promoted by civil society organisations represents an adaptational challenge for Orthodox churches. Being accustomed to represent the nation as a whole alongside a central government and promoting contemplation and patience as the core characteristics of Christianhood, making the detour, i.e. engaging their core supporters to raise their voices in a fragmented political and social space, instead of influencing the state authorities directly, is alien to local Orthodox churches. Given the strong presence of Western civil society organisations in the Orthodox countries after 1989, this resulted in a tendency to reject the modernization project of the West, warning the population not to lose its "Orthodox identity" and not to take over "Western" values "uncritically. A paradigm for this is the Romanian Orthodox Church's argumentation against legal abortion or tolerance for sexual minorities.

The political and social environment of the Catholic and Protestant Church took a different trajectory and the organisational learning triggered by this environment led to different assumptions concerning civil society. In the West, Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment led to democratization and pluralization on a national basis much earlier and much more profound than in the East. Performing in a nationally and religiously fragmented and increasingly democratic social space rendered it necessary for the churches to accept religious pluralism, the notion of free conscience and political activity by its members.

89 http://www.crestinism-ortodox.ro/html/06/0f_isihasmul.html (05.06.07).
90 Henkel, Jürgen (2005), p. 189.
93 Take as an example the articles and interviews by Ion Alexandru Mizgan, until April 2007 cultural counselor to the Romanian Orthodox Episcopacy of Oradea, Bihor and Salaj, in Mizgan, Ion Alexandru (2004).
This is not to say that the Catholic Church happily embraced the ideas of Enlightenment and democracy. Only gradually, the official doctrine changed from an overall neutral position towards forms of government - tending to favour monarchy due to institutional interests of the Catholic Church in the time of Absolutism - to a teaching that endorsed democracy as the morally superior form of government. In the 19th century the church still was in a rather defensive position against a rising tide of liberalism, nationalism and revolution. This led to the famous Papal encyclicals against these ideas.

In 1891, Leo XVIII made a first step in officially distinguishing between society and civil and ecclesial sovereignty in his encyclical letter *Rerum Novarum.* Another leap forward was made by John XXIII. In his encyclical letter *Pacem in Terris*, he states that "every human being has the right to honour God according to the dictates of an upright conscience" and that "the dignity of the human person involves the right to take an active part in public affairs and to contribute one's part to the common good of the citizens." At the end of the development towards endorsing democracy and pluralism stand the statements by John Paul II. In his encyclical letter *Centesimus Annus* after the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, he states that the primary responsibility for political issues "[...] belongs not to the State but to individuals and to the various groups and associations which make up society." The place of the church in such a civil society is that of one, however important, association among others. It cannot claim a privileged status in society, but only a "citizenship status". The relationship between Catholic Church and civil society was finally one of good will and cooperation.

Out of the historical account in the previous subchapters, for the set of norms related to civic activism that is conveyed by the different churches to their members, a clear picture emerges. It is depicted in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features of Organisational Culture</th>
<th>Orthodoxy</th>
<th>Western Christianity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in Society</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Pluralism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Pluralism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Orientation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Features of the Churches' Organisational Culture related to Civic Activism*

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Pluses and minuses indicate a general tendency. Pluses indicate an organisational culture that promotes the respective value and is therefore beneficial to the civic activism of the church's members; minuses in turn mean that the organisational culture in this point discourages civic activism due to the rejection of the respective values indicated on the left. Because the civil society in post-socialist countries is in the majority internationally oriented, nationalism is discouraging civic activism in Eastern Europe.  

The simplified assessment above suggests that the overall organisational culture of the Orthodox Church rather discourages civic activism. Therefore, I expect Orthodox Christians to be less active than Catholics and Protestants, both for their own communities and for people outside their community.  

However, organisational learning does not stop. Since 1989, some Orthodox Churches, like the Romanian one, have gained experience with a pluralist environment. On the topic of the promotion of civic activism, Teoctist speaks of his church as 'standing at the beginning' and 'having to complete the pastoral work with a social component'. Concerning the church's nationalist outlook, profound changes are still to be awaited, too. But first steps towards a positive international outlook are made. The lack of religious tolerance, in turn, is underpinned by the church's self-declaration as the national church in 1994 and its reluctance to give back the properties of the Greek Catholic Church. Changes in the Basic Assumptions, Organisational Culture Research tells us, take time.

4. The Sample

The database I will use for the quantitative analyses in this study consists of a sample of 3771 cases. Of these, 1776 cases were selected by the Romanian Gallup Organisation for a public opinion poll, conducted on behalf of the Romanian Open Society Foundation in October 2005 and representative for the Romanian population. The same poll is used by the World Value Survey for its third wave of worldwide data collection. The remaining 1995 cases constitute the sample of the Eurobarometr Rural, another poll ordered by the Open Society Foundation in Romania. It was conducted in November and December 2003 and is representative for the rural population in Romania. Because of this, in the merged sample, the rural area is overrepresented and I had to reweight the cases according to the distribution of the locality size variable in the former public opinion poll to assure the representativity of the database for the whole Romanian population.

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104 In 2000, the leadership of the Romanian Orthodox Church, together with all other denominations in the country, signed a common statement supporting the accession of Romania to the European Union (Henkel, Jürgen, 2002, p. 163).
For this paper, I will restrict the analysis to ethnic Romanians, leaving out all minorities and minority biases. These biases are huge and would distort the analysis decisively.\textsuperscript{107} Further more, I will exclude Uniates from the analysis, because of two reasons: Firstly, regarding their organisational culture one cannot be sure to place them. On the Orthodox side, because they follow the Byzantine rite or among the Catholics and Protestants, because of their organisational affiliation to the Catholic church. Secondly, the Greek Catholic Church of Romania is a unique case and the effect on the civic activism of its members less interesting. Given the fact that they Greek Catholics could distort the findings, when included on either of the sides, the risk seems not worth taking.

From the measurement of \textit{Organisational Involvement}, membership in or volunteering for unions will be excluded. This is because it is doubted, if involvement in these organisations really reflects voluntary engagement by the population.\textsuperscript{108} Under communism membership was obligatory. Union membership in post-socialist countries therefore distorts the evaluation of the current state of civil society in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{109} In Romania, too, it does not fit to the overall picture of civil society development: Romania has the highest percentage of trade union members of all new EU member countries, whereas the level of overall civic activism is well below the East European average.\textsuperscript{110}

For the quantitative analyses, Catholic and Protestant ethnic Romanians will be grouped as \textit{non-Orthodox Christians} and contrasted with \textit{Orthodox Christians}. However, even though I doubled the size of the sample and grouped the members of the two Western Christian denominations, for some subgroups the numbers of cases are still very small. This is mainly because the share of Catholics and Protestants in the ethnic Romanian population is only of 2.7% and 1.2%, respectively.

5. Findings of the Quantitative Analyses

In this section, I will present the findings of the quantitative analyses. I will start with an investigation of one of the two possible minority/majority effects on the findings, namely whether in the case of Catholic and Protestant Churches, due to their minority position, their membership displays a higher degree of religious activity. If this would be the case, an overall higher rate of organisational involvement could rather reflect the effect of religiosity in general, than an organisational culture conducive to civic activism.

Afterwards, I will provide an account of the results of logistic regression analyses with \textit{Organisational Culture of the Churches} as the independent and \textit{Organisational Involvement} as the dependent variable. After presenting the results

\textsuperscript{107} Hungarians are almost two times more likely to be involved in civil society organisations than ethnic Romanians, whereas Roma are nearly three times less likely to do so. Odds ratios for the two ethnicities in comparison to ethnic Romanians are 1.841 and 0.380, respectively. Findings significant at $p < .05$.


\textsuperscript{110} Civil Society Development Foundation (2005), p. 23.
for involvement in organisations in general, I will also discuss the findings for the different categories of organisations. Besides this, the results will provide me with a means to evaluate whether the minority position of the Non-Orthodox Christians in Romania leads to a higher rate of overall civic activism that solely reflects the higher rate of involvement in religious organisations. In all these analyses, Age, Gender, Income, Employment Status, Educational Level and Trust will be controlled for.

5.1. Nominal Members in Orthodox and Non-Orthodox Communities

To evaluate whether the first of the two possible minority/majority effects of the religious composition in Romania distorts the findings in the following chapters, I will evaluate the crosstabulation of the variables Denominational Affiliation and Church Going. Implicitly, this will provide me with a measure for the share of nominal members for the two religious communities in question. A nominal members will be defined here as a person that never attends religious services and therefore does not have any active relationship with his or her church. Table 1 on the next page shows the results of the crosstabulation.

Table 1. Crosstabulation
Variables: Denominational Affiliation and Church Going.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Orthodox</th>
<th>Non-Orthodox</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church Going</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't attend</td>
<td>3,5%</td>
<td>3,0%</td>
<td>3,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attends</td>
<td>96,5%</td>
<td>97,0%</td>
<td>96,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100,0%</td>
<td>100,0%</td>
<td>100,0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*At least once a year.

Apparently, regarding the share of nominal members, there is not much difference between the Catholic and Protestant Church on one hand and the Orthodox Church on the other. The first of the two possible minority/majority effects of the religious composition in Romania can therefore be excluded.

5.2. Churches’ Organisational Culture and Civic Activism

Table 2 shows the results for the logistic regression analysis with Organisational Involvement as the dependent variable. All independent variables but Trust appear to be statistically significant predictors for Civic Activism with $p < 0.05$. Odds ratios lower than one indicate a negative effect of the independent variable on Civic Activism, whereas values higher than one indicate a positive effect.
Table 2.

Logistic Regression Analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denominational Affiliation (Non-orthodox Christians(b))</td>
<td>2.234</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.188</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female)</td>
<td>0.741</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status (Employed)</td>
<td>1.410</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Level</td>
<td>1.624</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust (Trusting)</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>0.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(a\) Unions are excluded. For the categorical variables below, labels for the higher values are given in parantheses.

For Age, an odd ratio of 1.188 means that in general, middle agers are more likely to be involved in civil society organisations than youngsters and people that are aged 51 or higher have the highest chance to be active in civil society organisations. Coding the Age variable in line with previous findings, i.e. coding middle agers as "1" and the younger and older age group as "0", renders the effect of Age insignificant. In Romania, there seems to be a rather linear relationship between Age and Organisational Involvement.

For Gender the negative odds ratio indicates that women are less involved than men, possibly pointing to the importance of traditional role models in the Romanian society. Surprisingly, Income, too, proves to have an overall negative effect on Civic Activism. It might be that in post-socialist societies, the poor are more reliant on the networks civil society organisations are offering and are therefore more inclined to activate in them. In turn, the effect of Employment on civic activism is in line with the Resource theory, as is the effect of the variable Educational Level.

The variable Denominational Affiliation displays the highest odds ratio among the independent variables. The value for the odds ratio means that the odds to be involved in a civil society organisation are 2,234 times as large for a Catholic or Protestant as for an Orthodox Christian. Since Age, Gender, Income, Employment Status, Educational Level and Trust are controlled for, it is very likely that this is a genuine effect of the Organisational Culture of the Churches as hypothesized in chapter 3.

In general, the odds ratios in a logistic regression refer to a unit change in the independent variable, i.e. with every unit change, the odds increase or decrease by the indicated value. This means that one cannot compare the effect sizes of all the independent variables in the logistic regression analysis above directly, since some of them are dichotomous variables, whereas others have more categories, like Income or Educational Level that are broken into four and three categories, respectively. Therefore, only the effects of the dichotomous variables Gender and...
Employment Status are directly comparable with that of Denominational Affiliation. Here, the ratios indicate that Denominational Affiliation is more important for Organisational Involvement than both Gender and Employment Status. Regarding the other independent variables, comparing the odds ratios in Table 2, we can only say that having a high-school diploma in comparison with not having finished high-school, as well as an decrease in one quartile of the income level, is less important for civic activism than the person's denominational affiliation.

However, since the change in odds for a unit change in the case of Income is only of 28,53%, even the difference between belonging to the lowest income quartile in contrast to being among the richest in Romania has a smaller impact on civic activism than the difference in the basic assumptions conveyed by a church to its members has. For Educational Level, a unit change corresponds to an increase of 62,4% for the odds of being involved, meaning that the difference between the lowest and highest category, i.e. having some university education and not having finished high-school, makes in sum only a slightly higher difference for the odds of organisational involvement than Denominational Affiliation. This in turn means that the Organisational Culture of the Churches together with Educational Level have the highest effect on organisational involvement in Romania, followed by Income.

Table 3 breaks the level of analysis down to the different categories of organisations. In the odds ratio column the values for Denominational Affiliation are given. As we can see, the overall effect of Denominational Affiliation on civic activism seems to be mainly based on its effect on the involvement in two of the subcategories of organisations, namely religious and charitable organisations. For the other categories, its effects are not statistically significant. However, whenever the statistical significance comes to levels considerably lower than one, we have a positive effect of Denominational Affiliation on the involvement in the respective category of civil society organisations, too.

Table 3.
Logistic Regression Analysis.  
Independent Variable: Denominational Affiliation.a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables: Involvement in...</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Organisations</td>
<td>2.912</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport and Leisure Organisations</td>
<td>1.691</td>
<td>0.318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Organisations</td>
<td>1.539</td>
<td>0.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Organisations</td>
<td>0.433</td>
<td>0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological Organisations</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Organisations</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>0.991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charitable Organisations</td>
<td>3.144</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Organisations</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Organisations</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Age, Gender, Income, Employment Status, Educational Level and Trust have been controlled for in every analysis.

b Orthodox (0), Non-orthodox Christians (1). Uniates are excluded.
The odds ratios for the other independent variables are not given here. Mostly, they are insignificant. In the case of sports organisations, only Gender, Educational Level and Trust are significant. For the involvement in educational organisations, the significant predictors are Educational Level and Employment Status. In the case of political organisations, these are Gender, Employment Status and Educational Level. Involvement in ecological organisations is significantly predicted only by Income, here again having a negative effect. In turn, the results for involvement in professional organisations prove Age, Gender, Employment Status, and Educational Level to be significant. For consumer organisations there is only one statistically significant predictor, namely Employment Status.

This short account shows that every category of organisations has some distinct significant predictors. There is not a single predictor which is significant for all subcategories. This is probably because of the number of cases which is too small to yield significant results for a predictor when it is not among the most important. A cross-tabulation of the variable Denominational Affiliation with the nine dependent variables for the different categories of Organisational Involvement shows that only in the case of religious and charitable organisations, there are more than five cases for every cell. Therefore, the findings do not prove my hypotheses wrong. On the contrary, they give some support for it, since Denominational Affiliation is not only a significant predictor for civic activism bound to the religious community, i.e. involvement in religious organisations, but also for charitable organisations - the category of organisations that most likely benefits people beyond the borders of the religious community.

Let us now have a look at the results for the logistic regression analysis with the two categories of organisations as the dependent variable, for which Denominational Affiliation proved to be significant. Table 4 shows the results for involvement in religious organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denominational Affiliation (Non-orthodox Christians)</td>
<td>2.913</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.176</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female)</td>
<td>0.855</td>
<td>0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status (Employed)</td>
<td>1.337</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Level</td>
<td>1.013</td>
<td>0.904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust (Trusting)</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For the categorical variables below, labels for higher values are given in parantheses.
*Excluding Uniates.
Here, too, Denominational Affiliation is the predictor with the strongest effect among the three significant ones. The odds for a Non-orthodox Christian to be involved in religious organisations are nearly three times higher than for an Orthodox Christian. Age increases the odds for every unit change with 17.0%, i.e. compared with the youngest the odds for the oldest age group to be involved in religious organisations are only 34.0% greater. For Income, the difference between the odds for the lowest income and the highest income quartile are considerably higher than in the case of Age, namely three times 42.3%, but still less than in the case of Denominational Affiliation.

Table 5 shows the results for the logistic regression analysis with the second category of organisations as the dependent variable, for which Denominational Affiliation proved to be a significant predictor. In the case of charitable organisations, Educational Level in sum has the strongest effect on involvement, since it is broken into three categories. The variable is followed by Employment Status and Denominational Affiliation.

Besides this, the fact that Denominational Affiliation is a significant predictor not only for community bound civic activism, but also for the involvement in organisations that serve people outside the religious community means that I can rule out the second of the possible minority/majority effects that could have distorted the findings.

6. Conclusions
Orthodoxy shapes Romania’s future. Regarding civic activism the Orthodox Church seems to have a decisive role to play. As the results of the quantitative analyses in this paper show, denominational affiliation is one of the most important predictors
of organisational involvement. Apparently, the organisational culture conveyed by the Romanian Orthodox Church to its members is less conducive to civic activism than the organisational culture of the Catholic or Protestant Church in the country. The Orthodox Church attaches little value to civic activism, promotes an organic view of church, people and state and takes up a nationalist stance on societal issues. The latter is especially discouraging civic activism in Eastern Europe, because here, since 1989, civil society has had a strong international orientation. The differences in the organisational culture of the churches do not only manifest themselves in a higher rate of community bound civic activism, but also in a higher involvement rate in charitable organisations among Catholics and Protestants.

The research design of this paper combines approaches from political and social sciences, as well as organisational culture research. It provides a framework to analyse the impact of religious bodies on civic activism. Here, it was successfully applied to the Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Church in Romania. Still, other case studies for Christian churches are needed to compare their findings with the results obtained in this paper. Hopefully, in this way, the scheme for the evaluation of the organisational culture of religious bodies can be refined. It could be generalized to other religions, too, since the research design itself is in principle also applicable to non-Christian beliefs and religious bodies.

Today, religions play an increasingly important role in many societies around the globe. Given the fact that in some countries in Eastern Europe the churches gained ground after the democratic revolutions took place, we cannot expect that with the spread of liberal democracies, religious bodies lose power. Instead, they are likely to assert their position as a major societal actor for a long time to come. Knowing to what extent and in what direction they influence their members will therefore remain crucial to depict the future of the societies in which they activate. Until now, the Romanian Orthodox Church appears to have not been able to tap its full potential as a source for civic activism in Romania - which possibly is one of the reasons for the slow development of civil society in the country.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


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SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

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ABSTRACT. In this paper I explore the relationship between social capital and support for democracy in 14 Central and Eastern European countries. I contextualize the discussion on social capital and democratic consolidation through the European Union's regional policy. Thus, the European Union seems to reward countries with high levels of social capital, without actually tackling the problem of social capital formation in instances where such resource is scarce. Consequently, I operationalize social capital as interpersonal trust and involvement in civic organization, and assess the effects of these factors on support for democracy and market economy. The results show that while trust is positively associated with both dependent variables in all countries included in the research, involvement in civic organizations is a predictor of support for democracy and market economy only in the more "advanced" democracies of Central Europe. In less "advanced" democracies involvement in any kind of organization is positively associated with both dependent variables, thus suggesting an under institutionalization of civil society in the less consolidated democracies of the European Union.

Key words: social capital, democratic consolidation, European Union, civic organizations

“Social capital and institutional networks are identified as key components of dynamic political and economic governance at the regional level, which is closely linked to the adaptability and Europeanization function” (Paraskevopoulos, 1998b, 38)

Introduction

Since originally advanced by Robert Putnam in 1993, the idea of social capital has gained increasing acceptance among social and political scientists as a useful tool in analyzing “the quality of democracy”. In its initial formulation, social capital was understood as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate coordination and mutual cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1993, 36). The concept was further operationalized and refined by many scholars and proved its applicability and explanatory force in areas such as economic performance and international relations.

This paper explores the connection between social capital and democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe, in the context of European Union integration. Given that social capital is seen as conducive to a greater degree of democracy, more participatory citizenship and improved economic performance, and since the European Union makes increases in social as one of its priorities, I examine the degree of social capital in different countries in Central and Eastern

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Europe, and its relationship with support for democracy. The European Union’s approach towards social capital is found most literally in its cohesion policy. The latter becomes necessary in harmonizing levels of economic and social development, and it is precisely for this reason that, for a short time, it became the second highest prioritized item in the EU budget.

The analysis focuses on 14 Central and Eastern European countries – Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Albania, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. The choice of countries reflects different levels of democratic transition and consolidation, and also different statuses with regards to European Union integration. In fact, if the European Union is preoccupied with increasing social capital and deepening democracy in its new member states, then one would expect to see different levels of social capital in more democratic countries, and also a stronger positive relationship between measures of social capital and support for democracy. The dataset employed in this research is part of the World Value Survey last wave from the late 1990s and early 2000s. Accordingly, the data set comprises Central and Eastern European member states, applying candidates, which in fact have become full fledged members by 2007 and former communist countries that are still transitioning to democracy and whose prospects for EU integration are either absent or very improbable.

The structure of the paper starts with a discussion on social capital and the ways in which the European Union prioritizes social capital in its cohesion policy. At the end of this section, the reader will have a fairly clear idea about the interaction between social capital, EU integration and democracy. In the second section of the paper, I analyze public opinion data in order to show levels of social capital in the 14 countries mentioned above and also for testing the influence that measures of social capital have on support for democracy. The main goal of this paper is to see whether European Union integration and successful democratic consolidation lead to an increase in social capital, which, in turn, affects support for democracy. If the hypothesized virtuous circle between social capital and democracy is indeed present, then citizens of Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia should indeed be more supportive of democracy and display higher levels of social capital.

Social capital and the EU

Social capital became a priority of the European Union through its regional policy. In this section I introduce social capital and regional policy, and then I briefly examine the European Union’s official position towards social capital as a community resource and also a policy tool.

EU regional policy

Due to the need for EU states to collaborate and elaborate common policies, it becomes necessary to build a harmonized ground in economic, political and social terms. Regional policy is meant to provide precisely such an outcome. Regional policy is also often referred to as cohesion policy, because it aims at
reducing the differences across the European Union: “EU cohesion policy refers to the set of activities aimed at the reduction of regional and social disparities in the European Union” (Hooghe, 1996, 3).

There are at least three rationales underlying the very existence of regional/cohesion policy. The first is economic, and addresses the need “to overcome adverse affects of market integration on disadvantaged regions” (Hooghe and Keating, 1994, 368). Secondly, the social rationale is identified at the level of principle: people across the EU have to live in comparable conditions. Finally, the third rationale is political and consists in “the need to legitimize the new economic and political order” (Hooghe and Keating, 1994, 370).

The origins of the regional policy can be found in the 1972 enlargement of the union. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) came into existence as a response to the UK’s demand for a reward for its budgetary contribution (Wishlade, 1996, 32-33). The fundamental principle behind it was quota-based allocation of funds to member-states. During the eighties, regional policy became diversified, so that additional funds were created: the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB).

According to Ian Bache (1998) there have been four developments in EU regional policy. The 1975-1978 phase was characterized by intergovernmental bargains, with the Commission starting to acknowledge its own role. The 1988 reform is of utmost importance, as it brought the principle of partnership into play. According to this principle, both sub-national authorities and non-governmental actors were provided with the opportunity to take part in different stages of policy formulation and implementation; in turn, this “challenged established hierarchical relationships between central and sub national governments” (Bache, 1998, 141). Therefore, the role of partnership is:

…to reduce disparities, give structure to self-governance, diffuse principles of solidarity, participation and positive regulation, and practise multi-level decision-making… (Hooghe, 1998, 469).

The 1993 and 1999 reforms bear further witness to the Commission’s efforts to keep the partnership principle on the agenda, while member states try to bring back more intergovernmental principles.

Moreover, the principles of subsidiarity and additionality complement the partnership principle. Thus, the principle of subsidiarity states that “responsibilities should be exercised at the lowest possible level” (Hooghe and Keating, 1994, 378). In turn, additionality refers to the fact that “Community assistance should not replace but should supplement national and regional financial efforts” (Hooghe and Keating, 1994, 378).

The widely recognized contribution of multi-level governance (MLG) is to bring the sub national level of government into the process of EU policy formulation and implementation. Initially, the concept of MLG…focused on the spin-offs, which emerge from interplay between central state and European-level institutions and, more
or less incidentally, disperse decision-making powers to SNAs (sub-national authorities) and empower them to engage with and influence the EU policy process… (Marks, 1992, 1993, Marks et al., 1995, quoted in Jeffery, 2000, 6).

However, in Marks’s opinion, sub national authorities (SNAs) play a passive role, merely reacting to potential stimuli, here the process of involving the sub national level is seen as essentially a top-down process. Jeffery turns this perspective in its head and argues for a bottom-up model, in which “SNAs may […] actively seek to, and succeed in, changing those dynamics in ways which facilitate their European policy engagement” (Jeffery, 1996, 214). Therefore, the emergence of the idea of a European Domestic Policy was characterized by the following core assumption: European policy should not be regarded as foreign policy, and thus the regions should have direct access to the center of European policy-making (Jeffery, 2000).

EU regional policy is thus aiming at reducing disparities among regions. Assuming the multi-level governance approach, the collaboration between different levels of governments becomes important in both formulation and implementation of this policy. Furthermore, local specificity is to be taken into account when conceiving this policy.

Defining and operationalizing social capital

Social capital is a relatively recent concept. Nevertheless, the attention it received from both the academic community and the political elite (EU, World Bank) makes it one of the most powerful and dynamic concepts in the social sciences nowadays.

It appeared at the beginning of the century, but it became well known with Bourdieus work and especially Robert Putnam’s study on Italy. Social capital is a resource “whose supply increases rather than decreases through use and which becomes depleted if not used” (Putnam, 1993, 38). Putnam’s definition was modified by Kenneth Newton, asserting that social capital consists of (a) norms, (b) networks and (c) consequences—voluntarily produced collective facilities and resources (Newton, 1997). The clarification this definition brings regards the uncertainty of consequences, facilitating collective action.

Almost all of the attempts to operationalise this concept suffer from the same fallacy: authors transform social capital into an umbrella concept, an explanatory variable for virtually any social and political phenomena (Portes and Landolt, 1996). The level of measurement for social capital is the community, taken to refer to a wide range of entities from smaller groups of bowling players, to larger geographic/cultural units. Moreover, in a recent reconceptualisation by Campbell, Putnam and Yonishe (1999) social capital also acquires an individual dimension, namely civic engagement.

One important part of social capital literature attempts to tackle the issue of whether social capital is just a pre-existing resource, or it can be created through intentional acts. While Putnam’s original idea was that social capital is given, and
thus immutable, he changed his mind in subsequent works, identifying channels through which social capital can be created or increased.

In turn, this is closely related to that approach of state/society synergies, which opposes “endowments” to “constructability”. The former emphasizes …the dependence of successful state/society synergies on a preexisting strong civil society and presence of substantial stock of social capital […] while the latter stresses the possibility of short-run institution building though processes of synergistic relations… (Paraskevopoulos, 1998a, 161).

In conclusion, the concept of social capital refers to a certain community resource, which, if properly activated, would improve the overall economic performance in the respective region, and thus would lead to “better” democracies.

**Cohesion policy and social capital**

Three arguments will be offered in order to sustain the hypothesis that the EU policy makers are acquainted with social capital theory.

First of all, in *The Sixth periodic report about the delivery of structural funds* (1999, used as main official document) the importance of social capital is specifically mentioned. The Structural Funds are structured in a way that assumes social capital has “a major influence on the institutional structure in different regions, particularly the efficiency of public administration” (The European Commission, 1999, 66). Moreover, multi-level-governance insists on horizontal relationships between the supranational, national and sub national authorities:

…[cohesion policy] entail a multi-level system of governance, within which the relationship between the different levels is one of partnership and negotiation rather than a hierarchical one… (The European Commission, 1999, 66).

The principle of partnership is also relevant at this point, as “elected regional and local bodies have an integral role in the Structural Funds” (The European Commission, 1999, 68).

This assertion finds support in social capital theory. Putnam considers the structure of a network is crucial in deciding the successful creation of social capital, and states that horizontal, non-hierarchical relationships are the most beneficial (Putnam, 1995). Moreover, associational culture constitutes a relevant variable, in explaining sub national authorities’ representation in Brussels: “sub national governments in associationally rich regions are more likely to seek representation in Brussels” (Marks et al., 1996, 57). In other words, pre-existing social capital determined efficient accession to Brussels of sub national governments.

Secondly, the value attached to trust is relevant. There is a substantial amount of literature on trust and social capital. Thus, while Putnam considers trust to be an essential component of social capital, Eric Uslaner distinguishes between three types of trust. “Interpersonal trust” (also called “moralistic trust”) refers to trust people have in other people, without having previous information about them. Strategic trust is of two kinds: personalized (trusting people, on the basis of previous experience) and particularized (trusting people similar to us). Finally,
trust in the government relates levels of trust people have in public institutions to their performance (Uslaner, 1999, Stolle, 1998).

Cohesion policy initiators have taken this aspect into account, as monitoring committees in each region, are an intrinsic part of those respective communities. Furthermore, the fact that monitoring committees pay attention to local cultural specific is very important, as these committees are involved in doing fieldwork, and through their presence they might build people’s trust. Various organizations collaborate in this respect, from representatives of the EU, to local governments of different regions, and the business associations. The wide array of interests and methods involved in certain goals thus relies on building a milieu of trust and cooperation: “Effective institutional networks require civic engagement that is the presence of social capital” (Parakevopoulos, 1998a, 163).

Finally, the new EU cultural policy, and its relation with the cohesion policy, indicates that it acknowledges the role of social capital (the first part of my hypothesis). The cultural policy of the EU is seen by its initiators as “a way of developing peripheral regions” and thus relates with the cohesion policy. (Delgado-Madeira, 2000, 452). After the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission adopted two Communications: ‘New prospects for Community Cultural Action’ (Commission, 1992) and ‘European Community Action in Support of Culture’ (Commission, 1994) (Delgado-Madeira, 2000, 454).

The relationship between cultural and cohesion policy is proved by three arguments: 1) the Commission “estimated the cultural aid in horizontal, regional development programs, which were not allocated to the culture industry as a sector”; 2) the funds available for this policy are sizeable; 3) “the Commission sees culture as a potential source of regional development” (Delgado-Madeira, 2000, 461).

This strong connection between regional and cultural policy strongly indicates the EU’s preoccupation with cultural specificity across the Community. It is evident that encouraging the preservation and promotion of cultural patterns in various regions preserves social capital.

Consequently, it becomes evident that the EU takes social capital into account in both economic and political terms. Thus, the EU recognizes that “social capital has major consequences for the nature of the industrial economy that society will be able to create” (Fukuyama, 1995, 27).

However, the EU perspective is rather rigid. Undoubtedly, the need to preserve social capital and to respect cultural patterns is explicitly acknowledged. Nevertheless, there is little indication of a more dynamic perspective, which would aim at increasing social capital. Therefore, the next sub-section will focus on the characteristics and consequences of this perceived rigidity.

It is usually the case that a unit’s economic performance is given by successful strategies, as well as by “the human factor”. In this respect, the “embeddedness argument” elaborated by Granovetter states that “social relations, rather than institutional arrangements or generalized morality, are responsible for the production of trust in economic life” (Granovetter, 1985, 491, quoted in 52
Paraskevopoulos (1998b, 34). He stresses “the social character of economic action, the role of networks as a function between markets and hierarchies, and the process of institution building” (Granovetter, 1985, quoted in Paraskevopoulos, 1998b, 34). Here, Granovetter concurs with North, who argues that a missing factor in economic analysis is “an understanding of the nature of human coordination and cooperation” (North, 1990, 11).

The analysis elaborated above provides the framework for understanding the diversity of outcomes resulting from EU structural funding. Thus, the EU provides funds to be administered by supranational, national or sub national actors. There is evidence that this financial assistance is not always adequately used. As made apparent by the sixth periodic report on the delivery of structural funds (as cited above), important recipients of structural funds (such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland), have reached different levels of economic performance. While the Irish government used the funds to develop and stimulate the Irish economy, the funds allocated to Greece were spent on covering previous deficits.

Paraskevopoulos (1998a, 1998b) offers further evidence for this phenomenon. In his analysis of two groups of Greek islands, he observed that, even if both groups benefited from structural funds from the EU, the southern group used the funds in order to induce further development, while the northern groups chose to spend it on social subsidies (Paraskevopoulos, 1998b). This situation brings into light a shortcoming of structural funds policy, namely the failure to take into account the differences between the two groups of islands. Thus, I argue a more in-depth look at both groups in the first place could have indicated different patterns of evolution, both economically and culturally. Here, social capital could have proved itself to be an invaluable analytical tool.

The argument provided by Ostrom illuminates the consequences of the example examined above: external assistance does not always improve performance, as …there are many sources of heterogeneity among participants facing collective-action problems […] these asymmetries affect the bargaining strength of participants and resulting outcomes (Ostrom, 1995, 147).

Secondly, MLG presupposes that all three levels of the government are involved, while preserving subsidiarity. In the same report, I identified Spain and Portugal, as two important recipients of structural funds, and looked at the relationship between three levels of government. I expected a large involvement of both local governments and local business groups, as recommended by the partnership principle. I also expected involvement of local organizations at the level of implementing the policy, as they possess first hand information. Surprisingly, in Spain “local authorities, private business and trade unions play a relatively minor role in the Monitoring Committees and in the implementation of policy” (The European Commission, 1999, 71). In Portugal, the situation looks more or less similar: the relevant actor is the Commission for Regional Coordination, which consists of decentralized units of the government, and not of local authorities (The European Commission, 1999).
It is true that not all EU member states have similar levels of decentralization. However, investing more trust and responsibilities in the local public and private organizations would be a step towards more subsidiarity. Additionally, this would increase social capital, by involving local associations in the process of policy implementation.

Thirdly, the problem of trust is highly important. In the previous section, I have proved that the EU makes considerable efforts to determine people to trust the supranational authority. However, even if the EU seems to take good care of each region's cultural specific, overall trust in government could still be low in some regions.

Moreover, one needs not ignore trust among people. Uslaner (1999) considers that trust in government is least important for social capital, while interpersonal trust is the most important. Accordingly, Knack and Keefer (1997) proved that interpersonal trust is correlated with economic growth. Moreover, they assert that the influence of trust is higher in poorer countries than in the richer ones.

The last observation is important because it is closely linked to the fact that the largest recipients of structural funds are the poorest EU countries. Therefore, because trust is so important for economic performance, EU should try to build durable trust relationships with local and regional associations, so that the latter can integrate itself in the new supranational arena. McAleavy (1995) refers to the value of trust and to the “human dimension” in the implementation of programs, which should be perceived “not just in the technocratic sense of promoting expertise, but also as the evolution of reputation effects and trust” (McAleavy, 1995a, 338, quoted in Bache, 1998, 142).

My fourth argument regards specifically those voluntary associations mentioned by Putnam as secondary organizations. Paraskevopoulos (1998a, 1998b) points out, that participation in such organization is rather low in Greece. However, he indicates a slight difference between the two groups of islands in question. While the southern group (also the most developed) has higher rates, and a broad range of voluntary associations, within the northern group this phenomenon is almost non-existent. An idea could be to facilitate cooperation between these two regions, and thus develop trust between them. That could also bring more networks. Dietlind Stolle and Thomas Rochon (1998) make a differentiation between private and public social capital. While the former remains within a community, and thus only its members can benefit from its consequences (i.e. economic performance, or better democracies), in the case of the latter its consequences transcend the boundaries of the original community, and spread towards other groups. If the two groups of islands were encouraged to collaborate, it is likely that the higher rates of social capital from the southern groups would have migrated towards the northern group.

Finally, the relationship between cultural policy and cohesion policy can also be able to help here. Cultural support is available from the EU, as long as it has a lucrative outcome. The initial goal of designing such a policy was to reduce unemployment: “cultural projects will be eligible if they create jobs and are
integrated into local or regional development strategies” (Delgado-Madeira, 2000, 455). Although this is not harmful to social capital preservation, it could create a gap between cultural policy for cultural reasons and cultural policy for lucrative/economic reasons. Thus, justification for cultural policy would be merely utilitarian. In this context, Putnam argues, that sometimes countries get too much economic assistance, instead of being assisted in reconstructing their political culture, and reviving their social capital (Putnam, 1993).

The conclusion of this section is that the European Union as a supranational structure does indeed take social capital into consideration and constructs it as a rather valuable resource. Nonetheless, its approach towards social capital is rigid and focuses mostly on pre-existing stocks of social capital. Therefore, in the next section I explore the levels of social capital in Central and Eastern Europe and then also test its relationship with support for democracy and market economy.

**Social capital and support for democracy**

Social capital is considered in this paper as formed of two main components: trust and participation in voluntary organizations. From the point of view of trust, the distribution of percentages is presented in table 1. The data in this table depicts a rather mixed story. The levels of trust within a society vary from the very low 10% in Romania to more than 40% in Belarus, with every other country scoring somewhere in between. Interestingly, countries at different levels of democratization and EU integration have dramatically different scores. In fact, all former Soviet countries have higher values than Romania or Slovakia. Although there may be measurement errors with the question itself, the fact that non-democratic countries score higher on the levels of trust is indicative of a potentially non-existent relationship between democratization and EU integration and the development of trust.

The voluntary association membership component of social capital is measured through voluntary work in various non-governmental organizations, and it includes both non-political organizations, such as youth, women’s and sports clubs, and political, such as trade unions and political parties. The World Value Surveys include two related measures of participation in voluntary organization, one that measures membership and one that actually asks respondents whether they volunteer time in these organizations. After analyzing both variables I found a fairly high degree between the two, and I chose to use the latter in this research because of its inner conceptual meaning. People that have actually volunteered time in organizations are more involved citizens, in comparison to nominal members of multiple organizations.

Membership in political organizations is also depicted in table 1. While membership in political parties is overall low, voluntary work in trade unions is higher in all the countries. One also notices the influence of the political regime, since former Soviet countries have overall higher rates of voluntary work in trade unions in comparison with the rest of the countries. One explanation for these results is the fact that unionization in former Soviet republics is a more important
social feature, most certainly originating in their communist past, while in the rest of the countries it became a mere option. Contrastingly, voluntary work in these two types of political organization is overall low all over the set of 14 countries.

The same situation is observed for the other non-political organizations. The World Value Survey database includes participation in many non-political organizations: youth, education, professional, sports, women’s groups and any other kind of group collapsed in one category. Participation in each group is significantly lower than in other consolidated democracies, but the percentages are fairly similar across categories of organizations. Therefore, table 1 also presents the results for sports associations, but the percentages should be considered similar for the other types of organizations.

Given that the data used is survey data on representative samples, the differences between country levels of voluntary work in civic associations are not significant. Nonetheless, Albania, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Moldova tend to have the highest values. Although not much heft can be placed on the numerical superiority of voluntary work in these countries, it is nonetheless interesting to observe that they are not part of any traditional geographical area. In fact two countries are part of what is considered as the group of consolidated democracy, one is a former Soviet republic, and one is a former communist country that remained outside of most international structures in the years after 1989.

In conclusion, the levels of trust and voluntary work in non governmental organizations in Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the years 2000 vary from one country to the other, with no particular difference between consolidated and transitioning countries. These findings seem to agree with the European Union’s position towards social capital, as a pre-existing resource in a community, and not one that can be improved through institutional involvement. Nonetheless, I now turn to analyzing the influence that social capital measures have on support for democracy and market economy in Central and Eastern Europe, as a further refinement of the relationship between social capital and overall “goodness” of democracy.

The set of countries under analysis include political regimes at different levels of democratic transition and consolidation. Mixed levels of social capital within the set of 14 countries makes impossible the testing of a hypothesis according to which higher social capital correlates with more satisfactory democracy. Following an idiographic approach rather than a nomothetic one, I analyze the relationship between social capital and support for democracy and market economy in countries at different stages of democratization and democratic development, in order to capture the potential mutually reinforcing relationship between social capital and democracy. Social capital is thus expected to contribute positively to the evaluation of political regimes and economic systems because of its inner virtues accentuating trust and community involvement.

For procedural democracy, principal component analysis indicated that two different indices may be constructed. First, there are two items that measure so-called specific support, namely the rating of the political system governing the
country, and overall satisfaction with the way democracy develops. While these two items do not test citizens’ knowledge of democratic government, they are an overall measure of levels of acceptance of democracy as it is unfolding at one moment in time. The first index contains these two items, and was titled specific support. The second index consists of items that measure support at a more abstract informed level, expressing satisfaction with democracy as a political system, including the opposition to communism. It contains 7 items as follows: evaluations of the communist regime, opinion towards the importance of a strong leader, and the principle of army rule, the importance of a having a democratic political system, and also the opinion towards three particular traits of a democratic system (whether democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling, whether democracies are not good at maintaining order, and whether democracies may have problems, but it is still the best form of government). Rejection of the communist regime, of army rule and strong leader governments, together with positive evaluations of the democratic system correlate highly, and this index was titled procedural democracy. Factor analysis indicated a very clear cut between the two indices factor coefficient scores ranking almost equally for each variable composing the indices. Initially an additional item was included measuring the importance of having technocratic governments during transitions and consolidation, but it was subsequently dropped out of the analysis, because of its lack of correlation with any of the other items. These two indices measure evaluations of democracy in both more abstract and specific terms. For both measures, higher values represent more support for democracy. The construction of both indices – specific support and support for procedural democracy – was realized by adding each component variable with equal weights. The procedural democracy index is used in this research as a measure of overall satisfaction with democracy. This variable is more indicative of a society’s acceptance of democracy rather than the previous index, which measures mere evaluations of different post-communist governments. If social capital has an influence on acceptance of democracy, it is more important to play a role in its acceptance as a regime, as a set of norms and principles, rather than particular governments.

The attitudes towards privatization have also been grouped in one index, that comprises 4 items, all measured on a one to ten scale: attitudes towards private or state ownership of business, whether personal welfare should be state’s or personal responsibility, whether economic competition is good or harmful for businesses, and whether states should offer more or less freedom to businesses. Overall these 4 items express a person’s perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of the market economy system. Factor analysis has again shown that answers on these four items are correlated, and, consequently, one factor has been extracted. The privatization factor scores higher values for more support for privatization.

The independent variables measuring social capital consist of three variables: trust, political involvement and civic involvement. Trust is measured through a question widely used in comparative research “Do you think most people can be
trusted, or that you just can’t be careful enough”. Involvement in voluntary associations was initially measured through involvement in all non-governmental organizations. Nonetheless, the difference participating in trade unions and political parties formed one index (through factor analysis) while the rest of items concentrated to form a civic engagement index. Therefore, I decided to keep these indexes separate, and test their effect on support for democracy and market economy.

The first category of control variables includes demographic and socio-economic status indicators, used in most studies on political attitudes. The socio-economic indicators are represented in the sample by education and income. Education, on the one hand, is included because of most other findings suggest that favourable attitudes towards democracy increase with education. More educated people have a more informed perception of the political system, they understand its working better, and it is expected for them to be more supportive of it. Also, in Central and Eastern Europe, intellectuals played an important part in the demise of communist regimes, so there is more ground to include education. The last argument for including education in the set of control variables is the fact that in some research education and religiosity and church attendance variables are correlated. The underlying observation is (Inglehart and Norris, 2004) that education also privatizes religion, and people with less education rely on the church for general information and advice, or even political clues. Therefore, I have also included religious denomination as a control variable, in order to account for transnational variation in support for democracy and also test Huntington’s hypothesis on democratic spreading across the Western Christian world. For income the logic is fairly similar, namely that people with higher economic status are also more supportive of the system by virtue of the system allowing them to acquire a certain level of wealth.

In terms of demographic controls, it is customary to use age and gender. The rationale is that women and older people are less supportive of democracy than their younger, male and urbanite counterparts. In the Central and Eastern Europe the gender control is not significant, probably because of the egalitarian policies of 5 decades of communism, and so it was not included in the analysis. Age per se becomes relevant especially in conjunction with income; older people, mostly retired, that worked one job during communism, find themselves on shaky grounds after 1989, and form one of the most uniform category citizens that “lost” in the transition game. Moreover, some older generations, the ones that spent a fairly large portion of their life in communism, have more vivid memories of the totalitarian regime, while younger generations have been educated either at the end or after communism.

The rest of the controlling variables include political interest and national identity. Political interest, such as political discussion, self declared interest or consumption of political news, affect how a person evaluates democracy. On the one hand, more information about politics exposes the individual to its defects, inefficiencies and may trigger a negative evaluation of the system. On the other hand, political interest may make people understand the difference between the democratic system, which is the only option and thus desirable, and the actual
regime in power at some moment in time. To make matters more complicated, political interest should be interacted with the age variable, since forming the perception that democracy is the only option varies with a person’s age, and exposure to different types of regimes.

Nationalism is mostly portrayed as harmful to democratization. Nonetheless, some authors have argued the opposite: after all most of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe are fairly new states, and support for democracy as a political system cannot be realized without having a prior territorial sovereign entity. Therefore, I introduced a control variable that asks people how proud they are of being members of their nationality.

Political interest is also included as a control variable, because of the assumption that more political involved people will have different attitudes towards the system. One can expect either a positive effect, assuming that people that are interested in politics are more appreciative of democracy, because they realize the system’s benefic feature. On the other hand, a negative effect can also be hypothesized, since exposure to the everyday dirty game of politics overemphasizes the system’s failures. The political interest index contains three items: frequency of political discussion, frequency of news consumption and a subjective appreciation of interest in politics. Again, only two of these items are available for a subset of countries, and, in this case, the factor was constructed only out of these variables, after checking for consistency.

Finally, several country level independent variables have also been included in the model. I believe that evaluations of the political and economic system in one country are also dependent on its economic well-being and overall quality of democracy. In other words, a country’s level of economic development and democratic evolution influences its citizens’ evaluations. Therefore, I have included GDP/capita, the Gini index, EU membership and Freedom House scores. GDP/capita is a classic measure of wealth, and, as mentioned in most transition to democracy literature, economic prosperity is helping democracy, or, at least, affecting its survival rate (Przeworski et al., 2000). I also included the GINI Index (Muller, 1995b) because I believe that higher inequality also has an effect on how people evaluate their system, especially in a region in which communism made great efforts towards an egalitarian system. EU membership is a variable that has three values, according to which a country is not a member, or it is a recent member (Romania and Bulgaria), or an older Eastern European member. The effect of EU membership is many-fold. On the one hand, the EU accession process requires the implementing of several democratizing and market economy oriented policies. Older members of the EU thus should have higher levels of democracy and privatization, and their evaluations of the system should be affected by this process of enlargement. On the other hand, these policies may render people more dissatisfied with democracy, and especially the economic system, since Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic all suffered a period of economic recession after their integration. Finally, Freedom House scores are also included, because of their
attempt to quantify quality and quantity of democracy in the world. The FH democratization score has been introduced here because it combines several measures of democratization: national democratic governance, electoral process, civil society, independent media, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence and corruption.

All these independent variables are hypothesized to have an effect in support for democracy. In this section I discussed these effects, and justified the introduction of each control variable. I also offered detailed information on composite index construction. In the next chapter, I report the results of quantitative data analysis testing both the denominational and the 5 contextual hypotheses that I put forth. I examine the effects of religious variables on the formation of pro-democratic attitudes by placing them in statistical models accompanied by the above-mentioned set of control variables.

The effect of social capital on support for democracy and market economy is analysed through OLS regression.

Table 2 shows the effect of social capital measures on support for procedural democracy and privatization. At first glance, the effect of both trust and participation in voluntary associations are positively correlated with support for democracy. The effect of controlling variables is also consistent with the relevant literature. The individual level socio economic indicators have significant impact on support for democracy: education, age and income are all positively correlated with procedural democracy. Additionally, country level indicators are also significant, with more democratic countries, more economically developed countries and countries that are either members of the EU or candidate countries being more supportive, than citizen of former Soviet countries or Albania. The standardized beta indicators suggest that while the country levels indicators are the most important predictors of support for democracy, social capital measures continue being significant at different levels of country wide democratization. The religious indicators also have interesting effects, with Catholic and Orthodox people being overall less supportive of democracy than non-religious individuals, while Protestants and Muslim believers are more supportive. Nevertheless, the positive effect played by Islamism in this data set may be due to the high concentration of Muslim believers in Albania. Islamism potentially represents a country effect and not a religious one. Political interest as another controlling variable plays a significant positive part, and so does pride in nationhood. While the positive correlation between political interest and support for democracy is researched extensively in the literature, a positive relationship between national identity and support for democracy is only scarcely debated in the literature. Therefore, more in-depth analysis on cultural areas of Central and Eastern Europe will be conducted in order to assess more accurately the effect of national identity on support for democracy according to the sovereign statute and date of independence of each country.
Additionally I tested the same predictive model on privatization since social capital is presumed to have a positive effect on economic development. There is evidently no organic reason to believe that social capital would lead to more capitalist forms of economic development, but given that privatization is the signature of economic development in Central and Eastern Europe, I wanted to see whether there is any correlation between the two. According to Przeworski, the economic transition from command economy to market economy is frustrating for the majority of the population, and so I explore in what ways social capital influences this economic set of changes at the societal levels. The predictive model for the effect of social capital on support for privatization in the 14 countries is also found in Table 2. The results are quasi similar to the ones estimating support for democracy, although some significant differences do exist. Socio-economic indicators, nationhood and political interest affect positively support for democracy, but the country level indicators for democratization stopped playing a part. This effect may be due to the fact that consolidated democracies have ended their privatization process, while Romania and Bulgaria are still implementing it, and the former Soviet Republics do not even necessarily have it. From the perspective of social capital, trust is still positively correlated with support for privatization, but participation in voluntary associations, either political or civic lost their statistical significance.

The results of the two previous two models suggest a need to delve further into the subject, and analyze the relationship between social capital, democracy and market economy in different areas of Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore I split the set of 14 countries in several subsets, according to their level of democratization, economic development and European Union integration. Hence, I analyze 5 subsets of countries, in an attempt to capture the impact of EU integration and overall democratization on the relationship between social capital and support for democracy and market economy. There are two subsets of consolidated democracy: the first consists of Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia, as the 4 countries usually portrayed as the victors of the transition to democracy process in the whole area. The second subset consists of the three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as former Soviet Republics, but also countries with high economic development rates, and successful candidates to the first eastern enlargement of the European Union. The reason for creating two subsets of countries consisting of the Western European countries resides in the fact that the Baltic countries are fairly different when compared to the Central European countries, both in terms of communist past, but also in terms of enthusiasm towards EU integration, much lower in the former subset. The second subset of countries consists of Romania and Bulgaria as the two countries that are in between the consolidated democratic status of Central Europe, and the non-democratic or transitioning status of former Soviet Republics and Russia (excluding the Baltic states). In addition, Romania and Bulgaria also became the latest member of the European Union. The fourth subset of countries includes Russia, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine, as countries that are not democratic according
to Freedom House, and which are usually associated with either authoritarian regimes (such as Belarus), or long unfinished transitions to democracy (such as Ukraine or Russia). Finally, the fifth and last case in the analysis is Albania, which is analysed separately because of its unique position both in the geography of Central and Eastern Europe, its low levels of economic development, slowness of transition to democracy, and also non acceptance into the European Union structures.

In analyzing the effect of social capital on support for democracy and market economy in the five subsets of countries, one needs to acknowledge that these subsets are also differentiated by their religious composition, with countries to the West being mostly Catholic and Protestant, and countries to the East being mostly Orthodox. Furthermore, the country wide indicators for democratization, economic development and EU integration have been removed form the analysis due to their lack of variation within each subset.

Table 3 shows the effect of social capital on support for democracy and market economy in Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia. While most of the socio-economic indicators remained significant, national identity became negatively associated with support for democracy. Indeed, these four countries have not had a questionable national identity throughout the transition process, and so nationalism is not supportive of further democratization. From the perspective of social capital, trust is positively and significantly correlated with both support for democracy and support for privatization, but the effect of participation in voluntary association suffered an interesting change, from the previous models including all the 14 countries. While participation in civic organizations is positively associated with higher support for democracy and market economy, participation in political organizations is negatively and significantly associated with the same dependent variables. This finding is highly interesting, since it is in harmony with findings found in western consolidated democracies, where participation in purely choral organization makes one a more democratic citizen, while playing the hard ball game of politics, by volunteering in trade unions or political parties does have the opposite effect. According to Putnam (), the values and skills learned in choral societies are different than the ones learned in political organizations. While the former type of organization emphasizes cooperation and empowerment, the latter focuses on aggressive concept of power and illicit negotiation games. Interestingly, both Protestant and Catholic believers are less supportive of both democracy and privatization in these 4 countries, which is perhaps an indicator of the conservative effect of church.

Table 4 summarizes the findings for the same models in the Baltic countries. The results are different than in the previous case. The effect of socio-economic indicators is fairly similar, with age becoming relevant and positively associated with support for privatization. More interestingly, the effect of national identity is positively associated with more support for democracy in the Baltic countries, thus suggesting an effect according to which in those countries whose national identity was questioned and sometimes removed by foreign powers (in
this case the Soviet Union), transition from communism to democracy also represents a transition from a country under foreign domination to an independent and sovereign nation state. Therefore, the results suggest that democratization and constructions of national identity can go hand in hand during the transition process. Another difference from the model analyzing the Central European countries is the fact that participation in any kind of civic or political organization is positively correlated with support for democracy. These results may also be influenced by the simultaneity of democratization and acquiring of independence by the Baltic countries. Nonetheless, the importance of associational participation is not significant in the case of support for privatization, although trust is positively correlated with both dependent variables. Another interesting effect is the negative correlation between Catholicism and support for democracy, and the positive one between Catholicism and support for market economy. This finding makes more sense if two additional contextual factors are taken into consideration. First, the Baltic countries form the most secularized subset of countries, according to the CIA country reports, and also corroborated by historical evidence regarding the highly repressive antireligious effects of the Soviet domination. Nonetheless, the positive significant correlation between Catholicism and support for privatization may be due to the fact that the Catholic Church needs to claim back its property previously confiscated by the communist regime. This finding is also confirmed by the negative significant correlation between Orthodoxy and support for privatization that shows the Orthodox Church’s reticence in returning to the Catholic Church property formerly confiscated by the Soviet regime, and used by the Orthodox Church during 50 years of communism.

Table 5 presents the same models for Romania and Bulgaria. As mentioned before, these two countries are the newest members of the European Union, but usually referred to as the transitioning Eastern European countries that lagged behind their more western neighbors. The effect of socio economic indicator is very similar with the Central European countries, and so is the negative impact of national identity on support for democracy, which supports the idea according to which that national identity can be a promoter of democratization in those instances in which the former non-democratic regime also coincided with foreign domination. The variable measuring trust is still positively correlated with both support for democracy and support for privatization, but neither participation in civic association nor participation in political organizations do not affect either dependent variable. The suggested argument here is that in countries that had more democratic experience and a faster and more successful consolidation, the importance of voluntary associations increased, including their specialized effects that I presented on the case of Central European countries. Nonetheless, in order to qualify this argument, I now turn to analyzing the explanatory power of the models on the former Soviet Republics and Russia.

Table 6 depicts the influence of social capital on support for democracy and privatization in Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and Moldova. The results are very similar with the ones from every other country, with socio-economic indicators being significant and positively associated with the dependent variable. Trust is still positively correlated
with both support for democracy and support for privatization, but participation in voluntary associations is not significant in either case. The national identity hypothesis is not confirmed since the pride in one’s nationhood is not important in these models, but this lack of significance may be due to the fact that national identity work differently in the 4 different countries, with nationalism being a promoter of democracy in Ukraine (cf. Kuzio) and also its deterrent in Belarus.

Finally, table 7 presents the models on Albania. Interestingly, if Albania is considered the least democratic of all countries in this data set, then the results are indeed illuminating. While most of the socio economic indicators work in the predicted sense, measures of social capital are either non significant, like it is the case with support for democracy, or, like it is the case of support for privatization, its effect is negative. Probably, the corruption that accompanied most privatization efforts in Albania is responsible for this negative relationship. The lack of relationship between participation in voluntary associations is also part of the idea that further aging and institutionalization of the democratic game may bring about democracy related behaviors, such as the very voluntary involvement.

Conclusion

In this paper I analyzed the relationship between social capital and support for democracy in East Central Europe. European Union integration is also a process of democratic consolidation, and acceptance in its structures is a method of validating one’s new democracy as consolidated. Hence, one sees different waves of integration, with Central European countries being accepted earlier than Romania and Bulgaria. In the first part of the paper I showed that indeed the European Union constructs social capital as an importance feature of any democratic society, and, in fact, it operationalized the concept through its regional policy. Nevertheless, I argue that the European Union has a rather rigid understanding of social capital, rewarding communities that benefit from it, but not attempting to influence it through institutional involvement.

Therefore, in the second part of the paper I analyzed the relationship between social capital, measured as trust and voluntary work in civic and political organizations, in different subsets of Central and Eastern European countries. The conclusion is that while trust is positively associated with both support for procedural democracy and market economy all over East Central Europe, the relationship between involvement in organizations and the same dependent variables is not that clear. While involvement in civic organization is a predictor of support for democracy in the more consolidated democracies of Central Europe, it does not play any role in less consolidated systems. Furthermore, in the same subset of consolidated democracies, involvement in political organizations is negatively associated with support for democracy, confirming Putnam’s argument regarding types of organizations and their effect on social capital. In transitioning countries involvement in any kind of organization is positively associated with support for democracy, suggesting a less developed institutionalization of the political body, still very much anchored in the realities of the non-free past governments. The tentative suggestion at the end of this study is that institutionalization of democracy is a way of strengthening the relationship between social capital and support for democracy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Table 1.
Features of social capital per country (percentage of people saying yes, within each national sample)

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<tr>
<th>Country/soeial capital</th>
<th>Trust</th>
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<th>Membership Labor Unions</th>
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**Table 2.**

Effects of social capital on support for democracy and privatization in 14 countries

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*** significant at <=.01, ** significant at <=.05, * significant at <=.1

**Table 3.**

Effects of social capital on support for democracy and privatization in Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia

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*** significant at <=.01, ** significant at <=.05, * significant at <=.1
Table 4.
Effects of social capital on support for democracy and privatization in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia

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*** significant at <=.01, ** significant at <=.05, * significant at <=.1

Table 5.
Effects of social capital on support for democracy and privatization in Romania and Bulgaria

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*** significant at <=.01, ** significant at <=.05, * significant at <=.1

68
### Table 6.
Effects of social capital on support for democracy and privatization in the Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova

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*** significant at <=.01, ** significant at <=.05, * significant at <=.1

### Table 7.
Effects of social capital on support for democracy and privatization in Albania

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<th>Support for privatization</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rsq/N</td>
<td>.054/1089</td>
<td>.068/1145</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*** significant at <=.01, ** significant at <=.05, * significant at <=.1
Appendix A

Dependent variables – index construction

Support for procedural democracy
1. Communisme (initial E112 – rate political system as it was before – communism – scale 1-10, form very bad to very good). Now 0-9, 0 means very good, 9 very bad.
2. Leader (initial E114 – political system – having a strong leader, 4 categories, 1-4, 1 very good, 4 very bad). Now 0-3, 0 means it is very good to have a strong leader, 3 it is very bad.
3. Techno (initial E115 – political system – having experts make decisions, 4 categories, 1-4, 1 very good, 4 very bad). Now 0-3, 0 means very bad, 3 means very good.
4. Army (initial E116 – political system – having the army rule, 4 categories, 1-4, 1 very good, 4 very bad). Now 0-3, 0 means very good, 3 means very bad.
5. Dem_sys (initial E117 – political system – having a democratic political system, 4 categories, 1-4, 1 very good, 4 very bad). Now 0-3, 0 means very bad, 3 means very good.
6. Dem_inde (initial E121 – democracies are too indecisive and have too much squabbling – 4 categories, 1-4, 1 agree strongly, 4 strongly disagree). Now 0-3, 0 means agree strongly, 3 means strongly disagree.
7. Dem_ord (initial E122 – democracies are not good at maintaining order - 4 categories, 1-4, 1 agree strongly, 4 strongly disagree). Now 0-3, 0 means agree strongly, 3 means strongly disagree.
8. Dem_bet (initial E123 – democracy may have problems but it is better than any other forms of government, 4 categories, 1-4, 1 agree strongly, 4 strongly disagree). Now 0-3, 0 means strongly disagree, 3 means agree strongly.
The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

Support for market economy
1. Pr_own (initial E036 – private vs. state ownership of business – scale from 1-10, where 1 means private ownership should be increased and 10 government ownership should be increased). Now 0-9, where 0 means government ownership should be increased, and 9 means private ownership should be increased.
2. Ind_res (initial E037 – government responsibility – scale from 1-10, where 1 means people should take more responsibility, and 10 the government should take more responsibility). Now 0-9, where 0 means more government responsibility, and 9 means more individual responsibility.
3. Compet (initial E039 – competition good or harmful – scale form 1-10, where 1 means economic competition is good, and 10 competition is harmful). Now 0-9, where 0 means competition harmful, and 9 competition good.
4. Firm_fr (initial E042 – firms and freedom – scale form 1-10, where 1 means state should give more freedom to firms, and 10 state should control firms more effectively). Now 0-9 where 0 means more state control, and 9 means more firm freedom.
The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.
Independent variables - index construction

Demographics
1. Sex (initial X001), 1 male, 0 female.
2. Age_rec1 (initial X003r, ordinal). Now 4 categories 0-3, 3 means 15-34, 2 means 35-54, 1 means 55-64, 0 means 65 and older.
3. Edu_rec (initial x025, education, ordinal). Now 4 categories, 0-3, 0 means up to complete elementary, 1 means up to complete secondary, 2 means high school, 3 some university or university degree.
4. Income (initial X047, scale of income, ordinal, World Value Surveys coded for every country in national currency). Now 10 categories, 0-9, 0 low, 9 high.
5. Resid (initial X049, size of town, ordinal). Now 5 categories, 0 means smaller than 10000, 1 means between 10000-50000, 2 means 50000-100000, 3 means 100000-500000, 4 means more than 500000.

Political interest
1. Pol_dis (initial A062, political discussion, ordinal, 3 values, 1 frequently, 2 occasionally, 3 never). Now, 3 categories, 2 means frequently, and 0 never.
2. Pol_news (initial E150, how often following politics in the news, ordinal, 5 categories, 1 every day, 2 several times/week, 3 1-2/week, less often, 5 never). Now 5 categories, 0-4, 0 means never, 4 means every day.
3. Pol_int (initial E023, interest in politics, ordinal, 4 categories, 1 very interested, 2 somewhat interested, 3 not very interested, 4 not at all interested). Now 4 categories, 0-3, 0 means not at all, 3 means very interested.
The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

National identity
1. Nation (initial G006, how proud of nationality, ordinal, 1 very proud, 2 quite proud, 3 not very proud, 4 not at all proud). Now, 4 categories, 0 not at all proud, 3 very proud.

Civic engagement
Membership in associations (except religious), dichotomous, 0 not mentioned, 1 belong
1. Assoc_ed (initial A066)
2. Labourun (initial A067)
3. Pol_part (initial A068)
4. Profasso (initial A072)
5. Sports (initial A074)
6. Youth (initial A073)
7. Women (initial A074)
8. Other_gr (initial A079)
9. None (initial A080)
The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

Political engagement
Voluntary work – unpaid time (except religious, dichotomous, 0 not mentioned, 1 belong
1. Volun_ed (initial A083)
2. Vol_unio (initial A084)
3. Vol_par (initial A085)
4. Vol_prof (initial A089)
5. Vol_you (initial A090)
6. Vol_spor (initial A091)
7. Vol_wom (initial A092)
8. Vol_oth (initial A096)
9. Vol_none (initial A097)

The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

**Freedom House scores**

FHDI is a composite index including all of the below indexes.

Civil Society. Assesses the growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their organizational capacity and financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function; the development of free trade unions; and interest group participation in the policy process.

Independent Media. Addresses the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, editorial independence, the emergence of a financially viable private press, and Internet access for private citizens.

Local Democratic Governance. Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities.

Judicial Framework and Independence. Highlights constitutional reform, human rights protections, criminal code reform, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions.

Corruption. Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policy makers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives.

Democratization Score

1-2 Consolidated Democracy
3 Semi-consolidated Democracy
4 Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime
5 Semi-consolidated Authoritarian Regime
6-7 Consolidated Authoritarian Regime

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IN PARTNERSHIPS WE TRUST: NGO-DONOR RELATIONS. A CASE STUDY OF ROMANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT NGOS

DAN MERCEA*, ANDRA CĂTĂLINA STOICA*

ABSTRACT. In Romania, as in other Eastern European countries, the non-profit sector developed with funds and expertise from international donor organizations. This paper considers the relationship between non-profit organizations and their sponsors; particularly the influence funding has had on the structure of the former and their peer partnerships. To develop, NGOs have had to build a funding record; consequently, they have put a strong emphasis on the vertical relationship with their donors and the requirements of the latter for funding. Competitions to secure funding, access to specific know-how, the consolidation of the grants’ market have had a bearing on peer networks between non-profits. Ultimately, NGOs have been left with the difficult task of having to navigate between a pragmatic approach, to stay active in the sector, and their mission, to support the development of civil society.

Key words: civil society, NGOs, funding, partnership, development

I. INTRODUCTION

Overview of the study

The present chapter aims to be an informed and critical reflection on NGO-donor relationships in Romania. In the post-communist years the NGO sector has burgeoned, as in Romania macro-social transformations have been in high gear. To take roots, the sector had to be assisted both financially and with know-how from abroad. This relationship, between donors and non-governmental organizations working to strengthen civil society has previously been considered in different Eastern European countries (Hann et al. 1996, 2002, Henderson, 2002). Herein, our focus has been on civil society support and development nonprofit organizations based in Cluj-Napoca, Romania.

We have investigated how cooperation between NGOs occurred in Romania; how they defined their missions, how broad or narrow the latter were and their effects on partnerships. Moreover, the reviewed literature informed us that donors were influencing to a degree, the strategies adopted by NGOs in their decision to partner. Thus, we looked both at partnerships between Romanian

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This paper is based on an earlier draft to which Gabriel Bota contributed as part of the initial research team. In this version, the subchapter to which he made a contribution has been rewritten. We remain, however, greatly indebted to Gabriel Bota for his input and insights which we duly acknowledge.
NGOs and their donors and the non-profits’ partnerships with other NGOs within the sub-geographical context of Cluj-Napoca, one of the cities with the largest density of NGOs in Romania. We aimed to discern which were the conditions that would make partnerships between NGOs successful, and to what extent partnerships would broaden and deepen the sector, i.e. to include organizations that can work together to address issues that regard the development of the sector and its functions in the wider frame of our society.

Since the early days of the third sector in Romania, non-governmental organizations have had to recognize the need to carefully consider their donors’ interests, priorities and formal requirements for applications, to appropriate the categories in the discourse of the latter, on civil society. Nonetheless, the competitive development of the sector pressed non-profits to build a portfolio of successfully completed projects while at the same time controlling for loyalty to mission statements. Such events, we will argue, have affected the growth of horizontal, NGO-to-NGO genuine partnerships.

Access to funds has been based on a competitive approach to allocation, by donors. This has led to the consolidation of the sector, i.e. with a limited number of traditional donors and a decrease in the number of their beneficiaries, due to conditions for market entrance. Grants have been regarded as an investment and consequently grant-makers have observed that their local partners have the right experience and expertise to use the money they were allocated. This may have been detrimental to both the expansion of the sector and also the scope of the NGOs’ activities. To that extent, the latter have been compelled to establish a record of successfully completed projects to ensure their survival. This practice may have also been unfavorable to the development of horizontal networks between nonprofits because of a focus on short term, quantifiable goals, broad mission statements and the inability to concentrate on the vision to develop the organization, partnerships and ultimately the sector.

We have been interested to see how these NGOs cooperated with their peers, their outlooks on partnerships, both on opportunities and constraints- from within and without the sector-that have shaped their vision on association. We wanted to know how the NGOs regarded requirements by donors, for horizontal partnerships, which have ostensibly been among the eligibility criteria for grants. Ultimately, we hoped to see if partnerships worked. A robust cooperation becomes possible when NGOs have a well defined mission and specialized activities. In this way, NGOs can support and complement each other, work together on common projects, as well as transfer information, know-how and competences among themselves.

The organizations we selected for our research carried out projects and programs meant to consolidate civil society in Romania. They involved, in their projects, other institutions and citizens. They tried to build networks between organizations, people and institutions. Their projects, consultancy and trainings aimed to prepare citizens for a better involvement in the problems their communities faced. They were seeking to increase citizens’ civic awareness and to
stimulate their participation in community development. Furthermore, they were contributing to the development of start-up organizations while also co-operating with the more established actors from the nonprofit sector. They were therefore likely to work together with other NGOs, to implement common projects, build partnerships and consolidate intra-sectoral networks. Their creation and development inescapably has to be considered in the broader context of historical transformations that have occurred in Eastern Europe at the turn of the last century.

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2 The authors of this paper have decided to anonymize the names of the NGOs that were included in this research project and also of the research participants. Our decision was based on the British Sociological Association’s guidelines for ensuring the anonymity, privacy and confidentiality of research participants, online, available from http://www.britsoc.co.uk/equality/656#Anonymity,%20privacy%23and%20confidentiality. [20.05.2006]. Below is a brief description of the mission and activities for each organization. The information in the subsequent paragraphs was available on their web sites, at the time when the authors of this paper were deciding on a case-selection strategy, November 2005.

O1 has as its main mission “the mobilization of local financial resources for the benefit of the community”. It therefore aimed to first develop partnerships between non-profit organizations, companies and citizens, with a vision to strengthen the former’s capacity to raise funds. O1’s stated role thus was to “work with the public and companies to get them involved, constantly and coherently, in the development of communities and the support of non-profit organizations”. Secondly, it sought to promote an “efficient” environment for donors and not-for profits to cooperate in. Finally, the main tenet undergirding its work was its drive to “involv[e] clients/partners in the planning, implementation and evaluation of our projects”—ensure transparency. In a nutshell, O1 trained NGOs to build a trustful relationship with their donors and other partner organizations. Ultimately, O1 saw its mission to lie in its contribution to the sustainability of the non-governmental sector, “the long term...mobilization of local resources”.

O2 had 31 clubs. The club in Cluj-Napoca was founded in 1990, and received legal personality in 2000. Its mission was “to strengthen the democracy in Romania through the stimulation of civic participation”. Some of the main interests O2 related to the following topics: “civic education”, “citizens participation in the process of elaboration of public policies”, “the defence of human rights”.

O3 was founded in October 1992. Its mission, as described by its members, was “to stimulate local and regional development”. O3 had the following objectives: “to promote and implement local and regional development programs, to develop the relations between local government and population, to support local initiatives, to organize specialized consulting in various fields for local governments, to organize training courses for local public officials, to support the establishment and functioning of non-governmental organizations” (2006). O3 addressed more than a single group of beneficiaries. They were civil servants, local government institutions, rural communities and, more generally, human resources in a community. O3 had a regional office in Cluj-Napoca.

O4 was founded in January 1990 as a subsidiary of O4 Romania. Until 1998, O4 implemented national programs at the local level. In 1998, O4 became an organization developing its own programs, addressing issues at the county level. O4 had as a mission the protection of human rights through all legal means. Concurrently, O4 envisaged implementing several programs for the development of civil society: “consultancy in the elaboration of NGO projects”, expertise for NGOs in writing financial applications, “organizational support programs”, “organizational training programs”.

O5 was founded in 1992 as an organization offering social services. In 1997 it became the first volunteering center in the country. In 2002 it was upgraded to a national centre for volunteering, with the central office in Cluj-Napoca. Its mission was to promote and develop volunteering “as a viable and irreplaceable resource in solving the problems that the Romanian society is now facing”. The activities carried out by O5 were guided by the following values: it “respects and militates for equal rights for all people without discrimination, promotes active involvement in community life, believes in the unlimited ability of each member to participate in solving the community’s problems”. The programs developed by O5 were addressed to volunteering centers, state institutions, other not-for-profit organizations and businesses.
**Theoretical Background**

Eastern European states have been at the receiving end of Western financial assistance and respectively of a knowledge transfer for the development of the NGO sector. If there has been an ideological underpinning of the intelligence and asset transfer to the East, this was an export of a specific set of expectations, particularly that “making civil society work is a question of socialization into democratic norms” (Mercer, 2002:11). Consequently, NGOs were assigned the role of “effecting the democratic transformations of developing societies into modern, liberal societies” (2002:11). In all fact, such expectations were hardly, critics asserted, counter-balanced by a context-sensitive concern with existing societal rifts (social status, religious, gender, regional etc.); or with the skewed development of the sector (in some cases according to donor priorities) and even the power struggles within NGOs (2002:13). A synthetic description of civil society in Eastern Europe was conducted by Salamon et. al (2000).

In Romania, donor assessments have alluded to a series of problems that have hampered the development of the NGO sector: “the NGO sector is a reflection of Romanian society as a whole, with ‘them and us’ between NGOs and government and lack of trust between individuals in the whole society” (Donor Review, 2000:27). This statement may be borne out of years of experience in the country but is nevertheless based on the assumption that there still is a long way to go, to reach the Western standards for the sector. Ironically, these standards appear to be contradicted by the empirical observations of that context. As one author who has looked comparatively at both settings argues, “the dominant Western model of civil society seems less conducive to social cohesion and successful economic performance than starkly opposed models of social order” (Hann, 1996:10).

In the region, many shortcomings and failures, along the way, have been explained as resistance to transformation due to the resilience of socialist mentalities, i.e. lack of private initiative, of trust, heavy dependence on state assistance. In the mid-nineties, when transformations were in full swing, civic anthropologists revisited earlier arguments and concluded that „in fact, many ‘system-export’ schemes fail because systems or units are exported without their western context”. Inconsistencies and breakdowns in Central and Eastern Europe may, in this regard, have also been upshots of the fragmentary knowledge about Western institutions (Sampson, 1996:125).

There is hardly any denying of the fact that there has been a lack of trust within the NGO sector, specifically, which further undermined the liberal mission of organizations. The latter may be, in a nutshell, “to work in partnership, build alliances and coalitions”. In this regard, an assessment by a donor representative, of NGO performance, came to a dismal conclusion: “if they associate, at all, [it] is on a broader playing field and trying to do everything at once” (2000:32). With this statement in mind, a first postulate that the present study has been intent on verifying was what the role foreign donors played in the creation and subsequent supporting of partnerships between non-profits. Mercer’s (2002) indications pointed to the fact that actually, donor-NGO dynamics may be a determining factor for non-cooperation within the sector.
Somewhat in contrast with donor evaluations of the specific circumstances of Romanian NGOs, the appraisal of the latter, of their situation, emphasized that NGOs have been able to develop their operational capacity (e.g. to implement projects and build partnerships). However, their “capacity to formulate vision, strategies and policies [was] generally very weak;...capacity to raise resources supportive of the mission [was] also limited, with a much greater focus on short-term survival than long-term change”\textsuperscript{77}. These shortcomings were, and donors were aware of it, also an upshot of their funding priorities (Donor Review, 2000:33). Overall, NGO organizational strategies and vision have left, in spite of in-flowing foreign assistance, several key issues for the sector unresolved, i.e. accountability, shared working practices, scope of intra-sectoral cooperation, project partnerships.

The subsequent analytical sections stem out of a more detailed review of current debates about the development of the third sector which we embarked upon at the onset of this study and which we have not included here. This paper will progress towards analyzing donor-recipient relationships and their influence on the development of partnerships among NGOs in Cluj-Napoca. Our paper was guided by the tack sociological institutionalism has developed on the study of organizations and institutional cultures (Hall, 1996). We hoped to investigate both formal and informal practices, routines and conventions that demarcate the relationship not-for-profit organizations have with their donors. For the purpose of this paper we have regarded these relationships as institutions. We were subsequently interested to discern the perception that individual NGOs had on their rapport with their patrons, i.e. their attitude towards financing criteria, the relation between their mission and such criteria, the influence funding had on their partnerships with other nonprofits.

\section*{II. The Consolidation of the Third Sector: Probing Into the Meanings of NGO Representatives}

The main inspiration for this subchapter came from previous research conducted on the relationship between donors and NGOs in Russia (Henderson, 2002). Henderson has argued that foreign donors arrived in Russia with a mandate to develop civil society and consolidate the capacity of NGOs to part-take in the democratic governance of the frail Russian democracy (2002). The former were successful in providing NGOs with equipment and training to undertake these tasks, while also securing their survival at a time when the economy was in deep crisis (2003:141). However, donors’ goal to ensure the development of the civil society was, critics have argued, stalled by their concern with projects that focused on short-term objectives and produced “numbers for the report back to the home office” (2002:153). This, Henderson contended, led to NGO projects closely resembling one another and more importantly, to “the emergence of a vertical, institutionalized, and isolated (although well-funded) civic community” (2002:140).

“Partnerships” is the word designated to describe what may be a variable rapport between cooperating organizations (Lister, 1999: 2) which aim at buttressing civil society, e.g. not-for-profit civil society development organizations and their
financial backers. The fact that partnership roles were asymmetric and the flow of money was always from donor to receiver, forcefully bound the latter into an agenda set by the former: “this is a dialogue of the unequal and however many claims are made for transparency or mutuality, the reality is...that donors can do to the recipient what the recipient cannot do to the donor” (Lister, 1999: 4).

Much of the research about the extraneous determinants of NFPO (not-for-profit organizations) operations has focused on transnational partnerships between international donor organizations and local recipients, in developing regions (Lister, 1999, Brown and Kalegaonkar, 2002). Financial dependence may produce the erosion of NGO “identities and legitimacy in their own eyes and the eyes of skeptics” (Brown and Kalegaonkar 2002:234). It can also feed into the perception that a grant-receiving not-for-profit organization represents the political, economic and cultural interests of their benefactors. Finally, it can induce the permanent financial dependence of NFPOs on exogenous, locally unsustainable resources (2002:235).

For an NGO, designing and implementing a project entailed finding a balance between its ethical and practical purposes. The ethical purpose of an NGO is stated in its mission, its values, and its principles. In our case, we understood the ethical purpose to refer to the “nonprofit sector’s civil society roles as...service providers and...builders of social capital” (Boice, 2005: 16). In contrast, the practical purpose entailed consolidating revenues to ensure survival, much like a profit-seeking company; “they allocate money toward a desirable goal and use management practices, information systems and public relations to carry out programs” (2005: 18). An objective of this study has been to analyze how nonprofits navigated between their ethical and practical purposes.

Herein we have set out to analyze how civil society support and development organizations reflected on the “structure of the funding” they received, first of all from foreign patrons (Henderson, 2002:155). The objective here was to see to what extent NFPOs developed their own agendas or reacted to the goals, logic and norms of their funding organizations. Specifically, we wanted to understand how in a project proposal, NGOs’ missions and their donors’ requirements were evinced. Another objective was to discern, based on the testimonies we collected, how the structure of funding was reflected in the development of horizontal networks. Finally, we considered the language that NGOs used in the communication with their donors. We were interested to learn whether the use of the donor’s language influenced the structure of the organizations we researched and also, more generally, the nonprofit sector’s culture. “Many service organizations have felt shut out because they cannot speak the language they feel donors want to hear or...they simply do not even bother applying for grants because they do not know how to shape their proposals” (2002: 156).

This subchapter was aimed at understanding if and how the relationship of the NGOs with their donors influenced their organization and their partnership with other NGOs. To arrive at this question, a set of propositions were constructed, drawing on arguments from previous literature on civil society, development and democracy.
The scope of this chapter is the generalization of our empirical findings to the theoretical arguments reviewed in previous sections. If grants have contributed to the consolidation of a vertical relationship between donor and recipient, the latter has determined not-for-profit organizations to concentrate on the practice of building a funding record. Consequently, there has been an emphasis on the relationship with donors, to the detriment of horizontal networks, due to staunch competition for grants.

**Data Collection and Analysis**

This was an in-depth analysis of the outlook civil society support and development NGOs had on their relationship with their donors. It was a case-study of this research problematic. Yin (1994:31) qualified the approach as a method for arriving at “analytic generalizations” that engenders the use of “previously developed theory...as a template with which to compare the empirical results”. The focus of our project was narrowed down both geographically, to include organizations in one Romanian city which has the largest density of non-profits, alongside Bucharest (Review of Romanian NGOs, 2001) and thematically, concentrating specifically on civil society support and development organizations.

The main data collection method for this subchapter was the in-depth qualitative interview. It gave a broad scope to the interview subjects, to do an extensive interpretation of the topics discussed during our conversations. We used both an interview guide and standardized open ended questions. Our interviewees were classified as “experts” or “elites” (Quinn-Patton, 2002: 402), i.e. NGO leaders, managers, executive directors etc. The outcome was a set of stories based on a predetermined set of topics which were complemented by probes into contingencies and unrestrained comments by interview participants.

The research interviews were coded into topics that enabled reflection on answer patterns across the participants while also keeping particularities in sight. This initial stage of mapping the interviews played a seminal role in tackling the subsequent task of interpreting the story to ensue from our interaction with the participants. The methodology for this chapter was completed by adding narrative analysis and thematic content analysis to give scope to a synthetic assessment of material and cultural practices and representations built on a sociological institutionalist epistemic approach, herein to the study of non-profit organizations.

Narrative analysis is particularly suitable for interpreting data collected as a story (Lieblich et al, 1998: 2). “Narrators create plots from disordered experience, give reality a unit that neither nature nor the past possesses so clearly” (Cronon, 1992: 1349 quoted in Riessman, 1993:4). Analysis thus entailed the mapping of meanings constructed by respondents, in order to retrieve their interpretive context, their perceptions and practices, i.e. the opportunities and constraints in their setting, they identified and reflected on. Such meanings, in line with the sociological institutionalist episteme (see also Fischer’s discussion of social meanings, 2003), were expected to structure the knowledge, beliefs, language and actions of these actors. Consequently, the major merit in using narrative analysis lay in the fact
that it did not tamper with the meanings constructed by the respondents while examining how they were constructed.

Because this investigation proposed a context-sensitive take on the study of the relationship between NGOs and donors, a primary interest was to identify key notions and concepts participants used to describe and explain it. These we assembled into an inventory of “indigenous categories” (2002: 455) employed by interview participants. To go full circle, we designed a collection of sensitizing concepts that “can provide bridges across types of interviews” (2002:348), to bring into our interpretation the theoretical propositions our work started from. Examples of sensitizing concepts were: *funding market, project requirements* etc. The next section in this chapter is a map of the interplay between indigenous categories and sensitizing concepts. The conclusion of this subchapter will summarize the main findings and discuss them in view of the normative statements on which our paper was grounded.

Content analysis is broadly understood as “any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings” (2002:453). Taking reference from Singly et al. (1998:180), content analysis was herein employed for the study of the *themes*, the topics that were identified through theoretical delimitation, the formulation of the research question and working hypothesis for this section. If narrative analysis enabled the preservation of interviewee categories, thematic content analysis allowed us to discern the “structural logic” of the discourses retrieved from the interviews (1998:180). We used thematic analysis to patch together stories and discourses, into a series of dimensions, i.e. in the instance of the present research, concepts and practices embedded in a theme that can be concurrently analyzed across all interviews. In the words of Singly et al. this was a “vertical thematic analysis” which would expose variations and patterns across the principal dimensions of the investigation (1998:182).

**The NGO-Donor Relationship: The NGO Perspective**

**Prerequisites to Building a Track Record**

We started our interviews with the NGO representatives with a discussion about their relationship with their main donors, i.e. how they constructed and worked to consolidate it. A.H. noted that in the early days of the post-communist Romanian civil society, there were many funding opportunities for the sector. This had been changing more recently due to Romania’s accession to the E.U. in early 2007. It was initially foreign donors that “invested substantially in the sector and supported O5” (2006). “There have been changes along the way but this is not affecting our relationship with the donors, it just channeled applications towards one or another of their funding lines” (2006).

A key aspect in building a relationship with foreign donors was the setting up of personal contacts, a task easier to carry out at a time when the “Romanian market” was small. Over the years, having a track record with a funding organization spelled success in channeling more grants into the organization, from the same or other donors. Established donors were looking for the same thing, the “experience…that
you have the capacity to manage that money” (2006). A.H. subsequently emphasized that donors regarded this relationship as an investment they had “to keep and develop” (2006). As she explained, this was a key element in the strategy of the latter, i.e. “to invest constantly in the same organizations which have a chance to survive” (2006).

O1 was set up by a group of people who had been active in the sector, working specifically on assistance programs for NGOs. “Already, at that time [in 2002] the issue of how to raise funds was a significant one” (N.D. 2006). Hence, the members of O1 decided to pool together their resources -experience and know how- and “look beyond these projects”, financed according to donor objectives (2006). A key fact in this appraisal was the short term support these grants offered to non-profits, seconded by the need to work “within funders’ priorities” (2006). “This means to go into directions considered to be important [ and identified] at the top, and this will be the case even more when we integrate into the European Union - all projects will finance an agenda that is in concordance with what Brussels and the Romanian government define as priorities” (2006).

Considering the prerequisites for the development of a non-profit, N.D. explained that having a portfolio of projects successfully completed was a must as was a short term commitment to quantifiable and realistic goals. “You’ve been on the market for a while, you are a credible organization that wants to do something, and you meet people that want to listen to you” [emphasis added] (2006). This initial image we arrived at, about how to construct and maintain a relationship with donors, was further expanded with the insights brought by O.M., president of O4. “We sent applications to almost all funders in our field. So funders, in general, are traditional funders [working] in distinct fields...and I want to say that the majority of donors know what they give money for” (2006). Therefore, for a non-profit having a project portfolio on hand was a strategic plus because they could always “take out an idea and use it to send an application to a donor in the field” (2006).

In terms of how donors allocated funds, our interviewees pointed to what they perceived as implicit rules for allocation, i.e. time span, geographical focus etc. R.T., project coordinator in O2, pointed out that “there can be funders that only give [grants] once, to one organization” (2006). Ultimately, the sine qua non condition for a non-profit aiming to get funded was to have a track record. O.M. further qualified this statement. She explained that the first impression that donors had of their cooperation with an NGO would always be a long lasting one. In any case, donors, she explained, were bound by strict internal rules for allocating funds. “Big funders have precise rules. They can not finance an organization more than two times. This is both a legitimate and democratic conditioning because all [non-profits should have] a chance” (2006) to access funds.

F.C. talked about her organization’s experience with constructing a relationship with donors. O3’s experience had been to circumscribe its projects to agendas funding organizations they wished to cooperate with may have had. “This may be a weak point of our foundation but we don’t usually go and knock on their door” (2006). Her understanding was that this practice ensured their projects blended
in with their donors’ programs. Such consonance was, she contended, preferable to an attitude she summarized with the phrase: “look, this is who we are and come on, support our activity” (2006).

**Importing Categories to Develop the Organization: The NGO Lingua Franca**

For all these non-profits, their main donors had been large funding organizations such as the Open Society Foundation, USAID, the Charles Stuart Mott Foundation and the E.U. principally through its PHARE program. Except for the PHARE program, communication with donors was in English. A.H. explained that having to communicate in English did not influence how the organization came to be structured. However, she recognized that “models from abroad had to be imported which were more or less adapted over time” (2006). This process of appropriating a pre-cast model was dictated by the state of affairs NGOs had to function in. “What I can say is that all the literature that got here and all the know-how about the sector came from abroad because the culture of non-governmental organizations did not exist” (2006). In any case, given the relative scarcity of available funds, all not-for-profit organizations had to have an English speaker among them. For Romanian NGOs, this became the make or break rule:

“...an organization that doesn't have people who speak English has difficulties in accessing certain resources and know-how...It’s very important that in an organization there is at least one person that knows English because this is the direction of the information flow...” (A.H., 2006).

All the other interviewees concurred with A.H.’s assessment. Fluency in English, the “lingua franca” (R.T. 2006) of the sector was “a perk for accessing resources. So English was a resource for an organization that wants to communicate well, specifically with foreign donors” (O.M., 2006). Furthermore, the above assessments of our participants, in the in-depth interviews, were also backed by the results in the analysis of perceptions NGO staff had on the topic. In terms of building a good relationship with foreign donors, respondents believed that being conversant in the donors’ language was important and/or very important (83%). Ultimately, this fact may have put additional strains on these organizations and their members. If they were of a financial kind, e.g. with training the staff, even though the utility of the expenditure would be well justified, it remains somewhat unclear why the more well resourced organizations would be slow or uninterested in using the local language.

**The Project Proposal and Funding Criteria**

We asked our interviewees to describe how they developed a project proposal. F.C. observed that her organization started from the assumption that donors set up a funding line with a clear understanding of what projects and organizations they wanted to attract. For her organization, this perception became the iron law of project planning. “In fact [you have to understand] what donors want for that money because otherwise you stand no chance” (2006). Designing a project began with identifying donors that had programs in the same field of interest as the respective non-profit, R.T.
explained. “You first of all have to find the idea that you want to develop your project on, and then you try to find the funding organization whose goal is to finance activities in the same field” (R.T., 2006).

Overall, we were put across the picture that the design of a project proposal was a process that started with identifying financing programs donors may have had. Subsequently, an NGO had to “check whether your mission or goals match up with a funding line” (A.H., 2006). A.H. mentioned having heard of practices like “inventing needs that match funding lines” (2006). In as far as any ethical appraisals were put into project planning, A.H. made reference to “a moral decision” to be taken on “how much to swing the balance towards your needs or towards the financing line” (2006). It was, however, unavoidable for NGOs to stand by their practical purpose, before they could consider how to balance their mission with any constraints that were to come with funding.

The same idea came across from the interview with N.D. The exact timing for starting to write a project “depended to a large extent also on the funding opportunities on the market” (2006). N.D. shared her experience with project writing and explained that in her opinion, to start a project from scrap was a daunting task; this, because lacking experience translated into an inability to focus on the major outcomes one planned to attain. “Once you already have the experience and you’ve implemented several projects, ideas come from previous projects” (N.D., 2006). She added that it was, she believed, essential that the members who were on the ground, who had worked on previous projects, were co-opted in this planning stage.

Ultimately, our investigation was concerned with how these NGOs adjusted their projects to funding criteria donors may have had. Together with our participants we tried to come to an understanding of what were the main requirements their projects had to abide by. There was consensus that funds meant internalizing obligations and being responsible for adhering to program guidelines. “Because I take the money, I am compelled in some way to stick to his (sic) expectations...to implement the project he (sic) gave me the money for... to demonstrate and justify my spending” (F.C., 2006). Thus, planning a project incurred careful multi-tasking; putting together a comprehensive project file, motivating an application, defining realistic objectives, assessing the likely impact.

Donors had been adamant about defining measurable goals, our interviewees expounded: “...if you didn’t include enough clear indicators, numerical, you have to go back to that aspect and say how you will measure the impact of the project” (A.H., 2006). This meant that a successful project, regardless of for example, its long-term vision, had to be meticulous in defining short-term, quantifiable targets. Application terms such as this were part of formal requirements foreign funders had. It became apparent from all the interviews that these were never the object of any negotiations between donors and grant receivers. “There either is compatibility between the aims of the organization and those of the donors, or not” (R.T., 2006). In any case, the mission, the “intrinsic values” of an applicant organization should have never been the object of any bartering based on formal funding requirements, R.T. surmised.

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N.D.’s perspective complemented the above statements. She also talked about the careful consideration future grantees had to give to the application criteria. “There is no choice. I think it is very, very important to know before what they [the application requirements] are” (N.D., 2006).

These rigors and subsequent contract clauses were perceived as negative incentives for subsequent changes in the project, due to new developments in the implementation context, further down the line. “If you want to change something, this, in general, generates a lot of discussions and negotiations” (N.D., 2006). N.D. further qualified this observation by noting that one had to differentiate between private and public funders, the latter being generally sensitive about procedures, this making post-application adjustments a daunting task (2006). D.S., referring to EU grants (e.g. PHARE civil society development grants), explained: “They are not necessarily interested in the result of our project. They are interested in the activities actually taking place” (2006). Contrary to that, private donors were seen to be more concerned about outcomes (D.S., 2006).

However, D.S., managing director at O3 observed, when making reference to practices in the sector, that some NGOs were, bluntly, “opportunistic” (2006). Donor priorities designated specific interest areas they would consider applications for, e.g. interethnic relations, provision of social benefits etc. Having this awareness, some NGOs would change their goals, vision etc, to match the respective funding priorities. D.S. saw his organization to be different from this latter type of non-profits. He explained that his organization’s survival was the result of being consistent with its mission. Nevertheless, they were “somewhat lucky because the way our mission is formulated, it is quite...it can include many fields, let’s say” (D.S., 2006). For O3 that meant that it had never been in the unfortunate position of having to downsize its operations or shut down because it could not find funds for its projects.

From two of the testimonies we collected (of A.H. and F.C.), a puzzle ensued about the relationship between, on the one hand, commitment to program guidelines and on the other, putting ideas into practice. The main threat NGOs were generally faced with was to submit a half-baked project and later realize implementation could only be faulty. A flawed project, in a portfolio, could take a toll on future funding. More specifically, a damaged record was a dent in an NGO’s reputation that could take a lot of resources to fix. “If in the past you had an unsuccessful project then the respective donor will not give you any money a second time” (F.C., 2006). A.H. felt somewhat the same about running such a risk but she contended that some donors could be more flexible in their assessment: “sometimes we made mistakes and we told them that and we got funding to do what we had learned was wrong, to fix that...it’s this system of lessons learned which they genuinely work with” (2006). Ultimately, closely following program guidelines was essential both in preparing a project application and during implementation. At none of these stages did these two organizations negotiate any clauses with their donors, based on their mission:
“you don’t negotiate...in general there is an evaluation scheme that donors will publish...you get an answer and a score. You can sometimes submit a contestation...additional clarifications may be asked, generally about elements for the monitoring and evaluation of the project” (2006)

To conclude, NGOs aimed to do their best to stay in line with their donors’ instructions for the grants they offered. If there was any fault in the implementation of a project that had been approved, it could have jeopardized an NGO’s future, i.e. its capacity to secure subsequent funding. Therefore, the best option for the latter was firstly, to guide its activities in line with its practical purpose and ensure its survival and only subsequently to be concerned about staying faithful to its mission and ethical purpose.

The “Market”, Competition and Horizontal Networking

Several of the questions in our interview guide probed into the developments the interviewees perceived the sector had undergone. We were interested to learn how they had created and maintained their horizontal network with partner organizations. Building a strong relationship with donors, over time, was tantamount to having an impeccable track record. A.H. likened NGOs to profit-seeking companies. Funding was regarded as an investment donors made and which was tied to expectations of adequate deliverance. She compared the non-governmental sector to a market. Consequently, she perceived competition for funding between NGOs as being imminent. “One way or another, there is a market everywhere. There is also a market between NGOs, funding is limited and somehow we all compete for it” (A.H., 2006). The market metaphor was used, successively, by several of our interviewees. A.L. also applied this trope to underline what she perceived to be a positive development, akin to a process of natural selection: “on the NGO market should survive only those organizations that do things right. The rest, like on any other market, will perish” (2006). A similar line of reason, a positive outlook on sectoral competition was also endorsed by R.T. He believed that the latter was both “healthy” and hardly a disincentive for partnerships and professionalism. Losing a competition for grants, he contended, was an opportunity for NGOs to assess their performance and “to research the field in which it [an NGO] put forward an application, so that it becomes credible for the next contest” (R.T., 2006).

Competing for the same resources made NGOs aware of one another. F.C. remarked that there was “envy” between not-for-profits (2006). This was the main downside of competition. On the positive side, she saw it as an opportunity to share learning experiences: “We learn from one another...we are happy if another organization receives some funds and has managed to implement a project” (2006). In contrast, N.D. put forward a perspective which didn’t rest on the above

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3 Original quote in Romanian: “și intre ONG-urile este o piata, finantările sunt limitate cumva, ne batem cu totii pentru ele sau ne batem împreuna pentru ele” (A.H., 2006).
dichotomy. Her argument was grounded on a further qualification of the need for partnerships in the sector, also likened to a market. In her regard, organizations were well advised to partner with each other, in order to send a common and credible message on the market. “It is also a source of credibility when there are more organizations behind an initiative” (N.D., 2006). Partnerships were, therefore, perceived to be a solution for toning down any possible arguments among non-profits. “If everyone would do the same thing separately, this is a source of conflict between organizations, and the market would be bamboozled” (N.D., 2006).

A.H. explained that generally, funding organizations tried to encourage cooperation between non-profits. Her organization’s mission, to promote volunteering, made cooperation a fundamental aim while also allowing it to be flexible in choosing partners. Finding a financing program was the initial step in project planning, for all these organizations. What followed was a research process aimed at assessing feasibility, finding beneficiaries and partners to work with. This phase was precursory to submitting the project. “Generally you first look for partners and not after…and many times partners help out in your relationship with the donors and to get a project accepted” (2006). F.C. observed that partnerships were desirable, depending on an NGO’s mission. Some funding organizations required partnerships in the implementation of their projects. If this constraint was absent, NGOs generally tended to work individually. “…we also support one another if in certain circumstances such support is required but it’s more about the fact that everyone is implementing its project” (2006).

Comments

The qualitative data from the in-depth interviews with NGO representatives of civil-society support and development organizations produced evidence backing the working hypothesis for this subchapter. The intent here was to observe the perceptions of the interviewees in regard to their relationships to donors and the influence they exert on horizontal partnerships with other NGOs. The postulation this chapter commenced with was first confirmed and second, further qualified.

The structure of funding was likened to a market, in which a limited number of prominent, well-established organizations were able to build a track record of funded projects. The market was consolidated also because, as one interviewee explained, donors regarded grants as an investment and consequently wanted to ensure that their local partners had the right experience and expertise. This, as argued in the theoretical section of this paper, may have been detrimental to other, less experienced organizations and for that matter, to the overall development of civil society.

To extend our understanding of the latter problematic we considered the role that the drive to establish a financing record played in the development of horizontal networks between nonprofits. Interviewees explained that there was competition between NGOs and at worst even envy. They also expounded that funding organizations tended to encourage cooperation between grant receivers.
However, if this was not a specific requirement for the financing programs, NGOs will have worked individually.

An organization’s mission added a moral dimension to its pragmatic search to secure funding and ensure its survival on the market. In describing how a project proposal was developed, interview participants generally showed that the practical purpose of their organizations was the first to guide their activity. Thus, the first task in planning a project was to identify a funding opportunity and subsequently design the former in accordance with donor requirements. If this was not the case, NGOs would have had to have a stable source of income that would give them the leeway to experiment with ambitious ideas (N.D., 2006). If an organization was in neither of the above two situations, it would have had to run based exclusively on volunteer support (O.M., 2006).

Starting from the early days of the third sector in Romania, NGOs have had to recognize the need to carefully observe donor interests, priorities and formal requirements for applications, to appropriate the categories in the discourse of the latter, on civil society. The latter was imagined as an autonomous zone where individuals and groups associate freely, keep the state in check, address community needs and create partnerships to foster democratic development and economic growth. Nevertheless, the competitive growth of the market, the need to build a portfolio of successfully completed projects while also controlling for loyalty to mission statements were disincentives for horizontal, NGO-to-NGO genuine partnerships. The next subchapter discusses, in more depth, the topic of such partnerships and shows that there was, at the time of this research, general reluctance towards formal requirements for partnering. That meant that NGOs did associate in several ways but, generally, their representatives felt that this outcome was not the result of any top-down pressure. Rather, it was a natural process, inspired by common interests and goals, willingness to assist peers and, more broadly, changes in context-political, social and economic.

One conclusion this chapter arrived at was that partnerships were forestalled by grants for two reasons. Firstly, because of the strong competition for funding which forced organizations to either have broad mission statements or work exclusively with volunteers. If this was the case, then broad missions would have induced a reluctance to cooperate, for fear of overlapping interests, strategies and visions. As one interviewee noted, overcoming this situation would have incurred the further specialization of NGO missions and a consequent complementing of their activities. The process had started and, as another interviewee explained, it was bound to continue as the structure of funding was also changing, i.e. through increased funding from EU structural programs. But this was a process of consolidation that may have had a centripetal effect on the sector. Intermediary organizations, grant-makers and resource centers would have to become a buffer for this process if the NGO sector was to continue expanding quantitatively and to enhance the quality of its output. Secondly, partnerships may have been constructed, albeit in order to abide by application criteria and to
build a strong record. Nevertheless, the short-term focus of grants and the need to offer realistic targets for each project (i.e. quantifiable, to be included in progress and evaluation reports) may have impeded long-term partnerships, the development of the organizational capacities of NGO networks and their vision for consolidating the sector.

Finally, reading into the meanings put forward by the interviewees also gave scope to the articulation of a conclusion on the dynamics between the state and the third sector. In the Romanian context, the relationship between the two was not at all static as previous models designed in other circumstances postulated (see Salamon, 2000). Rather, the third sector appeared to be both critical of the performance of the state and at the same time optimistic about the future cooperation with public authorities. We leave this topic for further exploration elsewhere but one key aspect to note here is that the state has become, with EU accession, an intermediary in the EU grant schemes. To that extent, future research (e.g. on regime theories, the EU governance system) may find a noteworthy puzzle in the new interaction between the state and the non-profits.

III. Building Partnerships in the Third Sector; The Perspective of NGO Staff

In this subchapter we aimed to look at aspects which determine NGOs to associate, and analyze the perceptions of the latter on intra-sectoral cooperation. We started with a focus on donors’ requirements for NGOs to associate in projects and discussed the perceptions of NGO members and staff on this type of collaboration. We were interested in observing the relationship between donors and NGOs and the influence this relationship had on horizontal partnerships among NGOs. To recreate an image of how NGOs developed networks of collaboration we subsequently wanted to know how information, know-how and volunteers circulated from one NGO to another.

We formulated the above objectives based on a research question in which we considered how partnerships emerged and why the operation of NGOs brought only limited horizontal association in the third sector. We systematized this question in a working hypothesis in which we proposed that if partnerships between NGOs occur most frequently as a result of donor requirements- i.e. as a constraint on receiving grants or as a requirement for project implementation-this would lead to a discontinuous cooperation between non-profits. Moreover, competition for funding will have limited, to a certain extent, the specialization of NGOs’ missions with NGOs trying to cover as many topics of interest for donors as they could. A clear and specific mission and objectives could have paved the way to horizontal, genuine partnerships between non-profits which could have strengthened the sector and ensure its long-term development.

Adapting our approach: using mixed methods

We operationalized our hypothesis through a set of variables we included in a questionnaire to be used in structured interviews. We consequently conducted a survey on a non-probabilistic sample of NGO members and staff. We used a
mixed methods approach to design our questionnaire, recruit our participants and analyze the ensuing data.

The adaptive theory approach is a mixed-methods technique for data gathering and analysis (Layder 1998:39). It endorses the use of various research methods in order to increase the amount of knowledge collected (information, data) which could lead to amplifying “the potential for theory generation” (1998:42). Using both quantitative and qualitative data we were able to develop a pool of information about the research group under study; they complemented each other and made possible a more profound examination of the research topic.

We used a sub-type of purposive sampling, “theoretical sampling”, one of the main two data-sampling techniques in quantitative research (Layder 1998:46) to select “…events, people, settings and time periods in relation to the emergent nature of theory and research” (Layder 1998:47). We started from an understanding that in our case empirical data and theory would be cotermious: “the researcher is enjoined to collect and analyze the data simultaneously so that there is immediate feedback from the data collection which in turn suggests various implications for theory-generation.” (Layder 1998:47). In a subsequent phase, based on what she/he has found until that moment, the researcher will gather new information to expand the theoretical ideas.

In line with the adaptive approach, people and events have to be included gradually in the sample “through the combined forces of prior theoretical ideas or models and the collection and analysis of data in relation to them” (Layder 1998:47). Only in this case we can think about a “‘true’ theoretical sampling” (1998:47). In our turn, we arrived at our samples through detailed interviews. Consequently, sample size was not as pressing a concern as it is for probability samples. The expectation hence was that case-selection would provide particularly relevant data for generating new insights into our research topic.

We applied twenty three questionnaires to the members and staff of the organizations from our sample (4 - O5, 5 - O2, 4 - O1, 6 - O3, 4 - O4). The questionnaire was self-administered. We designed the questions based on the interviews taken in the first phase of our research, the Review of Romanian NGO Sector (2001), and the Donors’ Review (2000). The questionnaire had twenty one items. We envisaged enriching our data from the interviews through this questionnaire, to come up with a broader understanding of the relation between NGOs, and between NGOs and donors, to strengthen our grasp of our research problematic. We decided to apply this questionnaire to what we regarded as information-rich respondents, actively involved in the work of their organizations, e.g. in project writing, project management, networking with donors and other NGOs.

In our questionnaire we opted for closed questions and a small sub-set of open-ended questions wherein respondents could complete and refine some of their answers. Such open-ended questions asked them to consider the state of the non-governmental sector, the most frequent forms of cooperation between NGOs, how they regarded NGO members who left an organization, or the factors that determined them to choose working for a certain organization. With their answers...
to these open-ended questions we expanded our interpretation of the answers to the closed questions (Singly et al., 1998:65). Finally, we also collected socio-demographic data about our respondents.

This was a systematic approach that referenced the conclusions of the previous subchapter, checked for the consistency and accuracy of findings therein, and extend the breadth and depth of our investigation (Fischer 2003:154). Our questionnaire was a means to ensure consistency, in spite of this change of scale, also allowing us to develop the range of data we gathered. Ultimately, this was not a statistical test (Van Evera, 1997:29), but we envisaged our approach as an opportunity to compare our theoretical propositions and the views of NGO leaders with the perceptions of the NGOs’ members and staff. We also hoped that by using the categories from the interviews we would compensate for not using the “I don’t know” and “I cannot answer” response options in our questionnaire (Singly et al., 1998:67).

The Perception of NGO staff on Third Sector Partnerships

Cooperation in the NGO Sector

Project partnerships demanded by foreign funders were rare (47% of respondents believed so). Funds stimulating cooperation had been available for joint applications and there were even “bonus points” for applications made together by non-profits (A.H., 2006). However, A.H. did not think she could identify “a pattern” in application submission, i.e. a trend in collective applications. “But I expect that in the future because of the system of European structural funds...serious changes will occur” (A.H., 2006). This finding was in line with previous arguments, in the Review of Romanian NGOs. One likely explanation for this outcome was offered by D.S. (2006). He contended that, “generally, foreign funders design a strategy based on the needs in their home countries” (2006). In a subsequent phase, the latter present their plans to NGO leaders in Bucharest or academics who are at some distance away from the problems of the likely beneficiaries. Therefore, “some funding lines may open for several topics which are not perceived as priorities by NGOs or the beneficiaries” (D.S., 2006).

Contrary to that, partnerships initiated together by NGOs were, respondents claimed, frequent and/or very frequent (74%). Rather than teaming up to become eligible for a funding application, we understood that non-profits would partner to increase their operational capacity (A.H., 2006) or to support the development of the sector (D.S., 2006, N.D., 2006). Overall, partnerships between NGOs were, in our respondents’ assessment, frequent and/or very frequent (83%). Finally, cooperation outside projects was very frequent (for all the questions in the questionnaire, on this topic), i.e. participation at events organized by NGOs, discussions, round-tables, petition-writing etc. This last point had previously been made by O.M. who said that her organization participated in “the big debates that take place in Cluj” (2006). They concerned the sector and more generally, the local community.

Formal structures of cooperation were regarded as a constraint, “viewed negatively because they are thought to comprise autonomy” (Review of Romanian NGO Sector, 2001:33). The authors of this review offered the legacy of former
centralizing totalitarian organizations as an explanation for this phenomenon, they identified through their research. Nevertheless, both in our analysis of the in-depth interviews and later in our network analysis we have found that the NGOs we studied were participating in formal structures of cooperation. Based on such observations, we posit that the intensity of their engagement in such structures fluctuated according to their short-term objectives, their concurrent involvement in other projects, the lack of constant financial support for the development and maintenance of NGO coordination centers, and for encouraging participation in them. This proposition needs further testing, to be undertaken elsewhere. The evidence we built it on also came from D.S.’s (2006) statement that “on the one hand, there is no financial support, on the other there is not enough time” for NGOs to join extended structures of sectoral cooperation.

Cooperation among organizations with a different mission and goals was also rare (69% wrote that such partnerships were rare and or very rare). However, a possible explanation for its occurrence may have resided in D.S.’s argument that, for instance, his organization would team up with other non-profits when they were asked to. This happened even though they were not active in the same area. In any event, he would have favored partnerships with organizations that had a mission and a vision similar to that of O3, and only offer specific advice for other non-profits applying for funding in other interest area. “We even helped them to write the applications” (D.S., 2006).

Cooperation among NGOs with similar missions, goals, objectives, respondents claimed, was frequent and/or very frequent (a total of 82%). To take an example, O3 and O4 were both organizations that were partners in several NGO networks. These were either umbrella organizations, i.e. both these organizations were members of the ‘Civic Local Council’ (Consiliul Civic Local), or ad-hoc project partnerships. The latter differentiation was also discussed by O.M. (2006).

Networks were important also because NGOs that would consider implementing a project outside their immediate geographical area had to necessarily become partners with other non-profits from the particular community they would arrive in (A.H., 2006). Ultimately, A.H. believed that, to take the example of volunteering centers, even though there may have been demand for volunteers, in a distinct context, identifying partners was just as important as addressing this demand (2006). “We can’t take that risk [not to have partners] because I’m accountable to the donor and I have to return their money back if I didn’t do what I promised to” (A.H., 2006). NGOs were thus, first and foremost, aware they had to partner-up for pragmatic reasons, i.e. to complete a project or to address needs greater than their organizations could handle alone.

Knowledge and information sharing and volunteer exchanges were frequent and/or very frequent (82%), respondents showed. The frequency of this type of cooperation was confirmed in the Review of the Romanian NGO Sector (1999:31). The know-how and the experience obtained in project writing and through project implementation circulated from one organization to another, in the non-profit sector.
NGOs seemed to be very willing to help the others with this kind of resources. Experts from one organization would lend their abilities to help other NGOs, when asked to. O.M. outlined this practice, in the case of her organization: “…I can say that from the 11 members of the O4 team, at least three or four work permanently as specialists in other projects carried out by other organizations, too” (O.M., 2006).

**Key Factors in NGO – Donors Collaboration**

In our respondents’ evaluation of NGO-donor collaboration, first, a history of previous projects undertaken by the NGOs was very important, as was the trust that donors put in the NGOs they financed and finally, the mission of the latter. We were presented with a similar perception, throughout all the in-depth interviews, of the need for trust donors had. Trust came from “the consolidation…of the relationship at the institutional level” (R.T., 2006) and the potential in each project for successful implementation. That consequently meant that one may have envisioned the gradual consolidation of the sector, also because of the constant need for trust. Nevertheless, it looked like, in terms of trust, there was only a unidirectional relationship, with our respondents conjecturing that their trust in donors was comparatively less important (39% believed it was not important).

We understood that a strong portfolio and the capacity for innovation in a project were fundamental for the financial survival of a non-profit. Secondly, donor objectives also seemed to be highly important (92%) for cooperation and ultimately NGOs’ securing of funds. Project evaluation-of implementation and impact- both medium and long-term, undertaken by NGOs, was also very important for a positive relationship with donors. Finally, need-based assessments of the circumstances of project beneficiaries were in their turn deemed very important, respondents wrote (86%).

We were somewhat puzzled by the fact that our respondents perceived their trust in funders to be less important in their cooperation with grant-makers. If overall, the lack of trust was detrimental to partnerships, coalitions, and prioritizing (Donor Review, 2000:32), we postulate that trust in funders was an issue on which there was comparatively less emphasis because of a deeply engrained affinity, of the non-profits, for their benefactors. To better grasp this finding we turned to the Romanian Donor Review. The latter has mapped the eschewed history of the NGO sector in Romania. “Donors played an important role in the formation and development of the NGO sector…it is to be expected that their perceptions and visions will have shaped it” (2000:30).

If the above explanation was also an expression of the vertical accountability of NGOs to their funders, in terms of the internalized institutional practices that the former have absorbed since the creation of the sector, we felt we had to probe for the sensitivity non-profits had for the Romanian context. We were not particularly concerned with the effectiveness of their services for their beneficiaries but rather with the relationships built within the sector. We understood both from the questionnaires and the in-depth interviews that working and personal relationships, formal and informal interactions, were quite common. However, an unresolved puzzle was the
perception that donors had that it was a lack of trust within the sector which generally
led to a reduced number of partnerships, some degree of mis-coordination in the sector
and even the spawning of pragmatic and opportunistic non-profits. We attributed such
developments to the competition for funding, to funding priorities donors had, to the
broad focus of NGO missions and the lack of funding alternatives.

A very large proportion of the respondents believed they understood well, or
very well what were: their donors’ priorities (95%); the way their funders operated in
(87%); the factors their funders’ activity was constrained by (78%). An organization like
O1 was founded by experts from within the sector who were aware of these
constraints and also had a vision of how to gradually overcome them. Donors were
reducing the scope of their funding and moving out of the region and were leaving
behind a sector that not only had to struggle for resources (Review of the Romanian
NGO Sector) but perhaps also lacking a clear understanding of how to use the
concepts they had appropriated, to apply them henceforth. Even though the sector was
consolidating, there were bound to be many more twists and turns in its development.

Partnerships with other NGOs were deemed to be important and/or very
important for the cooperation of these NGOs with their donors (69%). We
interpreted this result as a possible incongruence between the representation of
donor induced partnerships (negative perception) and the actual practice of
partnering with other NGOs, to qualify for a grant. NGOs could therefore associate
to fulfill donor requirements, even though they were adverse to this claim.
Furthermore, a knowledge and information transfer from foreign donors to NGOs,
the latter deemed was highly important for their organization. In contrast to that, a
similar transfer from other NGOs was comparatively less important for these
organizations. This in spite of the fact that, our respondents claimed, knowledge
and information sharing was very frequent among NGOs.

Horizontal Partnerships: Cooperation vs. Competition

We also wanted to look, comparatively, at the perceptions the staff of these
NGOs had, on the one side, of their cooperation with other NGOs and, on the other, of
the competition between projects put forward by organizations with similar missions.
We asked them how important a series of factors identified in the literature was, for the
functioning of their organization. 73% of respondents believed their organization’s
relationship with other NGOs was important and/or very important. 70% of them also
conjectured that competition was also important and/or very important. Of our
respondents, 93% saw partnerships as an opportunity for their organization. 74% of
them believed they were not problematic for their organization when they would
engender an unequal rapport between partners. 61% believed that the specifics of each
organization’s activity were important in a partnership and respectively 75% regarded
long-term financial support for cooperation of little importance.

We subsequently asked how important the following factors were, for
partnerships between NGOs: projects previously undertaken together (75% of
respondents deemed them as important and/or very important); the mission of the

93
other organizations (86%). Fewer of them believed personal relationships were important (61% important and/or very important, 39% of little or no importance); 87% believed that donor requirements to partner were important and/or very important; 85% considered that other organizations’ need to enter into partnerships were important and/or very important; 87% thought that important and/or very important was to partner in order to address community problems. Finally, respondents were split about the importance of the reputation of an NGO when considering a partnership (48%-of little or no importance, 52% important and/or very important).

As we could see from these answers, the mission and the specialized activities of an organization were important and very important for considering a future partnership. In general, NGOs kept a good rapport with other organizations, but they preferred to associate in projects with other non-profits from their field of activity. R.T. underlined this fact when discussing relationships in the sector:

“We know, we are involved, we have relationships with the majority of NGOs, but…the primary relationships are with those organizations which have as objective citizens’ information, missions or volunteer involvement in certain specific problems of the community, public integrity, institutional transparency, civic education. These are the institutions, organizations we collaborate with more frequently [i.e. the organizations from the same field as O2]” (2006)

D.S. agreed, in what he said, with R.T. Moreover, he emphasized how important it was for a partnership that the NGOs belong to the same interest area. His organization preferred to cooperate with organizations which were not located in Cluj, but had the same focus as O3 (2006). Partnerships were more likely to register the successful implementation of a project, to be a gainful experience for all the involved non-profits, and for the sector at the same time, when organizations had a well-defined mission. The latter had to draw the boundaries of the specific niche of interests they were concerned with, and their beneficiaries. N.D. pointed out that through “specialization”, “the fear of working together” (2006) would be minimized. She thought that organizations which had a broad mission and common beneficiaries felt insecure when working together on projects. As she explained, “from the outside they could be seen as one organization being more powerful [than the other]” (2006). Finally, when discussing the issue of “specialization and complementarity”, N.D. gave the example of her organization, O1, and O5, two non-profits supporting the development of civil society, both covering a certain field without overlapping their missions, i.e. “financial resources mobilization” and “volunteering”, respectively (2006). In addition, the specialization of an NGO helped attract funds more easily on the long term.

Comments

In this subchapter we discussed different types of cooperation in the third sector, how they emerged, and what factors influenced them. What we have learned about collaboration between NGOs at the donors’ request, as it became apparent from the answers of our respondents, was that it occurred quite rarely, in
comparison to other forms of partnership. NGOs were willing to associate particularly with organizations having similar missions and objectives. Working together with organizations with different mission and objectives was sanctioned if it was outside projects. In the first case, it was important that organizations had a specific mission and a specialized area of activity, in order to complement each other, and in this way to avoid competition or the fear of it. Outside projects NGOs cooperated in different events; they exchanged information, know-how, expertise, they helped each other when they were asked to.

Another important issue was that of trust: donors’ trust in NGOs, NGOs trust in their donors and NGOs trust in each other. We observed that donors’ trust in NGOs was central when evaluating projects for funding. On the contrary, our respondents’ answers showed that their organizations did not consider their trust in donors to be important for vertical partnerships. Within the NGO sector, however, there seemed to be an inherent lack of trust which limited collaboration between organizations.

A strong debate in the sector related to finding alternatives to foreign funding. NGOs were well advised to try to attract funds from private local companies, multi-national companies, Romanian private foundations, and the local and central administration. Finally, NGOs had to learn to adapt to new funding circumstances, and learn to convince these potential donors to get involved in the community, through their projects.

IV. NGO Networks: an Outlook

Generally, civil society is strengthening democracy, but a well-developed civil society is buttressed by a strong institutional backbone formed by NGOs. Building networks between NGOs is not necessarily straightforward, or, in other words, the process has several particularities. First, networks seem to be created mostly by NGOs with similar declared missions or following the same goals. Abelson surmised: “NGO networks vary in the extent to which they have been formalized, representing coalitions of organizations with similar goals” (2003:2). On the other hand, creating cooperation networks between NGOs depends also on donors, firstly because in most of the situations donors have specific funding interests and secondly because there is a limited number of donors on a market. Ultimately, they provide the material support for establishing such networks and some of the strategic and moral constraints the latter are confined by.

One question for which we went back to the literature was “how effective are NGO networks at strengthening the NGO sector?” (Abelson, 2003:2). When creating networks, NGOs become more credible in front of the donors when they apply for grants, and have a better chance of being funded. More than that, such networks help NGOs develop, for example through knowledge sharing. Thus, creating networks “begins with communication” (Abelson, 2003:6). Networks are open structures, able to expand without limits, “integrating new nodes as long as they are able to communicate within the network” (Edelman, 2003:3). Communication
between NGOs from a network facilitates an information exchange which helps the development of every NGO and the tertiary sector, overall.

Networks encourage organizations to share how they develop strategic plans, fostering long-term sustainability. Funding could often draw NGOs to a particular issue but “networks can help organizations become more sustainable through strategic planning” (Abelson, 2003:8). In spite of many perceivable benefits, horizontal partnerships between non-profits may be constrained by many circumstantial factors that influence both particular organizations and the broader environment they function in. If partnerships generally bring together NGOs with similar goals and missions, competition for funding may inhibit their willingness to cooperate. This proposition has been discussed in the preceding subchapters. However, the literature ensuing from the Romanian context has showed that when they are ready to associate, non-profits would do so with a genuine regard for cooperation- identifying needs, beneficiaries and solutions in the communities they work with and alongside other partner organizations- and not simply respond to donor requirements. This subsection briefly develops on these propositions. We used the same sample of NGOs as in the previous subchapters.

The social network perspective encompasses theories, models, and applications that are expressed in terms of relational concepts or processes. It is situated at the intersection of social theory, empirical research and formal mathematics and statistics (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). There are several fundamental principles that give the specificity of this perspective, among which the crucial one refers to the centrality it gives to the idea of the interdependence of actors and their actions, unlike most inferential statistics models that conceive actors as atomized entities. Social Network Analysis (SNA) places the emphasis on actors and the relations between them, as opposed to other perspectives focusing on actors and their individual attributes.

By analyzing relational data and the ties or the interactions between the elements of the structure, we are able to get to data that cannot be reduced to characteristics of the social system, and thus which cannot be highlighted by analyzing an aggregate of the elements that make up the social system. SNA conceptualizes structure as lasting patterns of relations among actors and contributes to the outlining of the characteristics of the social structures and of the elements’ position in these structures (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).

The present study focused on the existing ties between 5 NGOs from Cluj-Napoca; we consequently analyzed several social networks referring to the same group of actors, each corresponding to a different content of the ties (Wasserman, 1994). More specifically, we looked at three types of relations between these NGOs: formal relationships, represented by their past or present collaborations; the possibility of initiating formal relationships in the future (collaborations or partnerships in future projects); informal relationships between the members of an organization with members of the other organizations.
The method of data collection we have chosen was the phone survey. Our questionnaire was made up of three questions, each operationalized for a specific type of network. One member from each of the five NGOs replied to our questionnaire—the first person to answer the phone. We chose this selection method because the questions focused on general problems concerning these organizations, and that was why we expected any member of the organization would have been able to answer these questions (by chance, the individuals who picked up the phone and thus answered the questions were persons occupying leading positions in these organizations).

To sum up, we analyzed three different social networks, referring to the same group of social units, which we identified for the purpose of our study to be civil society support and development NGOs, based in Cluj-Napoca. The first social network we considered was the formal network, and the formal relationships between the NGOs, represented by present or past collaborations or partnerships. The second social network we observed was based on the NGOs declared readiness to collaborate, formally, in future projects, with the others NGOs. The third social network we examined was based on the declared existence of informal relationships between members of one organization with members of any of the other four organizations, the network of informal ties.

**Data Description and Interpretation**

*Have (do) you collaborated (collaborate) with the following non-governmental organizations from Cluj, in projects undertaken by your organization?*

![Figure 1. Past/present collaboration among the five NGOs](image)

As Figure 1 shows we identified ten ties (four bidirectional and six unidirectional relationships) among the five NGOs under study. We were puzzled by the fact that there were more unidirectional relations than there were bidirectional ones. We surmised that very likely due to limits in our design and response imperfections our participants’ accounts about current/past collaborations appeared incongruent. To give one example, we asked our participants to try to recollect the history of partnerships with other organizations but not all of them were familiar
with their organizations’ past engagements since their establishment. Further analysis would have to explain and qualify the reasons for this occurrence.

In order to describe the centrality of the nodes of this graph, we only referred to degree centrality and left aside the measures for closeness and betweenness that would be more appropriate for larger networks. A high in-degree centrality was a measure for the degree to which an organization was recognized by the others as a past or present partner in projects. The out-degree centrality in this case was more closely related to the self perception of an organization as being in partnership with the others. Bidirectional ties indicated the mutual recognition of the partners and could have been an indicator for a greater importance of those partnerships than those which were only signalled by one of the parties involved.

Organizations O3 and O2 had the maximum in-degree centrality (indicator =1), as the existence of a partnership with them was signalled by all the other organizations; they were followed by O5 and O1 (indicator =0.75) that were chosen by 3 other organizations each. The more peculiar case was node O4, which had the lowest in-degree centrality (indicator =0). This organization reported being linked to this local network of NGOs with similar goals, a statement which was not corroborated with those of the other participants. Again, stressing the limitations of the data we were analyzing, we can hypothesise about the relative isolation of this node from the rest of the network, apart from its own perception.

If an application for a funding program would require partnerships with another non-governmental organization from Cluj, which of the following organizations would you collaborate with?

Figure 2. Readiness for future collaboration among the five NGOs

Figure 2 shows that four of the organizations named one partner organization which was also ready to collaborate with them in the future- three bidirectional relationships. However, there were a larger number of cases -five unidirectional relationships- in which the intention of one organization to associate with another from the five was not reciprocal. The network of the five NGOs that formed, using this criterion, measured the readiness to be involved in future projects.
degree centrality was here related very much to the prestige or popularity of the organization, while its out-degree centrality referred to its actual willingness to cooperate in the future. O1, O2 and O5 were the most popular potential partners for future projects (indicator = 0.75). O4 continued to have the lowest in-degree centrality, being the least recognized of all the organizations (indicator = 0.25). However, it did not remain entirely isolated from the rest of the network, as there was one organization that named it as a potential partner.

In terms of their readiness to become associated with other organizations from this set, O4 and O3 had the highest out-degree centrality (indicator = 1), as they were willing to cooperate with all the other institutions. O2 (indicator = 0) and O5 (indicator = 0.25) were the least inclined to form partnerships. The most recognized organizations from this group were the ones less inclined to associate themselves with the others in the future. We surmised, looking at the history of these latter two organisations that their track record with donors, their public visibility and their membership in other project networks and umbrella organisations may have been a reason for this outcome. Contrary to that, O4 seemed to have operated a change in its mission focus and engaged more in partnerships with public authorities (O.M., 2006). However, it was keen on developing future partnerships within the sector. The changing structure of funding may have been a determinant for this course of action (O.M., 2006) Overall, O3 appeared to be the most pro-active organization in our sample, as far as partnerships, both present and future, were concerned.

Do you have an informal relationship (friendship etc) with the members of the following organizations?

\[
\begin{array}{c}
O5 \\
O1 \\
O2 \\
O3 \\
O4
\end{array}
\]

Figure 3. Representation of informal relationships the interviewed representatives stated they had with any of the members from the NGOs quoted in our question

O3 and O4 had the lowest possible out-degree centrality (indicator=0), meaning that they declared that they did not have informal relationships with any of the other organizations. However, they were mentioned by at least one other NGO. The small clique\(^4\) between O1, O2 and O5 that was present in the first graph (referring to past or present collaborations) was also present in the informal relations one. Members of these three organizations mutually acknowledge their participation in projects and the fact that they had informal relations with each other. The clique was, however, missing in the graph that was formed on the basis

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\(^4\) A clique represents the maximum number of actors who have all possible ties present among themselves.
of the organizations’ willingness to cooperate in the future. We postulated that this absence may have been caused by the fact that it was likely that neither informal relationships, nor any past cooperation will have had a fundamental bearing on future partnerships between these organisations. To that extent, returning to the findings in the previous sections, we expected that at least one other factor may have had a significant influence on this outcome-the specifics of future projects. That is, depending on requirements for future projects, these organisations may have decided what organisation to associate with. Ultimately, this brought the donors back into the picture, as well as the idea of weak partnerships and all the drawbacks in the process of market consolidation we have previously discussed.

We must stress again the limitations of the data our analysis was based on: this study could not establish who the actual members in an organization were, with which respondents had stated they had an informal relationship. Also, organizations differed in size and the number of people active within them. Finally, the questions we asked did not prompt respondents to also make reference to past and not only present informal relationships with any of the members of the other organizations.

Comments
With this subchapter we hoped to begin to understand how these five NGOs from Cluj-Napoca were interacting or had interacted. We hoped to produce a tentative map of the relationships between them, and offer a limited set of criteria these relationship were based on. We were also interested to see whether these five NGOs had built any networks between them. Any expectations we may have had regarding partnership networks came from one of our main reasons for having researched this sample of NGOs from Cluj-Napoca; the fact that they all espoused one similar goal- the support and development of the institutionalized civil society.

Our study reviewed theoretical propositions that expounded the idea that the existence of horizontal relationships between NGOs strengthened civil society, and helped every NGO to further its aims. In analyzing the concept of NGO partnerships, we found two important dimensions: partnerships for projects and informal partnerships. Thus, herein, based on this systematization, we hoped to see which one of the two types of partnerships would more likely inform our respondents’ decision to collaborate with NGOs from our sample and others.

The comparison of the densities of the three different networks was interesting in this respect. The network with the highest density\(^3\) was the one referring to the past or present collaborations (10 existing ties out of the 20 that are possible, 0.5). The density of the informal ties network was smaller, only 0.3 (6 existing ties out of the 20 that would be possible). The density of the network referring to their willingness to collaborate in the future lies in between these values, namely 0.45.

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\(^3\) These values are obtained if the three graphs are regarded as non-directed ones, and no difference is made between unidirectional and bidirectional ties. If we are to take into account the fact that they are signed graphs, the values of the densities are all smaller than those indicated here, but their order remains the same.
Ultimately, we were left with the conundrum: in spite of the stories we collected in our interviews, about horizontal partnerships, and which resonated with findings in other studies that had dealt with the development of the Romanian NGO sector, our tentative network analysis somewhat blurred the expectation that genuine partnerships would be more desired if not yet present. Contrary to that, we observed that partnerships appeared to be, first and foremost, instrumental for projects and not a heuristic category for the development of the sector. This inference brought us back to the discussion we referenced earlier about the ideological underpinnings upon which the tertiary sector was grounded on in Romania.

V. Conclusion
This project has allowed the authors to consider and contribute to a broad debate about the Romanian post-communist society and the competing visions that have aimed to develop some of its fundamental institutions. Non-governmental organizations are and will be, in various ways, playing a role in the transformation of the beleaguered relationship between the state and civil society. They are also a relay mechanism for promoting alternative visions for the good society, within the framework of a consensus about the procedures in which this conversation will be conducted- the contemporary democratic regime. This would be a liberal ideal which has been associated with the development of civil society at the end of the last century. In these final paragraphs we briefly return to this ideal and consider other structural factors of which principally funding- that have had a bearing on the NGO sector. The main concern for this paper remained, however, the relationship between non-profits and their sponsors and the influence this may have had on horizontal partnerships in the sector.

Firstly, project portfolios were essential for the financial security of the NGOs in our sample, and this more so as the funding market was being gradually consolidated. Such developments put a great strain on the ethical purpose of these organizations, expressed in their mission, and were ultimately a disincentive to horizontal, genuine, partnerships. This meant that mission statements were generally broad, aiming to cover much of the interests of donor organizations and be in line with their priorities.

The respondents to our questionnaire believed that cooperation based solely on a requirement by donors was not popular among NGOs which preferred to associate with peers who had similar missions and objectives. They would do so, perceivably, drawing on their own assessments and needs rather than just heed to donor requirements. In any case, several nuances should qualify this inference. Firstly, NGOs would generally consider horizontal partnerships opportune when designing a project. Project based partnerships developed to a different extent based on evaluations of institutional capacity and implementation context on the one hand and formal requirements to set up partnerships, i.e. funding constraints. Secondly, even if partnerships were instrumental rather than built on a long-term vision, also for the overall development of the sector, NGOs were likely to choose
their partners based on their own preferences and needs. That meant that even if the reason for establishing partnerships rested with the need to comply with funding criteria and other prerequisites for submitting an application, non-profits had the leeway to decide what specific organization to cooperate with. Indeed, this may be the main explanation why the representatives of the NGOs in our sample believed that their decision what NFPO to work together with was not constrained by their funders. However, their interpretation may have been circumscribed by their appropriation of the categories and liberal discourse of their donors, on the one hand, and the absence of any indication in the application form of what organization to collaborate with. Ultimately, the biggest threat in this line of reasoning may have been the limitation it could bring on partnerships and how widely they would spread within the sector; and consequently the added marginalization this process would bring to less significant actors. This would have been a noticeable limitation for the sector as its existence and functioning were not grounded just on evolutionary market rules but encompassed a wide moral dimension.

NGOs cooperated in different events, participated in debates regarding the sector, exchanged information and know how, supported each other and shared their expertise. They were ready to cooperate with organizations that were involved in specific activities and had well-defined missions. To that extent, partnerships were established between organizations that had common interests and concerns. We observed, however, that organizations tended to have broad mission statements which were discussed elsewhere as a possible encumbrance to cooperation. Furthermore, even if organizations would find the common ground on which to work together, be it their mission, their institutional capacity, or their network with public authorities, or local constituencies, partnerships were created for an upward accountability to funders. Finally, as far as trust was concerned, we learned that, for donors, it was very important to be able to trust NGOs when they considered funding their applications and in the later stages of implementation and evaluation. In contrast to that, the extent to which NGOs were trustful of their sponsors seemed less important for a functional relationship.

This last finding seemed problematic for a constructive relationship based on feedback and learning both non-profits and their sponsors were eager to have and show. To this was also added the lack of trust between organizations, to which our survey respondents alluded. This we contrasted with all that we had thus far learned about establishing partnerships and we conjectured that structural changes in NGO funding coupled with a readiness to assess the general performance of the sector, by means of perhaps setting up a network within the sector, specifically concerned with this issue, could have a positive impact on the future development of the sector. An independent and transparent horizontal network for knowledge and skills transfer which would bank on new structural opportunities associated with E.U. accession may be one development we believe would be of benefit to the entire sector. The state, both at the central, local and intermediary levels could contribute to this outcome.
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MOTHERING AND ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP IN ROMANIA

BORBÁLA KOVÁCS

ABSTRACT. Interrogating generic understandings of civic participation, the present article aims to reveal the ways in which parenting, mothering in particular, affects fresh mothers' engagement in their communities through the constraints and difficulties that arise in the incompatibility of the two activities. Drawing on qualitative data collected in Cluj Napoca, Romania, the inquiry is geared towards contextualising women's accounts regarding their interests as civically active individuals engaged in childrearing, their priorities, as well as the responsibilities and constraints they face in attempting to combine civic participation and parenting duties. In addition, the text offers a modest account of these women's motivations and experiences as civically involved citizens. The novelty of the piece resides both in the conceptual framework it proposes through the reassessment of notions of civic participation and mothering (parenting), as well as the joint exploration of two issues that have been traditionally deemed separate, unrelated in the relevant literature.

Key words: civic participation, mothering, community

I. Introduction

As engagements of individuals, mothering and civic participation appear to have little in common due to the fact that while one is carried out in the private sphere of the family – mothering –, the other takes place in the public sphere of the more widely or narrowly defined political community. Anglo-Saxon scholarly literature focusing on the study of mothering as a social practice has failed to address the relationship between mothering and civic engagement until recently, tacitly maintaining the status quo that separates the private sphere, including mothering, from the public sphere where civic participation has traditionally been located. At the same time, debates around the decline of civic participation have remained vehemently insensitive to gender. On what grounds can we argue that civic engagement and mothering are not disparate social practices, but are thoroughly connected, affecting one another?

Feminist theorists of civic participation have been the first to point out that discussions regarding the decline of citizens' political involvement have been gender-blind (Herd & Harrington Meyer 665). Some have argued that women's care work, including mothering, is a form of civic participation (Herd and Harrington Meyer), while others have asserted that civic engagement has to be defined as a continuum of active citizenship rather than as a checklist of certain types of activities deemed by

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1 I make a fundamental distinction between mothering as a physiological phenomenon entailing conception, pregnancy, birth and post-partum mother-child relationships and mothering as a social practice, historically, culturally and economically embedded in society’s collective consciousness.
government or party ideology to be forms of civic participation (Greene). However, their proposals to revisit the established conceptual framework of civic participation in order to include certain activities of women or turning understandings of civic engagement more fluid are novelties to empirical research. If care work is a form of civic participation, are all mothering women civicly engaged? Given the diversity of women’s mothering, which practices qualify as contributions and which ought to be not considered as forms of engagement? How do everyday practices associated with mothering contribute to the quality of participatory democracy? Assertions of feminist theorists have yet to translate into new approaches, new questions and new concepts in the empirical study of mothering and that of the relationships between mothering and civic participation.

The central focus of this study is the exploration of the ways in which fresh mothers with a civicly active personal history view and experience mothering and its impacts on their volunteering. Personal accounts of difficulties and hardships encountered as fresh parents are of major interest since they best illustrate those factors that hinder these women to remain active and maintain close bonds with other members of their communities, generating what Putnam calls social capital. Their accounts of the mothering experience as a whole are valuable in understanding transformations in women’s interests, priorities and focus and illustrate structural factors that shape mothering in contemporary Romania.

Participatory actions emerge when individuals have resources that they can put to use for the benefit of their communities, when they are motivated enough to do so, when they can be mobilized (i.e. the community has channels through which individuals can be targeted and invited to get involved) and when they are available to do so (Bădescu 183). In less technical terms, individuals become civicly engaged when they have what to offer, when they are motivated to do so and when they can do so. This, however, is a rather murky list of factors that explain civic engagement. What kind of resources are the ones that are conducive to participation? What kind of availability of citizens is likely to lead to engagement? Do individuals void of resources not participate at all? Do people have to be motivated in similar ways to come together for the benefit of their immediate communities? When are citizens not likely to be available? The present study promises to exemplify some of the resources, types of motivation and availability that are conducive to civic engagement understood in traditional terms, especially among women with young children.

I start by reviewing classic scholarly approaches to the study of mothering and civic participation in order to highlight the conceptual inadequacies that inhibit scientific enquiry targeting the connections between these two activities of citizens. In the second part, I focus on feminist amendments to the study of mothering, offering a brief review of two different paradigms in the study of

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2 The distinction between mothering and motherhood bears relevance for the purpose of this article. Arendell, for instance, does not distinguish between the two terms, although Snitow – quoting Adrienne Rich and Rachel DuPlessis writing on motherhood in the late 1970’s – explains that motherhood stands for the patriarchal institution of female parenting as opposed to the more individualistically defined cultural-variant practice of mothering.
mothering, as well as feminist critiques of the social capital debate, followed by theoretical assertions that contribute to a more convenient conceptualization of civic engagement for the purpose of the current study. The third part focuses on women’s accounts regarding different aspects of their mothering that highlight changes in interests, attitudes, roles and activities. In addition, I include women's experiences as volunteers, their motivations and satisfactions, and, most important of all, their willingness and availability to resume voluntary civic activities after birth.

The scope of this study is new in the Romanian social sciences. As a result, the goals of this article are threefold. First of all, I offer a theoretical framework – for the lack of an already existing one - that permits the study of the effects of mothering on civic participation of women, drawing on feminist theory of mothering, as well as critical assertions of feminist theorists of civic participation. Secondly, I examine – relying on six semi-structured interviews with fresh mothers who had engaged in voluntary activities prior to birth – the consequences of mothering on women’s civic participation focusing on changes in women’s interests, priorities, obligations, difficulties and burdens. Thirdly, I make a contribution to the nascent Romanian feminist literature regarding theories of motherhood and the empirical research of the phenomenology of mothering.

II. Mothering: politicizing the private sphere

This section explores two fundamental assumptions of research in the social sciences, namely the separateness of the public and the private spheres, as well as the myth of the cohesive family, which have been guiding enquiries about motherhood and family research in general, and debates about civic participation. I illustrate the emergence of the public-private divide, as well as its implications for women and their social status in order to argue that the study of mothering and civic participation cannot be carried out in the presence of this division.

Due to the fact that birth and mothering are fundamental to the survival of the human species, mothering must be one of the oldest types of work humans, particularly women, have ever engaged in and motherhood must be as old as the first most rudimentary societies (Herd & Harrington Meyer 666, Lorber 159). Throughout time and space, however, mothering practices changed profoundly, as did cultural norms, expectations and appreciation for mothering women, motherhood as status and mothering practices. Moreover, the status of children and the care work children need from their parents, especially mothers, have varied greatly (Lorber 153).

Cultural, economic and social factors have always been crafted into ideologically dominant discourses of children’s worth or women’s mothering and were often times legally codified. The French Revolution and its aftermath produced

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3 I am avoiding the term introduced by Ruddick “maternal practices” for the tasks women perform caring for their children in order to signal the fact that such practices are not universal cross-culturally and over time.

4 See chapter 7, “Rocking the Cradle: Gendered Parenting” in Lorber’s book for a generous account of various, historically diverse, attitudes towards children, as well as their worth to family and society.
one of the most significant changes in ideology affecting (bourgeois and aristocratic) women’s place in society by redefining them primarily as childbearers and mothers, producing new norms and expectations for mothering and reevaluating children’s value. Several factors contributed to this rather abrupt change in ideologies. The first of these were the anatomic discoveries about the human body, reproduction in particular. Lacquer explains that until the mid-1700s, medicine did not distinguish between two biological sexes: women’s reproductive organs were considered to be the mere copy of the male ones, except placed inside the body (qtd. in Shilling 36). The progress of medicine revealed differences in the ways reproductive organs functioned and the understanding of two distinct sexes emerged as a result. This discovery was used to argue that women’s bodies were too weak to perform any activities other than childbearing, and their place was, therefore, in the private sphere of the family. Nineteenth century developments in medicine reinforced other (mis)beliefs about women’s bodies by turning pathological natural processes or by claiming that the intellectual activity of women had the potential to leave them infertile (Jordanova qtd. in Shilling 35-36).

A second factor was the change in attitudes towards individuals in general. The French Revolution brought about the reevaluation of men and women as equal and free citizens, constitutive elements of the ruling body politic, subjects rather than objects of political action. Children became future citizens overnight, a new status in its own right. It was at this time that philosophers and economists pointed to the necessity of women nursing and caring for their own children, future citizens (Lorber 145). Paradoxically, women’s ability to give birth to future citizens and their new role as primary educators of the latter did not elevate them, symbolically or politically, to equal footing with men. However, this transformation of norms and expectations governing mothering shrank women’s opportunities to maintain active roles in public life (Lorber 145).

A third factor was the opposition of bourgeois family institutions (e.g. marriage) to equalitarian principles brought along by Enlightenment. Although men and women were in some circles considered to be equal, having the right, at least ideally, to enjoy full citizenship, economic and political interests of men interfered with such beliefs. In order to maintain men’s control over women’s property and income, marriage had to remain hierarchical, subordinating women to their husbands’ will and interests (Vogel qtd. in Yuval-Davis & Werbner 6-7). Women, as a result, could not become citizens. Nineteenth century bourgeois norms reinforced and as a result strengthened the model of the secluded woman, subordinated to her husband, whose primary role was to give birth to heirs, but also raise “good” citizens. With women repudiated in their boudoirs where their reproductive abilities could not be jeopardized by intellectual and public engagements, the status of men was enhanced by the entitlements women could not enjoy: all the responsibilities of active citizenship located in the public sphere (Yuval-Davis & Werbner 6).
These factors strongly contributed to the establishment of the modern gender
dichotomy encompassing not only individuals, but also most human institutions
individuals are involved in. The separation and hierarchic ranking of the private and
the public that many societies across the world have internalized and deemed
desirable as a social model, originating in the ideas of Enlightenment, has survived
over time and individuals, as well as societies, enact this gap daily. Social research over
the past century has been taking this dichotomy for granted, avoiding the investigation
of much of what takes place within families. Although women can now participate in
politics and public life, as well as most fields of activity to the same extent as men can,
the child-centered model of mothering and the mother-centered model of parenting
seem to have not eroded. Women are still confined to the cradle even if they hold jobs
and support their families, while men remain entrenched in the provider’s role even
when they are not the actual providers.

One of the most common, culturally embedded assumptions about the
family is this notion of the two separate and hardly interdependent public and
private spheres. The most important conceptual implication of this is that
relationships within the family, as well as the family as a unit, are seen as only
indirectly affected by political or economic factors, and vice-versa. This spills over
into empirical enquiries. To illustrate, research of domestic violence or prostitution
in the traditional paradigm will approach these phenomena as individual issues
and find explanations in upbringing, personal deviancy, stress factors,
disadvantaged socio-economic background etc., avoiding the investigation of
macro-social factors, e.g. economic or legal, that can contribute to the maintenance
of such practices within the so-called private sphere, such as the lack of laws
punishing domestic violence (Marx Ferree 866-867).

The second assumption in the research of various dimensions of public life
is the implied solidarity of the family. This entails the notion of a unitary, cohesive
social unit within which interests coincide or complete one another and insinuates
the lack of sources for disagreement between various members of the family. In
addition to the simple empirical fact that such solidarity often lacks within nuclear
families, this assumption turns a blind eye on the different emotional, physical and
even financial investments that men and women within the family have to make:
women parent much more intensely than men do, hence women are much more
frequently dependent financially than men are; women do much more of the
domestic work than men do, hence they tend to be more overworked, experience
higher degrees of stress and have less time for leisure; men tend to carry a greater
financial burden once married etc.5 (Marx Ferree 867)

The gap between the two spheres has been guiding enquiries of civic
participation until the late 1990’s, as well. Although women’s care for their husbands
and especially children translates into the upbringing of able, knowledgeable, active

5 For a more illustrative exemplification of how the mentioned tasks differ for men and women in Romania,
see the result of chapter 2. Of the Barometrul de Gen (Gender Barometer).
and involved citizens, this dimension of citizenship has remained unnoticed (Herd & Harrington Meyer 669). The decline of civic participation in the US has been addressed by scholars whose explanations emerged into three different paradigms of civic engagement, social capitalism, moralism and historic institutionalism, all of which remained silent about women’s care work as a valuable contribution to participatory democracy (Herd & Harrington Meyer 667-669).

Putnam, one of the most vocal social capitalist theorists of civic participation, defined civic participation primarily as official membership in formal organizations coupled with “active and involved membership” (e.g. attendance at organization’s meetings, taking leadership roles within the organization, working for the various committees of the organization etc.). He also referred to the percentage of money spent by people on causes and associations as a good indicator of civic participation (Putnam 49-63). Although this definition should not automatically disqualify women’s work in the community, the focus of Putnam’s empirical analysis, subsequently employed by other researchers, as well, has been on organizations traditionally dominated by men (sports clubs, veterans’ and fraternal associations, professional associations etc.), inherently making women’s engagement invisible by neglecting it. In addition, as Lowndes points out, nowhere were informal and grassroots initiatives of individuals mentioned in the discussions regarding civic participation, least of all those self-help and spontaneous arrangements women with dependent children tend to rely on, especially in working class and/or minority communities (Lowndes 534-535).

Neither moralists, nor historical institutionalists target the work carried out within families and bring into discussion the different ways in which men and women contribute to the welfare of their communities. Although moralists do believe that the family, in its nuclear, heterosexual and monogamous form, is the “cradle of citizenship”, they seem disinterested in discussing the different work men and women within the family do in order to reproduce and enact active citizenship (Herd & Harrington Meyer 668). Traditional gender roles appear to permeate many civic engagement theorists’ visions of the family, deeming the private sphere of the family and its customary daily activities irrelevant to civic participation.

As we have seen in this section, mothering as a practice and the gendered institution of motherhood have been subject to transformations throughout time and space due to a variety of cultural, economic, social and legal factors. Traditionally, research in the social sciences has operated with the assumption of two distinct spheres of human activity, the public and the private overlapping with the masculine-feminine gender dichotomy, neglecting several phenomena of social organization. It has become clear recently that mainstream approaches to the study of family dynamics and mothering on the one hand and the study of political phenomena on the other hand are inadequate to study connections between these two. To illustrate, mainstream scholarly literature of civic participation is oblivious to the domestic work women do and which contributes to the growth of politically active and involved citizens. Moreover, mainstream scholarly literature of the family neglects implications of
domestic work for women, remaining blind to the fact that often times this inhibits the latter to actively become engaged. In the following I propose a more adequate approach to the study of the connections between mothering and civic engagement.

III. Care Work as Civic Engagement

Mainstream theoretical approaches to the study of both mothering and civic participation have proved to be inadequate for the study of the connections between these two engagements of citizens. The aim of this section is to offer an alternative, better-suited theoretical framework for the investigation of mothering and its effects on civic participation by (1) reviewing contributions of feminist scholars to the research of women’s mothering, including major changes in paradigms regarding the research of women’s mothering, (2) highlighting the reasons for which feminist understandings of mothering are suitable in investigating connections between mothering and various actions of individuals as citizens, and (3) including feminist critiques of mainstream understandings and analyses of civic engagement with a focus on the social capital debate as formulated by Putnam.

Central to the contemporary feminist paradigm, dominating among others theoretical and scientific enquiries of mothering in North America, is the concept of gender (Arendell 1193). As Acker points out, gender denotes the “pervasive ordering of human activities, practices, and social structures in terms of differentiations between women and men.” (567) Understanding gender as a principle of social organization rather than as a biologically defined fact shifts our understandings of men and women: instead of biologically different individuals, they are conceived as social beings whose activities, roles and expected behaviors are socially constructed and carry shared meanings, risking socially crafted sanctions. In addition to this, however, our understanding of human institutions, e.g. motherhood, also changes: instead of investigating the biological aspects that pregnancy, birth and post-partum care entail, mothering practices, norms, imagery, distributions of power and the dynamics that result from these become the focus of social scientists’ enquiries.

Theoretical approaches to mothering, as well as the phenomenology of this social practice have been receiving increasing scientific attention over the past forty years, evolving in tandem with the unfolding of feminist theory (Marx Ferree 867-870, Arendell 1193). Snitow identifies the birth of genuine feminist thought on mothering in the period between 1976 and 1979, arguing that “[i]n these years the feminist work of exploring motherhood took off, both about the daily experience … and about motherhood’s most far-reaching implications.” (38) There appears to be a confluence of understandings of mothering in feminist academia providing a minimal definition for mothering as “the social practices of nurturing and caring for dependent children” (Arendell 1192). However, this basic definition tells us little about the meanings, visibility and appreciation residing in these practices from society to society; the changes that mothering as a physical, emotional and social experience brings about in women’s lives; or the way women’s relationships with their environment change as a result of mothering.
Feminist theorists recognized the close ties between gendered power structures within the family and wider systems of gender dominance in the 1980’s, creating a basis for empirical research focusing on women in the labor force, women at their jobs and the impact of social policies (or the lacks of the latter) on women from different socio-economic backgrounds (Sinitow 39-41). Of interest to contemporary feminist scholars have been culturally specific practices, norms, dynamics, behaviors that apply to individuals who mother and which are conducive to the understanding of experiences and implications of motherhood in women’s lives (Arendell 1193).

Two paradigms have emerged in the feminist study of the phenomenology of mothering. Ruddick, professing a universalist approach to mothering, argues that all women caring for young children engage in what she defines as maternal practices: nurture, protection, teaching and training of her child (qtd. in Arendell 1194). Although the forms of these activities tend to be highly circumstantial, varying from person to person, they tend to be universal because infants have a supposedly common set of basic needs. Mothers aim to achieve the same thing and as a result, their everyday practices are to be considered universal. Dill and Glenn, on the other hand, stress the importance of cultural and socio-economic factors in mothering practices, arguing that the emotional and physical connection between mother and child is strongly dependent on these (qtd. in Arendell 1195). These authors argue that everyday mothering practices and strategies that women of different socio-economic standing, color, race, sexual preference perform are strongly shaped by their specific social contexts: the universality of mothers’ bodily experiences and their children’s’ needs are overruled by constraints individual persons experience as a result of their particular status.

The claims of these two paradigms highlight not only the complexities of mothering as a social practice, but explore different dimensions of mothering as a personal experience strongly shaped by circumstances. The particularistic approach to mothering has the virtue of stressing the importance of macro-social factors in shaping not only the experience, but the practice of mothering, as well. Therefore it is this approach that I deem adequate for the study of mothering and its implications for mothers’ civic engagement. It is this perspective of mothering that is sensitive to mothers’ individual circumstances, thus suitable to illustrate the complex ties among diverse resources, motivations, as well as women’s availability that are necessary in getting or remaining civically engaged.

So far, empirical research targeting the effects of mothering on women’s public lives as citizens has been rare. Gender-sensitive analyses of civic participation were lacking until the 1990’s when Putnam, writing about the decline of civic engagement in American society, initiated a heated debate about social capital and, implicitly, civic engagement. It was at this time that feminist scholars contributed to the discussion by signaling the lack of a truly critical understanding of women’s participation in public life, the nature of their involvement and, finally, the exclusion of many forms of women’s activities that – given their capacity to build
social capital as Putnam understands it - ought to be counted as forms of civic engagement (Lowndes 534).

Herd and Harrington-Meyer have brought under scrutiny the very definitions of civic engagement by arguing that care work, defined as “the daily physical and emotional labor of feeding and nurturing citizens” in an active form of civic engagement and has long-term positive implications within society (666). Their first argument is that women’s care and support at home provide men with valuable time, energy and resources to become civically engaged, contributing towards the welfare of their communities. This appears to be true for children, as well (672). Simply put, women’s unpaid care work within the household seems to be a resource for the other members of the family when it comes to civic engagement. Secondly, care work can be viewed – especially in post-industrial western societies – as a form of voluntary and altruistic activity, similar in content with any other such activity citizens perform in their communities (675). This argument, originating in a feminist theory of citizenship, is, however, problematic given western societies’ dominant ideologies regarding parenting: intensive mothering prescribing a child-centered, self-less and emotionally rewarding experience to individual women raising children excludes public dimensions of childrearing in general. The question that arises then is whether one can view women’s intensive mothering as a form of civic engagement when mothers themselves do not legitimate such a conceptualization of what they do?

In addition, some feminist authors have recurrently pointed out the invisibility of women’s engagement in public life by keeping the debate focused on activities dominated by men and excluding informal social capital generating activities of women, especially those of working women raising young children. Lowndes criticizes research carried out in the United Kingdom regarding civic participation for (1) its neglect in analyzing voluntary work and informal sociability, referring only to formal membership in associations as civic participation, (2) its gender-blindness in exploring the nature of men’s and women’s involvement and (3) the overwhelming attention given to traditionally male-dominated activities while avoiding traditionally female activities, e.g. childcare (Lowndes 533-535). At the same time, Greene reports on the negative effects of the strictly defined notion of “active citizenship” grounding social programs aimed towards the social and political involvement of marginalized groups. She argues that strict definitions of active citizenship pose in fact barriers to specific marginalized groups or individuals at risk, such as teenage single mothers (168). What she proposes is an alternative conceptualization of the concept, a “continuum of active citizenship”, raising awareness to teenage lone mothers’ contributions and struggles to become active citizen on a par with mainstream groups of British society (176-178).

Furthermore, recent feminist theorizing has highlighted a spectrum of factors that hinder women’s engagement in public matters of their communities: public (lack of) safety (Caiazzo), self-respect and appreciation (Greene), social capital of the community by social capital, Caiazzo and Putnam understand “connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” quoting Putnam in Bowling Alone.
(Caiazzai & Putnam), lack of recognition (Herd & Harrington Meyer, Greene), increased economic hardships due to mothering (Herd & Harrington Meyer, Putnam), responsibility for domestic chores or paid work (Herd & Harrington Meyer 670-672). Chances that some or all of the above factors will hinder women in remaining or getting civically involved are enhanced by other individual particularities such as class, race, color, ethnic background, education, marital status, sexual preference etc. (Arendell 1195). Paid work out of necessity is likely to negatively affect traditional forms of civic participation and scarcity of economic resources will also hinder women in becoming or remaining civically engaged (Herd & Harrington Meyer 670-671). Fatigue, stress and sickness, arising from overwhelming duties as caregivers affect civic participation negatively, as well, and women are more inclined to experience this than men (Herd & Harrington Meyer 671). Interestingly enough, however, childrearing seems to positively affect participation among parents with school-aged children: Putnam reports that volunteering is particularly high among these adults (Putnam 119).

Romanian authors of civic participation, e.g. Bădescu, have also neglected the gendered nature of civic participation, remaining silent about ways in which gender in Romania influences participation, types of activities men and women are engaged in, trust that men and women garner for a variety of different institutions and their attitudes towards political objects. There is an evident need to fill in this gap by looking into men’s and women’s involvement, their motivations, as well as structural factors that shape civic engagement in this country. The present study is one of the first contributions in mapping out a tiny segment of this phenomenon.

Motherhood is one of the most enduring gendered institutions of contemporary societies, strongly affecting others, e.g. citizenship. Feminist assertions of mothering have proved to be particularly useful in an attempt to find a common ground to study the implications of this activity for fresh mother’s civic engagement. Moreover, feminist critiques of the civic engagement debate, dominated by the social capitalist paradigm, have highlighted important omissions especially as concerns women’s particular contributions to a politically active and civically involved citizenry. Important for the purpose of this study is that women’s care, both of spouse and children, is considered to be a form of civic participation along with mainstream definitions of civic engagement. It is to be noted that women may have engaged in both alternatively or concomitantly. In addition, the existence of paid labor, education, ethnic background and marital status will be given priority when analyzing mothers’ accounts of their childrearing experiences and mapping out the complexity of factors inhibiting them to remain actively involved in voluntary activities.

IV. Mothering among civically active women in Cluj Napoca

Both Lowndes, in her critical overview of the social capitalist debate as an explanation to the decline of civic participation in the United Kingdom, and Arendell, reviewing the feminist scholarly literature of the 1980’s about mothering and motherhood, signal the necessity for more case studies and “personal
histories” for two ends relevant here: (1) to better understand ways in which individuals and groups use social and civic networks in politics and the extent to which these networks are vehicles for participation; (2) to better map out the intricacies of mothering and its diverse impacts, as well as give voices to women engaging in care work (Lowndes 536, Arendell 1202).

As Herd and Harrington Meyer so candidly point out, there are only 24 hours in a day and care work, especially upon the arrival of a newborn, can require much of it (670). Research in the United States has shown that two of the lead factors inhibiting women from participating is lack of time and shrinkage of disposable income as a result of unpaid care work (Herd & Harrington Meyer 670-671). Another factor that these authors mention is fatigue and stress that are direct results of laboring domestically (672). The focus of this study is not only the identification of factors that hinder women in their wishes to participate. Rather, I want to expose how these different factors shaping women’s particular situations shape their priorities, interests, necessities and availability. I argue that the fewer options women have in shaping their own activities, priorities and interests, the less they will be available to become civically involved after the arrival of their child.

1. Who are the women?

When defining the profile of my interviewees, I chose volunteering as a measure for their civic participation instead of official membership in formal organizations for two reasons. Firstly, because Putnam defines civic participation as “active and involved membership” in formal organizations and associations rather than official membership which, as he points out, often involves no human interaction and production of social capital (58). Secondly, Putnam explains how voluntary actions predict philanthropy and other altruistic dispositions. Individuals interested in politics and voluntary action are more likely to associate with other citizens to attain a communal goal (35). Volunteering has the virtue, then, of being a good measure of civic engagement. A second criterion of selection was that their children had to be not older than four. The reason for this is that by this age, children will attend kindergarten and women will have resumed their pre-leave positions as Romanian legislation stipulated that women can stay home on leave, with their position reserved for them by their employers, for two years maximum.

I carried out semi-structured interviews with six women in Cluj between April and August. I had personally known three of them prior to my research; one of the women was recommended to me by a member of Pro Democracy Association, Cluj branch; the fifth interviewee answered my posting on Parinticicujeni.ro, a forum for parents in Cluj and the sixth mother was recommended by the previous one. Of the six, two were the mothers of children above the age of three and the other four had babies whose ages ranged between six and twelve months. They all hold bachelor’s degrees, although three of the six earned their degrees after giving birth and therefore were not entitled to the government aid that women in the labor market receive upon entering motherhood. These three young women had never held jobs and
therefore completely lacked financial independence. Despite this, all of them enjoy relative well-being due to the support of their immediate families and/or husbands. With the exception of one woman, all of them have one child and their experiences revealed in the interviews reflect the unprecedented nature of this experience, role and status, as well.

Four of the women regularly volunteered for non-governmental organizations whose focus was on children of all ages, including high school students. Activities ranged from socialization and play to counseling and sex education. Another woman is a board member of a high profile non-governmental organization in Romania while the sixth interviewee mobilized local resources for the proposition of a law targeting child welfare in Romania. This distribution reinforces Lowndes’ observations regarding the gendered nature of civic engagement: women tend to invest energy and time in social-orientated activities (534).

2. Personal implications of motherhood

The particularistic perspective of mothering, theorized by Dilli and Glenn, highlights the crucial importance of the complexity of factors encountered daily as regards women’s mothering practices, the way they decide to structure their lives around their care work, the strategies they adopt to cope and the way they relate to a variety of social objects in their environments. These factors are diverse and differ from woman to woman. One’s own financial situation, that of the family, (lack of) help with childcare and domestic work, housing arrangements, marital status, intellectual resources, social connectedness etc. are micro level factors affecting women’s mothering. Macro level factors include the accessibility of the health care system, the existence and scope of medical services, availability of maternal leave, its duration, payment schemes for mothers on leave, policy incentives for childbirth etc. as well as more elusive elements, such as dominant ideologies of mothering, gender norms, relative power relations within couples, share of unpaid care work etc. Our attention here focalizes upon the specific ways in which all of these intermingle and create a complex situation in which women find themselves compelled to reevaluate their availability to become civically involved.

a. The physicality of mothering

The physical implications of mothering seem to completely elude the collective consciousness, especially the degree to which women’s new experiences regarding their bodies, moods, tasks, the newborn etc. affect much of how they feel about everything else. In the interviews, I aimed to explore women’s attitudes and feelings towards their own bodies in change. Responses varied from abhorrence to enjoyment. One mother said:

The thing with putting on weight ... I did expect to put on weight, but I also expected I would lose it. And that was indeed pretty shocking, you know, that every month fatter, another two kilos, and then another two. ... So that – I could predict. But it was rather shocking. ... To me this fat thing is the most bothersome, the fact that I am fat.
A similar experience was revealed by one of the student mothers, who was rather disconcerted regarding her own figure.

I don’t like myself now, my body at the moment. Before [pregnancy] I used to be content ... I never thought I had a chubby belly or big bottoms. I thought of myself as good looking and liked myself.

Others experienced their bodies with much greater emotional comfort. One mother in particular reported the emotional rewards of pregnancy originating in the promise of growing and staying plumper as a result of childbirth.

Negative experiences regarding changes in weight, aspect and looks affect women’s moods and their relationships with themselves. Some of them reported they felt guilty for not disciplining themselves better in working out a training plan, but at the same time felt constrained to spend the time and money for their gym membership on their child. It is clear that women’s bodily experiences resulting from pregnancy put women in a complex moral dilemma, enhanced by the lack of other resources (often financial): they feel fat or uncomfortable in their bodies, know they would have to take action, but lack time, energy, money to do so. They feel guilty not recovering from pregnancy and childbirth, but they also feel guilty about the idea of spending time and money on a gym membership or other ways of getting into shape. As one woman said:

I would love to do something about it, but I cannot find the time, my own resources to do it.

This discontentedness was augmented by what some women encounter immediately after birth and what is clinically called post-partum depression. Of six women asked, three reported they thought or knew they had suffered from post-partum depression, although not one of them had been diagnosed. Although this condition is thought to be a hormonal disturbance, women made accounts of panic attacks, feelings of loneliness and desertion, a sense that the whole burden of mothering rests on their shoulders solely etc. They seemed to have conceptualized it in very personal terms: their own singular experience of post-partum depression rather than a condition that other women suffer from, including themselves.

I also had this post-partum depression and other stress problems because I gave birth with a c-section and I had never conceived this before birth. I had never prepared myself for it. ... I also did not manage to actually nurse, although I would have wanted, naturally, I would have wanted to. At the beginning I had a very hard time ... It was a traumatic experience for me.

This personal construction of the condition seems to be caused by the intensity of the experience: it is a completely new encounter to most women and it manifests itself in feelings of worthlessness, emotional vulnerability, complete lack of motivation and drive for routine activities, often times feelings of inadequacy towards the care of the newborn etc. It is not surprising then that these women’s inclinations to resume their voluntary work they had invested dedication and energy in prior to childbirth completely lack. It is evident that the emotional experiences that women encounter as a result of pregnancy and childbirth - I am not referring to the emotional work that women invest in the care and training of
their children – are in themselves a unique and often hindering experience to any sort of activity women would “normally” engage in.

In addition to feelings of discontentedness, inadequacy and sometimes guilt, another factor that seems to contribute to women’s unavailability is exhaustion. An explanation is necessary here: interviewees all mothered in accordance with norms of intensive mothering: they felt it was their duty to care for their babies selflessly, permanently and – as much as they could physically cope with – individually, even at the cost of their physical, emotional, professional well-being. What seems to be at work among all of these women is a clear pattern of culturally induced norms, expectations and the very definitions of motherhood. Most of these women expressed their absolute wish to be the sole caretakers of their newborns, especially the women who had been married for several years, were approaching thirty and had planned their first babies thoroughly. One of them was even considering giving up her well paying job as a software developer and become a schoolteacher instead to adjust her schedule to that of her child when he was old enough to go to kindergarten. With the exception of one interviewee, none of the women had a strong desire to pursue career goals for their own individual satisfactions.

Due to the salience of this model of motherhood, most women were complaining of being constantly tired, physically and mentally drained. One of women explained:

I had never thought I would have to give up my sleep, vital, because I am the kind of person who, if does not get enough sleep, cannot do anything. And this was the thing I had the hardest time giving up. … At least the morning sleep. The child wakes up at 7 and, boom, you have to get up and start working around the house. … Anyway, the [lack] of morning sleep kills me.

Another woman explained how exhaustion contributes to the breakdown of interpersonal relations as well, leading not only to awkward situations, but also to the weakening of social ties within the community.

Neither of my kids slept at night for the first year and three months. So there were around three years not slept. I would start telling a joke to one of my friends, I’d get to the middle of what I was to say and I would forget the punch line. And I’d make myself look completely stupid. … I have to be ten times more careful than before because my brain doesn’t work as it used to.

The two women with older children I asked said that exhaustion was an issue as long as one nursed, up to the age of one. Afterwards, women could resume their usual rest at night. However, among women with young children, fatigue can prolong post-partum depression and contributes to the alteration of daily dynamics, as well as women’s habits. Readjusting one’s schedule, i.e. “going back to normal” can often be a challenge to women who – although getting their sleep – do remain primarily responsible for the welfare of their babies.

Other individual factors can also contribute to an overall sense of despair, inadequacy or simply frustration on a daily basis in the first periods of mothering: inability to nurse; complete lack of experience with childcare combined with the lack of initial assistance and poor coping strategies; lack of the partner’s involvement and
solitude; being confined to the home and/or being less mobile; restricted access in the public space or “segregated” children’s parks etc. All of these contribute to the discomfort of the environment in the wealth of situations in which women find themselves in as fresh mothers.

b. Financial dependence and its implications

As mentioned earlier, three of the six interviewees were undergraduate university students in their final year when giving birth. An important implication of this fact was that they were not entitled to enjoy the financial benefits that fresh graduates and earning women do7. Their particular situations are relevant for this study in three ways: (1) they reveal the complexities of a particular situation of financial dependency and its implications; and (2) highlight the flaws of Romanian legislation in the fields of parent support in childcare.

As mentioned earlier, all of the women interviewed live comfortable lives and neither of them has been forced to work in order to ensure the livelihood of the family. All women are married and the student mothers were actively supported by their parents or in-laws (financially, in care work or both). In spite of this, money and financial arrangements seemed to not be an issue for one mother only and another found herself comfortable in her complete dependency upon her husband and parents. These two interviewees were also the ones who either remained engaged in spite of their pregnancy and childbirth or expressed a variety of possibilities for engagement they envisaged as soon as their child was old enough to socialize.

Financial arrangements in which women are dependent on others seem to be predicaments not only to women’s availability to become civically engaged, but they also seem to put pressure and compel them to change priorities against their will. One of the student mothers explained that her contribution to the household and the care of the child was in fact her regular allowance from her mother.

Because I did not have my own financial situation, I was dependent on [my husband], my mother. … I had to beg. … I feel insecure about myself for the simple reason that I cannot buy [my son] anything. Powdered milk: “Hi, mom, we’ve run out of powdered milk. Could you please send us some money for powdered milk? … Be financially prepared [for the child]. … The woman should have her own income.

As a result of a financial arrangement in which she does not contribute anything, she is the one whose job is to care for the baby at all times. This, however, often leaves her dissatisfied and tired, but also feeling dependent, somewhat humiliated and guilty for being unable to provide for her family as well. As a result, her priorities have changed in ways she did not wish them to: although she would like to get involved in voluntary activities, she feels compelled and indebted to her family to look for a job instead.

7 Current Romania legislation stipulates that at the birth of a child, one of the parents has the right to go on maximum 2 years of parental leave and monthly receive a fixed allowance of 800 RON provided he or she has legally worked 12 months prior to the birth of the child. Recent university graduates who fall under the unemployment scheme also enjoy these benefits. The text of the Government ordinance can be found at http://www.mnnssf.ro/website/ro/legi/pensi/OUG148.jsp in Romanian. Accessed 3rd October 2007.
The other student mother, living together with her in-laws and with a husband with no income, illustrated similar concerns. However, in her case, the proximity of senior family members appeared to have been a positive contribution to her return into the realm of voluntary work. In spite of the relative independence this young mother enjoyed due to the involvement of her family members in the care of her child, her priorities overrode her interests and she too found herself in the position to look for full time employment.

The two senior mothers interviewed revealed radically different circumstances. Living in independent households, bearing responsibility for a variety of different expenses, including a large household in case of one woman in particular, and having a job, the issues and dilemmas these women faced in regard to their respective financial situations was different from that of dependent student mothers. With three children to raise, one of the interviewees had no choice but to return to work as soon as she could.

I have been working since he was one month old. I am lucky with an employer who is understanding. … Otherwise you cannot afford to have three children and not know how you’ll raise them afterwards.

In spite of this flexibility, she hired a nanny to stay with her youngest as soon as she stopped nursing. In her situation, she was compelled to stay active at her job because of the size of her family. The other interviewee preferred to return to work after only nine months of leave for personal reasons, but her choice was enhanced by the fact that she could earn an extra salary in addition to her maternal allowance from the state.

Another important aspect of women’s financial situation is the way their environment relates to it: women seem to be expected to cope with it, figure it out for themselves.

It is my personal problem, really, because it doesn’t bother [my husband] to support me and the family. So when I feel it bothers me, it is my own personal problem. … It bothers me [that I am not earning money] especially because I have always been more independent.

This shows once more how invisible issues associated with women’s mothering, especially when this entails a disproportionate amount of care work in the detriment of paid labor, are in the public consciousness.

Women’s individual stories cast light upon the inadequacies of the parental support policy in place in Romania currently, as well. Student mothers’ experiences highlight two drawbacks: (1) the discriminatory nature of the policy; and (2) the structural impediments it creates for young mothers, fresh university graduates. To address the first assertion, it is to be noted that the way Romanian legislation regarding parental allowance and leave is formulated clearly excludes women engaged in higher education training from enjoying parental rights on no grounds. Young women’s student status seems to be a channel to the infringement of their rights and entitlements as citizens. As far as structural impediments are
concerned, student mothers – even if they do graduate shortly after their child’s birth – remain excluded from financial benefits other recent graduates are entitled to. In addition, they spend longer or shorter periods of time mothering, staying away from employment. Although for working women maternal leave is registered as a period worked, contributing to the number of years actively spent in the labor market, women who had their children before engaging in formal employment are not entitled to this form of social benefits, either. To sum up, the current Romanian policy on parental leave and financial support overtly creates a structural disadvantage to women who have never had the chance to stay in the labor market for twelve months before the birth of their first child.

c. Play or work: the ideology of motherhood

Women – especially women with children – tend to conceive of free time (or play time, dedicated to one’ entertainment and leisure) as the time away from home and the child.

Going to university, going for a coffee with colleagues … This is my free time. Without the kid. My free time if outside the home. At this point, leisure time for me means leaving the kid behind. Definitely.

Paradoxically enough, though, only one of the interviewees would depict mothering as work and wished the Romanian social system enacted a way to pay women for their care work.

I think we pay enough taxes to be able to put aside money for this [professional motherhood] and we spend so much money on rubbish anyway … I think the fact that women stay home and … raise healthy children for society seems to be a much better investment. Later they will work, pay taxes and the children will do the same things …

Most frequently, women’s understanding of work is that of paid labor, something that creates a good that can have a price on the market. With the rise of the ideology of the “priceless child” in the late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries in developed western societies, the emotional work of mothering women disappeared from public consciousness, leaving women and men confused about where parenting really fits in (Lorber 149-153). Interviewees’ reactions to the conceptualizing of motherhood as work reflected this confusion, as well as its contradictory nature:

Practically, work means a profit to someone. It is a different kind of work, a work which is void of profit and that is 24-7. It is work, if you define it that way … I would rather say it is motherhood. It is work too, but it is motherhood to a much greater extent. … So it is hard to call it work.

Although the above reflection points at the inadequacy of mainstream social ideology regarding motherhood in defining its status vis-à-vis other activities, it also illustrates the fact that much more is involved in mothering than work. In fact, the confusion around this status and role may be caused by the artificial dichotomy it builds between play and work. “Much more is involved [in mothering], activity that cannot easily be dichotomized into play or work. Helping another to develop, the
gradual relinquishing of control, the experiencing of the human limits of one’s actions - all these are important features of women’s activity as mothers.” (Hartsock qtd. in Lorber 159). Where does motherhood fit in then? It is not work, but it is, and it is exciting and fun, but often it is not.

As mentioned earlier, most interviewees said that motherhood should not be considered on a par with paid labor. However, the state should encourage and support parents in having and raising children.

No ... It should not be considered work. Like a job? No! Society should encourage mothers to take care of their own children for their own reasons and initiative. Not to be paid to take care of them. ... It is not like you are raising someone else’s child and someone gives you money as an allowance to do that.

It is clear that women’s opinions regarding the locus of motherhood in a wider social order are fuelled by understandings of their own roles as mothers to their children. Naturally, they cannot conceive of their mothering, which entails unprecedented emotional input of maternal love, supposed to be natural and unconditional, as work, often done without passion or as a trade off for a more comfortable life. However, women have revealed that caring for a young child excludes many (most) forms of out of the home socialization and that free time is virtually inexistent unless there are other individuals, usually women, who act as mothers’ replacements. Mothering is a 24-hour job and it appears that there are no breaks from it.

d. Mothers’ civic engagement

One of the central interests of this study is to illustrate women’s availability to get involved civically after the arrival of their children, as well, irrespective of whether their engagement reflects their status as mothers or not. Although the interviewed women’s focus, priorities and to a certain extent interests did change as a result of childbirth and the inherent changes in schedule, free time, availability of resources, these women expressed great interest in getting involved in the future. However, they believed they could actively participate in certain circumstances that, provided the particular situations of some of them, seemed unlikely to materialize.

Hard to tell. If I had someone to stay with him for a couple of hours a day and my involvement would not require a presence longer than a couple of hours, I would definitely do it.

However, for a young mother completely dependent financially on her immediate family, who in turn expect her to be the caretaker of her child or find a job, the prospect of a nanny to replace her while away for unpaid business seems highly unlikely. Student mothering and its implications I discussed in section b appears to affect women’s availability for later civic engagement in other ways as well:

I have only ever worked as a volunteer ... I will get involved on a voluntary basis to help others who have helped me in the past ... I don’t think we will volunteer for other organizations because we simply don’t have the time to do it. ... I am talking of mutual help and being thankful here.
The significant input of time, energy and resources into voluntary actions before the arrival of the child, as well as the drawbacks of a financially unassisted early motherhood definitely changed this young mother’s priorities regarding her individual resources: it is much more important to her to find a paid position than remain the dedicated volunteer she so much enjoyed as a student. One interesting aspect that the experience of this woman reveals, however, is that she is dedicated in capitalizing her experience she gained as a volunteer. In this sense, her unavailability to volunteer can also be seen as a sign of maturation: moving away from an experimental phase into a more professional phase that can even bring her income.

Some of the women interviewed spent time doing what they had done before childbirth even in the presence of their newborn. One of the student mothers, whose husband was the president of a rapidly growing student organization, actually talked about how she took on smaller tasks she could perform on the computer, evading from her child for short periods of time when the baby was asleep. She said that as the child grew older, she could accompany her husband in a wider diversity of activities along with the child.

Another interviewee’s experience also revealed the fact that comebacks to voluntary engagement despite the presence of a young child are possible. She spoke at length about the intellectual and personal rewards that her serving on the board of a prestigious non-governmental organization offered. Because her knowledge and expertise were so highly valued and she could put them to use for a wide variety of beneficial activities, she found herself highly compelled to spend time and energy on tasks she was offered. In addition, what seemed to appeal to her was the networking and collaboration with other highly skilled, successful and intelligent individuals.

Apart from the two student mothers whose financial situations were the most disadvantageous, all women appeared to be keen on returning to voluntary activities or enhancing their involvement as their child grew. This finding resonates with findings from the United States that Herd and Harrington Meyer presented in their study, namely that financial burdens that compel women to work out of obligation negatively impact participation. In addition, women who have the option or the resources to pass on some of the care work childrearing entails to others are much more inclined to get involved that those – in this case the same two student mothers – who don’t have the choice to do so.

V. Conclusions

Data collected for the present study aimed to map out various dimensions of women’s mothering in Cluj whose personal histories were intertwined with different forms of civic engagement prior to childbirth. The intention of this study was to illustrate – in as much detail as was available – the complexity of factors that play a role in shaping women’s actual ability to become civically engaged once the burden of care work for children is present. The enquiry was founded on several assumptions, the first of which was that middle class Romanian women’s mothering
portrays quite well the theoretical model of intensive mothering. Interviewees’ accounts of their own mothering enforced this assumption. A second one, building on the first concerning intensive mothering, was that intensive mothering consumes not only women’s physical and emotional resources, but interferes with women’s opinions, interests, priorities and availability for non-family related activities. Although changes in priorities and to a certain extent changes did occur after childbirth and the early stages of childrearing, women remained interested to taking up voluntary activities, again. A third assumption was that women’s involvement – especially after childbirth – would be highly dependent on a different factors, such as financial dependency and disposable income, a disproportionately high amount of domestic work, energy and health. The bulk of data analysis provided in the present study in fact explored how these different determinants shape women’s availability to actively exercise their membership in the body politic.

Women’s stories revealed that motherhood is – first of all – tremendous emotional work in itself, doubled by the novelty of emotional and physical ties with the baby that consolidate after birth. Often, women are unable to cope and suffer from depression and exhaustion, which in turn feed into a variety of different feelings most of which tend to wear out women even more. This understudied dimension of motherhood appears to play a crucial role in how women’s priorities and interests change over time. Financial dependency, created by a mixture of individual, as well as structural factors, is another determinant of women’s availability for active citizenship after birth. The more financially dependent women are, the less liberty they have in shaping their opportunities and priorities. Women who do not earn or are not entitled to parental allowances are forced to take on the role of the home-maker, at least temporarily and when the opportunity arises to get out of the domestic realm, it is often into the labor market, leaving hardly any time for a diversity of other activities. A third factor seems to be ideological: the normative model of mothering, at least among middle class nuclear families, is that of intensive mothering: child-centered, demanding and neglectful towards the independence and well-being of the mother. All of the interviewed mothers, to a greater or lesser extent, saw this as the sole acceptable mode of childrearing in spite of the fact that often times they found themselves struggling, even traumatized by certain elements of it.

The relationships between mothering and active citizenship in the form of voluntary engagement in activities aimed at the welfare of the community are far-reaching and complex. In fact, I found that given the many similarities between the women interviewed for the purpose of the present study, findings reveal aspects that may be valid for only a limited number of Romanian citizens. It is likely that fresh mothers’ participation in rural Romania is crucially different from that of these well-educated, urban mothers or that experiences of women from more disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds will reveal a more complex connection between scarcity of resources and civic engagement. This study surely brings to light just a fraction of the links that exist between mothering as a culturally specific individual activity as notions of participatory democracy.
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