AMBIENTUM BIOETHICA BIOLOGIA CHEMIA DIGITALIA DRAMATICA EDUCATIO ARTIS GYMNAST. ENGINEERING EPHEMERIDES EUROPAEA GEOGRAPHIA GEOLOGIA HISTORIA HISTORIA ARTIUM INFORMATICA IURISPRUDENTIA MATHEMATICA MUSICA NEGOTIA OECONOMICA PHILOLOGIA PHILOSOPHIA PHYSICA POLITICA PSYCHOLOGIA-PAEDAGOGIA SOCIOLOGIA THEOLOGIA CATHOLICA THEOLOGIA CATHOLICA LATIN THEOLOGIA GR.-CATH. VARAD THEOLOGIA ORTHODOXA THEOLOGIA REF. TRANSYLVAN
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Autori: ADRIAN LUDUȘAN.
DOI: 10.24193/subbphil.2020.2.03
Published Online: 2020-08-10
Published Print: 2020-08-10
pp. 51-66
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ABSTRACT.
The paper is thematically divided into two parts. In the first part, we will address the arguments raised against the anti-intellectualist thesis that ability is a necessary condition for knowledge-how, present Katherine Hawley’s proposed generic solution based on counterfactual success in order to overcome these arguments, followed by an analysis of Bengson & Moffett’s counterargument to Hawley’s counterfactual success thesis [CST]. We will conclude that Bengson & Moffett’s counterargument misses its target, so that, as far as we are concerned, Katherine Hawley’s proposal, namely CST, is safe. In the second part of the paper, we will provide a statistical interpretation of one of Hawley’s more specific proposals, counterfactual success with occasional failure [CSTF], and assess a couple of philosophically challenging consequences that follow from such an interpretation.
Keywords: know-how, ability, counterfactual success, intellectualism, anti-intellectualism, null hypothesis significance testing, effect size.
