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    STUDIA PHILOSOPHIA - Ediţia nr.2 din 2020  
         
  Articol:   THE CONTENT OF COMPLEX VISUAL HALLUCINATIONS.

Autori:  ANDREI IONUŢ MĂRĂŞOIU. 		 
       
         
  Rezumat:  
DOI: 10.24193/subbphil.2020.2.05

Published Online: 2020-08-10
Published Print: 2020-08-10
pp. 85-94

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ABSTRACT.
According to a widespread view about the content of conscious experience (Peacocke, 1992; Siegel, 2007), an experience has content when it is accurate relative to a possible scenario. Suppose you saw a ripe tomato. Your visual experience would have content if what you saw looked exactly like a ripe tomato, be it a genuine tomato or an expertly designed wax copy of a tomato. I argue that this view cannot account for the content of a hallucination whose content is impossible. A 95-year old patient seems to see small pumpkins and flowers coming out of her body (Rocha et al., 2012). Intuitively, the patient''''s hallucination has content. But the accuracy-conditions view has to classify the experience as devoid of content, because what the patient hallucinated is impossible – accurate to no possible scenario. On the concept of flower we possess, it is incoherent for flowers to erupt from under one''''s skin. This visual hallucination is a counterexample to the view that an experience is endowed with content only relative to its accuracy conditions.

Keywords: conscious visual experience; hallucination; content; accuracy conditions; Charles Bonnet Syndrome. 		 
         
     
         
         
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