AMBIENTUM BIOETHICA BIOLOGIA CHEMIA DIGITALIA DRAMATICA EDUCATIO ARTIS GYMNAST. ENGINEERING EPHEMERIDES EUROPAEA GEOGRAPHIA GEOLOGIA HISTORIA HISTORIA ARTIUM INFORMATICA IURISPRUDENTIA MATHEMATICA MUSICA NEGOTIA OECONOMICA PHILOLOGIA PHILOSOPHIA PHYSICA POLITICA PSYCHOLOGIA-PAEDAGOGIA SOCIOLOGIA THEOLOGIA CATHOLICA THEOLOGIA CATHOLICA LATIN THEOLOGIA GR.-CATH. VARAD THEOLOGIA ORTHODOXA THEOLOGIA REF. TRANSYLVAN
The STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI issue article summary
The summary of the selected article appears at the bottom of the page. In order to get back to the contents of the issue this article belongs to you have to access the link from the title. In order to see all the articles of the archive which have as author/co-author one of the authors mentioned below, you have to access the link from the author's name.
Authors: MARCEL CREMENE, DUMITRU DUMITRESCU.
Update strategies are essential for the outcome of evolutionary games. Different problems often require different update strategies of approach. When individuals interact they choose update strategies according to the situations they face or their past encounters. In the following paper we discuss three different update strategies involved in the outcome of the Social Honesty game: Best, Fermi and Myopic. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of combining different update strategies on the punishment probability in the Social Honesty game. Our results may help to explain how the presence of hybrid update strategies influences the individual punishment-based mechanisms.
Keywords and phrases: social honesty, hybrid update strategies, punishment probability, game theory.
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. 35Q91, 91A80.
